



WORKING PAPER

RUSSIA–JAPAN COOPERATION IN EURASIA

43 / 2018

RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL

MOSCOW 2018

Russian International Affairs Council

Editorial Board

Editor-in-Chief:

I.S. Ivanov, RAS Corresponding Member, Dr. of History

Authors:

V.V. Nelidov; K. Kobayashi

Copy editors:

I.N. Timofeev, Ph.D. in Political Science; **T.A. Makhmutov**, Ph.D. in Political Science;
K.A. Kuzmina; A.N. Larionova

Nelidov, V.V.; Kobayashi, K.

Russia–Japan Cooperation in Eurasia: Working Paper 43/2018 / [V.V. Nelidov, K. Kobayashi] ; [I.S. Ivanov, Editor-in-Chief] ; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). – Moscow: NPMP RIAC, 2018. – 32 pages. – Authors and editors are listed on the reverse of the title page.

ISBN 978-5-6040388-7-1

The working paper presents a detailed discussion of Russia and Japan's approaches to multilateral cooperation in Eurasia, and includes an analysis of the possibility of Japan's involvement in the Eurasian initiatives. In the conclusion a list of practical proposals to facilitate Russian-Japanese cooperation in Eurasia is presented. The paper is based on the analysis of official plans and documents, speeches and statements of key decision-makers, as well as publications prepared by prominent intellectual platforms of Russia and Japan.

Russian International Affairs Council thanks Prof. Dmitry Streltsov and Prof. Oleg Paramonov for their contributions to the working paper.

The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the RIAC.

The full text of the working paper is available on RIAC's website. You can download it or leave a comment via this direct link – russiancouncil.ru/en/paper43

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	4
Eurasian Integration from the Russian Perspective	7
Eurasian Integration from the Japanese Perspective	13
Eurasian Security Cooperation, Japan and the SCO	14
Eurasian Economic Cooperation, Japan and the EAEU	17
Prospects for Regional Synergy: Goals and Practical Steps	20
Internal and External Challenges and Opportunities	24
Conclusions and Recommendations	27
About the Authors	29

Introduction

Since the 2000s, the Eurasian and Asian Pacific regions have increasingly come to embrace a multitude of regional institutional initiatives, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the upcoming Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite the fact that Russia plays a leading role in two of these organizations (i.e., EAEU and SCO), much part of analysis on Russian-Japanese relations to date has almost exclusively focused on the bilateral aspect and has neglected the possibility of multilateral engagement, namely, the prospect for Japan's involvement in Eurasian regional initiatives.

The idea of promoting Japan's regional involvement in Eurasia was devised in the late 1990s with the concept of *Yurasia Gaikou* (Eurasian Diplomacy) put forth in July 1997 by Ryutaro Hashimoto, Prime Minister at the time, who strongly advocated for a “Pacific approach” to Eurasia which envisioned embedding Russian-Japanese relations into wider regional institutional and multilateral arrangements.¹ As Hashimoto emphasized, Japan's deeper engagement with Eurasian regional initiatives could make a significant contribution to the development of the Eurasian-Pacific community stretching from Eastern Europe (Russia, Belarus, etc.) to the Pacific (Korea, Japan, etc.), possibly coordinating with other major players such as China and India.

This initiative, however, did not result in any concrete result because Tokyo's post-1945 foreign policy has historically exhibited a weak regional orientation. As Sergey Chugrov argues, “The Japanese have never felt the need to classify their country as a part of Asia; for centuries, they were convinced that they could ‘ignore’ Asia.”² In the imperial era, Japan's westernizers actively advocated *Datsua Myouu* – a political slogan that Japan should “exit” from the “uncivilized” space of underdeveloped Asian nations and “enter” the club of “civilized” European states. During the World War II, Japan reversed this course and sought a more active regional foreign policy, leading to the declaration of *Daitoua Kyoueiken* (Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere). This regional doctrine claimed that Japan bore a special responsibility to protect its fellow Asian nations from “white imperialists” and promote an equitable regional order based on the principles of racial equality and mutual respect. With Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allied Forces and the subsequent American occupation, Tokyo's post-war foreign policy since 1945 has hence naturally suppressed its claim to regional leadership, resulting in a heavily bilateral foreign policy orientation which has to date emphasized the asymmetrical patron-client relationship embedded in the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty.

¹ Performances Taken Pace during the Roundtable Conference of Members of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives // Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet's official website, July 24, 1997.
URL: <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hasimotosouri/speech/1997/0725soridouyu.html> (in Japanese)

² The Image of Russia in Japan and the Image of Japan in Russia: Working Paper 33/2017 / [S.V. Chugrov]; [I.S. Ivanov, Editor-in-Chief]; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Moscow: NPMP RIAC, 2017. 64 p.

In this vein, the concept of “Eurasia” remains largely alien to Japanese elites and society, but Tokyo also generally lacks any kind of regional foreign policy. While Japanese policymakers often talk about strengthening Japan’s engagement in the Asian Pacific region, what they often mean is to strengthen bilateral relations between Japan and the United States or develop a bilateral network of Japan-friendly neighbors. Perhaps the most salient case in this regard is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, which was originally sought as an instrument to strengthen economic ties with the United States. While Japanese elites and the wider public certainly do not see themselves as a part of the Eurasian region at the moment, many Japanese simply do not see themselves belonging to any region, including Asia.³

Meanwhile, multilateral cooperation in Eurasia emerged as a key priority in contemporary Russian foreign policy, although the concept of “Eurasian integration” itself is relatively new. It was only in 1994 when the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev became the first high-ranked politician to use the term.⁴ However, for Russia, the idea of unifying the vast, multicultural space of Eurasia is anything but new, as centuries of expansion of the Russian state to the east and to the south helped to establish linguistic, cultural, economic, and social ties that were further strengthened in the Imperial and Soviet periods. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the turmoil of the 1990s, a substantial degree of these ties remained, creating a foundation for integration efforts.

Moreover, the concept of Russia as a “Eurasian” power is a recurring theme in Russian 20th century thought, especially as far as “Eurasianism”, an original intellectual movement originating from the Russian émigré community of the 1920s, is concerned. In denying the exclusively European or Western nature of Russian culture and civilization, the “Eurasianists” traced the origins of their thought to the Slavophiles of the 19th century – a movement that emphasized the distinctiveness of the Russian (and, even more widely, Orthodox Christian) civilization as opposed to Western Europe. In the post-Soviet period, the idea of Eurasia as not merely a geographic area, but a specific cultural, civilizational and, eventually, political entity was revived once again, as Alexander Dugin formulated the concept of neo-Eurasianism as a geopolitical project.⁵ While the influence of the Eurasian and neo-Eurasian thoughts on the concept of Eurasian integration remains contested, it is clear that the idea of connection, rather than separation, in the wider Eurasian space resonates deeply with popular sentiments and political thought of present-day Russia.

While the origins and foundations of Russia’s interest in Eurasia as a key concept for framing its foreign policy are deeply rooted in the intellectual tradition of the

³ Watanabe, Y. The Perception of Asia by the Japanese // Bulletin, Cultural Research Institute, Aoyama Gakuin Women’s Junior College No. 14, December 25, 2006. URL: <https://ci.nii.ac.jp/els/contents110006245937.pdf?id=ART0008267162> (in Japanese). P. 37.

⁴ Nazarbayev, N. Eurasian Union: Ideas, Practice, Prospects. Moscow, 1997. URL: <http://personal.akorda.kz/images/file/63719964b326ba366059337703ffb4ac.pdf> (in Russian). P. 41

⁵ Dugin, A. Foundations of Geopolitics. Moscow, 1998. 608 p. (in Russian); Dugin, A. Eurasian Way as a National Idea. Moscow, 2002. 144 p. (in Russian)

nation and the extensive human-level ties that survived the end of the Soviet Union, recent events and trends in the international arena – from the economic and political rise of Asia in the early 21st century to the deterioration of Russia's relations with the West since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis – also facilitate the reorientation of its foreign policy priorities. The EU's share in Russia's trade has shrank from 52 per cent to 42.2 per cent from 2005 to 2017, while that of APEC countries almost doubled from 16.2 per cent to 30.5 per cent.⁶ According to the President of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) Lee Jae-Young, with Russia's pivot to the East, "Russia is striving to expand the horizons of cooperation throughout the continent" while being guided by its new found regional ambitions and the idea of a "Euro-Pacific power."⁷ Moreover, according to the Russian President Vladimir Putin, "Russia sees the development of its Far Eastern region as a national priority for the 21st century."⁸ In light of this, the former Russian Ambassador to Japan Alexander Panov remarked in 2013 that "Only the recovery of the Far Eastern regions of the Russian Federation combined with consistent and targeted diplomatic activity in the Asian Pacific region will create opportunities for Russia to solidify its position as a widely recognized great Pacific power."⁹

Despite these developments, Russian-Japanese cooperation in Eurasian regional initiatives remains minimal. This paper argues that this unfortunate trend in part reflects the inertial *modus operandi* of Russian-Japanese diplomacy, in which Moscow prefers to manage Russian-Japanese relations on the bilateral basis while Tokyo generally lacks practical knowledge on Japan's entry-points for initiating collaboration with the Eurasian regional initiatives. This primacy of bilateralism has heavily influenced the overall orientation of academic research on Russian-Japanese relations in both countries. While there are research centers focusing on "Eurasian" regional developments (most notably Hokkaido University's Slavic-Eurasian Research Center and Tohoku University's Center for Northeast Asian Studies), research projects on Japan's potential engagement with Eurasian regional initiatives have been extremely rare, both on the Russian and Japanese sides.

