At a Standstill: Russian-South Korean Relations

The spring of 2022 has unexpectedly become a point of bifurcation in the Russian-South Korean relations. Two factors have coincided to make this happen.

The first reason is the Ukrainian conflict, where Korea’s stance is aligned in accordance with the logic promoted by the West, even if the country does not seek to be at the forefront. Russia has responded by adding South Korea to the list of unfriendly countries. Certainly, this does not mean that Moscow considers Seoul an adversary or equates it with Russia’s European opponents—still, Korea’s accession to sweeping sanctions could not remain unpunished. As a result, the prospects for political dialogue and international interaction have become dim.

The second factor lies in the victory of the conservatives in South Korea’s presidential elections held on March 9. Russia and the South Korean conservatives have always had divergent assessments of the inter-Korean relations and foreign policy perspectives, and they are likely to deepen now, with the gap widening in the approaches to international affairs between Russia and the West.

Both factors cannot but matter not only for political interaction, but primarily for the economy. The structure of economic interaction—established some 30 years ago to function rather well ever since—was suddenly stifled. Bilateral cooperation has received a severe blow, and it is not yet clear how to recover from it.

One can still hope that in the first, initial stage of its activity, the South Korean administration will simply “keep its head down,” avoiding any drastic steps, acting reactively, playing it by ear. Seoul would probably be relieved to see the Ukrainian conflict resolved in any form, and especially the possible subsequent softening of the West’s line in relation to the northern neighbor. But Seoul is clearly unprepared to take any steps to achieve this goal.

We can further assume that the main priority for Seoul with regard to Russia will be the economy. Here, South Korea will try to promote its own interests, albeit tacitly, while constantly looking back at the United States. However, there is not much latitude—primarily, because of South Korea’s deep integration into the U.S.-controlled global financial system. If the actual financial blockade against Russia persists, one can only count on one-time deals and targeted projects in those areas that are of particular interest to the Koreans, obviously aimed at maintaining Seoul’s position in the export market and ensuring a vital supply of raw materials. The latter, however, are quite easy to replace. Although voluntarism’s negative influence is not excluded, because the president, as a novice in international affairs, may take a stand and insist on a line to isolate Russia, especially since Washington will push him to do so.

In turn, Russia, as in other spheres of international activity, will have to radically revise its approaches to its Far Eastern neighbor. We are clearly no longer “strategic partners,” as the Korean diplomacy tried to have it 15 years ago, but we are not adversaries either. And this residual positive should be nurtured.

The spring of 2022 has unexpectedly become a point of bifurcation in the Russian-South Korean relations. Two factors have coincided to make this happen.

The first reason is the Ukrainian conflict, where Korea’s stance is aligned in accordance with the logic promoted by the West, even if the country does not seek to be at the forefront. Russia has responded by adding South Korea to the list of unfriendly countries. Certainly, this does not mean that Moscow considers Seoul an adversary or equates it with Russia’s European opponents—still, Korea’s accession to sweeping sanctions could not remain unpunished. As a result, the prospects for political dialogue and international interaction have become dim.

The second factor lies in the victory of the conservatives in South Korea’s presidential elections held on March 9. Russia and the South Korean conservatives have always had divergent assessments of the inter-Korean relations and foreign policy perspectives, and they are likely to deepen now, with the gap widening in the approaches to international affairs between Russia and the West.

Both factors cannot but matter not only for political interaction, but primarily for the economy. The structure of economic interaction—established some 30 years ago to function rather well ever since—was suddenly stifled. Bilateral cooperation has received a severe blow, and it is not yet clear how to recover from it.

The Ukrainian factor

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The transition of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict into an acute phase, while the relations with NATO are progressively deteriorating when it comes to one of the “four powers”, traditionally seen in Korea as of special importance to the peninsula, came as an unpleasant surprise to Seoul. Although Ukraine is not Korea’s most marginal economic partner, South Korean politicians have so far taken little interest in the intricacies of the situation in Eastern Europe. Now, Seoul was forced to produce an expected reaction under pressure both from Western partners and on the part of its own public opinion. More importantly, from a long-term perspective, far-sighted analysts in Korea do not rule out the possibility that the current aggravation in the Russia-West relations is a precursor to a major conflict with China. In that case, South Korea will not be able to sit on the sidelines.

From the inception of the conflict, public opinion and the media have adopted harshly anti-Russian positions. This has been driven by Western propaganda, especially through English-language channels, which remain a traditional source of information for the South Korean media. According to the analysts, South Korean media have surpassed themselves. In the first days of the operation, up to a third of all news coverage was devoted to assessing the conflict strictly from the Ukrainian and Western perspectives, and “simply a real media war broke out”, with repetitions of U.S. and Ukrainian fake news “as is.” Russian experts on Korea suggest that “the overwhelming majority of the posts are so hysterically anti-Russian that one would think that just a little bit more, and South Korea would almost declare war against Russia on the side of Ukraine.” [1]

We have unconditionally lost the information war against Russia that was unleashed in South Korea. This negativity is also fueled by the projection of events onto the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. If no one seemed to expect that Russia would “intervene” in Ukraine, can we then expect that one day Kim Jong-un will also decide to resort to military action against South Korea?

