Can Southeast Asia Avoid Hierarchy?

Modern Southeast Asia has moved beyond the state of a “boiling cauldron” described by American scholar Robert Kaplan, but it has not yet evolved into a clearly defined structure. Moreover, the nature of regional order and the place of ASEAN countries in the future global political system remain open questions. The emerging multipolarity offers several possible scenarios, in which centers of power, including collective ones, can form symbiotic relationships or act as a counterbalance to hegemons and revanchists.

Chinese analysts conceptualize global governance as a system where power is distributed among nations, though not necessarily in equal proportions. As China’s overall power grows, it hopes to strengthen its capacity to safeguard and advance its own interests, which is not inherently directed against the West. On the contrary, there appears to be an intentional effort to “demonize” China and pin the blame for all global problems on its “undemocratic” system.

A number of Chinese scholars suggest that the new model of governance should be rooted in the ancient concept of “li” (礼). A system of international relations built on this principle implies openness and consists of several zones of interest. The meaning of “li” can be encapsulated in the idea of “propriety”, which in Confucian tradition is the foremost of the five virtues possessed by a statesman. Countries, in this context, are supposed to agree on a certain “code of conduct”—an established framework for interactions based on the principle of mutual respect.

For a thousand years, the system of international relations in East Asia was China-centric, in the form of the “Hua-Yi Order” (华夷秩序). The driving force had traditionally been the “give more but take less” principle (薄来厚往), which helped avoid wars with neighboring countries that would be disastrous for imperial dynasties and maintain stability across the region.

Today, as in the past, China seeks to give more than it takes—in other words, to promote socio-economic development not only in its immediate neighbors but also in all nations friendly to Beijing to foster a community of Tianxia, or “all under Heaven” (天下共同体). In this model, the center does not exploit but protects the periphery, following the principles of interdependence and co-prosperity. Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang described this concept as unity with the universe and the engagement of the whole world on common ethical foundations, echoing Immanuel Kant’s idea of perpetual peace and Joseph Nye’s notion of soft power. In this paradigm, China becomes an attractive partner for other countries through the appeal of its culture and values, which is expected to cultivate a conflict-free environment in the surrounding region. As a result, lower risks of conflict along China’s borders and a large number of states interested in developing cooperation will allow Beijing to allocate substantial resources toward addressing its own social and economic problems.

It is likely that the future of Southeast Asia, and possibly Greater East Asia as well, lies in a political system that combines the Chinese model of centralized governance with a strong emphasis on technocracy, much like in Singapore, where leadership is mainly entrusted to experts in science and technology, as well as professionals with specialized knowledge, chosen for their practical value to society. In this process, ASEAN’s experience in building a collective identity while preserving national uniqueness and ensuring equal rights will prove extremely helpful in preventing the emergence of any form of hierarchy or exploitation in the region.

Modern Southeast Asia has moved beyond the state of a “boiling cauldron” described by American scholar Robert Kaplan, but it has not yet evolved into a clearly defined structure. Moreover, the nature of regional order and the place of ASEAN countries in the future global political system remain open questions. The emerging multipolarity offers several possible scenarios, in which centers of power, including collective ones, can form symbiotic relationships or act as a counterbalance to hegemons and revanchists.

United by interests, divided by opinions

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The dynamics in Southeast Asia are defined by geographical proximity and mutual dependence. An important characteristic is the predictability of the actors’ behavior and the stability of the regional subsystem of international relations, despite some internal competition. There is no clear leader among ASEAN’s 10 member states, since no single nation has decisive superiority over at least several competitors combined—and, most importantly, no one seeks leadership. This suggests that an external power may attempt to shape the regional order and assert control over less wealthy and influential players, including through the promotion of values and ideas that serve its own interests.

ASEAN countries are interested in maintaining and developing partnerships with all major powers, but without favoring any one of them. The main interest is to avoid dependence in any form and to uphold an equidistant approach. While a few years ago ASEAN’s ability to pursue an independent foreign policy amid the U.S.–China rivalry was met with certain skepticism, today the landscape has changed. In fact, small and middle powers are now forming a collective center of power and playing an important role through membership in multilateral institutions. In this context, ASEAN members view their exclusive relationships with China in a purely pragmatic way, without recognizing any clear superiority over themselves. The cultural affinity between Southeast Asian nations and China is undeniable, but each of them values its own traditions and political specificities. For this reason, any hierarchical order seems undesirable to the countries of the region, and an imposed leader would lack both legitimacy and real power.

Foreign experts widely believe that the Chinese leadership considers Southeast Asia as a sphere of its own security and development interests and, therefore, looks to organize the internal order according to certain Chinese canons. Beijing assigns a key role in this process to the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as other global efforts in development, security and building a civilizational community. China’s influence in Southeast Asia is indeed increasing, especially in the economy and technology. Some local elites perceive China’s growing presence as an expansionist move aimed at reshaping the regional architecture. As a result, efforts to oppose the implementation of Chinese plans have emerged in the region, framed as a precaution against falling into a “debt trap.”

