Cold Peace in European Skies

As it comes to a close, the year 2014 has seen relations between Russia and the collective West reach an emotional level if not seen during the time of the Cold War, then certainly during the periods of detente. Hence, close attention is being paid to any sort of military activities, with the Western media focused on the allegedly increasing intensity of Russian air force missions. Among other works published, in November 2014, the London-based noncommercial think tank European Leadership Network issued an inherently biased policy brief titled Dangerous Brinkmanship.

As it comes to a close, the year 2014 has seen relations between Russia and the collective West reach an emotional level if not seen during the time of the Cold War, then certainly during the periods of detente. Hence, close attention is being paid to any sort of military activities, with the Western media focused on the allegedly increasing intensity of Russian air force missions. Among other works published, in November 2014, the London-based noncommercial think tank European Leadership Network issued an inherently biased policy brief titled Dangerous Brinkmanship [1].

No doubt, the ELN paper compares favorably with the tritely emotional stories seen in the media, first of all coming from the Baltic states, thanks to its brevity and detailed listing of even minor episodes captured in the press and relate to NATO-Russia military encounters at sea and in the air. Since the authors also give references to these sources, the document appears helpful at least as a digest, despite the authors' emotional comments, conclusions and recommendations.

The policy brief highlights three high risk incidents and 11 serious incidents with escalation risks, the most dangerous of them the episode happening on March 3, 2014 when the SAS 737 Boeing flying from Copenhagen to Rome with 132 passengers aboard apparently avoided a collision with a Russian reconnaissance aircraft, probably the IL-20 that was cruising along the Swedish coast with its transponder disabled [2]. The authors stressed that "had these two planes collided with a major loss of civilian life comparable to the tragedy of flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, the result would almost certainly have been a new round of western sanctions on Russia and increased NATO patrolling in the Baltic Sea…". At the same time, the authors held back on the information that the airliner's pilots had been warned about the unidentified aircraft immediately after takeoff, flight vision was excellent, and the two airplanes passed each other at a distance of about 90 meters, which is less than the standard for the civilian flight levels, but still hardly a miraculous escape [3]. Two more high-risk incidents include the detention of an Estonian intelligence officer [4] and the epic hunt for an unknown submarine offshore Sweden [5].

By the end of October 2014, NATO conducted over 100 intercepts of Russian aircraft, which is about three times more than occurred in 2013.

REUTERS/Ilya Naymushin
Discussing the ELN Report: Methodology,
Comparisons and Perspectives

While the threat of escalation following an unfortunate scenario for these three incidents appears rather far-fetched, the 11 serious incidents with escalation risks are even more fanciful. Most of them are related to different kinds of Russian aviation activities. In four cases Russian fighters intercepted and escorted American and Swedish reconnaissance planes, twice they flew around battleships in the Black Sea, and three training flights of bombers were recognized as mock bombing raid missions. There was also the detention and towing of an escaping Lithuanian fishing vessel to Murmansk (where 15 tons of crabs that had been illegally caught were found) [6] and a major Russian exercise in late October. The two latter cases are amusing because the detention of poachers in a national exclusive economic zone is not something that would cause an escalation of international tensions. Moreover, the authors tactfully omitted the series of NATO exercises held last summer and fall, as well as current maneuvers taking place around the periphery of Russia [7].

The run-of-the-mill cases are so numerous that even the authors admit that due to their routine nature, they are barely worth conducting an analysis on. At the same time, their numbers are snowballing. All in all, by the end of October 2014, NATO conducted over 100 intercepts of Russian aircraft, which is about three times more than occurred in 2013 [8].

