A Rift Between the Koreas: Implications for Russian Policy

Speaking on the occasion of the National Liberation Day of Korea on August 15, 2024, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol unveiled a “new doctrine” for unification, but there was nothing new about it, not even the old adage about dialogue. To put it bluntly, Yoon’s doctrine boils down to “Carthage must be destroyed”: Korean unification can only happen on South Korean terms, and the path to it lies in the violent elimination of North Korean statehood. This essentially amounts to a clear declaration of aggression and an aspiration to take over the North. True, some administration officials are trying to smooth over the negative impression by claiming that the new doctrine is an extension of the 1994 concept of “community” and does not necessarily mean the North’s annexation by force. However, the feverish pace of Seoul’s military exercises, typically conducted jointly with the U.S. and now also Japan, unnerve the North, which responds with its own drills and missile tests.

The danger of a military clash is growing, and a full-scale war could break out from a minor local incident. The North Koreans have every reason to perceive any military action as the beginning of an effort to overthrow their government, especially since this has been explicitly proclaimed as the core direction of South Korea's foreign policy. At the same time, it is important for us that Seoul considers Russian–North Korean cooperation as one of the main negative factors for the unification cause. South Korea’s new approaches to inter-Korean relations raise important questions: how should we build relations with such an unconstructive and unrealistic partner? And how should we take this factor into account in the strategic partnership with North Korea, which has entered a new phase?

Today, when South Korea seems determined to justify its status as a “country unfriendly to Russia” and criticizes us on every occasion for cooperation with North Korea, it would be odd to say anything positive about Seoul’s unification policy, even if we consider it reasonable and worthy of support. Still, from the perspective of Russia's long-term interests in Korea, there is no point in criticizing an empty doctrine that has no practical value anyway or futile efforts of the current government to “expose” the human rights situation in North Korea. If anything merits a response, it is only direct criticisms from South Korea against Russia; otherwise, we can simply ignore these verbal jabs, while preserving the channels for discussing genuinely serious issues as much as possible.

Proceeding from the same considerations, Russia’s growing cooperation with North Korea should not imply official support for Pyongyang’s steps in such a sensitive area as inter-Korean relations. As the U.S., South Korea and Japan are forming a triangle directed against North Korea, China and Russia, the former are eagerly waiting for an excuse to blame us for similar aspirations and “supporting” what they see as North’s aggressive actions in preparation for war against the South. Admittedly, the North Koreans, who were rather skeptical about participating in blocs back in the Soviet era, have recently spoken out in favor of containing the “expansion of the aggressive bloc[s]” on the peninsula and in the region through “the powerful and coordinated counteraction of independent sovereign states.” However, it is important to state clearly that there is nothing even remotely comparable to the activity in the above-mentioned southern triangle happening in the northern part of East Asia, and there are no signs of such plans, so there is no need to put our adversaries on guard in advance. Even if we find the North’s position on Korean unification realistic and logical, because Pyongyang’s recent rejection of practical actions toward Korean unification and the corresponding rhetoric reflects reality and clarifies some misunderstandings.

Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a policy of “standing on our own two feet” on the peninsula and, despite the current asymmetry in relations with the North and the South, to prevent a repeat of the 1990s scenario, when improving relations with one of the Koreas was made contingent on severing ties with partners on the other side of the 38th parallel. Thus, inter-Korean relations should be a matter of our concern only if the prospect of their degradation into a direct conflict becomes real. For now, given North Korea’s strong defense capabilities and the security guarantees outlined in the new treaty with Russia, such a prospect seems unlikely.

Throughout 2024, the two Korean states have fundamentally changed their positions on Korean unification and their relations with each other. A new situation has emerged on the Korean Peninsula that affects the interests of major geopolitical players, including Russia. Formulating relevant approaches is also critical in view of Moscow’s unprecedented reinvigoration of its Korean policy during the same period.

Has the current situation become more dangerous than before? Is a new crisis brewing—this time on Russia’s eastern borders, also involving NATO states, namely from the “eastern flank”? What should be done or avoided?

How realistic is the idea of Korean unification?

A bit of history. Let’s recall that for decades, at least since 1972 (almost 20 years after the ceasefire between the two sides was signed), both Koreas have paid lip service to the gradual unification of the country in a peaceful and democratic manner through dialogue. Both put forward competing (but, to put it mildly, equally unrealistic) concepts of a “Korean community,” “confederation” and others. At the 2000 summit they even seemed to agree on a common understanding of Korea’s future based on the “one country, two systems” model.