⁶ Russian Federation's External Trade with Main Countries and Groups of Countries for January–December 2017 // Federal Customs Service of Russia's official website. URL: http://customs.ru/index2.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=26531:-2017-&catid=51:2011-01-24-16-27-51&Itemid=1977 (in Russian)

⁷ Lee Jae-Young. The New Northern Policy and Korean-Russian Cooperation // Valdai Paper No. 76, October 2017. URL: <http://valdaiclub.com/files/16143>. P. 10

⁸ Putin, V. Russia's Role in Securing Asia's Prosperity // Bloomberg, November 8, 2017. URL: <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-08/vladimir-putin-russia-s-role-in-securing-asia-s-prosperity>

⁹ Panov, A. Integration of Russia into the Asia-Pacific Region (2013–2020 Outlook) // RIAC, April 2, 2013. URL: <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/integration-of-russia-into-the-asia-pacific-region-2013-2020>

Eurasian Integration from the Russian Perspective

In the first two decades of the 21st century, Russian strategy on Eurasian integration can be described as maintaining cooperation within a variety of partially overlapping integration formats, while realistically evaluating the goals, possibilities, and prospects of each of them. While there is a Western speculation that these attempts are driven by nostalgia for and a desire to restore the Soviet Union in one form or another,¹⁰ the reality seems to be quite different. None of the formats existing in Eurasia to which Russia is a participant (even the Union State of Russia and Belarus, unlike what one could deduce from the name of this structure) actually aims to become or move in the direction of forming a single national entity.

The first integration structure to appear in the post-Soviet Eurasian space was **the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)**, an international organization established in December 1991 by the same Belavezha Accords that dissolved the USSR.¹¹ It includes all former Soviet republics, except for the three Baltic states whose independence was declared in 1990 and was recognized by the USSR in September 1991, and Georgia, which officially withdrew from the organization in 2009, with Turkmenistan and Ukraine being associate states (Ukraine practically ceased participating in the organization).

Despite the presence of as many as 84 bodies established to facilitate cooperation within the CIS,¹² as well as a number of ambitious documents signed by the member states, such as the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Treaty on the Establishment of the Economic Union, both adopted in 1993,¹³ the organization has failed to meet the high expectations initially placed on it. Many of the agreements signed by the member states remained anything but declarations of intent, and the lack of political will made it largely impossible to go beyond that.¹⁴

The weakness of the CIS as an integration structure is evidenced by the fact that, among the 11 heads of member and associate states, only seven attended the 25-year anniversary summit in Bishkek in September 2016. Still, the seemingly low effectiveness of the organization does not mean that it is a complete failure.

¹⁰ The Other EU. Why Russia Backs the European Union // *The Economist*, August 23, 2014.
URL: <https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21613319-why-russia-backs-eurasian-union-other-eu>

¹¹ The End of the Soviet Union. Text of Accords by Former Soviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth // *The New York Times*, Archives, 1991. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/23/world/end-soviet-union-text-accords-former-soviet-republics-setting-up-commonwealth.html>

¹² For information about the structure of bodies of the Commonwealth of Independent States, see: Key Documents of the Commonwealth // Executive Committee of the CIS's official website.
URL: <http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=11216> (in Russian)

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Ivanova, E. Eurasian Integrations: Way from the CIS to the EAEU // *Rossiyskiy vneshneekonomicheskiy vestnik*, No. 6, 2015 (in Russian). P. 115

Its goal has been, it is often argued, not integration, but “peaceful divorce” among the post-Soviet states. As this goal has been more or less achieved, and movement towards economic integration in the region is being pursued within the framework of other formats, most notably, the EAEU, the CIS is moving away from the ambition of playing the role of a vehicle of integration and becoming more of a discussion forum. This is expressed in the changes in the structure of the CIS agreed by the member states at the 2016 Bishkek summit, which generally aim to reduce the bureaucratic structure of the organization and curb the functions that are already being performed by more advanced and more successful structures of Eurasian integration.¹⁵

While the CIS failed to produce significant results in the field of integration, interaction between two of its members, Russia and Belarus, within the framework of **the Union State of Russia and Belarus**, often referred to as the Union State, has been more fruitful. Still, despite what its name suggests, the Union State is neither a state, nor does it currently aim to become one. The Union State remains mainly an instrument of promoting bilateral relations between Russia and Belarus, and its significance from the point of view of multilateral Eurasian integration remains low. Another body of multilateral cooperation originated from the CIS arrangement is **the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)**. The treaty provides for collective defense in the event of external aggression (Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty) and consultations in the event of “menace to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or several Member States or menace to international peace and safety of the Member States” (Article 2).¹⁶

While the results of the above-mentioned multilateral cooperation formats have been modest at best, it is **the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)** that is currently the most successful and advanced of all integration formats in the post-Soviet space. The organization is comprised of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. The treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union was signed in May 2014 and became effective on 1 January 2015.¹⁷ The EAEU replaced the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC or EurAsEC) established in October 2000 and the Customs Union which had been created in 2007. The organization provides for free movement of goods, services, capital, and working force, and its member states act as a single entity in the domain of international trade.

The significance of the EAEU for its member states’ relations with third countries was demonstrated by the establishment of a free trade area (FTA) agreement with Vietnam, signed in May 2015 and effective since October 2016.¹⁸ The agreement,

¹⁵ An Instrument of Divorce: Why the CIS cannot be an Integration Platform // Sputnik, September 19, 2016.
URL: <https://ru.sputnik.kg/analytics/20160919/1029281543.html> (in Russian)

¹⁶ Collective Security Treaty // Collective Security Treaty Organization’s official website, May 15, 1992.
URL: http://www.odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=1897

¹⁷ The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union is Effective // Eurasian Economic Commission’s official website, January 1, 2015. URL: <http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/01-01-2015-1.aspx>

¹⁸ Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Vietnam to Enter into Force on October 5 // Eurasian Economic Commission’s official website, August 19, 2016.
URL: <http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/19-08-2016.aspx>

the text of which counts more than 1300 pages, envisaged an immediate cancellation of customs duties on 60 per cent of commodity items traded between the two sides; after the transition period of 10 years, customs duties on nearly 90 per cent of commodity items will be annulled. At the time of signing, it was expected that the conclusion of the agreement would help to double the amount of trade between the EAEU and Vietnam, bringing it to the level of \$8–10 billion, even though certain tariff and non-tariff barriers are expected to remain in place.¹⁹ Since the agreement became effective in October 2016, the amount of trade between the EAEU and Vietnam grew by 28 per cent by April 2017, with export from the EAEU increased by 22.4 per cent and import by 41 per cent.²⁰

Moreover, the FTA with Vietnam seems to be only the first step in promoting EAEU's cooperation with third countries. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as of early 2017, approximately 50 nations have expressed their interest in cooperation with the EAEU. Among them, Egypt, Iran, and Mongolia, have considered applying for an official membership.²¹ In November 2017, then the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Igor Shuvalov claimed that the EAEU was close to signing an FTA agreement with China,²² and talks with Iran and Singapore were also nearing completion. The official added that the EAEU might start FTA talks with “several dozen countries”.²³ Furthermore, in early 2018 it was revealed that talks on an FTA agreement between the EAEU and India would start within the same year,²⁴ and Russia's Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev mentioned that FTA talks with Egypt, Iran, and Serbia were also taking place.²⁵

Among Western experts, however, there is a widespread view that Russia's goal in establishing the EAEU was to become the dominant power in the grouping,²⁶ with some decrying it as “merely a fiction serving Russia's geopolitical ends.”²⁷ Nevertheless, other scholars and politicians, both supportive²⁸ and critical²⁹ of the EAEU project, note that, far from giving Russia an advantage over other member

¹⁹ Tsvetov, A. Six Questions about the EAEU – Vietnam FTA // RIAC, June 29, 2015. URL: http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/shest-voprosov-o-zst-eaes-vietnam/?sphrase_id=69752 (in Russian)

²⁰ Vietnam – EAEU: First Results // Regnum, June 30, 2017. URL: <https://regnum.ru/news/2294862.html> (in Russian)

