From Tanks and Deserts to Missiles and Tropical Islands

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has launched a radical reform that fully reflects the changes in U.S. geopolitical priorities. The Marines are busy getting rid of all their tanks, planning to stock up on medium-range missiles and preparing to become a defensive wall against the growing Chinese fleet.

The reason given for the reform is that the current structure of the USMC, which is optimized for large-scale landing operations that involve the establishment of a base area to deploy a strike force and further advance into a given territory alongside the Army, is outdated and incompatible with the task of preparing for a confrontation with the great powers in the near future. It is almost safe to say that the USMC has spent the last several decades as a hostage to its own dogmatic beliefs about a glorious large-scale operation similar to the assault landings of World War II or the Battle of Inchon of the Korean War. It wouldn't dare to admit to itself (and, more importantly, to those politicians who are responsible for budget allocations) that it would never venture to carry out such operations in today’s much-changed world. The USMC leadership has come to the realization that nostalgia for the past threatens the future of the Corps.

In order to be more mobile, the Marine Corps needs to become “lighter.” The plan is to reduce the number of marines in the Corps by approximately 12,000 by 2030. But qualitative enhancement is far more important than quantitative augmentation. The USMC currently uses light reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Boeing ScanEagle and RQ-21 Blackjack, and the AAI RQ-7 Shadow, which are to be moved to the Army’s infantry units. Meanwhile, the individual squadrons can purchase something more serious, with longer flight duration and better strike capabilities, such as the General Atomics MQ-9B Reaper or something even more advanced. The capabilities of missile artillery are expected to grow in a more impressive manner.

However, the USMC’s plans to strengthen its striking power in the coming years extend beyond simply doubling the amount of ammunition and increasing the range of existing systems. It looks like the Marine Corps plans to become the first branch of the United States Armed Forces to deploy missile systems that had previously been banned under the INF Treaty. And we are not talking about modernizing the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) here. A compact launcher based on the JLTV all-terrain vehicle is set to be completed under the ROGUE (Remotely Operated Ground Unit Expeditionary) programme by 2022–2023. The first stage of ROGUE involves equipping the vehicles with Naval Strike Missiles (NSMs), which have a range of up to 200 kilometres and are, of course, capable of striking ground targets. However, the plan is to add nothing less but long-range Tomahawk missiles at the earliest opportunity. Once they have been deployed, for example, in Okinawa or Mageshima, this will be enough to knock out targets in East China, the most populated and industrialized part of the country. It is important to understand that these are not just fantasies: the USMC’s budget request for 2021 includes the purchase of Tomahawk missiles, even though it does not currently have the technology to actually use them.

New ships will also be required to transport and safeguard small combat groups over long distances. The relevant design work has already begun in cooperation with the Navy.

Following the reform, the USMC should become a tool that is streamlined as much as possible for solving the most important task the U.S. Armed Forces will encounter in the coming decades, namely, to contain the growing power of China. The Marine Corps plans to take up the first line of defence: to “jump” from island to island of the so-called “first island chain” and saturate the combat groups as much as possible using long-range missile weapons, while avoiding the cumbersome infrastructure that is vulnerable to strikes from Chinese medium-range missile attacks from the mainland. Ground units with light armoured vehicles will be tasked, first of all, to protect these missiles, as well as to repel air and sea landings and seize no man’s land or poorly protected pieces of land from other states.

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has launched a radical reform that fully and completely reflects the changes in U.S. geopolitical priorities. The Marines are busy getting rid of all their tanks, planning to stock up on medium-range missiles and preparing to become a defensive wall against the growing Chinese fleet.

The “Devil Dogs,” a name the Marines have worn proudly since World War I, have always spearheaded the American military machine, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The highly mobile amphibious forces deployed on ships and at overseas bases around the world are often the best prepared for use during crisis situations. The image of the USMC as “elite” units is fostered by the countless works of art glorifying their heroic deeds and by the fact that it is the Marines that guard the White House and U.S. embassies abroad. Many believe that the USMC is the only branch of the military that the president can use freely without having to obtain permission from Congress, although this is a myth that took root during Soviet times [1].

