France and Africa: Another Fresh Start?

In the last winter days of 2023, French president Emmanuel Macron held a large press conference where he heralded a postcolonial “new era” in Franco-African relations. This statement was made on the eve of the French leader’s second tour to several local countries in recent months, with the intention to set the tone both for the trip and for France’s regional strategy for the coming years. In an attempt to mitigate the failure of anti-terrorist Operation Barkhane, the president introduced new policy outlines and the methods of its implementation. However, Macron’s reasoning, as well as the outcome of his tour, left more questions than answers, highlighting the growing vulnerability of the French positions in Africa.

The so-called “communicative offensive”, labeled as the fight in the information space and in soft power to fix the image of the Fifth Republic in Africa, is declared as a priority. Instead of the previous polyphony of agencies, when security forces, businessmen, politicians and cultural figures talked to Africans each separately about their own topics, there should be a single “national team of France,” capable of broadcasting a shared vision of major goals. Nevertheless, it is still appropriate to conclude that the reality is less rosy for Paris than the Elysée Palace wants to present. As the political scientist N. Bagayoko notes, the countries of the continent have learned over the past decades not to trust even the most benevolent statements of the French presidents. Particularly, French diplomacy is still failing to define its attitude toward the political systems of African countries.

The general abstractness of the president’s reasoning catches the eye. For example, it is yet to be determined how the “Africanization” of French bases will work in practice and whether this process will cause additional political and financial costs compared with the current situation. The bet on the youth, proposed by E. Macron, is not very adequate to improve France’s reputation in Africa here and now.

Thus, it would again be premature to claim that France’s African policy has already obtained a new coherent image, because its crisis is too deep to be resolved in a single press conference and a trip. Interestingly, the same assessment prevails inside France. According to surveys, about 60% of respondents are pessimistic about the future of Franco-African relations. Against this background, while French diplomacy is overcoming the legacy of the past, there is a favorable situation for the expansion of the presence of Russia, which has no colonial past in Africa and could fill a number of promising niches where French influence has weakened. Among these, experts highlight not only the security sector or the agro-industrial sector, but also, for example, cooperation in the digitalization of public finances. Additional impetus for Russian-African relations should be expected from the Second Summit Russia–Africa, scheduled for July 2023.

In the last winter days of 2023, French president Emmanuel Macron held a large press conference where he heralded a postcolonial “new era” in Franco-African relations. This statement was made on the eve of the French leader’s second tour to several local countries in recent months, with the intention to set the tone both for the trip and for France’s regional strategy for the coming years. In an attempt to mitigate the failure of anti-terrorist Operation Barkhane, the president introduced new policy outlines and the methods of its implementation. However, Macron’s reasoning, as well as the outcome of his tour, left more questions than answers, highlighting the growing vulnerability of the French positions in Africa.

Triple crisis

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Notably, Macron has repeatedly touched upon the problem of updating the African dimension of French policy. Thus, back in 2017, speaking at the University of Ouagadougou, he admitted that the old schemes no longer work and that the heart of the Francophone world beats “in the Congo basin, not on the banks of the Seine.” In another speech to French ambassadors in 2019, the head of state stressed the inescapable continuity of the historical destinies of the Fifth Republic and Africa, insisting on the need to offer the latter an equal partnership without unilateral asymmetry. Three years later, Montpellier hosted an unusual Africa–France Summit whose main audience was the youth rather than top officials. Since Macron’s accession to office, the Presidential Council for Africa, which brings together representatives of civil society and diasporas, has been put in place; intellectuals and artists, such as the philosopher A. Mbembe, the musician F. Ipupa, etc., are close to the top official.