²¹ Sergei Lavrov: Approximately 50 countries Want to Cooperate with the EAEU // Soyuznoe Veche, January 25, 2017. URL: <https://souzveche.ru/articles/politics/35309/> (in Russian)

²² Shuvalov: EAEU is Close to Signing an FTA Agreement with China // Mir24, November 17, 2017. URL: <https://mir24.tv/news/16278014/shuvalov-eaes-blizok-k-podpisaniyu-soglasheniya-o-zst-s-kitaem> (in Russian)

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Talks between India and EAEU on an FTA Will Start in 2018, the Trade Representative Stated // RIA, February 7, 2018. URL: <https://ria.ru/economy/20180207/1514123471.html> (in Russian)

²⁵ Medvedev: EAEU is to Continue FTA Talks with India and Israel // Gazeta.ru, February 2, 2018. URL: https://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2018/02/02/n_11122507.shtml (in Russian)

²⁶ Duchatel, M. et al. Eurasian Integration: Caught between Russia and China // European Council on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2016. URL: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/essay_eurasian

²⁷ Dragneva R., Wolczuk, K. The Eurasian Economic Union. Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power // Chatham House Research Paper, May 2017. URL: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2017-05-02-eurasian-economic-union-dragneva-wolczuk.pdf> P. 3

²⁸ Ramani S. Interview: Tigran Sargsyan on the Eurasian Economic Union // The Diplomat, October 18, 2017. URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/interview-tigran-sargsyan-on-the-eurasian-economic-union/>

²⁹ Libman A. Eurasian Economic Union: Between Perception and Reality // New Eastern Europe, January 9, 2018. URL: <http://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/01/09/8767/>

states, the EAEU seems to have the opposite effect, often forcing Russia to make concessions to keep the organization developing.

Moreover, the EAEU is not without internal problems of its own, even if it is substantially more successful and visible than other integration structures in the post-Soviet space. The situation wherein the EAEU member states regularly fail to fulfill their obligations has become ubiquitous. At the same time, the powers of the central executive body of the organization, the Eurasian Economic Commission, are quite limited and, among other things, do not permit it to go beyond the discussion of tariffs in its talks with external partners, which significantly limits its ability to establish bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Finally, the lack of political will of member states to sacrifice more of their independent decision-making powers for the sake of integration may be a critical challenge. While Russia's year-long presidency in the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in 2018 may be able to bring a new impulse to the development of the EAEU, even the long-term survival of the format as a relevant integration structure is not fully guaranteed.³⁰

The above-mentioned formats of multilateral cooperation in Eurasia focus on the post-Soviet space and have essentially developed from the ties that existed between their member states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, another noticeable organization, namely the **Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)**, has a much wider geographical coverage. The SCO has its roots in the Shanghai Five grouping, established in 1996 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan for the purpose of promoting confidence-building measures and solving the border management issues. Eventually, its scope of interest expanded and came to include issues of economic, cultural, and political cooperation, with a special focus on security, especially in combating the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

The SCO was established under its present name in June 2001 by six states – the original Shanghai Five members plus Uzbekistan. In June 2017, the organization was expanded with India and Pakistan joining its ranks. The expansion of the SCO, that now includes nations which have substantial unresolved disputes among themselves (first of all, India and Pakistan, but also India and China), as well as the broad area of its stated activities, ranging from political and security ties to cultural and economic cooperation, naturally lead to questions regarding the relevance and future prospects of the organization. This is especially so since Russia and China are increasingly focusing on their own multilateral cooperation projects, namely the EAEU and the BRI respectively. All of this makes both Russian and foreign experts agree that the SCO, despite the fact that it comprises 60 per cent of Eurasia's landmass and approximately a half of the global population, will play, at best, a supplementary role within the larger system of multilateral cooperation, being rather a platform for talks than an actual integration structure.³¹

³⁰ Bordachev T. What is Wrong with Eurasian Integration and How to Fix It // Valdai Discussion Club, November 14, 2017. URL: http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/something-went-wrong/?sphrase_id=38928 (in Russian)

³¹ The Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: How It Is Seen in Moscow, New-Delhi, and Beijing // Moscow Carnegie Center, June 15, 2017. URL: <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/71257> (in Russian)

The role of the China's **Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)** also cannot be omitted from the analysis of Russia's Eurasian integration strategy. Of particular interest to Russia is the Silk Road Economic Belt part of the project, going from China, through Central Asia, West Asia, and the Middle East towards Europe. The unprecedented scale and character (not a "traditional" integration grouping but rather an ambitious program of economic cooperation and infrastructural development) of the initiative initially caused mixed and sometimes cautious reaction among the Russian expert community.³²

Nevertheless, Russia is officially welcoming the BRI. As early as in 2015, Russia and China signed a joint statement on the "alignment" of the EAEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt initiatives.³³ The efforts to link the two initiatives are already bringing concrete results. In October 2017, the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have announced provisional conclusion of talks on the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, which was finally signed in May 2018.³⁴ In November 2017, the EAEU and the PRC delegations have agreed upon a draft of the agreement on goods and transport vehicles moved through the customs borders of the EAEU and the PRC.³⁵ Moreover, the Eurasian Economic Commission is examining the possibility of China co-sponsoring more than 40 projects in the fields of transport and infrastructure.³⁶

Russia's strategy for multilateral cooperation in Eurasia essentially focuses on the EAEU, while maintaining presence in other formats as well. However, the idea of a more comprehensive vision of cooperation, named **Greater Eurasian Partnership**, has recently become the guiding vision of the nation's views on the goals of multilateral cooperation in Eurasia. Proposed by President Putin in June 2016,³⁷ it is not an integration structure by itself but rather an "integration contour" that is supposed to include the EAEU countries, as well as other nations with which Russia has built close ties, such as China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and

³² See, e.g.: Vorobyev, V. New Silk Course // Russia in Global Affairs No 3, 2014. URL: <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Novyi-shelkovyi-kurs-16776> (in Russian); Zotin, A. One belt, many dead-ends. What Does China Need the New Silk Road for? // Moscow Carnegie Center, May 24, 2017. URL: <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/70057> (in Russian); How China is Taking Over Central Asia from Russia // Vedomosti, October 25, 2015. URL: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2015/10/26/614254-kitai-aziyu-rossii> (in Russian). For a review of Russian language scholarship on the OBOR issue, see: Luzyanin S. Consumption, Binding, or Conflict? SCO, the Silk Road Chinese Project, and EAEU: Variants of Interaction in Eurasia. Part I // RAS Institute of Far Eastern Studies. URL: http://www.ifes-ras.ru/images/stories/2017/project_rbr_2016-2018_luzyanin-1.pdf (in Russian)

³³ Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the Cooperation in Linking the Construction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt // President of Russia's official website, May 8, 2015. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/4971> (in Russian)

³⁴ Agreement Signed on Trade and Economic Cooperation between EAEU and PRS // Eurasian Economic Commission's official website, May 17, 2018. URL: <http://eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/17-05-2018-5.aspx>

³⁵ EAEU and China Harmonized Draft Agreement on the Customs Data Exchange // Eurasian Economic Commission's official website, November 15, 2017. URL: <http://eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/15-11-2017-1.aspx> (in Russian)

³⁶ Petrovsky, V. Russia – China. Prospects of Cooperation within the Framework of the Eurasian Economic Commission // Valdai Club, February 6, 2018. URL: <http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/rossiya-kitay-eei/> (in Russian)

³⁷ Plenary Session of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum // President of Russia's official website, June 17, 2016. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178> (in Russian)

that incorporates “a network of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements with different depth, speed, and level of interaction”.³⁸ It is partnership between Russia and other EAEU countries, on the one hand, and China, on the other, that is expected to become a key axis of the Greater Eurasian Partnership.

Soon after the idea was announced, China stated its support for the initiative and expressed hope that it could encompass nations of the EAEU, the SCO, as well as ASEAN.³⁹ At the same time the project is open for European nations as well. While the precise nature of the proposed initiative remains rather vague, reminiscent of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (now in TTP11 format called Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPTPP) and the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the scope of the envisioned partnership hints at the ambitious nature of the proposal aimed at establishing a whole new standard of international cooperation and economic order in Eurasia.

In sum, Russia’s stance on multilateral cooperation in Eurasia cannot be reduced to a single initiative and, despite the suspicions that it is driven by the wish to restore the Soviet-era sphere of influence, has neither achieved nor even tried to pursue this goal. The most substantial results to date have been reached within the EAEU, and it is this format that seems, from Russia’s point of view, to be most promising for establishing concrete cooperation with third countries, including Japan. The SCO, while unlikely to become an economic integration structure or a political-military alliance by itself, can still be of interest to the Japanese side due to its wide geographic coverage and the wide array of issues that can be brought up within it. Other above-mentioned international formats existing in the post-Soviet space, such as the CIS, CSTO, and the Union State, are almost exclusively geared towards the specific problems of their member states, and thus can hardly pose any but academic interest for the Japanese side. At the same time, the Greater Eurasian Partnership can be seen as an umbrella concept for cooperation in Eurasia, and existing or future multilateral initiatives proposed by Japan, including the Japan-Central Asia Forum and the revived TPP (TTP11/CPTPP) can be incorporated within it as well.