Let’s be honest: in reality, both sides realized that such a prospect was unrealistic, and each pursued its own goals under the popular banner of unification. This, of course, could not be said out loud, especially by foreigners, who would then be reckoned by both sides among the enemies of the “entire Korean people” (although the author of these lines has privately expressed this view for many years).

The North initially hoped to complete the unsuccessful “campaign to liberate the South” that started in 1950 (and nearly ended in complete disaster, were it not for China’s intervention). Yet by the 1970s, amid détente between the United States and North Korea’s “patrons”—the Soviet Union and China—Pyongyang came to understand that its hopes of defeating a stronger South Korea, heavily backed by the Americans, were futile. Since then, the North’s goals have become more pragmatic: to receive aid and assistance from the South without ceding its own positions, and ideally to achieve South Korea’s decoupling from the U.S. to engage in dialogue from a position of strength, leveraging its nuclear capabilities.

The South, on the other hand, has always believed in the need to change the “Pyongyang regime” and unify Korea under its rule, although it camouflaged these aspirations with declarations of dialogue, cooperation and unification. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the socialist system around the world, the ruling circles in South Korea were convinced that this goal was within reach: the regime was about to collapse, overwhelmed by hunger and external pressure from a united front of “normal” nations (which at the time sought to include both Russia and China). It didn’t work out—the North Koreans bristled and adopted a siege mentality.

Still, even during periods of inter-Korean rapprochement, such as the Sunshine Policy pursued by Nobel laureate Kim Dae Jung, Seoul’s real goal was not to recognize the North or reach a compromise with its authorities and move towards peaceful coexistence, but rather to soften the regime so as to “strangle it in an embrace.” The North surely saw through this, its frustration from pointless diplomatic efforts and overtures was growing, and the only thing that kept it from walking away was material benefits from economic cooperation (e.g., a joint economic complex in Kaesong). But propping up the regime instead of eroding it did not suit the South, and the conservatives, who replaced the liberals in power, returned to feuding. The situation spiraled into an acute crisis in 2016–2017.

But, in keeping with the pattern of inter-Korean relations, 2018 brought yet another declaration of “the start of a new era.” Following the summits, Moon Jae In and Kim Jong Un solemnly declared that there would be no more war on the Korean Peninsula and that the two Koreas would strive for complete denuclearization. Specific measures were taken to reduce military confrontation, and in September 2018, the defense ministers of South Korea and North Korea adopted the Comprehensive Military Agreement, which included provisions for establishing buffer zones between the two states. But all these good intentions did not outlive the liberal administration for long and were scrapped with the coming to power of conservative Yoon Suk Yeol. Still, both sides did not give up their unification rhetoric. They understood that voluntary unification was unrealistic, whereas “involuntary” unification would in fact lead to the destruction of both states in a nuclear conflagration.

Andrey Gubin:
Spokes versus Axes: Modalities of Regional Security in Northeast Asia

New times—new tunes. The U-turn of the North

After the “honeymoons” of inter-Korean summits and assurances of a new era in Korea’s history, a predictable backslide began that foreshadowed the escalation of global confrontation in the early 2020s. It was essentially rooted in the same processes of global disengagement which proved it was impossible to reach a compromise with the collective West that would satisfy the opposing countries. In the Korean case, the point of no return was the collapse of the U.S.–North Korean dialogue, highlighted by the unsuccessful Hanoi summit in February 2019. Frustrated by the inability of even the liberal administration of Moon Jae In to keep its word and act with any degree of independence from Washington, Kim decided not to engage with South Korea at all.

After a natural pause caused by North Korea’s lockdown during the pandemic, he took a historic step by simply telling the truth: unification in a peaceful and mutually satisfying way for the two Koreas, which are fundamentally antagonistic in all respects, is utterly impossible and even unnecessary. In his speech at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea on December 30, 2023, Kim declared that the unification policy was an “illusion” and should be abandoned, making an irrevocable break with the doctrines of his grandfather and father. He said that unification would never happen with the current Republic of Korea and noted that “the north-south relations have been completely fixed into the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states, not the consanguineous or homogeneous ones anymore.”

