European Security Space: the Problem with Ukraine
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PhD in Economics, Head of the European Security Department RAS Institute of Europe
Put forward at the beginning of the 1990s with universal support, the doctrine of a "Europe of peace and cooperation" is creating a fundamental conflict of interests between the Eastern and the Western poles of the continent. The crisis in Ukraine poses the most serious trial en route to a Wider Europe.
Put forward at the beginning of the 1990s with universal support, the doctrine of a "Europe of peace and cooperation" is creating a fundamental conflict of interests between the Eastern and the Western poles of the continent. The crisis in Ukraine poses the most serious trial en route to a Wider Europe.
After the end of the Cold War, the overall paradigm of European development radically changed, from confrontation and reciprocal containment to systemic and comprehensive cooperation. Former adversaries in Eastern and Western Europe eventually came together to set a goal of creating a single and indivisible common European space and a community of security from Vancouver to Vladivostok on the principles of consent, common obligations and objectives. As far as the security of this Wider Europe is concerned, it appears reasonable to look, on the one hand, towards all-out cooperation, and on the other, towards drastic reforms of relations in the field of security, especially with regards to military and political engagement.
Wider Europe is a Wobbly Historical Concept
After World War Two, Western Europe integrated itself in order to contain the communist and Soviet threat. However, as soon as the Warsaw Pact collapsed and the USSR broke up, its strategic task evolved into consolidating security structures in order to repel threats and solve the challenges of instability emanating from the East, including those related to processes of disintegration. This strategy inevitably reduced the idea of Wider Europe to the expansion of the western space of "freedom, security and stability" eastward, also incorporating the practical policies of such basic Euro-Atlantic institutions as NATO and the EU. Attempts to bring Russia into the expanding Euro-Atlantic community failed, whereas Moscow stepped up its efforts to resist this enlargement and consolidate the Eastern, i.e. post-Soviet, space.
The growing interdependence within the European system due to globalization has prompted a rejection of mutual containment in favor of the idea of Wider Europe.
At the turn of the 1990s, a deep-rooted conflict of interests arose between these two poles – the integrating West that could not incorporate Russia, and Russia itself, eager to create an independent pole equal to the West in political terms. In reality, this controversy is still significantly affecting the development of the European Security System (ESS). Now and then, the potential for conflict continues to plague political crises between Russia and the West, at the same time pushing both sides to search for less confrontational ways to overcome their differences.
The growing interdependence within the European system due to globalization has prompted a rejection of mutual containment in favor of the idea of Wider Europe. However, the interests of the East and the West do differ (Eurasia vs. Euro-Atlantic projects), maintaining the need for a permanent balance between containment and cooperation. This kind of equilibrium could be qualified as mutual restraint, which periodically tilts towards either side depending on the evolution of the political and economic environment in Europe. The most important fluctuations are happening in the field of security. First of all, this area seems most sensitive in view of national or collective sovereignties and interests. Second, prior to the Ukraine crisis, the ups and downs within this structure never had before caused direct negative consequences of critical economic importance; during this period, the indirect consequences were also not always linear [1]. Third, certain adjustments in security policy have appeared to be somewhat easier to accomplish institutionally, whether through harmonizing approaches, in implementing decisions or in selecting appropriate timing.
As a matter of fact, this seeming ease later turned into a major disadvantage for European affairs. Worsening security relations send an important political signal, indicating the lowering of bars on contacts between the Europe's West and East. At the same time, events have shown that it would be improper to overestimate the possibilities for a security breakthrough, as overall tensions are building due to instability and the perpetual recurrence of security problems due to the fundamental differences between East-West interests that remain (and are growing).
Although the Cold War is a thing of the past, the bipolar structure of the European security system is still intact, having morphed into a new vague bipolarity with the inner structure of the poles deprived of their previous rigidity and supplemented by an emerging common space for interaction. As a result, in the absence of a direct reciprocal military threat, the European Security System preserves the non-prevailing logic of mutual containment and the zero-sum game, which prevents the development of a multi-level and multilateral partnership. The twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War have not been enough to eliminate the dangers of a military-political conflict in Europe, and the Ukraine crisis points to the need for amending the political planning process. This yet another shift in the European political balance from cooperation to mutual containment, all the more in the military-political dimension of the relationship between Russia and the West, is not a temporary occurrence.
The Ukraine Crisis: One More Setback
Russia and the West appear to have exhausted their resources and capabilities to build cooperation by harmonizing the Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic projects.
