What has not been said about EU-Turkey Summit?

An unexpected, but extremely important result of the immigration crisis in the European Union in the summer and autumn of 2015 was the intensification of the dialogue between Europe and Turkey. From now on, the Sword of Damocles that is the issue of migrants transiting through Turkey hangs over the European Union – and it is clear that Turkey will hold this sword over the heads of the Eurocrats until a visa-free regime and, eventually, EU membership become accomplished facts.

An unexpected, but extremely important result of the immigration crisis in the European Union in the summer and autumn of 2015 was the intensification of the dialogue between Europe and Turkey. The Meeting of the EU Heads of State or Government on November 29, 2015 resulted in the European Union promising to reenergize negotiations on introducing a visa-free regime between the two sides, revisit the process of Turkey’s accession to the European Union and pay Ankara 3 billion euros to set up camps for Syrian refugees. Turkey, for its part, pledged to tighten its border. It was the exodus of Syrian refugees from Turkey (by the end of 2014, there were 1.6 million Syrians in Turkey, according to official Turkish estimates) that triggered the sharp crisis of the Schengen zone and of the European Union’s immigration policy.

In negotiating with Turkey, the European Union proceeds in accordance with earlier and apparently rational schemes. The idea of cooperation with countries that export/transit migrants was formulated in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum in 2008 and was being successfully implemented. The current crisis gave the European Union added incentive for increased interaction with third countries. Turkey is not only a transit country for migrants, but also a long-time partner of the European Union in this area: specialized Turkish camps accommodated more than 200,000 refugees. Consequently, there are enough institutional and practical reasons for turning Turkey into the main ally of the European Union in containing Middle East immigration. However, there are some obvious questions. The first is: What price is the European Union ready to pay Ankara for partnership? Second: how effective would such a partnership be?

There are enough institutional and practical reasons for turning Turkey into the main ally of the European Union in containing Middle East immigration.

EPA / STR / Vostock Photo
Migration – A Challenge of Time

A certain paradox can be detected in the decisions of the Meeting of the EU Heads of State or Government: to counter the wave of illegal immigrants, the European side promised to ease control of the border with the country, which is responsible for a significant proportion of illegal migrants coming to Europe, by the end of 2016.

A certain paradox can be detected in the decisions of the Meeting of the EU Heads of State or Government: to counter the wave of illegal immigrants, the European side  promised to ease control of the border with the country, which is responsible for a significant proportion of illegal migrants coming to Europe, by the end of 2016. Given the growing terrorist threat on the one hand, and the fact that there are Islamic State fighters on Turkish territory on the other, you cannot help but wonder about the rationale of the European Union’s position. The European Union, of course, will do everything to delay the fulfilment of the most important and risky commitments to Turkey and confine itself to financial aid. Indeed, the half-a-century-old history of Turkey’s attempts to become a member of the European Union shows that the European establishment is committed to keeping Turkey in the anteroom of Europe without letting it into the European home. There is nothing to suggest that the strategy has changed radically under current circumstances.

However, the context has changed somewhat in recent months. From now on, the Sword of Damocles that is the issue of migrants transiting through Turkey hangs over the European Union – and it is clear that Turkey will hold this sword over the heads of the Eurocrats until a visa-free regime and, eventually, EU membership become accomplished facts. That would determine the effectiveness of Europe–Turkey interaction in controlling illegal migration. On the one hand, we can already see that Ankara has actively set about implementing its end of the bargain. Hardly a week passed before the Turkish security forces carried out a massive operation in the border area, arresting 1300 migrants who were planning to enter the European Union illegally, as well as the people who organized their transit through Turkey. Obviously, in the future such operations will be carried out fairly regularly. But let us suppose that for some reason – perhaps in relation to the Cyprus issue, which blocks rapprochement between Europe and Turkey – the European Union fails to meet its very extensive obligations fully. Will Ankara have enough motivation and good will to continue to keep Syrian refugees in Turkish camps if the Syrian conflict drags on and Brussels once again starts dragging its feet? The answer is obvious. Even the current influx of refugees to Europe was to a large extent provoked by a conscious decision on the part of Ankara, which was fed up with being a loyal ally of the Old World without due reciprocity. The Turkish borders were opened, refugees flooded the European Union, and now the European Union has to ask its ally for help. But not for free.

From now on, the Sword of Damocles that is the issue of migrants transiting through Turkey hangs over the European Union – and it is clear that Turkey will hold this sword over the heads of the Eurocrats until a visa-free regime and, eventually, EU membership become accomplished facts.

REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin
Arif Asalyoglu: A New Page in Relations with
Moscow, or Life after 24 November 2015

However, the context has changed somewhat in recent months. From now on, the Sword of Damocles that is the issue of migrants transiting through Turkey hangs over the European Union – and it is clear that Turkey will hold this sword over the heads of the Eurocrats until a visa-free regime and, eventually, EU membership become accomplished facts. That would determine the effectiveness of Europe–Turkey interaction in controlling illegal migration. On the one hand, we can already see that Ankara has actively set about implementing its end of the bargain. Hardly a week passed before the Turkish security forces carried out a massive operation in the border area, arresting 1300 migrants who were planning to enter the European Union illegally, as well as the people who organized their transit through Turkey. Obviously, in the future such operations will be carried out fairly regularly. But let us suppose that for some reason – perhaps in relation to the Cyprus issue, which blocks rapprochement between Europe and Turkey – the European Union fails to meet its very extensive obligations fully. Will Ankara have enough motivation and good will to continue to keep Syrian refugees in Turkish camps if the Syrian conflict drags on and Brussels once again starts dragging its feet? The answer is obvious. Even the current influx of refugees to Europe was to a large extent provoked by a conscious decision on the part of Ankara, which was fed up with being a loyal ally of the Old World without due reciprocity. The Turkish borders were opened, refugees flooded the European Union, and now the European Union has to ask its ally for help. But not for free.

Thus, the European Union’s tactical interest – countering the challenge of immigration – plays into the hands of what is in this situation a strategic interest of Turkey, which is to draw closer to the European Union and make itself useful for European policy. The next two or three years will show which side has gained more. Will Turkey win by securing not only promises and fast-dwindling money, but also concrete institutional and legal formats that bring it closer to the European Union? Or will the European Union win by managing to stabilize the migration flow and simultaneously keep Ankara at a distance? So far, all we can say is that the interests of the parties in this context are at odds with one another and a win-win situation may not materialize.