The U-turn led to the dissolution of different bodies handling inter-Korean reconciliation in North Korea, the destruction of monuments and sculptures, even the renaming of stations and streets. Any mention of unification disappeared from the narrative, while relevant literature, images and other materials were destroyed, even the writings of the leaders on this topic were removed. Pyongyang went so far as to refer to the Republic of Korea and its people by their official name (Koreans in the South and North use different words for this).

The complete overhaul of the approach to relations with the South was not immediately understood and left the camp of North Korea’s opponents in shock: South Koreans and Americans did not think of a better option than to interpret Kim’s rejection of the very prospect of unification as “preparation for an imminent war.” This was a rather strange conclusion, given Kim’s statement that he does not want unification. So conquering the South is not in his plans either (although he will be ready to respond to attempts at conquest, which will lead to the country’s destruction). The “phantom pains” of his grandfather and father over the “unfinished business of unification” are completely alien to Kim Jong Un. And the fearmongering about his “rush to the South”—while deterring U.S. involvement in the conflict with the threat of using intercontinental missiles against it—appear utterly outlandish. Kim Jong Un and the North Korean elite have proven their pragmatism: what would they gain from occupying the South, which would be immediately isolated from the global economy and face a deep humanitarian crisis that the new rulers will have to address...?

Kim is basically demanding that they leave him alone, get off his back with the unification nonsense and let the two Koreas develop independently, without looking over each other’s shoulder or interfering in each other’s affairs. Is this even possible in today’s bifurcated world? Could the South Koreans accept this “olive branch” and reaffirm that they also view North Korea as an independent state and have no intention of forcibly annexing it?

No such luck.

Konstantin Asmolov:
Russia and North Korea Ready to Cooperate in a Big Way

New times—old tunes. The aggressive rhetoric of the South

Speaking on the occasion of the National Liberation Day of Korea (which commemorates independence from Japan’s colonial rule, with not a word mentioned about it) on August 15, 2024, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol also unveiled a “new doctrine.” But there is nothing new about it, not even the old adage about dialogue. To put it bluntly, Yoon’s doctrine boils down to “Carthage must be destroyed”: Korean unification can only happen on South Korean terms, and the path to it lies in the violent elimination of North Korean statehood. This essentially amounts to a clear declaration of aggression and an aspiration to take over the North.

Yoon’s principles are as follows: unification can only be achieved “on the basis of liberal democratic values,” and the North Koreans must bring to their fellow citizens the freedom that people in South Korea now enjoy, i.e., regime change in Pyongyang. Second, it is necessary to bet big on the North Korean masses, instilling in them the need for such a turn of events as well as ideas of revolt and collaboration with the occupiers. Third, it is necessary to secure the support of the international community, which in this context refers exclusively to the developed democracies of the West. Russian experts have already commented on the unrealistic nature of this doctrine and suggested that it is primarily intended for domestic political use.

Amusingly, this doctrine, as noted by a former South Korean minister of unification, echoes the long-forgotten revolutionary slogans from a different era of North Korea’s "Great Leader" Kim Il Sung. In 1964, he proposed unifying Korea by overthrowing the puppets in Seoul, conducting subversive activities among the South Korean population and working with “progressive nations” to gain support. Both are equally unrealistic. As Russian experts point out, the Yoon administration seems caught between two fires: opposition to unification comes not only from Pyongyang but also from a significant part of South Korean population, which believes that the costs of this process far outweigh any tenuous gains. The conservative administration has no other solutions, much less any real achievements.

In practice, no dialogue or diplomacy can be expected until the term of the current South Korean administration ends, given its clear show of intent to destabilize North Korea and absorb it. True, some administration officials are trying to smooth over the negative impression by claiming that the new doctrine is an extension of the 1994 concept of “community” and does not necessarily mean the North’s annexation by force. However, the feverish pace of Seoul’s military exercises, typically conducted jointly with the U.S. and now also Japan, unnerve the North, which responds with its own drills and missile tests.

The danger of a military clash is growing, and a full-scale war could break out from a minor local incident. The North Koreans have every reason to perceive any military action as the beginning of an effort to overthrow their government, especially since this has been explicitly proclaimed as the core direction of South Korea's foreign policy. At the same time, it is important for us that Seoul considers Russian–North Korean cooperation as one of the main negative factors for the unification cause. South Korea’s new approaches to inter-Korean relations raise important questions: how should we build relations with such an unconstructive and unrealistic partner? And how should we take this factor into account in the strategic partnership with North Korea, which has entered a new phase?

