A Monsoon Instead of a Gentle Breeze: Creeping Nuclearization in the Asia-Pacific

Eight out of nine nuclear armed states are either situated or have direct strategic interests and a military presence in the Asia-Pacific.

The following paper attempts to demonstrate the self-organizing stratified nature of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the Asia-Pacific. This hierarchical structure – even with its shifting boundaries– contrasts the picture of there being anarchical chaos that is oftentimes drawn by (neo)realists. Arguing for the dichotomy between the center and the periphery, the author highlights the different approaches pertaining to the nuclear question within the region.

An overwhelming majority of universally recognized nations belong to a cohort of NNWSs (non-nuclear-weapon states), and the Asian-Pacific region is no exception. More than that, huge chunks of the Asian-Pacific area are covered by NWFZs (nuclear-weapon-free zones). Some Asian-Pacific NNWSs are active Non-Aligned Movement members, who vocalize their discontent to the NPT (The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) review process. This standpoint has been embodied in the adoption of TPNW (The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) in 2017. The broader geographical backbone of the Asia-Pacific region, i.e. SEA (Southeast Asia), is quite uniform as far as its stance in all-things-nuclear is concerned: the sub-regional players considerably favor TPNW; nine out of ten Southeast Asian nations have signed it.

At least three out of the five NWSs (nuclear weapon states)—China, Russia and the US—have direct stakes in the region. The crippled arms control system has not been trilateralized as China has refused to be included in the configuration, nodding to its incomparably smaller nuclear arsenal. NWSs continue to modernize their nuclear forces in an active manner.

Three out of four world’s de facto nuclear powers can be found in the Asia-Pacific. Such countries choose not to participate in the NPT in exchange for their choice to go nuclear. On the one hand, it is the DPRK, who has been perfecting its missile delivery systems. On the other hand, these include India and Pakistan defining the fragile balance of bipolar sub-regional nuclear order in South Asia.

At the same time, certain individual mid-level powers in the Asia-Pacific region also show certain behavioral similarities. Three particular actors that should be named include the Republic of Korea, Japan and Australia.

In early 2023, South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol generated buzz with his statement that expressed Seoul was considering the possibility of nuclearization. Alarmed by this prospect, the US increased its diplomatic activity, and April 2023 was marked by a bilateral Washington Declaration, essentially including a clarification of provisions on the specifics of the nuclear umbrella.

Several months before his assassination, Abe S. triggered an argument regarding Japan possibly hosting US nuclear warheads. Even as incumbent Prime Minister Kishida F., who originates from Hiroshima, keeps promoting disarmament in the global arena (bearing in mind the resolutions sponsored in the UN General Assembly), pro-nuclear voices are here to stay.

Australia’s limitations to the front-end of a nuclear fuel cycle are amended by the AUKUS pact, whose Pillar I presuppose supplying Canberra with nuclear-propelled submarines in a matter of years. Indeed, it sets a precedent for a NNWS to acquire a sensitive nuclear-propulsion technology that is inextricably linked with handling highly-enriched uranium.

Unsurprisingly, the TPNW is largely ignored not only by the nuclear powers, but also their allies heavily dependent on the nuclear umbrella. At any rate, an indigenous military program is not ruled out as an alternative in these countries. The US has been utilizing miscellaneous tools as a bargaining chip to boost confidence in the eroding extended deterrence credibility. Long story short, the latent nuclear powers effectively employ a salami slicing strategy by taking small steps forward while stopping short of becoming a full-fledged nuclear-armed state without crossing the imaginary line.

The regional component, the sense of belonging to the same sociocultural space, forms a point of convergence in the global fora. It is imperative to create channels for communication to mitigate the risks, e.g. mil-to-mil contact lines between the US and China. Finally, educating the general public about both peaceful use of atomic energy and military risks is a path to eradicating dangerous stereotypes about a sustainable and environmentally friendly energy source that, in the wrong hands, could become the Destroyer of Worlds.

The East Asian Sea is affected by the East Asian Monsoonal System (EAMS), which
carries moist air from the Indian and the Pacific Oceans to East Asia. The EAMS
influences the climates of Japan, Korea, and much of coastal China, and thereby affects
approximately one-third of the global population.
Po, R.C. (2018). The Blue Frontier: Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire.
Cambridge University Press. P. 39.

