Bandmaster or Conductor: What is Wrong with the EU ”Selective Engagement” Policy?

In March 2016, after the initial shock of the crisis that had hit relations between Moscow and Brussels had passed, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini made a policy statement in which she set out the new strategic principles of the European Union’s policy towards Russia, which had been unanimously approved by all members of the EU.

I addition to the glut of provisions that were hard for Moscow to swallow, the so-called “Mogherini List” included the potentially constructive principle of “selective engagement.” That is, Brussels could interact with Moscow in areas of mutual interest, whether this be regional conflicts or global issues, without making unilateral concessions to the Kremlin and without encouraging the various manifestations of Russia’s “aggressive and irresponsible” behavior in international affairs.

It would seem that this was a logical and reasonable position for the European Union, as well as for the West as a whole. Constructive behavior on the part of Russia should be encouraged by expanding cooperation, while unconstructive behaviour should be punished by the introduction of tougher sanctions. The Russian political and business elites who are in favor of a dialogue with Europe should be motivated and emboldened, while those who oppose it need to be isolated and weakened.

And who, if not the European Union, is capable of composing and performing the complex score of “selective engagement”? The European Union has unique experience in dealing with Russia, and it boasts an extremely wide range of tools for exerting influence on the country’s leaders, as well as on Russian society in general. The European school of diplomacy is in many ways far superior to that of the United States and other Western countries.

However, something went wrong along the way.

“Selective engagement” between Russia and the European Union on security issues was unsuccessful, as the latter has invariably turned to NATO and the United States on the most pressing issues. Even though four EU members (France, Germany, Belgium and, for the time being, the United Kingdom) are currently on the UN Security Council, Europe’s stance on nuclear matters is barely audible.

The tentative steps taken by Paris and Berlin to open a dialogue with Moscow on Syria have not led to any practical actions. Also, it would seem that the “selective engagement” between Europe and Russia on Libya is equally doomed.

The European Union and Russia have still not got around to coordinating their positions with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue and to relations with Iran as a whole. And while the stances of the two sides on the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict being objectively close, “selective engagement” is absent here too.

As a result, instead of the harmonious sounds of a symphonic orchestra, only the drums, timpani, cymbals, timbrels and tambourines of the old military marching band can be heard coming from Brussels. And the European Union’s High Representative is doing little to ensure that the musicians are playing in time with each other. Rather, she is more concerned about the EU members marching out of step and breaking the line.

As a result, Federica Mogherini is waving a tamburmajor’s staff, rather than a conductor’s baton. And, on the whole, the European Union’s High Representative has not done a bad job in the role: she has managed to preserve the formal unity of the EU members with regard to Russia, and she has even managed to get such obvious dissidents as Greece, Hungary, and Italy to keep pace with the rest. However, the trouble is that they have all been marching in place for the past five years, albeit together and with great discipline, not taking a single step towards mending relations with Russia.

The “Russian issue” will not budge unless the slogans of the European Union are converted into detailed “road maps” and concrete proposals.

In March 2016, after the initial shock of the crisis that had hit relations between Moscow and Brussels had passed, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini made a policy statement in which she set out the new strategic principles of the European Union’s policy towards Russia, which had been unanimously approved by all members of the EU.

I addition to the glut of provisions that were hard for Moscow to swallow, the so-called “Mogherini List” included the potentially constructive principle of “selective engagement.” That is, Brussels could interact with Moscow in areas of mutual interest, whether this be regional conflicts or global issues, without making unilateral concessions to the Kremlin and without encouraging the various manifestations of Russia’s “aggressive and irresponsible” behavior in international affairs.

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It would seem that this was a logical and reasonable position for the European Union, as well as for the West as a whole. Constructive behavior on the part of Russia should be encouraged by expanding cooperation, while unconstructive behaviour should be punished by the introduction of tougher sanctions. The Russian political and business elites who are in favor of a dialogue with Europe should be motivated and emboldened, while those who oppose it need to be isolated and weakened.

And who, if not the European Union, is capable of composing and performing the complex score of “selective engagement”? The European Union has unique experience in dealing with Russia, and it boasts an extremely wide range of tools for exerting influence on the country’s leaders, as well as on Russian society in general. The European school of diplomacy is in many ways far superior to that of the United States and other Western countries.

In an ideal world, the implementation of the policy of “selective engagement” would resemble the Berlin Philharmonic’s breath-taking performance of Beethoven's Symphony No. 9 under the baton of the great Herbert von Karajan.

“Selective Partnership” as a Failed Strategy

However, something went wrong along the way.

The orchestral performance obviously never took place.

What does the European Union have to show for its strategy of “selective engagement”? The Minsk process, which is aimed at putting an end to the war in Donbass, is at an impasse. Very few people today believe in the full implementation of the Minsk accords – neither in Brussels, nor in Moscow, nor in Kiev.

“Selective engagement” between Russia and the European Union on security issues was equally unsuccessful, as the latter has invariably turned to NATO and the United States on the most pressing issues. Even though four EU members (France, Germany, Belgium and, for the time being, the United Kingdom) are currently on the UN Security Council, Europe’s stance on nuclear matters is barely audible.

As far as we can tell, the tentative steps taken by Paris and Berlin to open a dialogue with Moscow on Syria have not led to any practical actions. Also, it would seem that the “selective engagement” between Europe and Russia on Libya is equally doomed.

The European Union and Russia have still not got around to coordinating their positions with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue and to relations with Iran as a whole. And while the stances of the two sides on the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict being objectively close, “selective engagement” is absent here too.