Russia-led initiatives have largely been confined to the nations of continental Eurasia and, particularly, to the post-Soviet space. With Japan’s foreign policy firmly based on its cooperation with the United States, the prospects of Japan becoming a full-fledged member to any of these integration groupings has never been seriously considered by Russian foreign policy and expert circles. Still, given the key role of the EAEU in Russia’s regional strategy, the possibility of economic cooperation between the EAEU and Japan deserves a closer scrutiny,⁴⁰ even though, as of now, there have been no concrete results.

³⁸ Plenary Session of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum // President of Russia’s official website, June 17, 2016. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178> (in Russian)

³⁹ China Welcomes Russia’s Wish to establish Greater Eurasian Partnership // RIA, August 3, 2016. URL: <https://ria.ru/east/20160803/1473546327.html> (in Russian)

⁴⁰ Putin: The Creation of a EAEU-Japan Free Trade Zone Will be Discussed // Regnum, December 16, 2016. URL: <https://regnum.ru/news/2218481.html> (in Russian)

Eurasian Integration from the Japanese Perspective

Post-war Japanese foreign policy exhibits a heavily bilateral orientation with the perpetual lack of regional initiatives and institutional leadership. Japanese elites (and also to a certain extent the wider public) have rarely identified themselves in regional terms and predominantly see “Asia” and “Asia Pacific” as an external environment around Japan. Bilateral relations and diplomatic contacts will inevitably continue to play a crucial role in the future development of Russian–Japanese relations. However, focusing on bilateral relations cannot by itself produce a lasting and stable relationship. Moscow and Tokyo should continue pursuing deeper and wider regional cooperation whenever possible, even though the rising structure of new Russia-West confrontation may stand its way.

The crucial point here is that stable bilateral relations need to be embedded in a wider web of multilateral interactions, which, at times of bilateral crisis, function as a built-in stabilizer to maintain contacts and minimize the possibility of a total break-down. Eurasian regional initiatives and other neighborhood frameworks could serve for this purpose of anchoring Russian–Japanese bilateral relations into a wider web of regional networks. By institutionally linking and embedding Japanese foreign policy into multilateral regional initiatives, Tokyo can minimize the possibility that future Japanese policymakers will downgrade or disengage from Russia and the Eurasian region as a whole. If any kind of bilateral crisis between Russia and Japan comes up in the future, Moscow and Tokyo will be still multilaterally tied to Eurasian regional initiatives, which will not only make sure that periodical diplomatic interactions and minimum economic cooperation are maintained, but also may provide a useful platform to solve emerging issues within a common community framework. From the Russian perspective, Japanese participation in Eurasian institutional initiatives will not only enhance its inclusiveness and hence overall regional legitimacy, but also alleviate the pervasive fear of Eurasia becoming a region managed in the shadow of a Russian–Chinese condominium. If other key regional players such as India, Iran, Turkey, South Korea, Mongolia, and Singapore, are successfully involved, Eurasian initiatives may even strengthen Russia’s (and others’) negotiating position vis-à-vis other initiatives such as the EU.

So far, Japan’s regional policy has been an ad-hoc and minimalistic one. For instance, Tokyo participates in the Asia – Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Japan – ASEAN Summit, ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, South Korea) Summit, and the East Asia Summit (EAS), but these meetings largely remain of symbolic nature. Japanese policymakers have been actively pursuing the TPP, but this mega trade deal is rather seen as an instrument to deepen Japanese–American bilateral relations (and hence Japan’s enthusiasm waned after the Trump’s Administration exited from its negotiation). In Central Asia, Tokyo spearheaded the launch of the “Central Asia plus Japan” Dialogue to accelerate energy and infrastructure cooperation but there have been only six Foreign Ministers meetings between

2004 and 2018, even though there are a number of concrete development projects implemented in this framework.⁴¹ In October 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe conducted a tour of Central Asian states and concluded contracts and agreements worth more than \$27 billion, but this deal-making mostly focused on bilateral arrangements (out of the \$27 billion, \$18 billion went to Turkmenistan for energy cooperation projects; the second largest \$8.5 billion went to Tajikistan for economic development projects) with a limited use of the Dialogue platform.⁴² With the rapid evolution of dynamic Eurasian multilateral projects such as the SCO, the EAEU and the BRI, however, Japanese leaders are compelled to reconsider its region-wide engagement strategy. As the Director of Carnegie Moscow Center Dmitry Trenin emphasizes, “Tokyo has to update and refresh its Eurasia strategy.”⁴³

Eurasian Security Cooperation, Japan and the SCO

Although Japan has not established a formal relationship with the SCO, Tokyo has closely monitored the organization’s development since the early 2000s. One of the earliest official studies on the SCO was put forth by Tomoko Shimamura of the National Diet Library’s Research Legislative Reference Bureau (Foreign Affairs Research Service Office) in 2006.⁴⁴ This congressional report did not entail any political analysis and largely focused on summarizing historical, organizational and managerial facts.

As Shimamura pointed out in the report, Japan had established its own initiative of multilateral engagement in the region in 2004, termed as the “Central Asia plus Japan” Dialogue with five Central Asian states which has so far resulted in six foreign minister meetings (the last one in Ashgabat in May 2017), eleven senior official meetings, eight “Tokyo Dialogue” events for cultural and intellectual exchange, and a “Central Asia plus Japan” Economic Forum held once in 2011.⁴⁵ The original rationale behind this format was to accelerate Japan’s development aid in Central Asia as well as to establish a scheme of closer energy cooperation. Consequently, at the press conference of June 29, 2006, Yasuhisa Shiosaki, Deputy Foreign Minister at the time, remarked that while Japan did not intend to establish a formal relationship with the SCO and would continue its own Dialogue with Central Asian states, any collision between the two initiatives was unlikely and each should aim at contributing to the stabilization and development of the region.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Murashkin, N. Japanese Involvement in Central Asia: An Early Inter-Asian Post-Neoliberal Case? // *Asian Journal of Social Science*, No. 43, 2015. Pp. 50–79

⁴² Paramonov, O., Puzanova, O. Tokyo’s Diplomacy in Eurasia: Successes and Failures (1997–2017) // *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2018. Pp. 135–136

⁴³ Trenin, D. Japan’s Eurasian Challenge // Carnegie Moscow Center, December 2015.
URL: <https://carnegie.ru/2015/05/12/japan-s-eurasian-challenge-pub-60143>

⁴⁴ Shimamura, T. History of Creation and Problems of the SCO // The National Diet Library, December, 2006.
URL: http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/diet/publication/refer/200612_671/067104.pdf (in Japanese)

⁴⁵ “Central Asia plus Japan” Dialogue // Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official website.
URL: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/dialogue/index.html>

⁴⁶ Vice Minister Conference Record // Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official website, June 29, 2006.
URL: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/fuku/f_0606.html (in Japanese)

In 2007, the Japanese Foreign Ministry under the first Abe Administration mandated the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) to produce a policy report outlining Japan's prospective foreign policy towards Eurasian regional organizations. The report was published by the JIIA under the title of "Our Country's Eurasian Diplomacy," led by Professor Akihiro Iwashita of the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center at the Hokkaido University. The report generally focused on theoretical aspects of the balance of power and analyzed how different regional actors (Russia, China, Japan, the U.S., Iran, Mongolia, Afghanistan, as well as Central Asian, South Asian, Southeast Asian, and Middle Eastern countries) may approach the SCO as a tool of classical power balancing. Despite this heavy theoretical focus, Iwashita's key suggestion was that Japan should link its Dialogue with the SCO to increase regional synergy, which, in his view, would also contribute to increasing SCO's inclusiveness.⁴⁷ In this vein, he argued that Russia and China should have a strategic incentive to promote Japan's formal or informal ties with the SCO, as Tokyo's engagement would be able to positively contribute to Eurasian regional stabilization and economic development without insisting on the Western-style democracy and human rights imposition activities.

Following this report, Iwashita initiated a three-year research project in 2007 entitled "Toward a New Dialogue on Eurasia: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its Partners." In summer 2007, the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center joined by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation held an international symposium on the SCO inviting American and European scholars to explore various ways of regional engagement with the organization for Japan, the U.S., and the EU.⁴⁸ In the final conference report, Iwashita proposed to seek Japan's affiliation with the SCO as a dialogue partner and summarized the merits of involving Japan in the organization as following:

Benefits for Japan:

- Increasing the effectiveness of the "Central Asia plus Japan" Dialogue process by linking it to the wider multilateral platform of the SCO;
- Engaging with the Eurasian region without bearing the managerial and administrative responsibilities of maintaining the SCO;
- Promoting the creation of a Eurasian Regional Security Forum;
- Redefining Japan's role in the Japanese-American Security Treaty and seeking a more active regional engagement;
- Establishing a multilateral channel to coordinate and manage Russian-Japanese and Chinese-Japanese relations.

