12 Essential Steps in a Conceptual Dead End

The fact that Russia and Europe have managed to maintain diplomatic dialogue, including on the so-called second and third tracks (Track II and Track III diplomacy) is, of course, a great achievement in itself. The experience of two civilizations with comparable military might living side by side plays a vital role in this, and it would be extremely rash to disregard it. However, there may be doubts that this remarkable ability can continue to endure the consequences of the conceptual uncertainty and different interpretations of what the most critical parameters of the relations between the two sides actually are. For example, if we claim that the security of the "Euro-Atlantic community" depends on progress made concerning a particular issue (say, the Ukrainian crisis), then it is clear that we mean the security of the "collective" (i.e. a group of states) against risks and threats from the outside.

That is, against threats from states that are not part of that collective or community, for instance, Russia or China. This is the only interpretation that the discipline of “international relations” allows. You can hardly view global warming, for example, as a culprit since it a priori does not represent the interests of any one group. We agree that calling upon certain countries to jointly solve problems that the community is facing because of their very existence is tantamount to doubting the rationality of their foreign policy behaviour. And, in general, it is difficult to imagine that any state in its right mind would care about the security of a community to which it does not even belong. We thus end up in a situation where Russia and Europe continue to call on each other to fix problems that only exist because they need to serve their own national interests.

This conceptual dilemma would be amusing if it did not have direct political consequences which have been felt over at least the past two decades, including in the form of limitations deliberately laid down in the expert study of emerging contradictions. The Twelve Steps prepared in collaboration with the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and presented on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference provide a conceptual framework of how to remove the main tactical risks arising from the protracted military and diplomatic confrontation in Eastern Europe. In this sense, we can only welcome such a document. However, there is little reason to believe that the ongoing differences in the approaches of Russia and Europe to the very understanding of regional security will not severely limit the strategic gains of implementing these reasonable proposals.

Melodramatic as it may sound, the central issue in EU–Russia relations in terms of regional security is that, even at a conceptual level, the sides are not prepared to recognize each other as parties to the conflict. Europe and its interests represent a security problem for Russia because it has the means to realize these interests. Russia's interests are similarly problematic for European security, as well as for the protection of the "Euro-Atlantic" community, which is the only community present.

People on the ground are often far better at getting to the heart of the matter than theoreticians who spend their whole lives trying to understand it. Around 500 years ago, in the first half of the 16^th century, Emperor Charles V wrote these very words: “My cousin Francis [King Francis I of France – translator] and I are in perfect accord – he wants Milan, and so do I.” In terms of the basic issues of war and peace, the modern history of relations between Russia and Europe, starting from the events of 1989–1991 and continuing until the present day, has been dominated by the different visions that Moscow and European capitals have of the most critical parameters of regional security. The Russian foreign policy doctrine contains a provision on the indivisibility of regional security as a central tenet. Formally, the European Union does not have any objections to this, but nuances determine the content of the relations between the two sides.

Twelve Steps Toward Greater Security in Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic Region. Twelve Steps Toward Greater Security in Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic Region

Put bluntly, these nuances are NATO and the European Union. Together, they form the Euro-Atlantic community, which unites most of the planet’s economically developed military powers. This contradiction was barely noticeable during the initial post-Soviet years when Russia was still forming its new foreign policy, and the country's importance on the international stage was so insignificant that any discussion of complex issues was pointless from a purely practical point of view. However, as Russia started to gain influence in the field of European security, the fundamental differences in the views of the two sides became more and more pronounced.

It seems to me that, at this stage in the development of the science of international relations, there is no need to dwell on the conceptual and substantive difference between “collective security” and “international security.” However, this difference is important in terms of understanding why Russia and Europe have been unable to work together on this issue for two decades. Collective security refers to the security (including the national security) of a group of states that, for one reason or another, can incorporate each other's interests into their own. NATO and the European Union are perfect examples of this. As the so-called English School brilliantly argued many decades ago, these two organizations are unique in terms of the scale of their internal homogeneity. Although the case of Turkey demonstrates that low-ranking states whose current interests clash with those of the collective may be granted access to certain instruments.