To sum up, the ELN experts suggest the following conclusions and recommendations toward de-escalation:

• The alarming military incidents between Russia and NATO are growing in number primarily because of the heightened aggressiveness of the Russian military, which is sanctioned by Moscow leaders. In turn, Russia's aggressiveness is generated by the increased activity of the Alliance in East Europe (a statement that can hardly be quarreled with). At the same time, the authors insist that this is a justified response of NATO to the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea.
• The Russian leadership should urgently re-evaluate the costs and risks of continuing its more aggressive military posture, and Western diplomacy should be aimed at persuading Russia to move in this direction.
• All sides should exercise military and political restraint.
• All sides must improve military-to-military communication and transparency.

While the two latter conclusions seem levelheaded (regrettably, the sides are still failing to move in that direction), accusing Russia of escalation in the Baltics appears quite strange. We should recall that the number of fighters in the NATO mission Baltic Air Police was significantly increased back in early March 2014 [9]. More proof of double standards can be found in the way the paper highlights its key points. If a Russian reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace is intercepted and escorted by the Alliance fighters, the case proves Russian aggressiveness. If Russian aircraft intercepts an American reconnaissance aircraft, this is also aggressiveness emanating from Russia, because "the interceptors are armed" (with no questions about the armed NATO interceptors on duty). There appears to be only one solution that will make the authors happy, i.e. an end to Russian flights, including those within national boundaries because encounters between Russian and foreign aircraft predominantly occur during routine flights between Kaliningrad and the mainland.

Does the Military View the Situation as Very Frightening?

Notably, NATO officials and the U.S. top brass in many cases are quite sensible. They certainly recognize the increased activity of the Russian air force and have announced countermeasures in public, at the same time stating that the flights do not pose any kind of direct threat.

www.ausairpower.net
Tu-95MS and СF-18

For example, last September 18, two Russian Tu-95MS bombers and cruise missile carriers with two IL-78 tankers and MIG-31 interceptors were spotted on the Canadian coast. Canadian CF-18 fighters were sent for visual identification and escorting, and after a brief joint flight, the Russian aircraft turned around and went away. At the press conference a NORAD representative said: “We do not see these flights as a threat.” [10] Some experts even expressed certain understanding. Tom Nichols, a national security professor at the U.S. Naval War College remarked in an interview to Forbes: “If you’re going to train to fly 6000 miles to drop a cruise missile, you need to fly 6000 miles to practice, especially if you want to familiarize yourself with the various countries’ reactions along the route.” [11] .

NATO’s official attitude can be seen in its responses to the interception of Russian reconnaissance aircraft by the Baltic Air Police, i.e. the Russian planes do not pose a threat to NATO, while the intercepts are basically needed for the accurate visual identification of the target [12].

On the whole, in terms of threats, NATO and the United States appear to be much more concerned about the developments along the Russian-Ukrainian border and the strength of the nearby contingents. Under these circumstances, the events in the Baltics, from routine flights to the hunt for the mysterious submarine, are strictly peripheral. More proof can be found in the actions of U.S., who had temporarily bolstered its contingent within the Baltic Police Control, but upon termination of this mission, shifted the task of tripling the contingent to the French, the British, Canadians, et al. The U.S. also limited its own role through the periodic deployment of F-16s at the Aviano base in Italy and in Poland for joint exercises that lasted as long as one month each last March and September [13]. With the most serious incidents during the six-month-long aggravation being the detention of an intelligence officer, an airliner and reconnaissance aircraft passing each other at a distance slightly under the standard and a mysterious submarine, the lack of genuine tensions is compensated for by a media campaign depicting Russia as an enemy on the verge of invading Europe [14]. Despite the scrupulously collected and systemized data, the policy brief in question appears to be a piece aimed at making the mudslinging more convincing.

Russia's Attitude

REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov
Alexei Fenenko:
Is Ukrainian Crisis the Last for Russia?

As far as airspace encounters are concerned, Russia's official view, mostly responding to accusations, is normally presented by the Ministry of Defense, which traditionally focuses on adherence to international law and the violation of state borders [15] . At the same time, the MoD usually underlines that the flights are scheduled [16].