That is by no means an exhaustive list of missed opportunities for “selective engagement.” As a result, instead of the harmonious sounds of a symphonic orchestra, only the drums, timpani, cymbals, timbrels and tambourines of the old military marching band can be heard coming from Brussels. And the European Union’s High Representative is doing little to ensure that the musicians are playing in time with each other. Rather, she is more concerned about the EU members marching out of step and breaking the line.

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As a result, Federica Mogherini is waving a tamburmajor’s staff, rather than a conductor’s baton. And, on the whole, the European Union’s High Representative has not done a bad job in the role: she has managed to preserve the formal unity of the EU members with regard to Russia, and she has even managed to get such obvious dissidents as Greece, Hungary, and Italy to keep pace with the rest. However, the trouble is that they have all been marching in place for the past five years, albeit together and with great discipline, not taking a single step towards mending relations with Russia.

Discussions about Tactics or Deliberations about Strategy?

I am not at all inclined to lay all the blame for the failure of the strategy of “selective engagement” squarely on Europe. The Russian side has made its fair share of missteps too. Moscow could probably have shown more interest in developing cooperation with Brussels – on the issue of Afghanistan or Syria, for example. It could have refrained from showing its outward support for the right-wing populists in Europe. It could have proposed large-scale joint projects in priority areas for Brussels (for example, environmental protection). Make no mistake, there are all kinds of things that Moscow could have done to restore the dialogue with Brussels – if only it had had the desire to do so! But, seeing as though it was Brussels that put forward the principle of “selective engagement,” then it is Brussels that must take on the bulk of the responsibility for its implementation.

What is more, as we all know, it is easier for the stronger side to take the initiative. And, whatever the Euro-sceptics may say, the European Union is objectively stronger than Russia in just about every respect. The only exception is the military sphere. The European Union has clear advantages in terms of economy, demographics, modern technology, and “soft power.”

This notwithstanding, “selective engagement” was and will always be nothing more than a political slogan, and discussions in Europe about Russia will always be reduced to important but fleeting topics, such as the fate of Nord Stream 2, the latest extension of the sanctions against Russia and the prospects of Russia becoming a member of the Council of Europe. And if the main criterion for the success of the European Union is keeping five-year-old sanctions in place, then doubts about the ability of Brussels to engage in any kind of strategic thinking involuntarily start to creep in.

Incidentally, three months after Mogherini published her “five points,” the Russian side presented a list of proposals to their European partners during the June 2016 visit of the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker to St. Petersburg on how to fill the “selective engagement” principle with real content. However, the visit was heavily criticized in a number of EU member countries, and the Russian proposals got lost in the bureaucratic labyrinths of Brussels.

It is clear that Russia is not the only problem that Brussels officials have to deal with right now. There is also the painful divorce from the United Kingdom, the disagreements on the EU budget and the unprecedented crisis in relations with the United States. Add to this the challenge emanating from China, the threat of a new influx of migrants from the Middle East and, to top it all off, the general feeling of “fatigue” with regard to the issue of Russia, on which no progress has been made for over five years.

However, the “Russian issue” will not budge unless the slogans of the European Union are converted into detailed “road maps” and concrete proposals. We are not talking here about abandoning the policy of “containing” the Kremlin in order to “appease” it, but rather about greater consistency, clarity, certainty, and unequivocalness when it comes to setting tasks. It is also about how Brussels views the prospects of its relations with Moscow in the long term and, in a broader sense, how it sees the future of the European continent in five, ten or 20 years from now.

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The only way for anyone to benefit from “selective engagement” between Moscow and Brussels is through a pan-European consensus on the continent’s future. Without such a consensus, any step taken by the EU leadership to meet Russia halfway will inevitably be met with criticism from the numerous opponents of a rapprochement with Moscow, and the EU policy will devolve into lowest common denominator from among the positions of its members every single time. And since new problems will continue to pop up for the bureaucrats in Brussels, the “Russian folder” will end up being buried under a thick layer of other, equally important but more urgent, cases.

The Precariousness of the Current Consensus

All that being said, the European Union cannot march on the spot forever.

The time will come when the tired musicians of the regimental band will start moving in different directions, and no bandmaster will be able to maintain discipline and drill order any longer. The fragile consensus that Federica Mogherini has worked tirelessly to maintain will eventually fall apart into individual national strategies. And while the attitude towards Moscow is one of the main symbols of European unity today, it will be a fault line of the European schism tomorrow.

And it will not require any kind of ingenious plan on the part of Moscow to undermine the unity of the European Union. In fact, we should not expect any large-scale or grandiose initiatives from the Kremlin with regard to Europe in the foreseeable future. Russian policy is likely to be primarily tactical and opportunistic, as is usually the case with the weaker side in any relationship. The Kremlin can afford to take a wait-and-see approach, without taking any excessive political or economic risks.

In the 30 years of difficult relations with the European Union, Moscow still has not learned how to effectively interact with the numerous levels of the Brussels bureaucracy to extract the maximum benefits. However, over the past five years, Moscow has somehow managed to adapt to the “new normal” in its relations with Europe, and the Russian leadership sees this “new normal” as a far from ideal, but perfectly tolerable, state of affairs.

So, the ball remains in Europe’s, which is where it was five years ago. While I give full credit to Federica Mogherini for her continued efforts and undeniable achievements as High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, I would very much like her successor to do away with the bandmaster’s staff and pick up the conductor’s baton before the orchestra does a runner.

First published in Le Courrier de Russie.