International security refers to the interaction of states, regardless of whether or not they share each other's interests and can integrate them into their own. It this format, countries work together while holding different values and trying to serve their own, often different interests.

Moreover, this type of cooperation does not allow, even at the conceptual level, those who enjoy a monopoly of power to make use of this advantage. This is why we are generally very sceptical when it comes to assessing the ability of states to create international security regimes. One rather radical interpretation of the UN Security Council is that it is the collective security body of the five nuclear powers who strive to keep their monopoly power allowing to restrict the rights and freedoms of everyone else. This involves, first and foremost, the right to use violence to resolve inter-state disputes. This explains why the spheres of real interaction among states along the lines of "international security" are extraordinarily selective and rare.

Igor Ivanov:
Russia — Europe: Towards Relations of Pragmatism And Responsible Interaction

Having said that, Russia, as the only country that is capable of influencing the situation in this area, has repeatedly called for the creation of a European international security system. At the same time, Russia is well aware that it is unlikely to gain even the hypothetical support of its European partners on this issue. And it would be an unforgivable oversimplification to assume that Russia does not understand this. Therefore, the only hypothesis that we can discuss here in terms of the consistency of Russia’s actions is the ongoing search for a real alternative to the order that European countries can offer without placing the stability of their collective in jeopardy. This forces Russia to propose the impossible rather than the unacceptable.

The fact that Russia and Europe have managed to maintain diplomatic dialogue, including on the so-called second and third tracks (Track II and Track III diplomacy) is, of course, a great achievement in itself. The experience of two civilizations with comparable military might living side by side plays a vital role in this, and it would be extremely rash to disregard it. However, there may be doubts that this remarkable ability can continue to endure the consequences of the conceptual uncertainty and different interpretations of what the most important parameters of the relations between the two sides actually are. For example, if we claim that the security of the "Euro-Atlantic community" depends on progress made concerning a particular issue (say, the Ukrainian crisis), then it is clear that we mean the security of the "collective" (i.e. a group of states) against risks and threats from the outside. That is, against threats from states that are not part of that collective or community, for instance, Russia or China.

This is the only interpretation that the discipline of “international relations” allows. You can hardly view global warming, for instance, as a culprit since it a priori does not represent the interests of any one group. We agree that calling upon certain countries to jointly solve problems that the community is facing because of their very existence is tantamount to doubting the rationality of their foreign policy behaviour. Additionally, it is difficult to imagine that any state can in its right mind care about the security of a community to which it does not even belong. We thus end up in a situation where Russia and Europe continue to call on each other to fix problems that only exist because they need to serve their own national interests.

Ivan Timofeev:
2020 Munich Security Conference: Back to Utopia?

This conceptual dilemma would be amusing if it did not have direct political consequences which have been felt over at least the past two decades, including in the form of limitations deliberately laid down in the expert study of emerging contradictions. The Twelve Steps prepared in collaboration with the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and presented on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference provide a conceptual framework of how to remove the main tactical risks arising from the protracted military and diplomatic confrontation in Eastern Europe. In this sense, we can only welcome such a document. However, there is little reason to believe that the ongoing differences in the approaches of Russia and Europe to the very understanding of regional security will not severely limit the strategic gains of implementing these reasonable proposals.

Melodramatic as it may sound, the central issue in EU–Russia relations in terms of regional security is that, even at a conceptual level, the sides are not prepared to recognize each other as parties to the conflict. Europe and its interests represent a security problem for Russia because it has the means to realize these interests. Russia's interests are similarly problematic for European security, as well as for the protection of the "Euro-Atlantic" community, which is the only community present.

The motives of the two sides are unlikely to have moved far from the traditional “triad” of Thomas Hobbes – material gain, prestige and security. But nuclear weapons are a great leveller that is beyond our control. The very fact that a major conflict between Russia and Europe is completely impractical means that there is no need to try and hide the fundamental differences that exist between the two. And it is here that the line between diplomatic processes and scientific (or expert) discussion is particularly important, as it gives us a framework in which we can talk about issues that would otherwise require military and political decisions.