In contrast to previous European security crises (Yugoslavia 1999, Georgia 2008) when opponents managed to find solutions with positive cooperation, the crisis in Ukraine crisis has shut off such prospects in the foreseeable future. The crisis is devaluing the results of the reset between Russia and the West in the early 2010s, leaving current and future rival political elites virtually no choice in favor of another rapprochement. Russia and the West appear to have exhausted their resources and capabilities to build cooperation by harmonizing the Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic projects.
During Vladimir Putin's third presidency, Russian politics has undergone major changes. Moscow has proposed Eurasian integration that is oriented primarily at accommodating the interests of partners rather than the political and ideological weapons to counter Western expansion. To this end, the project was announced and intended not as an alternative to Western integration or to the European integration of Russia but as a scheme for possibly enabling convergence between the West and the East of the Eurasian space and promoting competition on a harmonized and transparent basis. But Russia's partners in the West, first of all the European Union, perceive this opportunity as a geopolitical challenge.
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The third acute ESS crisis over Ukraine has dotted the "Is" in setting off a qualitative shift in the Russia-West security relations over mutual containment. The West has perceived Russia's Ukraine policy and the "annexation" of Crimea as irrefutable proof of Moscow's aggressive, imperial aspirations. For its part, Russia assured itself of the West's inability and reluctance to consider its fundamental concerns and interests, and, moreover, that of the intended course to undermine these interests. The West, primarily NATO, has refused to interact with Russia on a business-as-usual basis. The European post-Cold War modernism has brought forth a geopolitical classic redux rather than a postmodern Wider Europe.
Why Ukraine?
The Ukrainian domestic mess on the one hand reflects the accumulating tensions between the European poles and, on the other, has sparked off one more (and expected) crisis of the European security system, which is pushing the sides to drastic adjust their policies, strategic yardsticks and guidelines. NATO has officially declared a revision of its entire relationship with Russia, the EU has cancelled talks on a new basic agreement, the G8 has returned to the G7 format, and the toughening of Russia sanctions has become central to the bilateral agenda. Moscow has accused the West, primarily the United States, of intentionally escalating the conflict, which was started by the West to pursue its interests and contain Russia.
The European post-Cold War modernism has brought forth a geopolitical classic redux rather than a postmodern Wider Europe.
The Ukrainian crisis of the ESS is specific for its unprecedented political and economic features. First, it has been caused by the aggravated conflict of the Western and Eastern integration projects, so it has been geo-economics that has determined the strategic choice of the EU/United States and Russia in the security area. Second, the West has for the first time imposed direct economic sanctions against Russia. Economically engaged with Russia much less than Europe, the U.S.A. is twisting its allies' arms to adopt harsher measures against Russia in response to the "annexation of Crimea" (1, 2, 3). This considerably raises the threshold for recovery and diminishes the military-political dangers in Europe, including on the basis of international treaties.
Third is the issue of the payer for Ukraine, i.e. for the country that is becoming critical in view of European security and relative stability. The absence of coordinated or at least mutually acceptable actions between Russia and the West, with the tug of war across Ukraine in full swing, will definitely deepen the ESS rift.
Fourth, the European security crisis will have long-term political and economic consequences, as both the EU and Russia are already in search of alternative trade, financial and investment ties, first of all in the area of energy. Corporations both in Europe and Russia are trying to offset the adverse political environment and the centrifugal trends caused by the Russia-West political crisis, only exacerbating the conflict between business interests and security policy.
Soft Power Failure
Regarded by the European Union as the key method in ensuring security when political aims are drastically different, soft power no longer seems effective for alleviating conflicts and even has even precipitated political crises, including military confrontations. To this end, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and the association offered by the EU to its Eastern partners have made up the core of European security policy. But this approach has turned highly conflict-prone and aggravated tensions in many areas, including along the East-West dimension and covering all types of conflict, i.e. extended, smoldering, delayed and escalating. Soft power has by no means ousted harsh military-political security aims, as many had hoped, but instead has provoked a new spiral of military and political tensions. The ESS is still increasingly volatile, its only constant being stable uncertainty.
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and the association offered by the EU to its Eastern partners have made up the core of European security policy. But this approach has turned highly conflict-prone and aggravated tensions in many areas.
Just about every main parameter of the current security system is experiencing difficulties in countering modern dangers and challenges. At the same time, there is no consensus about these inadequacies, since the containment-partnership balance has not been fixed in the Russia-West strategic partnership framework, neither between states and between politicians nor between politicians and civil society.
