A Step Forwards, or a Step Backwards? Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Iqaluit (Canada)
Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Iqaluit,
Canada
(no votes) |
(0 votes) |
Head of the Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Studies at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor of MGIMO-University, RIAC Member
It would be difficult to say there was a breakthrough at the Arctic Council biennial session of the eight member-states’ foreign ministers, which took place on 24-25 April 2015. But the successes and failures of the Arctic Council should be assessed primarily on the basis of the expectations that its members associated with the action plans that were agreed two years ago. The Arctic Council states have succeeded, if not fully then to a significant degree, in shielding the council from the impact of the worsening relations between Russia and the West. This may be just half a step forwards, not a whole step. But it is certainly not a step backwards.
It would be difficult to say there was a breakthrough at the Arctic Council biennial session of the eight member-states’ foreign ministers, which took place on 24-25 April 2015. Some had earlier hastened to describe it almost as a failure.
Firstly, Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov did not go to the Arctic Council session. However, Russia was appropriately represented – by Sergei Donskoi, Minister of Natural Resources and Environment.
Secondly, not a single new legally binding agreement was signed at the session. People hastened to place the blame for this on Canada, which has held the presidency of the Arctic Council for the last two years and which is pursuing a harsh policy towards Russia in the context of the Ukraine crisis. However, if one looks closely at the issues that could in theory be the subject of new agreements – cooperation between states in preventing oil spills and cutting methane and carbon emissions – Canada would be counted among the active supporters of binding decisions rather than among the opponents.
Thirdly, the session in Iqaluit did not take a decision to give the European Union observer status, despite the fact that in autumn 2014 Canada lifted its objections, which had been the main obstacle to the relevant decision being taken two years ago. Of course, Moscow was not in a mood to throw open the doors to allow the EU to take part in the work of the Arctic Council at a time when the EU is pursuing a policy of sanctions against Russia. But they still managed to take an outwardly elegant decision – the examination of all applications, not just the EU’s, for observer status was postponed to the next session of the council, which will take place in two years’ time in the USA.
It would be pointless to deny the atmospheric influence of the Ukraine crisis on relations within the Arctic Council. It exists, and it has been manifested repeatedly over the past year. First Canada’s representatives don’t go to Moscow for a task force meeting, then Canada doesn’t have the budget to pay for translators at another session. Little provocative actions like this accompanied the work of Arctic Council bodies through the whole of the past year.
In the context of the profound crisis in relations between Russia and the West there is a great temptation to blame the absence of new agreements on the unconstructive approach of the western countries. But the successes and failures of the Arctic Council should be assessed primarily on the basis of the expectations that its members associated with the action plans that were agreed two years ago. If this is the basis for comparison, it would be difficult to see the last session of the Arctic Council as a failure, or worse, a step backwards. Obvious success can be seen in a whole range of areas of cooperation agreed at the last session in Kiruna (Sweden), which the states were not particularly counting on two years ago, when there was no talk of a Ukraine crisis.
The ministerial sessions of the Arctic Council that take place every two years are the tip of the iceberg. The main work done in the task forces and working groups, which is undertaken by senior officials and requires the approval of ministers, attracts less public attention but is no less important.
One remarkable feature of the Arctic Council is the fact that its agenda and all the discussions held on an Arctic basis are of an exceptionally constructive nature. The actions taken from time to time on issues that bear no direct relation to Arctic cooperation do not alter the overall atmosphere of cooperation.
The permanent secretariat has started working at full strength in the last two years. After several years of agreements and decisions on organisational and financial issues, the tool for financing Arctic Council projects has begun operating, the main beneficiary of which is Russia. The active and extremely busy work of the council’s six working groups and four task forces has continued. The latter have a special place in the structure of the organisation’s operations, since they are tasked with specific objectives in preparing decisions to be taken by the ministers.
The four task forces were set up in 2013: to prepare an action plan or other arrangement on preventing oil pollution; to develop arrangements on actions to achieve enhanced black carbon and methane emission reductions in the Arctic; to work towards an arrangement on improved scientific research cooperation among the Arctic states, and to facilitate the creation of a Circumpolar Business Forum.
In 2013 there was no talk of preparing legally binding agreements on any of the aforementioned issues. The members of the Arctic Council were aware of how difficult this work would be.