⁴⁷ Policy Recommendation: Eurasian Diplomacy in Japan – Using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a Clue // JIIA, Research Report, August 10, 2008. URL: http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/report/h18_eurasia.pdf (in Japanese)

⁴⁸ New Formation of Eurasian Order – Interaction between China and Russia and Neighboring Regions (2006–2009) // Hokkaido University's Slavic Research Center, Report, 2007. URL: <http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/kaken/iwashita2007/contents.html> (in Japanese)

Benefits for the SCO:

- Increasing prestige and legitimacy by involving Japan;
- Preventing potential conflicts and mistrust with the West;
- Enhancing the SCO's possibility of growing into a comprehensive Eurasian regional platform in the future;
- Solidifying the basis of balance-of-power diplomacy within the organization;
- Promoting further regional cooperation with Japan's global resources and networks.

While these points might have been valid back in 2007, the landscape of Eurasian regional cooperation has changed dramatically in recent years, most notably due to the SCO's southern enlargement with India and Pakistan as full members. In the coming years, Russia, China, and other existing SCO members are likely to focus on adjusting internal governing structures to accommodate the new members. As a result, there may be limited incentives for Moscow (and Beijing) to launch a new relationship with other partners, especially major regional players like Japan. Despite this, it is common interest of Japan and SCO members, including Russia, to initiate informal ties and structured interactions. Tokyo remains skeptical of China's BRI and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and it initially refused to engage with these new regional schemes, but a growing number of Japanese policymakers began to consider participating in these initiatives in recent years.⁴⁹

In this sense, the SCO can be a gateway for Japan's new engagement with Eurasian regional projects. Although Tokyo will not be able to participate in the SCO's military exercises and exchanges, anti-terrorism operations, and border management practices, it can seek a status of a dialogue partner (as it had been suggested by Iwashita) and contribute to the discussion on Eurasian security governance. The tense relationship with China should not be used as an excuse to disengage from the SCO – in fact, this is precisely why Japan should proactively engage with the Eurasian security organization and seek mutually acceptable solutions to stabilize Japanese-Chinese relations. Indeed, this is why India chose to join the SCO even though New Delhi has a similarly problematic relationship with China (and Pakistan).

For Russia, Japan's engagement with the SCO could bring a greater legitimacy to the Greater Eurasian Partnership, which aims at transcending the obsolete bloc mentality of the past and establishing a genuinely free and fair world order involving a widest range of regional initiatives, including the SCO, EAEU, BRI and others. By embracing Japan as a partner, the SCO can demonstrate that it is a genuinely inclusive organization which transcends bloc mentality. Japan's pragmatic participation in the SCO can be in fact used as a template to attract a wider network of partners, including NATO members such as Turkey. It could

⁴⁹ Dadabaev, T. "Silk Road" as Foreign Policy Discourse: The Construction of Chinese, Japanese and Korean Engagement Strategies in Central Asia. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, No. 9, 2018. Pp. 30–41.

also send a clear message to Brussels that Eurasian integration is progressing aside from the EU's participation and the punitive logic of sanction politics can only harm the interest of European citizens and companies who would have much to gain from participating in the emerging Eurasian markets. While Japanese participation in the SCO may bring little specific outcomes in terms of security cooperation, it offers a vast potential to rebrand and transform the SCO as an inclusive hub of Eurasian security and economic governance, in which all stakeholders are welcomed to participate regardless of their political orientation and outstanding institutional affiliations.

Eurasian Economic Cooperation, Japan and the EAEU

Japan's interest in the EAEU to date remains rather limited and there has been no systematic proposal to advocate a closer relationship. In 2012, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) put forth a policy brief summarizing recent developments of Eurasian economic integration. This publication highlighted that Russia might be attempting to balance against China's growing involvement in Central Asian economies and the region's rich energy markets, while Kazakhstan had also a fear of being dominated by Chinese investments and infrastructure projects.⁵⁰ Interestingly, the author stressed various concerns expressed by the Japanese business community that high-level discussions on Japan's involvement in Eurasian economic cooperation were lacking and Japan was lagging behind other major players such as the EU and the Republic of Korea.

As a part of annual foreign policy studies commissioned by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a 2013 JIIA report on the latest trends in regional integration included Eurasian integration as one of major global integrative vectors. The author of the Eurasian chapter Yoko Hirose, Associate Professor at Keio University, argued that many post-Soviet states are interested in enhanced economic and cultural relations with Japan and there is a growing need for Japanese food imports and other industrial products. In 2016, the Japanese Foreign Ministry again mandated the JIIA to produce another policy report analyzing Russia's engagement policy in the Asia Pacific and prospects of Russia–Japan cooperation within the context of a post-TPP regional economic order. On top of these annual publications, the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), primarily supported by its Moscow office, periodically publishes summaries of customs- and trade-related information on its website, but they largely remain Japanese translation of legal documents and lack strategic and political analysis of proactive orientation.

While the wider Japanese public (and many Japanese policymakers) may not well understand the working of the EAEU at the moment, this lack of popular perception should not deter the initiation of a closer relationship with the Union. A sense of community and public understanding of regional initiatives mainly emerge as a result of enhanced cooperation and increased interactions. While a number of Western pundits initially predicted that the EAEU would eventually become an

⁵⁰ Unified Economic Zone in Eurasia – Russia, Surrounding Countries and Concept Realization // Japan Bank for International Cooperation's official website, January 2, 2012.
URL: https://www.jbic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/reference_ja/2012/02/2815/jbic_RR_J_2011068.pdf (in Japanese)

“impotent union” lacking any meaningful prospects of concrete competence and activities,⁵¹ these hostile forecasts have proven to be utterly wrong. As Lee Jae-Young, President of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), remarked in 2017, the Eurasian Customs Union (the EAEU’s predecessor) greatly contributed to the improvement of Russian and regional business environments.⁵²

For long, a perception persisted among Japanese corporate leaders and investors that the “post-Soviet” business environments are “chaotic” and “risky,” but the World Bank’s assessment shows that this may no longer be the case.⁵³ While local corruption, frequent change of regulations, delay in implementations continue to pose challenges in Russia and other EAEU countries, Eurasian business is no riskier than Japan’s other investment destinations, including Vietnam, Indonesia, China, India, the Philippines, and Cambodia. Given the fact that Russia is an economic engine behind Eurasian economic integration process and it plays a leading role in the EAEU (with the Eurasian Economic Commission sitting in Moscow), it would be prudent to link Japan’s Central Asian economic projects with the EAEU and also to start reflecting on how Japan should engage with the regional and multilateral frameworks of the EAEU as an integral part of its foreign economic policy towards Russia.

In devising a new Eurasian regional economic policy, Japan does not need to start from scratch as it can learn from pioneering activities already undertaken by its regional partners, particularly South Korea. In October 2013, Seoul launched a new Eurasian Initiative which aimed at following objectives:

- Opening new regional markets and creating growth drivers;
- Sharing South Korea’s economic development strategies and experiences with its neighbors;
- Diversifying economic relations and expanding transport and logistical infrastructure;
- Encouraging reform and openness in North Korea and promoting stability and further cooperation in inter-Korean relations;
- Positioning South Korea’s middle power diplomacy within a wider context of Eurasian cooperation and enhancing its position as a hub of regional interactions and discussions.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Michel, C. Vladimir Putin’s Impotent Eurasian Union // Foreign Policy, June 5, 2014.
URL: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/05/vladimir-putins-impotent-eurasian-union>

⁵² Lee Jae-Young. The New Northern Policy and Korean-Russian Cooperation // Valdai Paper No.76, October 2017.
URL: <http://valdaiclub.com/files/16143>

⁵³ Between 2010 and 2015, Russia has shown an astonishing progress in the World Bank’s *Doing Business* ranking moving from 120th to 62nd place. With the consolidation of the EAEU in 2015, Russia’s ranking further progressed to the 51st position in 2016. In the 2018 *Doing Business* report, Japan is ranked 34th and Russia is ranked 35th. Other EAEU members similarly demonstrated incredible progress, with Kazakhstan ranking 36th, Belarus 38th, and Armenia 47th. The source: The World Bank’s *Doing Business* rankings.
URL: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2018>

⁵⁴ Lee Jae-Young. The New Northern Policy and Korean-Russian Cooperation // Valdai Paper No.76, October 2017.
URL: <http://valdaiclub.com/files/16143/P.3-4>; Jae-Young, L. Korea’s Eurasia Initiative and the Development of Russia’s Far East and Siberia / *The Political Economy of Pacific Russia: Regional Developments in East Asia*, ed. by Huang, J., Korlev, A. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 103–125.