The constant attention to this subject is indicative as such, because Macron is trying to solve one of the main chronic problems of French foreign policy through such steps and statements, which is the rapid decline of French influence on the African continent. During the Cold War, when Africa was not quite central to the confrontation of superpowers, French diplomacy enjoyed almost unlimited carte blanche on the continent, especially in its western part, where most of the former French colonies are located. The Fifth Republic could afford to use almost any tool, which included, as summarized by IFRI expert F. Gaulme, military capabilities (overseas operations), financial leverage (CFA franc), official development assistance (often under non-transparent schemes). With the light hand of the French secret service, figures who were far from high standards of democracy and human rights, but who provided official Paris with political influence and control over natural resources, came to power in Africa, namely J.-B. Bokassa, B. Compaoré, O. Bongo, and others. Since the 1990s, however, this system of informal patronage over former colonies has increasingly started to falter. The Communist threat that had partly legitimized France’s special role on the continent had disappeared, but the Fifth Republic was also forced to integrate itself into a changing world where its capabilities came to be sufficient for a middle power with elements of global responsibility rather than that of an all-powerful gendarme of Africa. In a number of cases, mistakes were made in assessing the situation on the ground, most notably in Rwanda, where, as the French leadership subsequently admitted, no real steps were taken to prevent genocide. Although the search for a new concept to replace Françafrique was looming, it was constantly postponed: each president gave in time and again to the temptation to try the old methods, as was the case with J. Chirac (the military operation in Ivory Coast), N. Sarkozy (Libya) or F. Hollande (Sahel, Central African Republic). Without ever getting a new qualitative content, by the 2020s the French strategy in Africa had found itself in a deep crisis of at least three inter-related dimensions.

First, the conflict in the Sahel clearly demonstrated France’s inability to be an effective security provider for African countries. Despite the occasional local successes in the fight against terrorists, such as undercut warlords and destroying strongholds, no systematic solution has been found since 2013 to address the root causes of jihadism. The presence of French armed forces in the region, as well as the international MINUSMA and EUTM missions, has not prevented the geographical expansion of terrorist attacks or the financial and personnel support of the factions. The training of local armies, whose joint contingent could hardly be called a combat-ready unit due to a lack of logistics, poor discipline, etc., was falling apart without any clear success. Attempts to involve European allies more actively in the Sahel theater of war also yielded limited results, since EU countries chose to commit only a small expeditionary force (Takuba Task Force). Over the years, the range of international sponsorship formats supported by France for the countries of the Sahel has expanded, but none of them has really changed the tense situation in health, education, water, and food supply. As a result of the 2020-2022 military coups, France lost two of its most important regional allies, Mali and Burkina Faso, whose new authorities demanded that the French army withdraw from their territory. As a consequence of these trends, in November 2022 Macron was forced to declare the end of Operation Barkhane, thereby de facto admitting the defeat of France in the Sahel.

Hence, second, the French presence in Africa was proved to be at an image deadlock. The protracted nature of Operation Barkhane suggested that the Elysée Palace was not really concerned with combating terrorism and restoring regional security, but with its own vested Françafrique-styled interests (mainly, access to the natural resources of the Sahel). As Western experts have recognized, a persistent sentiment anti-français on the continent has emerged, among both elites and ordinary citizens. A constant background for the work of French diplomats and the military was the rebuke of neo-imperialism sounded at numerous protests, the demand to immediately “get out” of Africa and repent for the mistakes made. The various gestures that the government of the Fifth Republic has made for historic reconciliation (for example, the restitution of museum objects to Benin) have still caused overall irritation for being too point-like and for the various associated conditions. Characteristically, Paris preferred to ignore the real origins of the problem at the official level, believing that anti-French sentiment was artificially fueled by the alleged “Russian propaganda.” Meanwhile, as FRS expert L. Rinel rightly points out, Russia’s information influence should hardly be exaggerated: other powers (China, Japan, Turkey, etc.) are also active in constructing their own narratives, while the French do give reasons for criticism (including the military’s nonideal behavior toward the local population).

Third, former claims to a special status have lost their basis because of a certain economic disengagement between France and its former colonies. While France was the main trading partner of most West African countries in 2000, it was heavily bypassed by China two decades later. It was Beijing that managed to transfer the lion’s share of all debts of African countries to itself, sharply increasing direct investment and getting a number of major projects in infrastructure and energy. At the same time, France’s share of African markets is now estimated at only about 4%, of which the Maghreb countries, not Sub-Saharan Africa, account for a large part. According to estimates by Les Echos, France has fallen to fifth place in terms of annual investment in Africa, behind the United States, Britain and Italy, in addition to China. As explained by the Chief Executive Officer of Business France C. Lecourtier, this is largely due to the reluctance of French corporations to take risks and invest in mega-projects on the continent—modernization of port infrastructure, construction of highways and railways—which, by contrast, is actively done by the Chinese competitors. The main area of high interest of French business rests in the fields of mining and oil and gas industries—primarily, uranium mines in Niger and oil and gas in the Gulf of Guinea. However, IFRI experts believe that even these African natural riches are no longer as high a priority for France as they used to be, since alternatives have been found for every usual supplier (for example, uranium deposits in Namibia, South Africa and Kazakhstan).