The simplest objective to fulfil proved to be the creation of the Arctic Economic Council, which was set up in September 2014 (one of the peaks of the Ukraine crisis). The work was more difficult in the other task forces, and the difficulties they encountered were primarily linked to the actual subject of their activities.
The co-chairs of the task force on oil pollution prevention were Russia and Norway. The agreement signed in 2013 spoke only about being prepared to deal with the consequences of oil spills. Issues concerning the prevention of spills were excluded from it, since it proved much more difficult to reach agreement on these. A cautious decision was therefore taken in 2013 – to discuss an action plan or other arrangement for preventing oil pollution. It was anticipated that the report of the task force would be considered in 2015, while at the same time not excluding that it would present its main findings only in 2017.
Nevertheless in Iqaluit the ministers adopted a framework plan for cooperation in preventing oil pollution resulting from the extraction of hydrocarbon resources and the intensification of shipping in the maritime Arctic. This plan is not legally binding. It is supposed to be implemented by the competent national authorities of the Arctic states in cooperation with each other. But in any case this is even more than the states were expecting to do in 2013. Nevertheless, the group will continue its work and will present its findings to the council’s next session in 2017.
The task force for developing arrangements on actions to achieve enhanced black carbon and methane emission reductions has been working under the chairmanship of Canada and Sweden. This is a difficult issue, above all for Russia. In Kiruna in 2013 Sergei Lavrov even had to put a special emphasis in his speech on the fact that Russia was not quitting the discussion of this issue, but that it required a comprehensive and thorough discussion. The difficulty of the issue is not linked to politics. It lies above all at the economic and financial level. A substantial reduction in emissions, not to mention their minimisation, would require Russia to make significant investment, which it could not afford in 2013, let alone now.
Nevertheless, a framework document on actions to achieve enhanced black carbon and methane emission reductions was adopted in Iqaluit. It sets modest aims. At this stage it is a question of states providing quantitative evaluations of black carbon and methane emissions, and also information on measures taken by them to reduce these emissions. An expert group is being set up within the Arctic Council in order to facilitate the implementation of the goals set in the framework document. The task force will continue its work and present its findings to the next session of the Arctic Council in 2017. The ambitious aim that faces it is to prepare recommendations for an overall quantitative reduction of black carbon and methane emissions by the Arctic Council countries.
Arctic Council Gets New Leader: what choice
will Washington make?
The success of this mission is by no means guaranteed. The difficulties which Russia might encounter in implementing such ambitious goals are indicated by its more restrained stance on this issue and its reservations regarding the nature of its cooperation with the expert group. So it is entirely possible to claim that the progress achieved by the task force on black carbon and methane emission reductions has on the whole exceeded the expectations of 2013, although its activity to bring this work to a logical conclusion is far from over – regardless of how much longer the Ukraine crisis will last.
Finally, the task force on working towards an arrangement on improved scientific research cooperation among the Arctic states, which has been working under the chairmanship of Russia, Sweden and the USA. Its original mandate did not mention preparing an inter-state agreement. The objective of the group was to inventorise the issues that countries are encountering as they move towards intensifying and increasing the efficiency of cross-border scientific cooperation, and to prepare relevant recommendations. At some stage the question arose in this group that preparing an inter-state agreement would be of the greatest assistance in fulfilling this objective.
The possibility of preparing a legally binding agreement on scientific cooperation in the Arctic was discussed at the last meeting of the task force. And although there is not complete unanimity on this issue, and difficult questions can clearly be seen in drawing up such an agreement, including the question of the involvement of third-party, non-Arctic states in this cooperation, a decision was taken in Iqaluit to amend the task force’s mandate and instruct it to prepare a legally binding agreement by 2017.
Thus not only did the work of the Arctic Council not stagnate in the period between the last two sessions under the influence of the Ukraine crisis, but on the contrary it was extremely busy and quite productive. An important intermediate milestone has been passed. New aims have been mapped out. Decisions have been taken to create new task forces and a range of framework documents on other issues.
All this indicates that the Arctic Council states have succeeded, if not fully then to a significant degree, in shielding the council from the impact of the worsening relations between Russia and the West.
This may be just half a step forwards, not a whole step. But it is certainly not a step backwards.
(no votes) |
(0 votes) |