With these new objectives, Seoul initiated a number of concrete activities to enhance the multilateral dimension in Russian–South Korean relations, including:

- Finalizing the roadmap for the Eurasian Initiative;⁵⁵
- Resuming talks on the South Korean involvement in the Rajin–Khasan project;
- Signing and implementing a visa-free (up to 60 days) agreement with Russia in 2014;
- Launching Korean–Russian investment and financial platforms;
- Creating a joint public-private committee for economic cooperation with Central Asian states;
- Initiating meetings of the Coordination Committee for Economic Cooperation with Eurasia (under the Korean government);
- Promoting joint research activities on the opportunities for establishing a free-trade area with the EAEU;
- Negotiating an FTA-like Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement with Russia to complement the multilateral dimension (preparatory works completed in 2016).⁵⁶

As South Korea ultimately aims at establishing an FTA with the EAEU, such agreement seems to offer several important benefits. It will allow deeper economic engagement in the region’s growing market under the unified EAEU framework with common regulations and contractual enforcement mechanisms. The benefit is likely to become larger with the plan to gradually apply these common standards for energy transactions and ultimately create a single Eurasian energy market (which is currently under discussion).

Many other regional states have expressed their interest in concluding FTAs with the EAEU, including Vietnam (already concluded in 2016), India, Mongolia, Singapore and Thailand.⁵⁷ As a result, the EAEU’s regional trade agreements are likely to become one of the key drivers of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, complementing other existing and proposed arrangements in the Asia Pacific such as ASEAN, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), and CPTPP.

⁵⁵ Kwon, Y. South Korea’s Eurasia Ambitions // *The Diplomat*, August 20, 2014.
URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/south-koreas-eurasia-ambitions>

⁵⁶ Lee Jae-Young. The New Northern Policy and Korean-Russian Cooperation // Valdai Paper No.76, October 2017.
URL: <http://valdaiclub.com/files/16143/P.15>.

⁵⁷ Vinokurov, E. Eurasian Economic Union: Current State and Preliminary Results // *Russian Journal of Economics*, 2017, Vol. 3, No. 1. P. 66.

Prospects for Regional Synergy: Goals and Practical Steps

Any discussion of possible synergy between the approaches of the two nations towards cooperation in Eurasia should begin with an analysis of the objective interests and needs that such cooperation may serve. The danger of baseless cooperation must be guarded against in the case of Russia and Japan's engagement in Eurasia, especially given the yet marginal nature of Japan's interest in Eurasian affairs, as opposed to the stability of its ties with its main international patron, namely, the United States.

Despite this, there is a growing importance of multilateral cooperation in Eurasia both for the region in general (mainly due to the development of the EAEU and the BRI), and for Russia's foreign policy in particular. In this sense, engagement with the Eurasian cooperation formats to which Russia belongs (such as the EAEU and the SCO), and with which Russia aims to cooperate closely (the BRI, particularly its Silk Road Economic Belt part) can serve as a tool for putting the bilateral relations between Tokyo and Moscow on a more solid footing – a measure that would be especially necessary given that the current rapprochement between the two countries relies, to a large extent, on good personal relations between Russia's President Putin and Japan's Prime Minister Abe.

Another goal that might justify efforts at building Japan's engagement with various Eurasian cooperation formats might be securing its participation in the new regional international order that is taking shape in the greater Eurasian region. While its details remain difficult to predict, it is already clear that China is going to be the leading player in this order, and that Russia has already grasped the importance of embedding itself in this new system of political, economic, and cultural ties, as evidenced by the Greater Eurasian Partnership initiative articulated by President Putin.

Japan's position in this order, however, is yet to be determined. Again, much would depend on the position of the United States, and should Washington choose to confront China's rise rather than embrace it (and the unfolding "trade war" between the U.S. and China makes such scenario quite possible), thus, essentially, continuing on the path of "containment of China", it may very well turn out that the U.S. and its allies – Japan among them – will find themselves contained and isolated from the new formats of economic cooperation and political dialogue in Eurasia. While Tokyo is unlikely to influence Washington's strategy directly, Japan's turn to more active contacts with various Eurasian multilateral initiatives is likely to turn the scale of strategic balance in the Asia Pacific and make it more difficult for the present or future U.S. administrations to opt for a full-scale confrontation with China or the emerging Eurasian international order in general.

For Tokyo, the issue of cooperation with Russia in Eurasia is ultimately linked to the momentous question of whether to pursue increased multilateralism in

its foreign policy, or avoid it and keep following a diplomatic course focusing on U.S.-centered arrangements. Moscow, however, does not face such dilemmas. Russia already has both substantial experience and important achievements in the sphere of multilateral cooperation in Eurasia. All of this means that engagement with Japan in Eurasia is, from Russia's point of view, not an issue of overall foreign policy strategy, but rather a new venue for cooperation with Japan, constituting just another step of Moscow's plans for bilateral ties with Tokyo and of its strategy concerning the future of multilateral cooperation in Eurasia in general.

The Greater Eurasian Partnership that has recently become the new guiding vision of Russia's strategy in Eurasia is, by its very definition, an inclusive and flexible concept. The only thing that would be required for Japan to have its cooperation with Russia under this umbrella idea is Tokyo's explicit political will. Such a step may not even be particularly demanding from the point of view of political constraints within which the Japanese leadership operates, as historical examples of late 1990s – early 2000s Japan's Eurasian diplomacy⁵⁸ and the early 1970s “multipolar diplomacy” pursued by the Cabinet of Kakuei Tanaka – can easily be employed as justifications to pursue greater cooperation with both existing and emerging multilateral cooperation structures in Eurasia.

At the same time, Japan needs to be aware that, not possessing a portfolio of multilateral cooperation comparable to that of Russia, it will have to adapt to the existing formats of cooperation, rather than assume a leading role in the development of its engagement in Eurasia's international formats in general and Russia-backed structures in particular. Given Tokyo's limited regional ambition, such adjustments would not be difficult. In fact, Japan's greater engagement in Eurasia can be an optimal “middle way” to increase its presence and leadership while maintaining the traditional Japanese preference for low-profile activities in the region.

As a first step towards any sort of cooperation between Russia and Japan in Eurasia, a greater understanding of the processes unfolding in the Eurasian space should be fostered in both countries, particularly in Japan, given the rather limited extent to which the Japanese expert and academic communities have been involved in this study to date. Perhaps the most important goal here is to foster a more flexible understanding of the models of cooperation in the present-day world that would transcend a limited view based on an overtly geopolitical bloc-thinking. Based on this spirit of open regional policy, Japan's engagement in Eurasian affairs does not need to contradict its orientation towards political and military cooperation with the U.S.

As soon as the idea of Japan turning more actively towards Eurasian multilateral cooperation takes root in the political discourse of the country, more concrete initiatives of engagement with particular formats of cooperation, such as the SCO, or the EAEU, may be pursued. From a Japanese perspective, perhaps a key potential benefit of engaging with the SCO (in any capacity, including the ad-hoc

⁵⁸ Togo, K. *Eurasian Diplomacy in Japan, 1997–2001* // *Nippon*, March 13, 2014.
URL: <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/c00205>

status of a guest country at annual organizational meetings) may be the creation and maintenance of multilateral channels of contacts with China. This may not solve any of the outstanding bilateral disputes but it still might prove to be useful as a means of sustained communication, especially when such interactions take place in the presence of Russia (which is not principally interested in the aggravation of Chinese-Japanese relations) and other regional stakeholders. In the years to come, the “Asian” regional developments are likely to be driven (consciously and unconsciously) by a Sino-centric vision of regional order in which all “Asian” international relations will involve, to a varying degree, the Chinese military, political and economic factors. Given this context, the reality is that challenges of Chinese-Japanese relations can never be addressed by only looking at China.

Russia, in turn, should actively support Japan’s involvement in the SCO (as well as the involvement of other regional states). Even though the geographic expansion of the SCO diminishes its capacity for reaching consensus decisions and essentially deprives it of any capability of becoming a political “bloc” in the foreseeable future, it simultaneously bolsters its role as a legitimate mechanism for inclusive dialogue and non-binding coordination of interests. While Moscow and Beijing may not feel the immediate necessity of involving Japan in the SCO at least for the next few years, Russian and Chinese policymakers should reflect on the future of the organization as well as on the opportunity of using it as a platform for the Eurasian-Pacific region-building exercise. Involving a wider number of regional actors besides India and Pakistan serves the strategic imperative of emphasizing the cooperative and non-hegemonic nature of the SCO. Even though Russia has no intention of ‘dominating’ the region together with China, a grand partnership of the two most powerful nations might stir concerns among less powerful neighbors, including Japan. Hence, multilateral platforms such as the SCO are particularly important tool of mitigating such misperception and promoting inclusive and cooperative regional dialogue without clear-cut dividing lines. In this sense, establishing contacts between Japan and the SCO will only increase its legitimacy for achieving these goals and help to establish the SCO as a vital part of the nascent Greater Eurasian Partnership.