Of course, this approach employs a small measure of chicanery. For example, the Tu-95 mentioned in the Canadian episode was seen on the same day when President Poroshenko was speaking in the Canadian parliament [17]. At the same time, Russian aviation does have objective grounds to become more active. Notwithstanding the Ukraine-related political tensions between Russia and the West and the ensuing muscle flexing, the Russian armed forces are undergoing a process of modernization and should inevitably see more action. While pilots are accumulating flight hours and gaining the skills to use the new hardware [18], an onlooker may as well interpret this process as more aggressiveness, especially since during the period between the collapse of the USSR and late 2000s Russian long-range aircraft did not practice regular training flights [19].

Whereas ELN’s appeals for deeper military-to-military cooperation to evade a potentially tragic misunderstanding and restraint from all sides seem reasonable, their first recommendation is far from acceptable because the West should also reevaluate its costs and risks. Conducting exercises near Russian borders only to express amazement and hurt feelings by the fact that Russia was closely watching the maneuvers and then holding its own games indicates either naivety or hypocrisy. Essentially a self-exiting process, mutual military activities will build up until politicians willingly adopt the path of de-escalation. A real cold war is still far away but the sides are working hard to make it happen. The U-turn is feasible only if Russia and the United States, NATO's military and political leader, resolve their fundamental differences, first of all about Ukraine, which appears unlikely in the near future. Until then, expect many more reports on the Russian threat coming from Western media and think tanks.

An appropriate conclusion can be found in the words of the 19th-century top Russian diplomat Alexander Gorchakov who is known to have said: "Russia is reproached for isolation and silence in the face of the facts that fail to harmonize with law and justice. They say that Russia is angry. Russia is not angry, it is just concentrating…"

1. http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/dangerous-brinkmanship-close-military-encounters-between-russia-and-the-west-in-2014_2101.html

2. Civil aviation uses secondary radiolocation when the requested onboard transponders report to ground stations the type, altitude and location of the aircraft. For obvious reasons, military planes in some cases do not activate their transmitters used for identification purposes. In addition, military and civilian systems sometimes experience compatibility problems.

3. http://xn--80aeqcxgbkpk.xn--p1ai/world/20140508/1006956335.html

4. http://itar-tass.com/proisshestviya/1423990

5. A detailed analysis of the episode would not fit the format of this article and can be found in an article by well-known Russian military observer Ilya Kramnik: http://lenta.ru/articles/2014/10/27/baltic/

6. http://ria.ru/incidents/20140919/1024787257.html

7. http://xn--80azep.xn--p1ai/ru/news/20141029/10420.html

8. http://www.aco.nato.int/nato-tracks-largescale-russian-air-activity-in-europe.aspx

9. For details see article "The Fighter Diplomacy" by Alexander Yermakov: /inner/index.php?id_4=3894#top

10. http://www.ibtimes.com/us-canada-intercept-6-russian-planes-2-bombers-over-their-air-defense-identification-zone-1692342

11. http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucedorminey/2014/09/16/recent-russian-bomber-incursions-designed-to-provoke-says-expert/

12. http://news.yahoo.com/nato-intercepts-russian-j ets-over-baltic-sea-151513381.html

13. http://theaviationist.com/tag/31st-fighter-wing/

14. http://www.dw.de/baltic-states-are-worried-and-alert/a-17515615

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/09/15/how-nato-could-defend-against-a-russian-invasion/

15. http://russian.rt.com/article/50807

16. http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20140909/1023361531.html

http://www.rg.ru/2014/05/21/minoboroni-anons.html

http://itar-tass.com/armiya-i-opk/1571070

17. http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/09/20/patrulnye-bombardirovshhiki-tu95-proletaya-u-beregov-alyaski-granic-ne-narushali.html

18. Last October 29, the Norwegians spotted the Su-34 bombers used for intensive training by the Russian air force. http://theaviationist.com/2014/11/11/su-34-rnoaf-f-16s-photo/

19. http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/796804