Clouds Piling Up

The vibrant and lively existence of the mega-region is being poisoned by seeds of discord as the international milieu is becoming increasingly securitized by the US-China rivalry. Such can be illustratively exemplified by the blame game that took place at the 2023 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. Intense technological competition is slowly but surely drifting into an arms race. This concerns current infrastructure deployment and R&D advancement that involves dual-use technology, i.e. technology used for both defense and civilian purposes. This includes cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, hypersonics, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as digital infrastructure connectivity and maritime domain awareness undertakings. Another crucial trend is that nations are securing their respective resources, from strategically important rare earth metals to human capital, not to mention the unceasing territorial disputes that occasionally result in border clashes.

That being said, it is no wonder that non-traditional security challenges in the region have been extensively discussed as of late. The pronounced relationship between nuclear weapons and conventional forces is merely one instance that demonstrates the relevance of the nuclear factor in this context. Nonetheless, out of all types of WMD (weapons of mass destruction), nuclear warfare can hardly be omitted from the system of equations describing the regional security architecture. Undoubtedly, this aspect continues to play a prevalent role in the Asian-Pacific region.

If not located in the macro-region itself, virtually all nuclear weapon states leave their military footprint here. To be precise, eight out of nine nuclear armed states are either situated or have direct strategic interests and a military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Such data leads commentators to somewhat alarmist predictions that the next nuclear power may emerge in Asia. These developments prompt analysts to raise the question of whether or not the world is witnessing a transition from the Second Nuclear Age to the Third. Another concept used to describe this trend is the “missile age”, which allegedly came after the unilateral US withdrawal of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty. Paradoxically, the future of nuclear non-proliferation in Asia appeared concerning even almost a quarter of century ago during the so-called “golden age of nuclear arms control”.

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As for the spatial dimension, geographical conditions represent a constant in the field of international relations. In terms of the Asian-Pacific space, this parameter can be designated in terms of heterogeneity. As such, according to the Copenhagen School of International Relations, the Asian super-complex could be arbitrarily divided into subcomplexes based on a sub-regional criterion. This classification, in turn, reflects the unevenness of the distribution relating to the presence of nuclear weapons and the general attitude towards this topic.

The following paper attempts to demonstrate the self-organizing stratified nature of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the Asia-Pacific. This hierarchical structure – even with its shifting boundaries– contrasts the picture of there being anarchical chaos that is oftentimes drawn by (neo)realists. Arguing for the dichotomy between the center and the periphery, the author highlights the different approaches pertaining to the nuclear question within the region.

The Anti-Nuclear Core

An overwhelming majority of universally recognized nations belong to a cohort of NNWSs (non-nuclear-weapon states), and the Asian-Pacific region is no exception. More than that, huge chunks of the Asian-Pacific area are covered by NWFZs (nuclear-weapon-free zones). First of all, there is the Southeast Asian NWFZ under the Bangkok Treaty and the South Pacific NWFZ envisioned by the Treaty of Rarotonga [i].

Some Asian-Pacific NNWSs are active Non-Aligned Movement members, who vocalize their discontent to the NPT (The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) review process. In their view, negotiations in good faith postulated by NPT Article VI are not being pursued as expeditiously as they should. This standpoint has been embodied in the adoption of TPNW (The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) in 2017. Even though the Treaty formally entered into force in January 2021, it clearly lacks verification procedures, and its legally-binding capacity is often questioned.

Supporting the argument that ASEAN plays a central role in the region, it is necessary to pay special attention to the broader geographical backbone of the Asia-Pacific region, i.e. SEA (Southeast Asia). The subregion is quite uniform as far as its stance in all-things-nuclear is concerned. Examining the peaceful use of atomic power, despite dire energy demand, not a single country in SEA can boast the operation of nuclear power units.

On a different note, the sub-regional players considerably favor TPNW. Nine out of ten Southeast Asian nations have signed it, with only Singapore abstaining from the vote. On top of that, more than half of all ASEAN countries [ii] have already ratified the Treaty. This almost unanimous determination may be explained by the consensus-based decision-making characteristic of SEA. Sub-regional actors are watching the nuclear sabre-rattling and growing Sino-US tensions with mounting concern. AUKUS (see below) raised uneasiness in leading ASEAN member states over the securitization of the region’s affairs.