In the economic realm, Russia and other EAEU members should seek closer cooperation with Japan within the framework of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. Exploring Japan’s partnership with the EAEU may be framed as a first attempt to put the Greater Eurasian Partnership into practice, especially considering the recent conclusion of Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).⁵⁹ While the EU has so far refused to constructively engage with the EAEU, Japan may become a bridge between these two influential centers of regional integration by capitalizing on its neutral standpoint between the two camps. In the long run, Russian and EAEU policymakers should consider an inclusive and region-wide strategy to systematically link up regional partners in the Eurasian-Pacific community, which may require a sort of “Eurasian Neighborhood Policy” reflecting on the EU’s past experiences.

⁵⁹ Japan – EU Economic Partnership Agreement // Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official website.
URL: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/page6_000042.html (in Japanese)

In light of this, there are several ways to seek more synergies between Japan and the Eurasian integration projects. Given the situational uncertainty that Japan is currently leading the institutionalization process of an “America-less” TPP, it will be difficult for Tokyo to immediately pursue an FTA with the EAEU. Nevertheless, this certainly does not mean that Japan can ignore the enlargement of the EAEU’s regional partnerships, especially because Vietnam (Japan’s key investment destination) and Singapore (the region’s financial hub) seek to forge closer ties with the structures of Eurasian economic integration. As a first step, the Japanese government could commission a new report on the potential partnership with the EAEU in the near future (which may take the form of a formal FTA, informal dialogue and consultations, or joint Russian-Japanese events and platforms on the topic), perhaps within the existing framework of annual JIA projects on Russia. The exclusive focus on bilateralism prevailing in Japan needs to be changed and Japanese experts should carefully begin to reflect how Russian-Japanese relations can be situated in a wider web of Eurasian regional cooperation led by Moscow. Other possible activities may include:

- Dispatching an official Japanese delegation to visit the Eurasian Economic Commission and establish contacts and a working relationship;
- Developing an informal academic network between Japanese experts on the EAEU, organizing joint events and discussion sessions on the multilateral dimension in Russian-Japanese relations, desirably in cooperation with Russian and Eurasian think-tanks and experts;
- Initiating a forum and information sessions on the EAEU’s international activities for Japanese corporate leaders and managers in Moscow, which may be attended by participants from other regional partners including China, South Korea, and India, with the potential of transforming these activities into an international business forum;
- Exploring the possibility of linking the “Central Asia Japan” Dialogue with the EAEU.

For the effective implementation of these initiatives, Japan should actively learn from the lessons of South Korea. Lee Jae-Young observed that, despite the initial high hope, Seoul’s Eurasian Initiative has so far produced limited outcomes because it lacked a central coordinator and “each ministry or agency has created various business units and undertook impromptu measures.”⁶⁰ To avoid the same error, the initial phase of Japan’s Eurasian regional policy may need to be directed by the Cabinet Office of Prime Minister Abe with the support from the Foreign Ministry’s Japan – Russia Economic Affairs Division (which manages Japan’s economic cooperation projects with Russia) and Japanese Embassy in Moscow. The task should also involve the Foreign Ministry’s Russian Division, Central Asia and Caucasus Division, and Japan – Russia Exchange Programs Division for outreach activities.

⁶⁰ Lee Jae-Young. The New Northern Policy and Korean-Russian Cooperation // Valdai Paper No.76, October 2017.
URL: <http://valdaiclub.com/files/16143/> P. 4

Internal and External Challenges and Opportunities

A number of internal and external factors are bound to exert significant influence on the two nations' regional cooperation in Eurasia. No discussion of multilateral cooperation in Eurasia, including the one concerning Russia and Japan, can avoid taking into consideration the implications and significance of other regional players and initiatives. Russian foreign policy was quick to embrace the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Japan also followed suit: in June 2017, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed Tokyo's readiness "to extend cooperation" with the initiative if it is conducted in "harmony with a free and fair trans-Pacific economic zone," and if the infrastructure to be built will "be open to use by all".⁶¹

Provided that no political complications mar the prospects of Japan's cooperation with the BRI, the Chinese initiative may serve as a common platform to both support individual projects between Russia and Japan and to develop a wider scope of bilateral cooperation in the space of Eurasia. From a Japanese point of view, Russian and Indian participation in the BRI would make it more inclusive and this will enable Japanese leaders to thwart the opposition from nationalists who attempt to frame the project as an embodiment of "Chinese hegemony."

Another external variable that may exert significant influence on Russian-Japanese cooperation in Eurasia is Russia's relations with the United States and other Western nations. The tensions between Russia, on the one hand, and the U.S. and other Western states, on the other, that became especially pronounced since the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, may become a stumbling block to Japan's participation in Russia-backed projects in the Eurasian space. In this vein, the sanctions that were imposed by Japan on Russia were, in the opinion of many analysts, purely symbolic and only motivated by Japan's willingness to show its solidarity with its Western partners, rather than by a desire to "punish" Russia.⁶²

However, Japan's attempts to maintain and develop ties with Russia have already caused Washington's displeasure, as was the case in 2016, when Obama asked Abe not to visit Russia – a suggestion that the Japanese leader ignored.⁶³ As of autumn 2018, relations between Russia and the West continue a downward course. Should the escalation of tensions between Russia and the West continue, Japan may once again face increased pressure from the U.S., as well as other Western nations, which may damage its ties with Russia, including any projects of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in Eurasia.

⁶¹ Japan and 'One Belt, One Road' // The Japan Times, June 24, 2017.
URL: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/06/24/editorials/japan-one-belt-one-road/#.W2gIrtIzaUk>

⁶² Alexander Panov: "Japan Made a Choice in Favor of Russia" // Argumenty i Fakty, October 29, 2016.
URL: http://www.aif.ru/politics/world/aleksandr_panov_yaponiya_sdelala_svoy_vybor_v_polzu_rossii (in Russian)

⁶³ Abe Breaks Ranks with Obama by Visiting Putin // The Japan Times, May 6, 2016. URL: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/06/national/abe-breaks-ranks-obama-meeting-putin-russia/#.WsTtYyhuaUk>

Furthermore, Japan's orientation towards the alliance with the United States may potentially cause Russia's caution on Tokyo's motives and intentions. One example of this factor affecting bilateral relations is Russia's criticism of plans to upgrade Japan's missile defense system.⁶⁴ Another is the often repeated argument that Russia must not make any concessions to Japan in their territorial dispute about the South Kuril islands (so-called "Northern Territories", according to the Japanese side), as U.S. military installations may be put in the territories given to Japan, thus endangering Russia's national security.⁶⁵

In light of this, any attempt to envision Japan's new Eurasian regional policy needs to consider its implication for the Japanese-American security alliance, on which Tokyo is heavily dependent. More specifically, will Japan's Eurasian involvement be compatible with its pro-American foreign policy orientation? Is that even feasible to envision a sort of multi-vector foreign policy for a nation whose mentality appears to be so deeply ingrained with the support for the United States? These are legitimate concerns. The "pro-American" attitudes of the mainstream Japanese elites should be, however, not treated as an inevitable impediment to its closer engagement with Eurasian regional initiatives. Pro-American Japanese elites and citizens are not necessarily anti-Russian. This point is easily underlined by the fact that Prime Minister Abe, who deeply respects President Putin and Russia, is considered as one of the most pro-American political figures in the Japanese political arena and repeatedly called for a stronger Japanese-American alliance. This is precisely why Japan's newfound engagement in Eurasia offers the possibility for us to go beyond the captive logic of international cooperation jealousy and construct a genuinely free and fair partnership respecting one's political orientation.

In the medium- and long-term perspective, if Russia aims at deepening stable relations with Japan, it must carefully reflect on how to maintain and consolidate the current level of interactions in the post-Abe era. Involving Japan in regional, multilateral, and institutional platforms led by Russia is one of the ways to achieve this end. In this vein, perhaps Russia needs to establish a multilateral dimension in Russian-Japanese relations while Prime Minister Abe is still in power, so that the institutionalized channels of contacts and interactions will remain in place even when someone who is not so enthusiastic about Russia will become the Japanese next prime minister.