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All three crisis dimensions are brought together by the fact that France’s strategy in Africa has essentially lost any clear and long-term objective. For all its contradictory nature, Françafrique still had a guideline, which was to preserve a kind of Pax Gallica, or a special sphere of influence, which could confirm the country’s great power status. Now that this project no longer corresponds to the real possibilities of Paris, France’s African strategy is in need of a new meaning to its existence, not merely another impetus.

New modus operandi, old shortcomings

At a press conference on February 27, introducing his approach, Macron tried to emphasize its innovative nature, insisting that a “new era” in French-African relations is emerging and that it has little in common with the old strategy. As the president explained, France no longer perceives its partners on the African continent as “a backyard”, but as equal, sovereign nations with whom it will foster “balanced and partner-like” relations. The French no longer have the right to “dictate the development framework” for African countries and societies, but rather it is the former metropolis itself that absorbs traditions and cultures of its former colonies (“our youth listens to Congolese, Nigerian, Ivorian music”). According to Macron, the perception of Africa through military-political rivalry is nothing more than an “anachronism”, so France consciously renounces competition by old methods. While “other countries” continue to act as “predators,” France will follow a more equitable path, taking into account the interests of local states and achieving common objectives not only in the military sphere, but also in the economy, sports, science and health care. Instead of retaining the former sphere of influence at all costs, the current meaning of the French strategy on the continent is much broader, seeking to build a large Euro-African space as a new axis of development for the twenty-first century.

Among the most substantive proposals that Macron voiced at the Elysée Palace press conference and on his tour to Gabon, Angola and the two Congo, these ideas stand out:

• Macron has expressed his intention to restructure the format of the French military presence. So far, France has a number of strongholds on the African continent, located along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon), in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait (Djibouti) and partially in the Sahel (Niger, Chad). These bases will now serve as training centers (“security hubs”) in conjunction with local military forces, which could also receive training and practice interacting with each other. French troops themselves, as Macron has repeatedly reiterated, are not leaving their locations and will focus, in addition to fighting jihadists, on preventing climate crimes, repression of piracy, drug and arms trafficking. Overall, according to the French president, the military presence of the Fifth Republic should not catch the eye and will be carried out in a coordinated manner with the consent of the host countries. The very existence of bases, he stressed, does not give France any special rights to intervene in internal African affairs: it cannot and should not try to tackle every conflict on the continent.
• The so-called “communicative offensive”, labeled as the fight in the information space and in soft power to fix the image of the Fifth Republic in Africa, is declared as a priority. Instead of the previous polyphony of agencies, when security forces, businessmen, politicians and cultural figures talked to Africans each separately about their own topics, there should be a single “national team of France,” capable of broadcasting a shared vision of major goals. French representatives should be open to dialogue on any topic without complexes and without former arrogance, especially with young people, which is important, including outside the Francophone zone. Where Paris has previously unilaterally imposed its point of view, it should act more delicately: reaching out not only to ruling elites but also to opposition and civil society and conveying its views through African intellectuals and opinion leaders. Not only the eternal problems of Paris’ continental strategy should resonate in public space, but also all kinds of success stories when, thanks to France, African descendants become prominent figures in science, art or sports (following the example of football player K. Mbappe).
• Besides, Macron drew attention to the economic return of the Fifth Republic to the continent. In this regard, it is proposed to forget the logic of “colonial rent,” when French business expected unilateral advantages simply by virtue of the fact that it represented a former metropolis. In today’s environment, France has to fight anew for its place in the sun, beating China, Turkey and other countries by using the market way and by the quality and cost ratio. The idea of “co-industrialization” of the French and African economies, that is, the establishment of joint small and medium-sized enterprises, which could be primarily undertaken by representatives of the diasporas, was mentioned. As a new priority Macron singled out, although without going into details, France’s participation in the establishment of logistic corridors between the North and the South in the framework of the EU Global Gateway initiative, as well as the intention to consider the wishes of African countries in the development of a “new architecture” of the global financial system. In addition, a different approach to development assistance to African countries is planned to be taken: the so-called “solidarity investments” are to replace non-repayable grants, ideally with a reverse positive effect on the French economy.