SEA is not alone in retaining a moderately anti-nuclear posture; another prominent case includes smaller Pacific island nations, which were seriously affected by nuclear testing back in the 20^th century. It is no wonder why both Washington and Beijing have been wooing the Pacific islands these days, trying to gather their support to subsequently capture the full benefits of the strategic location of these territories. The PRC appears to have succeeded in winning over the Solomon Islands by concluding a security pact with them in April 2022, followed by a number of other bilateral documents thereafter. This contrasted A. Blinken’s visit to Papua New Guinea, culminating in an updated defense cooperation agreement between the two. Be that as it may, at this stage, the Pacific countries are certainly not ready to host or deal with nuclear weapons in any other way.

Nuclearizing the Periphery: Great Power Impacts

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Official nuclear powers are threatening not only each other but also to middle powers and small states. At least three out of the five NWSs (nuclear weapon states)—China, Russia and the US—have direct stakes in the region. However, the crippled arms control system has not been trilateralized as China has refused to be included in the configuration, nodding to its incomparably smaller nuclear arsenal. Notwithstanding the discovery of numerous silos in the PRC described further, Moscow and Washington’s stockpiles still surpass those of Beijing roughly tenfold, even though China is predicted to have about a thousand nuclear warheads by 2030. Moreover, preventing bilateral arms control arrangements from crumbling—let alone strengthening the corresponding regime—seems like a daunting task in the ever so convoluted security conundrum. The situation is further aggravated by the ambiguity behind deploying various warheads on delivery vehicles, thus lowering the threshold of a nuclear attack – the same vague divisive line as the one between offensive and defensive systems.

China has long been striving to create a full-scale nuclear triad that is based on the Russia-US model. This incorporates the advanced projects of DF-41 ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), Jin-class submarines (Type 094), and Xi’an H-20 stealth bombers (with hypersonic gliders being the cherry on top). The PRC is the only P5 member that is not constrained by one side or any other limitations in terms of producing highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear weapons. No matter how delicately Zhongnanhai has been hiding its nuclear program in the fog of secrecy, in 2021, H. Kristensen and M. Korda famously revealed that 300 silos had been constructed: a discovery that largely changed the power landscape in the region. This build-up suggests that Beijing presumably no longer abides by its minimum credible deterrence posture that goes in accordance with its “no-first use” doctrine.

Russia, with its budget expenditures being noticeably reoriented towards defense, is consistently relying on its nuclear potential. Against the backdrop of the Ukraine conflict, Russia visibly keeps strengthening its nuclear deterrent. Unlike the US, who explicitly banks upon the maritime prong of its nuclear “trident”, Russia—as the successor of the Soviet Union—rather counts on the land-based constituent, namely ICBMs. This does not prevent Moscow from investing in its submarines: over the last few years, the Pacific fleet was supplemented by brand-new SSBNs [iii].

At the current stage, the US prioritizes modernizing its strategic nuclear forces. This tendency is not inconspicuous if seen through the prism of its political economy; major defense contractors have been given contracts for large-scale production with the conflicts in Ukraine and Israel-Palestine. Regardless of rumors of Washington downgrading its nuclear reliance, the role of the latter in US strategic documents becomes all the more striking. “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific” paper was issued under the Trump administration in 2019, while President J. Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy was published in February 2022. A simplistic quantitative content-analysis yields indicative results. Comparing the sheer number of “nuclear” mentions in the two texts, one can conclude that in the 2019 version, there were only two instances, as opposed to the five in the 2022 document. These figures corroborate the idea that nuclear deterrence is not only preserved, but is also consolidating its vital significance for Washington’s regional vision.

Last but not least, extra-regional players with nuclear capabilities are also placing their bets on this part of the globe. Take France for example; with its special attitude towards the Indo-Pacific, it was the first EU country to officially announce a corresponding strategy. Around 7,000 French troops are reported to be stationed in the region permanently. The UK must also not to be overlooked, with its recently announced decision to maintain a “persistent” naval presence in the region, including a deployment of nuclear-propelled submarines. Ideologically, this is reflected in the Global Britain construct with its Indo-Pacific tilt implemented through the AUKUS format.

On the Outskirts of the Regime… But Compensated with Nukes

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Three out of four world’s de facto nuclear armed states (non-NPT) can be found in the Asia-Pacific. Such countries choose not to participate in the NPT in exchange for their choice to go nuclear. Obviously, the most frequently cited example is the DPRK, who declared its decision to leave the Treaty in 2003.

