One unexpected outcome of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that China-Russia relations have taken center stage in global affairs. Even though China is not a party to the conflict, while the Russia-Ukraine crisis has nothing to do with the PRC and the conflict’s termination does not hang upon China, Sino-Russian relations are a major variable in the international environment where this conflict is unfolding, since the relationship has a critical impact on the strategic balance between Russia, the United States and Europe. As a result, China-Russia relations have become the focus of global attention, and China’s policies are being studied through a magnifying glass.
Given the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the policy chosen by China will be the main factor of potential changes in Sino-Russian relations. In other words, how relations between China and Russia will change depends mainly on China. In this sense, China is the largest and perhaps the only external force capable of shifting the international balance of power. Beijing’s choice will not only determine the direction of Sino-Russian relations but will also tilt the balance of power in the international arena in favor of one side or the other. The rapprochement of China with the United States and Europe and its estrangement from Russia, even if only on political and economic levels, would significantly worsen the strategic positions of Moscow. Moreover, the international strategic structure will become highly unbalanced, which will further aggravate Russia’s plight. On the contrary, unification of China’s efforts with those of Russia will shift the balance in Moscow’s favor on the world stage as China and Russia will inevitably form a powerful force, and Russia’s ability to compete with the United States and Europe will greatly increase. At the same time, this will contribute to the formation of two major blocs, which will give the Russian-Ukrainian conflict a tinge of group confrontation.
Thus, China’s political choices are crucial, and despite the very narrow room for maneuver, Beijing needs to come up with the most appropriate posture. Of all China’s political choices, Beijing’s policy toward Russia is the main one, because it defines Beijing’s relations with Moscow, which, in turn, influence the strategic structure and balance of power, and this will certainly have important repercussions for the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
One unexpected outcome of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that China-Russia relations have taken center stage in global affairs. Even though China is not a party to the conflict, while the Russia-Ukraine crisis has nothing to do with the PRC and the conflict’s termination does not hang upon China, Sino-Russian relations are a major variable in the international environment where this conflict is unfolding, since the relationship has a critical impact on the strategic balance between Russia, the United States and Europe. As a result, China-Russia relations have become the focus of global attention, and China’s policies are being studied through a magnifying glass.
Given the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the policy chosen by China will be the main factor of potential changes in Sino-Russian relations. In other words, how relations between China and Russia will change depends mainly on China. In this sense, China is the largest and perhaps the only external force capable of shifting the international balance of power. Beijing’s choice will not only determine the direction of Sino-Russian relations but will also tilt the balance of power in the international arena in favor of one side or the other. The rapprochement of China with the United States and Europe and its estrangement from Russia, even if only on political and economic levels, would significantly worsen the strategic positions of Moscow. Moreover, the international strategic structure will become highly unbalanced, which will further aggravate Russia’s plight. On the contrary, unification of China’s efforts with those of Russia will shift the balance in Moscow’s favor on the world stage as China and Russia will inevitably form a powerful force, and Russia’s ability to compete with the United States and Europe will greatly increase. At the same time, this will contribute to the formation of two major blocs, which will give the Russian-Ukrainian conflict a tinge of group confrontation.
Thus, China’s political choices are crucial, and despite the very narrow room for maneuver, Beijing needs to come up with the most appropriate posture. Of all China’s political choices, Beijing’s policy toward Russia is the main one, because it defines Beijing’s relations with Moscow, which, in turn, influence the strategic structure and balance of power, and this will certainly have important repercussions for the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
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A more accurate definition of China’s positioning in the Russia–Ukraine conflict is
constructive intervention rather than neutrality. Unlike the US and the West, China’s policy is not based on choosing a side, but oriented toward constructive results.
At this stage, China’s understanding of constructiveness can be summarized in the
twelve-point proposition of the Ukraine peace plan it proposed in February 2023.
From China’s perspective, the Ukraine crisis is extremely complex in terms of its
causes, participants, and pursued interests. It is not only a war between Russia and
Ukraine, but also a proxy war or quasi-war between Russia and the US and NATO.
With regard to Russia and Ukraine, China has never had any problems with Ukraine.
However, when it comes to Russia and the US and NATO, China believes that the
latter two hold substantial responsibility for the outbreak and continuation of the war
and that some countries have exploited the Ukraine crisis to pursue their own geopolitical goals.
From this perspective, China is not neutral.
Constructive engagement is a flexible policy that has room for specific policy
adjustments according to the situation and is not fixed in one position.
China and Russia’s “no forbidden areas of cooperation” phrase is widely used by
Western public opinion as evidence of China’s support for Russia’s military operations and a possible alliance with Russia. This is a misunderstanding or misperception. Putin did not inform China of Russia’s planned military action, and naturally
there is no possibility of China’s support for Russia. “No forbidden areas of cooperation” has nothing to do with alliances. China and Russia established the principle of
non-alignment in 2001, and this principle has never changed.
From the wording, the “no forbidden areas of cooperation” and non-alignment
can easily trigger misunderstanding. However, if we analyze the entire relevant section of the China–Russia joint statement instead of examining these terms in isolation, we can see that “no forbidden areas of cooperation” falls within the framework of non-alignment and non-targeting of third parties.
There are two diametrically opposed viewpoints on the issue of the Russia–Ukraine conflict in Chinese academic circles. One supports Ukraine and the
other supports Russia. The pro-Russia side is the mainstream. Its main argument is
that the US and NATO are responsible for the Ukraine crisis and that the US will be
freed up to deal with China after defeating Russia. Therefore, China should not help
the US fight Russia.
China will continue to maintain normal state relations with Russia. China–Russia
relations encompass extensive and important interests for China, especially in terms
of security in border areas, stability in surrounding areas, regional cooperation, and
energy cooperation. These interests are long-term and require good state-to-state
relations as a guarantee. Maintaining normal relations does not mean supporting
all policies of the other side, but China cannot give up all these important national
interests because of this.
Maintaining China–Russia relations is in line with the general law of state relations; that is, if there is no direct and major conflict of interests, friendly countries
usually maintain normal relations and will not take the initiative to destroy them.
Most countries in the world have not joined the sanctions against Russia, which confirms this rule.
China is willing to maintain good relations with all parties, including the US and
Europe. But the credo of the West, especially the US, is still “you are either with us
or against us.” This does not give China any space, as it equates China’s unwillingness to oppose Russia with support for Russia. The consequences of this approach
are obvious. Its natural result is to push China and Russia closer, deepening the trend
of global division and bloc confrontation.
The US’s “black and white” policy is also selective. China’s policy on the conflict
between Russia and Ukraine is no different in principle from that of many countries
across the world. All Shanghai Cooperation Organisation countries, including India,
also hold positions similar to China’s, but the US chooses to target China. This is
certainly because the China factor is more important, but it is also driven by certain
geopolitical needs.
The Russia–Ukraine conflict is still ongoing, and neither the final outcome nor the
end of the war can be seen clearly. As long as the war is still going on, all kinds of accidents and losses of control may suddenly break out and turn the whole situation upside
down. The future situation is not optimistic. China’s policies, China–Russia relations,
and relations between China and the West all may yet face new tests and challenges.
Originally published in the China International Strategy Review.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-023-00129-2
Read the full text of the article https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-023-00129-2