The Wider Europe Chimera
The Ukraine crisis has only proven the conclusions that emerged during the settlement of the 2008 Georgian quandary – no concept of a Wider Europe can be built in the absence of qualitative restructuring of the European security system. And it has become even more obvious that such changes are unfeasible without tackling the fundamental difference, i.e. the "dilemma of the two Europes" related, on the one hand, with the expansion of and strengthening of the Western/Euro-Atlantic space (and creation of a Wider Europe through its expansion), and, on the other, with the unlikely inclusion of Russia into the Euro-Atlantic model of Wider Europe and Moscow's mounting resistance to Western pressure. However, the key ESS members currently believe that the previous moves in favor of the security community, including relevant initiatives (the European Security Agreement, joint missile defense system, the Medvedev-Merkel Memorandum of Meseberg in June 2010 on the establishment of Russia-EU foreign policy and security committee), will not provide in the foreseeable future opportunities for solving the Ukraine crisis by revisiting the philosophy of Wider Europe. The Wider Europe project is aimed at establishing equal cooperation between the United States, the European Union. Russia is unlikely to have any strategic interest for Washington. On the other hand, the domestic European conflict is bolstering the U.S.’s position in Europe through a situation where its strategic priorities are moving away from Europe. At the same time, the New Europeans, invariably enthusiastic about defending against an "aggressive Russia", are gaining ground. Since the trans-Atlantic alliance is the main tool for organizing the defense, the European allies of the United States are strictly limited in their opportunities to move away of the U.S. policies toward Russia.
Attempts by NATO and the EU to begin crossing the "Ts" (1, 2) might provide a proper foundation for launching the dialogue anew. In view of the Ukraine crisis, it seems timely to acknowledge that the West is correct in saying that Russia would like to structure its sphere of interests, perhaps creating some special privileges, and is not much different from the West in that it has been consolidating and expanding its area of security and stability since the early 1990s. Russia is definitely behind in terms of resources and would like to maximize its advantages by playing its historical cards, which include such things as the notion of the Russian world, political and administrative levers, and economic ties, including in the energy sector.
It does not seem appropriate to suggest working toward a new European Alliance. Both Russia and the West have to recognize that they have failed to drive the European balance from containment to true partnership and drop the zero-sum game, despite two quite successful attempts to navigate the relationship from a political crisis towards engaged cooperation at the turn of the 2010s. Today, such a crisis management strategy is hardly acceptable for political reasons, since it failed to tackle the key conundrum, i.e. to harmonize the common European space now divided by Ukraine and within Ukraine. The shortage of mutual trust in Europe has become acute, as Russia and the West deeply mistrust each other. In the near future, the sides might only work to minimize the damage and preserve a pragmatic level of cooperation and constructive relations. At that, the two European poles appear to be constructing new strategies proceeding from the need to lessen the highly strategic mutual dependence.
Meanwhile, new realities – the association agreements signed by the EU and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and the Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union signed by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan – seem to be preparing a new common European agenda. Now it appears most important to formulate it in the absence of a prolonged geopolitical rivalry but rather in the context of decreasing the chances for conflict and harmonizing the evolving integration structures, including by establishing universal rules and democratic mechanisms for competition.
At that, the parameters for a future European Security System to a great extent hinge on the situation in and around Ukraine. The deep-rooted causes of the Ukrainian crisis, combined with potent external drivers, the virtually crossed line of the humanitarian price and likely further military and political escalation make the situation highly unpredictable and settling the crisis highly troublesome.
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Hence, it appears that external conflict of interests provoked the Ukrainian mess, which is definitely both a reflection of widening European rifts and their origins. In order to overcome this dangerous crisis, the sides should on the one hand attempt to continue building a Wider Europe as a common fundamental goal in order to minimize the negative political fallout of this acute phase of the Ukraine crisis. On the other hand, efforts must be taken to jointly arrange a settlement in Ukraine that will not only call for the de-escalation and stabilization of the situation, but also create the prerequisites for future cooperative development within the common European system.
1. For example, the chill in relations between Russia and NATO in some way prevented the degradation of the economic relationship, diverted political differences and even raised interest in interactions within formats beyond NATO, primarily the Russia-EU and G8. After the events in Yugoslavia in 1999, the Russia-NATO freeze was accompanied by enhanced Russia-EU interaction, largely to compensate for the lack of political dialogue. After the conflict in Georgia in 2008, the EU refrained from sanctions because freezing the NATO relationship with Russia offered a conclusive political response sufficient to avoid the risks to economic interests and ties.
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