News headlines commonly register numerous North Korean missile tests designed to demonstrate the qualitative growth of Pyongyang’s technological prowess. Contrary to widespread misgivings, North Korea refrained from testing its nuclear bomb in 2022 and 2023. The most recent test was conducted as far as 2017, a year and a half after Kim Jong-un bragged about his thermonuclear weapons (that in some expert opinions, was seen as only as a boosted fission device). In the meantime, the nation looks concentrated on perfecting its delivery vehicles, by solving its miniaturization dilemma. Solid-propellant Hwasong-18 ICBM is reportedly able to reach any spot in the continental US. Diversifying its options, the regime is also aimed at making its nuclear attack submarines operational: No. 841 was launched in 2023. Last year, the DPRK engraved its nuclear status in its Constitution. Curiously enough, similar reports were circulated in 2012.

A fragile balance of bipolar sub-regional nuclear order in South Asia is centered around the India-Pakistan stand-off. The two states have been refining their means of delivery, while also gradually amassing nuclear explosive devices.

Regarding India’s strategic equipment, one could refer to SSBN 80 a.k.a. the INS Arihant and Agni-V missiles that are already in service. During S. Jaishankar’s visit to Moscow, India confirmed its defence cooperation with Russia. Naturally, the jointly devised nuclear-capable supersonic cruise missile BrahMoS is seen as a key project. At the same time, New Delhi is also participating in the joint Critical and Innovative Technologies Initiative with the US. Despite its membership in the Quad, India is strategically autonomous, building nuclear ties with both Moscow and Washington.

Islamabad’s nuclear program is traditionally alleged to be backed by China. Pakistan has been set to overcome New Delhi’s demographic superiority by “eating grass” to create its A-bomb [iv]. In other words, one can witness a particular asymmetry within the subregion: Pakistan has obtained low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons to balance out New Delhi’s larger conventional army.

Even more dangerous is that nuclear clashes may take place between the two parties at any time. Think back to the Sino-Indian rivalry that could have spiraled out of control during the 2020 Ladakh plateau skirmish.

Threshold States: Towards a Nuclear Horizon

On the other hand, certain individual mid-level powers in the Asia-Pacific region also show certain behavioral similarities. The emergence of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” with its accompanying ideologemes (such as “rules-based order”) did not coincidentally coincide with a shift in the US alliance system. By the latter is meant the gradual transformation of the familiar "axis and spokes" scheme into a network. Three particular actors that should be named include the Republic of Korea, Japan and Australia. The US not only provides or exports theater missile defense elements, but also develops them in conjunction with these countries. Adding more stakeholders to previous bilateral naval exercises incrementally contributes to this institutionalization.

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Such a swing in favor of a more decentralized approach is accompanied by a transition from extended nuclear deterrence to integrated deterrence, as is ingrained in Washington’s defense strategy. This complex notion embraces conventional deterrence as well (including economic deterrence), witnessing the overall weaponization of the Asian-Pacific region in a plethora of areas. Notable is the continuity between the D. Trump and J. Biden administrations, including in the nuclear realm.

For a while, ROK (Republic of Korea) has been resorting to a so-called “hedging” policy, i.e. constantly enhancing its non-nuclear strategic capabilities. In early 2023, South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol generated buzz with his statement that expressed Seoul was considering the possibility of nuclearization. Alarmed by this prospect, the US increased its diplomatic activity, and April 2023 was marked by a bilateral Washington Declaration , essentially including a clarification of provisions on the specifics of the nuclear umbrella. After a decades-long hiatus, the practice of US SSBN stops in the coastal cities was resumed. In addition to truly consequential visits by Ohio-class submarines to the port of Busan, a Nuclear Consultative Group was established, primarily to regularly coordinate the details vis-à-vis deterring the North

Although the Japanese population is not so unanimous in gravitating towards nuclear weapons as the South Koreans [v] are, global instability ignited a heated debate in Japan. Several months before his assassination, Abe S. triggered an argument regarding Japan possibly hosting US nuclear warheads. Even as incumbent Prime Minister Kishida F., who originates from Hiroshima, keeps promoting disarmament in the global arena (bearing in mind the resolutions sponsored in the UN General Assembly), pro-nuclear voices are here to stay. Strategic documents revised in December 2022 expressed Tokyo’s (not-so) covert militarization on a doctrinal level. About a year ago, R. Schriver who served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Affairs for the Asian-Pacific Region under the previous administration, admitted that the security environment in the region is conducive for Tokyo to consider the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons, even if he made an important reservation pertaining to the historical grievances of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings. As Washington formerly blocked South Korea’s intention to get hold of nuclear weapons, this statement could be interpreted as a sign of the US discursively prioritizing specific Asian allies over others.