Lockheed Martin
PrSM launch

However, this image is a far cry from reality. The fact is that the USMC, which is without a doubt made up of well-trained and highly motivated personnel with extensive combat experience, is the “poor cousin” of the American armed forces. It does not have its own department in the Pentagon and is subordinated to the U.S. Department of the Navy and is consequently financed on a largely “left-over” basis (the United States tries to split military expenditures equally among the three main departments — the Air Force, the Navy and the Army).

Once the “household” expenses are taken care of, there is barely enough for the most critical rearmament programmes, which currently include the purchase of F-35B Lightning II short take-off and vertical landing fighters and amphibious combat vehicles (ACVs). The F-35B is set to replace the F/A-18 Hornet combat jets, the AV-8B Harrier II assault aircraft and the EA-6B Prowler electronic-warfare aircraft — the USMC simply does not have the funds to purchase the cutting-edge EA-18G Growler jammers used by the Navy, for example. At the same time, the Marine Corps has to rummage through garbage, so to speak, just to keep its current fleet in decent working order — pulling decommissioned naval aircraft from “boneyards” or acquiring retired Harrier II jump jets from the United Kingdom to strip them for parts. The USMC does not have the funds to develop and deploy its own large drones. Instead, it contracts manufacturers to carry out flights in conflict zones.

This is the state of affairs in the United States Marine Corps, and it has been this way for the past two decades or so, hopelessly stuck in seemingly “endless wars” in the Middle East, where, instead of carrying out decisive landing operations, it has been mostly engaged in counterinsurgency activities or strenuous occupation service in countries that do not even have access to the sea. In the meantime, the focus of U.S. military and geopolitical efforts have shifted to the Indo-Pacific, and the country’s main enemies are now other great powers.

The Donald Trump administration has been quite candid about this, despite the fact that the process was already in full swing under Trump’s predecessor, the man he hates so much, Barack Obama. The new course was written into policy documents, including the key 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America [2]. For General David H. Berger, who was appointed Commandant of the United States Marine Corps in the summer of 2019, the National Defense Strategy provided the rationale for the development of Force Design 2030 [3] — a plan for the most comprehensive reform of the Marines since it took on its current form in the 1950s–1960s that was published in March 2020. Implementation of the plan, however ambitious, has already begun.

Jettisoning the Ballast

The reason given for the reform is that the current structure of the USMC, which is optimized for large-scale landing operations that involve the establishment of a base area to deploy a strike force and further advance into a given territory alongside the Army, is outdated and incompatible with the task of preparing for a confrontation with the great powers in the near future.

It is hard to argue with this: despite the fact that, thanks to modern aviation and amphibious assault vehicles, landing craft do not need to come closer than a few dozen kilometres to the coast (even the basic landing vehicles, AAVs and ACVs, are capable of covering 20–30 kilometres by sea), they will nevertheless enter the destruction zone of coastal missile systems. The increasing prevalence of such systems, as well as their general improvement and enhanced target acquisition, mean that landing forces would inevitably suffer huge losses in a confrontation with a serious enemy even as they prepare for landing. As for a weaker enemy, advanced landing vehicles are not needed — the stereotypical “peasants who have got their hands on machine guns and grenade launchers” will not be able to withstand a freer landing, as it were.

United States Department of Defense
The First and Second Island Chains

It is almost safe to say that the USMC has spent the last several decades as a hostage to its own dogmatic beliefs about a glorious large-scale operation similar to the assault landings of World War II or the Battle of Inchon of the Korean War [4], not daring to admit to itself (and, more importantly, to those politicians who are responsible for budget allocations) that it would never venture to carry out such operations in today’s much-changed world.

It is difficult to not draw parallels with the Russian Airborne Forces that are still based on the concept of deep airborne assault operations developed back in the 1960s and the 1970s. Any attempt to carry out such an operation today, even on a much smaller scale, would require the involvement of literally the entire military transport aviation of the country and would probably result in significant material losses, not to speak of wasting highly trained personnel.

But rejecting these concepts was apparently too scary, as it could lead the military-political leadership to believe that there would no longer be any need for these kinds of troops, or at the very least they would lose their exalted status. The USMC leadership, however, has come to the realization that nostalgia for the past threatens the future of the Marine Corps. In his impassioned speeches, General Berger has stressed that the Corps should stop being a “second sort of land Army” and replicating what the Army is already “very good at” (for the simple reason that it is much larger and has far more money), and instead provide the nation with unique capabilities for rapid expeditionary operations and assistance in the struggle for supremacy at sea.