According to public opinion surveys conducted in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines, the population does not see China as having the authority to lead the entire region or set the rules. However, similar concerns about the United States as an alternative leader are even stronger, to the point of outright antipathy. It is worth noting that Southeast Asian nations are not willing to push back against the growth of Chinese influence, especially by force. The prevailing narrative is that ASEAN must retain its centrality in regional affairs, as the organization has managed to build a stable collective identity while respecting national diversity.

Until recently, a significant obstacle had been the “wolf warrior” diplomacy, which Beijing also pursued in Southeast Asia to safeguard its interests, including through coercive methods. However, the Chinese leadership now prefers a softer and more selective approach, actively leveraging public organizations, the diaspora and dialogue along corporate lines.

Profit above all else

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ASEAN is now one of the most popular and successful platforms for diplomatic engagement by small and middle powers. In 2025, crisis management and a complex geopolitical landscape are becoming the new reality. Alongside the COVID-19 pandemic and growing U.S.–China rivalry, the political climate in the region is further strained by the Myanmar civil war and the multilateral dispute in the South China Sea. Malaysia, which chairs the association in 2025, is calling for a balance of interests and responsible behavior. Kuala Lumpur is focused on confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy in relations with China to reduce the risk of escalation, including the finalization of provisions of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Notably, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is not yet inclined to resume full cooperation with the U.S. due to American support for Israeli military action in the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, Malaysia has invited Beijing to participate in the ASEAN–Gulf Cooperation Council summit in May 2025 and intends to actively develop South-South ties within the BRICS framework.

Western analysts are convinced that China has “weaponized” its trade and economic relations with other countries. According to their logic, China’s foreign policy is subordinated to the goal of reforming the global governance system, while the priorities officially declared by Beijing, in practice, imply the erosion of democratic principles and their replacement with authoritarian ones—ultimately restricting freedoms for many nations and hurting prosperity and security.

At the same time, U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to raise duties and tariffs on various groups of countries, including friendly ones, has put ASEAN in an extremely difficult position. Southeast Asia is about to be hit by a “tsunami of imports” from China, as bilateral trade is already approaching the trillion-dollar mark, while the region is unlikely to be able to tap into the U.S. domestic market to make up for the imbalance. As a result, Southeast Asian states are facing the problem of growing social instability due to imminent losses for local businesses, job cuts and rising inflation. Washington is clearly unconcerned about the emerging crisis; moreover, its attempts to “win over” ASEAN members cannot be ruled out.

Governance without subordination

Chinese analysts conceptualize global governance as a system where power is distributed among nations, though not necessarily in equal proportions. As China’s overall power grows, it hopes to strengthen its capacity to safeguard and advance its own interests, which is not inherently directed against the West. On the contrary, there appears to be an intentional effort to “demonize” China and pin the blame for all global problems on its “undemocratic” system.

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A number of Chinese scholars suggest that the new model of governance should be rooted in the ancient concept of “li” (礼). A system of international relations built on this principle implies openness and consists of several zones of interest. The meaning of “li” can be encapsulated in the idea of “propriety”, which in Confucian tradition is the foremost of the five virtues possessed by a statesman. Countries, in this context, are supposed to agree on a certain “code of conduct”—an established framework for interactions based on the principle of mutual respect.

For a thousand years, the system of international relations in East Asia was China-centric, in the form of the “Hua-Yi Order” (华夷秩序). The driving force had traditionally been the “give more but take less” principle (薄来厚往), which helped avoid wars with neighboring countries that would be disastrous for imperial dynasties and maintain stability across the region.

Today, as in the past, China seeks to give more than it takes—in other words, to promote socio-economic development not only in its immediate neighbors but also in all nations friendly to Beijing to foster a community of Tianxia, or “all under Heaven” (天下共同体). In this model, the center does not exploit but protects the periphery, following the principles of interdependence and co-prosperity. Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang described this concept as unity with the universe and the engagement of the whole world on common ethical foundations, echoing Immanuel Kant’s idea of perpetual peace and Joseph Nye’s notion of soft power. In this paradigm, China becomes an attractive partner for other countries through the appeal of its culture and values, which is expected to cultivate a conflict-free environment in the surrounding region. As a result, lower risks of conflict along China’s borders and a large number of states interested in developing cooperation will allow Beijing to allocate substantial resources toward addressing its own social and economic problems.

It is likely that the future of Southeast Asia, and possibly Greater East Asia as well, lies in a political system that combines the Chinese model of centralized governance with a strong emphasis on technocracy, much like in Singapore, where leadership is mainly entrusted to experts in science and technology, as well as professionals with specialized knowledge, chosen for their practical value to society. In this process, ASEAN’s experience in building a collective identity while preserving national uniqueness and ensuring equal rights will prove extremely helpful in preventing the emergence of any form of hierarchy or exploitation in the region.