Australia’s limitations to the front-end of a nuclear fuel cycle are amended by the AUKUS pact, whose Pillar I presuppose supplying Canberra with nuclear-propelled submarines in a matter of years. The domestic power struggle is hardly an obstacle: after the Labor party gained the upper hand in 2022, the newly elected government easily reconciled with the submarine deal, in spite of their preceding vows to sign the TPNW. Returning to AUKUS, it indeed sets a precedent for a NNWS to acquire a sensitive nuclear-propulsion technology that is inextricably linked with handling highly-enriched uranium. Canada already had similar intentions in the late 1980s, while Brazil has also been working towards this.

Apart from the threshold states, US “ironclad treaty alliances” in the Asia-Pacific also include the Philippines and Thailand. Nuclear weapons were stored in the soil of the former during the Cold War. This is to say nothing of likely nuclear dimensions of a Taiwan contingency.

Unsurprisingly, the TPNW is largely ignored not only by the nuclear powers but also their allies heavily dependent on the nuclear umbrella. At any rate, an indigenous military program is not ruled out as an alternative in these countries. The US has been utilizing miscellaneous tools as a bargaining chip to boost confidence in the eroding extended deterrence credibility. Long story short, the latent nuclear powers effectively employ a salami slicing strategy by taking small steps forward while stopping short of becoming a full-fledged nuclear-armed state without crossing the imaginary line.

Quid facere debemus?

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This widening schism between the NWSs and NNWSs, coupled with the hesitancy on the part of latent nuclear powers, complicates the regional security nexus. That is not to say the puzzle is hopelessly insoluble. The regional component, the sense of belonging to the same sociocultural space, forms a point of convergence in the global fora. One of the associated recommendations is thus reviving dialogue in multitudinous venues such as NPT Review Conference preparatory committees that start functioning years before the RevCon itself. Another line of work deals with doubling down on the efforts dedicated to empowering the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) to enter into force, which is particularly critical for Annex 2 states in the Asia-Pacific.

In the regional setting, sensible advice is to engage in neighborly relations through multilateral confidence building methods and preventive diplomacy measures. In this context, all the partakers are expected to exhibit readiness for concessions, not excluding asymmetrical ones. ASEAN’s Regional Forum has the potential for promoting preventive diplomacy to work out solutions to nuclear issues. Security problems could also be included in the East Asia Summit agenda. To reinforce regional NWFZs, NWSs could consider ratifying the Protocols to the Treaties. Beyond that, the players should not ignore the opportunities of Track 2 diplomacy in bridging the gaps governments fail to observe.

On a higher level, it is imperative to create channels for communication to mitigate the risks, e.g. mil-to-mil contact lines between the US and China. Such seminal threads have been metaphorically denoted by Australia’s A. Albanese as “guardrails”. Ironically, the tumultuous relationship does not inhibit India’s and Pakistan’s annual exchange of nuclear installation lists.

Reiterating that a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought is a remarkable symbolic move, though it is difficult to imagine de facto nuclear weapons states joining NWSs in these circumstances. Nevertheless, such rules of the game ultimately provide predictability in the misty future.

The anti-nuclear inertia of Hiroshima displayed at the G7 summit in May 2023 spurred a growing rift in the nuclear technology market. By contrast, it would be imperative to facilitate equitable opportunities for developing atomic energy for electricity generation and other non-military purposes under Article III of NPT , underpinned by the commitment to IAEA safeguards. The latter could be buttressed by the vociferous adherence of the region’s states to the Additional Protocol. Finally, educating the general public about both peaceful use of atomic energy and military risks is a path to eradicating dangerous stereotypes about a sustainable and environmentally friendly energy source that, in the wrong hands, could become the Destroyer of Worlds [vi].

i. Given an inherently broad understanding of both the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific concepts, one may find other similar agreements applicable – albeit partly – too, e.g. NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty).

ii. To be exact, this includes Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.

iii. SSBNs are ballistic missile submarines capable of carrying nuclear warheads onboard.

iv. The celebrated saying ascribed to Pakistan’s national leader Z.A. Bhutto goes as follows: “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own”.

v. Repeated polls in ROK exposed that more than 70% of the citizens agree that Seoul should gain nuclear weapons.

vi. “Now I am become Death, the Destroyer of Worlds” is J.R. Oppenheimer’s renowned quote from Bhagavad Gita.