In order to be more mobile, the Marine Corps needs to become “lighter.,” To achieve this, the following measures have been proposed:

• Cut one of the regiments (leaving seven), as well as three active and two reserve infantry battalions (leaving 21 and six, respectively). Reassign around 200 marines from each of the remaining battalions.
• Drastically reduce the number of tube artillery, from 21 batteries to five.
• Cut the number of amphibious assault companies by two, with four remaining.
• Disband all seven tank companies, as well as three pontoon bridge companies, and hand the equipment over to Army storage facilities. The process was started this past summer.

Following the reform, the USMC should become a tool that is streamlined as much as possible for solving the most important task the U.S. Armed Forces will encounter in the coming decades, namely, to contain the growing power of China.

• As smaller forces need fewer aircraft, it is recommended that three squadrons of MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, three squadrons of CH-53E Super Stallion / King Stallion heavy-lift helicopters and two light attack squadrons (made up of AH-1W SuperCobra attack helicopters and UH-1Y Huey utility helicopters), be taken out of service (leaving 14, five and five, respectively).

The plan is to reduce the number of marines in the Corps by approximately 12,000 by 2030. Reducing the personnel strength and getting rid of the equipment that requires the most expensive maintenance will, of course, greatly simplify the logistics of “jumping” from island to island and supporting garrisons, but so far these measures look like the USMC is cutting its losses under the guise of “streamlining.” However, the authors of the reform have put forward a number of other proposals that they believe will not only compensate for the reductions, but even increase the power of the Marine Corps:

• Increase the number of missile batteries from seven to 21.
• Increase the number of UAV squadrons from three to six.
• Increase the number of light-armoured reconnaissance companies from nine to 12. These units are currently equipped with LAV-25s, which are to be replaced with new combat and reconnaissance vehicles developed under the ARV programme.
• Deploy an additional squadron of KC-130J Super Hercules military transport aircraft also used for refuelling (which does not exactly fit the trend of reducing resources, but air tankers are needed to support aviation operations at long distances over the sea and between islands and to provide supplies to stage airfields).

But qualitative enhancement is far more important than quantitative augmentation. The USMC currently uses light reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the Boeing ScanEagle and RQ-21 Blackjack, and the AAI RQ-7 Shadow, which are to be moved to the Army’s infantry units. Meanwhile, the individual squadrons can purchase something more serious, with a longer flight duration and better strike capabilities, such as the General Atomics MQ-9B Reaper or something even more advanced.

USMC
Refueling of the F-35B

The capabilities of missile artillery are expected to grow in a more impressive manner. Currently, it is represented by the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), a wheeled launcher that can be equipped with either a single ATACMS tactical ballistic missile with a range of up to 300 kilometres (for versions with the lightest warhead) or six MLRS rockets (originally created for multiple launch rocket systems, but now being developed as a precision guided missile) with a range of up to 70 kilometres. The winner of the PrSM programme tender for the production of a new short-range ballistic missile that is set to enter into service as early as 2023 will be selected in the next few years. At the first stage, the missile is expected to be able to destroy stationary targets at a distance of up to 500 kilometres. By the mid-2020s, it should be able to hit ships and the range should be increased to 700–800 kilometres — the expiry of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty will make such advances possible. The UNMC will not even have to buy new launchers to use the same HIMARS, perhaps even two.

However, the USMC’s plans to strengthen its striking power in the coming years extend beyond simply doubling the amount of ammunition and increasing the range of existing systems. It looks like the Marine Corps plans to become the first branch of the United States Armed Forces to deploy missile systems that had previously been banned under the INF Treaty. And we are not talking about modernizing the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) here.

A compact launcher based on the JLTV all-terrain vehicle is set to be completed under the ROGUE (Remotely Operated Ground Unit Expeditionary) programme by 2022–2023 (without overloading the reader with unnecessary details here, it will replace the Hummer, but in the form of the slightly larger Oshkosh L-ATV). The vehicle’s size does not allow for personnel to be in the vehicle when the missiles are loaded, meaning that the ROGUE complex will be made up of a single manned “guide” vehicle and several unmanned vehicles with missiles. The concept is quite daring, but numerous tests have instilled confidence in the possibility of developing unmanned vehicles capable of following a lead vehicle, even over rough terrain, and performing simple commands such as dispersing on a launch field.