Andrey Kortunov:
The Cold War Never Ended in Asia

Russia’s response strategy?

Russia generally refrains from commenting on the new twists and turns in the two Koreas’ positions toward each other. Moscow’s conceptual approach has always been to “seek to ease confrontation and de-escalate tension on the Korean Peninsula, as well as achieve reconciliation and facilitate intra-Korean cooperation by promoting political dialogue”; yet Russia is not going to interfere in these processes.

Before the new confrontation with the West, when the Republic of Korea was seen as Russia’s prospective strategic partner and North Korea as a friendly neighbor, we proceeded from the following assumptions. In principle, a peaceful, voluntary and independent unification of Korea, once such an agreement is reached by the two states without any outside interference, generally meets Russia’s national interests and its vision of the world. Meanwhile, we understood there was little hope for such a development at the time, though theoretically, in the distant future, when generations change and Koreans in the North and South want to live together, Russia would have no reason to oppose this, given that a unified Korea becomes a neutral and Russia-friendly state. With no historical or significant bilateral problems, it could be a crucial economic partner and a kind of “balancer” in Asia in the context of relations with other major powers, a “security buffer” of a kind. With this approach, we were better positioned than other players involved in Korean affairs: the U.S. saw Korea’s unification only through the lens of conquering the North while maintaining its control over the whole country, China would hardly welcome a large independent power with historical grievances against Beijing on the doorstep, whereas for Japan, a unified Korea with a negative attitude toward the former colonizer would be a nightmare.

Today, when South Korea seems determined to justify its status as a “country unfriendly to Russia” and criticizes us on every occasion for cooperation with North Korea, it would be odd to say anything positive about Seoul’s unification policy, even if we consider it reasonable and worthy of support. Meanwhile, experts find Seoul’s approaches laughable and frustrating, which raises the question of whether this attitude should be extended to the official level. However, it is important to consider how much it will contribute to achieving the primary goal regarding the Korean Peninsula today—preserving stability and preventing conflict. From the perspective of Russia's long-term interests in Korea, there is no point in criticizing an empty doctrine that has no practical value anyway or futile efforts of the current government to “expose” the human rights situation in North Korea. If anything merits a response, it is only direct criticisms from South Korea against Russia; otherwise, we can simply ignore these verbal jabs, while preserving the channels for discussing genuinely serious issues as much as possible.

Proceeding from the same considerations, Russia’s growing cooperation with North Korea “on strategic and tactical issues” probably should not imply official support for Pyongyang’s steps in such a sensitive area as inter-Korean relations. As the U.S., South Korea and Japan are forming a triangle directed against North Korea, China and Russia, our adversaries are eagerly waiting for an excuse to blame us for similar aspirations and “supporting” what they see as North’s aggressive actions in preparation for war against the South. Some Russian social scientists speculate about the possibility of “gradual integration of North Korea into the Russian–Chinese regional security framework” [1]. Admittedly, the North Koreans, who were rather skeptical about participating in blocs back in the Soviet era, have recently spoken out in favor of containing the “expansion of the aggressive bloc[s]” on the peninsula and in the region through “the powerful and coordinated counteraction of independent sovereign states.” [2] However, it is important to state clearly that there is nothing even remotely comparable to the activity in the above-mentioned southern triangle (including joint exercises) happening in the northern part of East Asia, and there are no signs of such plans, so there is no need to put our adversaries on guard in advance. Even if we find the North’s position on Korean unification realistic and logical. As a scholar, I can strongly express my opinion using such terms, because the rejection of practical actions toward Korean unification and the corresponding rhetoric reflects reality and clarifies some misunderstandings (previously, North Korea persistently asked us in contacts to support their concept of unification and criticize South Korea).

Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a policy of “standing on our own two feet” on the peninsula and, despite the current asymmetry in relations with the North and the South, to prevent a repeat of the 1990s scenario, when improving relations with one of the Koreas was made contingent on severing ties with partners on the other side of the 38th parallel. Thus, inter-Korean relations should be a matter of our concern only if the prospect of their degradation into a direct conflict becomes real. For now, given North Korea’s strong defense capabilities and the security guarantees outlined in the new treaty with Russia, such a prospect seems unlikely.

1. K.V. Babaev, S.G. Luzyanin. A Pivot to the East. Moscow: ICCA RAS, 2024, p.135

2. External Policy Office of DPRK Foreign Ministry Issues Press Statement // Rodong Sinmun, 02.07.2024