As a consequence, Macron’s March tour was designed to immediately confirm the emphasis that had been put. In particular, the main event of the visit to Gabon was the French leader’s participation in the One Forest Climate Summit, which ended with the signing of the so-called Libreville Plan for the protection of equatorial forests. During his trip to Angola, the French head of state attended an economic forum with the participation of local and French business circles, while having briefly visited Brazzaville, Congo, he announced the construction of a memorial to the colonial soldiers who fought for free France during World War II. Finally, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Macron has distanced himself from direct involvement in the conflict in the east of the country, limiting himself to the provision of humanitarian aid and failing to criticize the Rwandan authorities for possible support for the rebels against Kinshasa. It was supposed to look as if Macron had really given up the image of, in the words of an adviser to the Gabonese president, “the Frenchman who lectures,” and was ready to change France’s African policy in terms of style and reputation.

Nevertheless, it is still appropriate to conclude that the reality is less rosy for Paris than the Elysée Palace wants to present. As the political scientist N. Bagayoko notes, the countries of the continent have learned over the past decades not to trust even the most benevolent statements of the French presidents, since the discussions on the end of Françafrique have been held, strictly speaking, not even since the Macron administration, but much earlier, and each time they did not lead to any real progress. The chronic lack of specificity behind slogans about a “new era” in relations leads to distrust and ultimately the denial of any French policy as such. “We can only hope that this is not a momentary flare-up, but really a new beginning,” his Congolese colleague F. Tshisekedi exhaustively commented on Macron’s new perspective. The previous tours of the head of state in Africa have also received extensive press coverage, with numerous announcements and symbolic steps, but the effect was sufficient for several months at best. Accordingly, the latest trip does not give any guarantees of qualitative changes, especially since Macron’s approach is still not devoid of internal contradictions.

African Pressure Points: Sahel (situation review and future prospects). RIAC and ICRC Report (2022)

Particularly, French diplomacy is still failing to define its attitude toward the political systems of African countries. Judging by the theses of the head of state, Paris intends to defend democratic values and the turnover of power with one fell swoop, harshly criticizing the leadership of Mali and Burkina Faso for the neglect of electoral procedures. At the same time, France continues to maintain ties with Chad and Gabon, where the incumbent leaders inherited their positions from their fathers, or with Cameroon, whose president P. Biya has been in office since 1982. France thus also tries to communicate with civil societies over the heads of national elites, causing discontent of the latter. According to Bagayoko’s observation, French diplomats, while promising to listen to the entire spectrum of opinions, in practice still give priority to friendly segments of the African public, and prefer to ignore pan-African, anti-Western sentiment. This paradox was formulated by the center-left Libération as “New words hide old schemes,” referring to the contradiction in the president’s words between the idea that competition for Africa is “archaic” and the desire to engage in economic competition.

The general abstractness of the president’s reasoning catches the eye. For example, it is yet to be determined how the “Africanization” of French bases will work in practice and whether this process will cause additional political and financial costs compared with the current situation. The bet on the youth, proposed by E. Macron, is not very adequate to improve France’s reputation in Africa here and now. This will only pay off by the end of the decade, when the current young generation of Africans begins to fully integrate into politics, economy, and other areas (also with no guarantee of sustained sympathy for the former colonial power). Most importantly, apart from culture, education, and sports, the specific niches that the Fifth Republic could pick up on the continent and through which it itself would be of interest to Africans as a prospective, rather than historical, partner remain unclear. As the Elysée Palace itself seeks to banalize its role in Africa, it will increasingly have to put up with the fact that its non-Western competitors will prove more successful in a number of areas, and its former colonies’ international ties will become increasingly diversified. However, as the recent cases of Mali and Burkina Faso have shown, acknowledgment of such facts is still very difficult.

Thus, it would again be premature to claim that France’s African policy has already obtained a new coherent image, because its crisis is too deep to be resolved in a single press conference and a trip. Interestingly, the same assessment prevails inside France. According to surveys, about 60% of respondents are pessimistic about the future of Franco-African relations. Against this background, while French diplomacy is overcoming the legacy of the past, there is a favorable situation for the expansion of the presence of Russia, which has no colonial past in Africa and could fill a number of promising niches where French influence has weakened. Among these, experts highlight not only the security sector or the agro-industrial sector, but also, for example, cooperation in the digitalization of public finances. Additional impetus for Russian-African relations should be expected from the Second Summit Russia–Africa, scheduled for July 2023.

This article was prepared as part of a grant project of the Russian Science Foundation no. 23-28-00418, https://rscf.ru/project/23-28-00418/.