The voices of the few experts on the former Soviet Union, as well as of analysts who are more rational and objective about Russia, remain virtually inaudible.

Besides, speaking out in favor of Moscow has simply become dangerous for one’s career. Internally, South Korean experts on Russia hastily discuss the prospects, coming to disappointing conclusions regarding South Korea’s relations with Moscow, highlighting the growing Russian-U.S. tensions as the main determinant. In other words, they admit, not without cynicism, that they cannot go against the will of their main ally, even if they run counter to Seoul’s own interests.

The attitude toward Russians has also changed for the worse, including on the Internet. The anti-Russian narrative of the Ukrainian propaganda is being broadcast. In fact, all the achievements of the three decades we spent to overcome the biases against Russia that were shaped during the Cold War have gone to waste. It will take many years before contacts with Russia become less toxic.

At the start of the escalation, the current liberal leadership of the country sought a more balanced approach. At the beginning of the conflict, the statements of the incumbent President Moon Jae-in in this regard were rather vague. The condemnation of South Korean “soldiers of fortune” attempts to take part in hostilities is an interesting signal. Clearly not having a grasp of the situation, the South Korean leadership even presumptuously dared to declare that it did not intend to fully join the collective West’s sanctions against Russia. The South Korean Minister of Trade said that their firms will not accede to export sanctions against Moscow.

This provoked a hysterical reaction in Washington. The obvious and brazen pressure of the United States produced immediate benefits—on March 4, the U.S. Department of State was glad to issue a special press statement about South Korea joining the sanctions.

The approaches of Seoul’s current liberal leadership are based primarily on its own national interests.

First, it understands Russia’s role in resolving the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Although South Korea believes that Russia does not yearn to do anything to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear missile ambitions, Moscow’s shift to supporting the DPRK and, in particular, a possible abandonment of sanctions against the North would be an extremely unpleasant scenario for politicians in South Korea. Russia’s balancing role is also important for Seoul’s greater policy space between the U.S. and China, which are antagonists on the Korean issue.

Second, the main factor might well have to do with economy. Russia has become one of Korea’s ten top trading partners as well as an important export market. Russia is one of the main buyers of shipbuilding products, including unique gas carriers. The Koreans are leading among the suppliers of foreign vehicles on the Russian passenger car market. Thus, Hyundai-Kia sold more than 370,000 cars in 2021. In its turn, Samsung is the leader in sales of cell phones and smartphones, occupying more than 20% of the market, while other electronics of Korean companies sold well. South Koreans do not want to leave the Russian market for “humanitarian reasons” under Western dictates, as they do not perceive the conflict as affecting their principles and values. Unlike, for example, the forceful coercion of the so-called “misguided northern brother,” which is considered acceptable in the South. The Koreans clearly understand that the market niche they freed would be quickly filled, primarily by the Chinese. This would be due, among other things, to the declining purchasing power of Russians due to the depreciation of the ruble.

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In this regard, they fought vigorously to have their producers excluded from U.S. export sanctions against Russia, promising to impose their own export controls of the same level in return. Seoul also managed to get its manufacturers out of the so-called Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR), under which companies producing goods abroad using U.S. technology must obtain a license from the U.S. government before shipping those goods to Russia.

There is another side to the coin. Russia has become one of Korea’s main suppliers of energy and minerals. The supply of some vital for Koreans seafood, something we consider exotic, is also important. Seoul’s adherence to blocking SWIFT operations with Russia, stopping transactions with the Central Bank of Russia, and participating in international sanctions against a number of Russian banks are disastrous for mutual economic cooperation. According to Russian financial analysts, South Korean sanctions against Moscow, including those targeting the Central Bank, “may lead to a reduction or even a complete cessation of trade between the countries.” South Koreans would like to avoid such a scenario by any means, which works in favor of overcoming the standstill in cooperation in the future.

What about Yoon Suk-yeol?

Although South Korea’s new president is not very well-versed in matters of foreign policy, his basic approach is clear, as it consists in strengthening the relations with the U.S., containing China and increasing pressure on North Korea. These approaches do not bode well for Russia in the current confrontation with the United States.

At his very first press conference, the president-elect declared, “I will rebuild the South Korea-U.S. alliance. I will make it a strategic comprehensive alliance while sharing key values like liberal democracy, market economy and human rights.” He also stressed the strategic importance of re-establishing ties with Washington’s other Asian ally, Tokyo, despite longstanding and complicated historical disputes. He even talked about forming a “triangle,” including a possibility of integrated missile defense system between the three countries. As for North Korea, Yoon made some unusual remarks, such as the mentioning of a preemptive strike if Seoul decided that the North Koreans were about to launch a missile attack. Obviously, the Republic of Korea will also be more actively involved in the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, which is basically directed against China. We predict that Seoul will join QUAD, which is essentially an anti-Chinese alliance. A semblance of an Asian NATO based on QUAD and AUKUS is emerging before our eyes. Relations with China may be stress-tested, and cumulatively, the chances of improving relations with Russia will worsen.