Even in the post-Abe era, however, there is a seed for optimism in Russian-Japanese relations. In 2017, only 26 per cent of Japanese citizens had favorable view of Russia. Indeed, the 2017 RIAC Working Paper *The Image of Russia in Japan and the Image of Japan in Russia*⁶⁶ presented a similar picture, citing the 2016 survey according to which nearly 80 per cent of the Japanese had a negative view

⁶⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Installation of Missile Defense in Japan Will Negatively Influence Relations between Moscow and Tokyo // Rossijskaya Gazeta, December 28, 2017. URL: <https://rg.ru/2017/12/28/mid-ustanovka-pro-v-iaponii-negativno-povliiaet-na-otnosheniia-moskvy-i-tokio.htm> (in Russian)

⁶⁵ "Are We Supposed to Look at This Idly?" Putin Told about the Future of Kuril Islands, Should They Belong to Japan // Gazeta.ru, June 1, 2017. URL: <https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2017/06/01/10703423.shtml> (in Russian)

⁶⁶ The Image of Russia in Japan and the Image of Japan in Russia: Working Paper 33/2017 / [S.V. Chugrov]; [I.S. Ivanov, Editor-in-Chief]; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Moscow: NPMP RIAC, 2017. 64 p.

on Russia. Despite these facts, aggregate survey results are often misleading. The negative attitudes held by Japanese citizens are mainly driven by the older generation who still tend to see Russia from the Cold War era's perspective. Indeed, a 2017 Pew Research Center survey revealed that, while only 16 per cent of Japanese citizens aged above 50 years old view Russia favorably, the majority (53 per cent) of the young generation see Russia positively. This indicates that a new generation of younger Japanese leaders may be more enthusiastic to engage with Russia in bilateral and multilateral formats. In designing a new model of Russian-Japanese cooperation in Eurasia, involving younger Japanese leaders from an early stage of development hence will be an important stabilizing factor.

Along with this, the open and flexible nature of the nascent international order in Eurasia makes it imperative for both Russia and Japan to take into consideration the role of important regional players and international issues, even if these seem to be, at the first glance, outside the scope of the above-mentioned formal frameworks of international cooperation. For example, a new and comprehensive international order in Eurasia can hardly be imagined without taking into consideration the role of such states as Turkey, which is a key regional player both having substantial presence in the region of Central Asia with active political ties with Russia and Japan; or Mongolia, a nation at the heart of Eurasia with traditional ties to Russia and Japan that nevertheless has a strong multi-vector tendency in its foreign policy.⁶⁷ As far as new areas are concerned, cooperation in the Arctic may be a particularly important policy domain. Given that Russia and China are already starting to discuss their cooperation in this field with regard to the Northern route,⁶⁸ its role may rise substantially in the future, and the nations concerned may very well opt to embed their Arctic activities in the emerging framework of regional cooperation in Eurasia.

⁶⁷ Rinna, A. Mongolia Makes the Most of the Middle Position // East Asia Forum, April 30, 2016.
URL: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/30/mongolia-makes-the-most-of-the-middle-position>

⁶⁸ Russia and China are Developing a Memorandum on Joint Exploitation of the Arctic // TASS, May 15, 2018.
URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/5200505> (in Russian)

Conclusions and Recommendations

Multilateral cooperation has become one of the dominant directions of Russia's foreign policy in Eurasia. Meanwhile, Russian-Japanese relations have developed heavily in bilateral format and continue to lack a strong regional dimension. In deepening the relationship between the two nations, a multilateral track should be added and Japan's engagement in Eurasian integration projects needs to be promoted. Economic cooperation and cultural interactions will not automatically synchronize the two nations' preferences and solve their outstanding problems, especially when bilateral relations are strongly based on personal contacts of the two countries' leadership. A more institutionalized format of cooperation needs to be pursued in addition to the bilateral ties in order to stabilize Russian-Japanese relationship.

Based on this conclusion, this Working Paper proposes following concrete steps:

1. Confidence-building measures in the security and military fields should be pursued by both countries for the purpose of reducing mutual suspicions and overcoming the misperception of Eurasian integration as an embodiment of exclusive bloc-thinking.
2. Both sides should be willing to separate their cooperation in multilateral venues from the unresolved issues in their bilateral relations.
3. In Eurasian cooperation, the "Central Asia plus Japan" Dialogue can seek a stronger synergy with the SCO and the EAEU. Should Japan choose to reactivate this Forum, attempts should be made to mitigate fears that it is trying to compete with the existing Russian and Chinese initiatives. Japanese diplomats and experts should try to formulate a new role for the Dialogue within the framework of the emerging Greater Eurasian Partnership initiative in such a way that it does not contradict the multilateral initiatives promoted by Japan (first and foremost, its TTP11/CPTPP project).
4. Japan's direct participation in the SCO may be possible only in a distant future, although such possibility has been raised in the reports commissioned by Japanese ministries. In the short- to mid-run, Japan's engagement with the Organization may be pursued in a format of guest/visitor in SCO meetings and regional projects.
5. Given that India and Pakistan recently joined the SCO, and both Japan and South Korea are interested in a wider regional cooperation, there may be a possibility to create a wider platform to discuss Eurasian regional security in a more inclusive format.
6. The lack of interaction between Japan and the Eurasian Economic Commission impedes constructive cooperation. Japan should establish a (formal or informal) working relationship with the Union and seek for the possibilities of collaboration. The ultimate goal may be the establishment of an FTA agreement between the EAEU and Japan, with the existing agreement

with Vietnam and possible future agreements with China, India, Singapore, Israel, and other nations serving as a model for the Japanese side. The Japanese leaders should be aware that this would be, first and foremost, a political achievement for Russian-Japanese relations, and would thus be a goal worth pursuing even when the economic rationale for such an agreement may be limited.

7. The South Korean model of collaborative regional engagement with the EAEU can be presented to Japanese ministries as a best practice and incentivize them to devise a similar policy in order for Japan not to fall behind the regional trend.
8. On the side of the Union, there may be a need to organize information sessions on the EAEU's international activities for Japanese corporate leaders and managers in Moscow, which may be attended by participants from other regional partners including China, South Korea, and India. The possibility of these information sessions eventually evolving into some sort of a specialized business forum, with a focus on Eurasian cooperation, may be an additional benefit both for Japan, which will be able to obtain another item for its as-of-yet limited portfolio of multilateral cooperation in Eurasia, and the EAEU and Russia in particular, which will have the benefit of being the host of this new format.
9. Japanese political and business leaders should continue to participate, whenever possible, in the regular business events held in Russia, particularly the annual St. Petersburg Economic Forum and the Eastern Economic Forum. The understanding needs to be promoted that these events can serve as gateways to Japan's cooperation not only with Russia, but with a wider Eurasian area as well.
10. The new format of Eurasian cooperation should strive to involve the new generation of young researches and politicians, what need to be simultaneously sought as a bottom-up building bloc of Japan's closer engagement in Eurasia.
11. Russian and Japanese preference for bilateralism has heavily influenced the overall orientation of academic research on Russian-Japanese relations in both countries. As the lack of understanding on the level of experts can be a serious impediment to any further actions, studies on multilateral cooperation in Eurasia should be promoted. Joint workshops, conferences, and analytical papers on the regional dimension of Russian-Japanese relations need to be organized. Possible inclusion of academics from Western countries will benefit the achievement of the goals of these activities in an inclusive format.

About the Authors

Vladimir Nelidov – Lecturer, Department of Asian and African Studies, MGIMO University; Research Fellow, Center for Japanese Studies, RAS Institute of Oriental Studies

Kazushige Kobayashi – Postdoctoral Researcher, Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies; Expert, Russian International Affairs Council

Russian International Affairs Council

Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) is a non-profit international relations think-tank on a mission to provide policy recommendations for all Russian organizations involved in external affairs.

RIAC engages experts, statesmen and entrepreneurs in public discussions with an end to increase the efficiency of Russian foreign policy.

Along with research and analysis, the Russian Council is involved in educational activities to create a solid network of young global affairs and diplomacy experts.

RIAC is a player on the second-track and public diplomacy arena, contributing the Russian view to international debate on the pending issues of global development.

Members of RIAC are the thought leaders of Russia's foreign affairs community – among them diplomats, businessmen, scholars, public leaders, and journalists.

President of RIAC Igor Ivanov, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from 1998 to 2004 and Secretary of the Security Council from 2004 to 2007.

Director General of RIAC is Andrey Kortunov. From 1995 to 1997, Dr. Kortunov was Deputy Director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies.

Notes

Russian International Affairs Council

Cover photo credits:

top right: Donat Sorokin/TASS Host Photo Agency/Pool via REUTERS/Pixstream;

down right: Flickr / Eiichi Kimura CC BY-NC-ND 4.0;

down left: PA-EFE/SERGEI CHIRIKOV / Vostock Photo.

Printed in Russia



RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL (RIAC)

1, B. Yakimanka street, 119180, Moscow, Russia

Tel.: +7 (495) 225 6283

Fax: +7 (495) 225 6284

E-mail: welcome@russiancouncil.ru

www.russiancouncil.ru