The first stage of ROGUE involves equipping the vehicles with Naval Strike Missiles (NSMs), which have a range of up to 200 kilometres and are, of course, capable of striking ground targets. However, the plan is to add nothing less but long-range Tomahawk missiles at the earliest opportunity. Officially, they are going to be the latest Block Va modification, called Maritime Strike, which has anti-ship capabilities and would seem purely a means of defending the islands from the enemy fleet. However, given the fact that the USMC has such modern anti-ship missiles as the NSM, and will soon have ballistic PrSMs, the only conceivable reason for wanting a Tomahawk, which is not really great when it comes to striking ships, is for its range (approximately 1600 kilometres). Once they have been deployed, for example, in Okinawa or Mageshima [5], this will be enough to knock out targets in East China, the most populated and industrialized part of the country.

It is important to understand that these are not just fantasies: the USMC’s budget request for 2021 includes the purchase of Tomahawk missiles, even though it doesn’t have the necessary technology, in particular the launchers needed to use them. That said, I must admit that the elegance of the design — something that is quite rare for the United States these days — is admirable. The programme will be presented to the public as the completely non-aggressive equipping of small island garrisons with modest means of defence against the increasingly confrontational manoeuvres of the growing Chinese fleet.

Oshkosh
JLTV Roque Concept S

The USMC is not particularly interested at the present juncture in the “hyper-hype” that has engulfed the American military and is not involved, for example, in the development of a new medium-range ballistic missile with a high-precision hypersonic glider. However, this is likely down to the fact that the USMC leadership understands that it lacks the financial resources and wishes to make use of what others have provided by purchasing the LRHW complex in the mid-2020s, for example. On the other hand, the United States Army may simply choose to not give its little naval brother a missile system with a range of up to 4000–5000 kilometres. It is quite normal for the branches of the United States Armed Forces to compete with each other in developing cutting-edge technologies, and now the conflict between the Army and the Air Force, caused by the latter’s realization that it may lose its position as the only military force that is capable of hitting targets deep in the rear, has laid itself bare for all to see.

New ships will also be required to transport and safeguard small combat groups over long distances. The relevant design work has already begun in cooperation with the Navy. Ironically, the American Navy, which had long-since abandoned the landing methods used during World War II and switched to “progressive” over-the-horizon assaults using helicopters, amphibious vehicles and air-cushioned ships, is now planning to purchase 30 new light amphibious warships (LAWs) with ramps that are reminiscent of the tank landing ships used in the middle of the last century.

Following the reform, the USMC should become a tool that is streamlined as much as possible for solving the most important task the U.S. Armed Forces will encounter in the coming decades, namely, to contain the growing power of China. The Marine Corps plans to take up the first line of defence: to “jump” from island to island of the so-called “first island chain” and saturate the combat groups as much as possible using long-range missile weapons, while avoiding the cumbersome infrastructure that is vulnerable to strikes from Chinese medium-range missile attacks from the mainland. Ground units with light armoured vehicles will be tasked, first of all, to protect these missiles, as well as to repel air and sea landings, also relatively light-armed, and seize no man’s land or poorly protected pieces of land from other states.

In Lieu of a Postscript: Russia’s Airborne Issue

Russia has more than a passing interest in the reform of the USMC, even though it is more from a theoretical point of view: a transformed Marine Corps will be even less suited for a war in the European theatre (the yearlong mission in Norway is already set to be overhauled [6]), while the Russian Pacific Fleet, for good or bad, has clearly not been tasked with forcing its way into the vast ocean. But the experience of radically and courageously abandoning its historically entrenched goals and image in order to be in line, in the words of the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, with “what the nation demands today” will be worth learning from.