Yoon had not said much about Russia earlier, since it was not considered a priority, and it was possible, in nominal terms, to refer to “the need to develop mutually beneficial cooperation.” However, he switched to very critical rhetoric against Moscow on his own initiative after Russia launched a special operation in Ukraine. We could easily draw parallels with the sacred theme of the Korean people’s struggle against Japanese colonialism, as Russia’s actions are perceived as an unjust act of a colonial power acting against a weaker neighbor.

However, the new president’s international affairs and security team, however, will be more realistic. These people are quite powerful, and they adhere to the long-standing traditions, while Russian specialists are well aware of their views. The South Korean administration’s foreign policy team, however, largely relies on the American prism when looking at Russia. It will not be a revelation to assume that all, even minor, steps with respect to Russia will be strictly controlled and restrained from Washington. Therefore, we should not expect much autonomy and progress from the Koreans.

This is nothing new for Russia. President Putin publicly spoke back in 2019 about South Korea’s “shortage of sovereignty” when making decisions regarding its relations with Moscow, even if it serves its own interests. “The Republic of Korea has certain allied obligations before the United States. Therefore, everything stops at a certain moment,” he said.

To be fair, it should be noted that the new South Korean administration is well-intentioned. Thus, the pre-election concept paper on foreign policy expressed the desire to “revitalize bilateral cooperation by breathing life back into and restoring momentum to ROK-Russia relations,” “start with projects that are feasible for both countries,” “expand interchanges of youth and exchanges in culture and humanities,” “operate a high-level consultative mechanism for broadening investment and trade,” “support medical care and tourism,” and finally “restore and rejuvenate information and policy cooperation between the ROK and Russia on North Korean issues.” In our opinion, it would not be necessary to “restore” anything, since the infrastructure for communication on the issues is quite developed at the official and expert level, although this activity has decreased somewhat due to the COVID-pandemic.

What is clear, however, is that Yoon, once he assumes office this May, will obviously have little desire to contradict his ally overseas on the normalization of relations with Russia, so that all the above mentioned will die on the vine.

What happens next?

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One can still hope that in the first, initial stage of its activity, the South Korean administration will simply “keep its head down,” avoiding any drastic steps, acting reactively, playing it by ear. Seoul would probably be relieved to see the Ukrainian conflict resolved in any form, and especially the possible subsequent softening of the West’s line in relation to the northern neighbor. But Seoul is clearly unprepared to take any steps to achieve this goal.

We can further assume that the main priority for Seoul with regard to Russia will be the economy. Here, South Korea will try to promote its own interests, albeit tacitly, while constantly looking back at the United States. However, there is not much latitude—primarily, because of South Korea’s deep integration into the U.S.-controlled global financial system. If the actual financial blockade against Russia persists, one can only count on one-time deals and targeted projects in those areas that are of particular interest to the Koreans, obviously aimed at maintaining Seoul’s position in the export market and ensuring a vital supply of raw materials. The latter, however, are quite easy to replace. Although voluntarism’s negative influence is not excluded, because the president, as a novice in international affairs, may take a stand and insist on a line to isolate Russia, especially since Washington will push him to do so.

In turn, Russia, as in other spheres of international activity, will have to radically revise its approaches to its Far Eastern neighbor. We are clearly no longer “strategic partners,” as the Korean diplomacy tried to have it 15 years ago, but we are not adversaries either. And this residual positive should be nurtured.

There is a certain lure to stand in support of North Korea as opposed to the South. There will probably be those who think that this will make South Korea pay more attention to Russia, which will lead to a greater consideration of our interests. After all, South Korean politicians proceed from the presumption that Russia cannot help much to achieve Seoul’s goals in the inter-Korean settlement, even if it wants to, because of its weak position in the North. But it can make a mess of the situation. What if Russian military and technical assistance to the DPRK is resumed, or—I hesitate to say this—a Russian base is established in the North of the Peninsula? Seoul will try to appease Russia in light of this probability.

We think this is still a risky line, which is unlikely to bring benefits in the long run. Something needs to be done to encourage the DPRK and to align our policies with our own national interests. For example, we could reconsider blindly copying Western sanctions on North Korea. Our policy should become more nuanced, but Pyongyang’s provocative actions in the nuclear missile arms race should hardly be tolerated. In the current world, such actions taken by North Korea could cause a nuclear domino, primarily in South Korea, which would undermine Russia’s national security in the Far East. Nor should South Korea be antagonized for economic reasons, although interesting multilateral projects should obviously be forgotten for now.

In a broad sense, it is not so bad to have a relatively non-hostile and pragmatic partner in the “opposite camp,” as Russian experts on Korean argue. It should be borne in mind that the Republic of Korea is the weak link in the united anti-Russian front of the developed powers.

1. Yoon Suk Yeol’s foreign and Security Policy: Confident Diplomacy and Strong National Security.