The United States Marine Corps and the Russian Airborne Forces are similar in that they enjoy an elite status and are separate from the “regular” forces. Interestingly, the situation is mirrored: in the United States, the “airborne forces” are, despite the undeniable cult status of the 82nd Airborne Division, a part of the Army, while the Russian “marines” are part of the Coastal Troops of the Russian Navy. They are also similar in the fact that they have spent decades preparing for a task that not only cannot be accomplished, but will never even be set. While the United States Marine Corps, at least theoretically, has enough ships, Russia would need to increase its military transport aviation by four times in order to be able to land both of its airborne divisions (and given the current rate at which Il-76MD-90As are being produced, it is more likely to be reduced). And that is not including air-droppable equipment and the training of airborne assault units.

Sea Transport Solutions
he Navy's new Light Amphibious Warship Concept

At the same time, the potential capability for parachute drops has a price, not just in the form of money, but also in terms of quality. Let us take, for example, two standard vehicles that are used for very similar purposes — the BMD-4M armored assault vehicle and the BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle. The only difference in a combat situation is that the assault version has inferior armour plating due to the obvious weight restrictions for such a vehicle, yet it is significantly more expensive, in about the same price range as a main battle tank.

A rather schizophrenic situation is developing where, in combat situations, the best-trained personnel are forced to use what is quite clearly the worst equipment, while never getting the opportunity to take advantage of those of its capabilities that were developed at the expense of others. And the gap here will continue to widen, given the obvious trend in Russia and around the world towards bigger and heavier infantry fighting vehicles.

Realizing their “lightness,” the air assault divisions of the Russian Airborne Forces are forming tank battalions and furnishing them with T-72B3 main battle tanks. But hooking the airborne units up with equipment that is neither fit for airborne operations nor even transportable by air [7] is just as irrational.

A solution will be found sooner or later that will likely involve a long-overdue change in the primary goal — from the chimera of a large-scale deep airborne operation to air assaults by light infantry groups, where the high quality of individual training will shine through. Preserving the “flying armour” is not out of the question, but it would involve transporting highly mobile parts using air landing, which would ease the restrictions on equipment, enhance the striking capability of those formations and their interoperability with army units. Airborne units around the world have evolved into this format organically (primarily in countries which, unlike the USSR, have had experience with large-scale airborne assault operations) and the effectiveness of these methods has been demonstrated time and again in local conflicts over recent decades. It is ironic that such iconic operations of the Soviet airborne force as the seizure of airfields when introducing troops into Czechoslovakia were carried out using the air landing method.

Certain episodes in recent military exercises show that the topic of reform is being broached from time to time. However, understanding that change is needed awakens those same fears about the Airborne Forces losing their elite status, an attitude that even the most respected commanders of airborne forces have to candidly refer to as “airborne chauvinism.” Successful reform of the equally elitist United States Marine Corps could become a watershed moment. Otherwise, eternally clinging to sacred traditions could leave them in the same position as the Chinese army — of course, not its current version, but the one it was during the Opium Wars.

We would like to thank Daria Khaspekova, editor-in-chief at the Research Centre of Integration Prospects, for her help in preparing this paper for publication.

1. In fact, the War Powers Resolution that governs the use of the armed forces does not make a distinction: the President of the United States can use any of the branches without congressional approval for a maximum of 90 days.

2. A Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America has been posted in the public domain. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

3. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6819616/CMC38-Force-Design-2030-Report-Phase-I-and-II.pdf

4. Also known as Operation Chromite, an important episode in the Korean War. The assault operation took place on September 15–19, 1950 in the deep rear of the North Korean troops that have invaded most of the South. The operation allowed to cut off North Korea’s strategic communications and, under threat of large-scale encirclement, force the North Koreans to retreat, a backwards march that was only halted at the Chinese border with the help of “volunteers” from the neighbouring country.

5. The Japanese government purchased Mageshima Island, announcing plans to deploy a U.S. base there away from the eyes of the Japanese public, which has grown somewhat weary of the U.S. military presence. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/06/asia/japan-us-military-base-island-intl-hnk/index.html

6. This is important because, first of all, it shows that the United States is less interested in preparing for armed hostilities in a cold climate, which is what the exercises in Norway were essentially geared towards. And, secondly, because Scandinavia was to become the frontline for the USMC’s operations against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Marine Corps trained for battle and stored their weapons and equipment there, in skerries and caves. The Army was responsible for the rest of the European continent.

7. Even without additional armour, the early T-72 tanks barely fit into Il-76 aircraft, while the improved later-series tanks are too large for them.