Igor Ivanov’s Remarks at the Federal Academy for Security Policy

If we are adversaries, which we were for the greater part of the second half of the 20^th century, then our relations will have to be structured accordingly, taking care of our own security interests first. At the same time, we will need to establish relevant communication channels to guard ourselves against unintentional incidents and misunderstandings. On the other hand, we will have to do as much as possible to reduce the material costs of rivalry and prevent an uncontrolled arms race on the European continent. This would mean essentially reproducing the communication mechanisms of the Cold War era and adapting them to new realities.

The other option is partnership. This was something we proclaimed in the 1990s but failed to implement. There were summits of the NATO–Russia Council, regular meetings between ministers of foreign affairs and defence, meetings between chiefs of the general staff, etc. Still, things never progressed beyond general political statements. The most obvious example of this is the deployment of elements of the U.S. missile defence system in Europe. Russia repeatedly suggested developing that system together. The American side rejected all of our proposals. The same happened in 2008 when Russia proposed starting joint work on a European Security Treaty that would make it possible to create a single, undivided Euro-Atlantic security space. Our western partners did not even see the point in considering the draft Treaty Russia had submitted.

Therefore, we need to decide what we are to each other and start a serious conversation.

The same approach applies to trade and economic relations between Russia and the European Union. Today, our relations are regulated by the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. There were plans to create a common economic space, but since 2014, all contacts have been frozen. I would like to remind you before that, we held two Russia–EU summits a year, as well as a significant number of meetings at other levels. This means that our relations did not stand the test of time. The sanctions and counter-sanctions constitute another example: everyone understands they are pointless, yet would never get rid of them.

Russia and Europe are parts of a great, dynamically developing Eurasian space. There are many other actors here. Everyone has their own interests and plans. It is up to us to decide whether Russia and the EU will act as partners or as competitors. However, we do not have much time to make that decision. Other actors will not wait.

Dear Ambassador Brose,

Ladies and gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to thank the Federal Academy for Security Policy for inviting me to speak at today’s event. Sadly, in recent years, such meetings have become rather rare, which I believe is wrong. The world we live in is becoming increasingly complicated and aggressive. It is with real alarm that we read websites or newspapers every day, expecting new events to shake the foundation of international stability. The number of such problems is increasing, while the mechanisms for resolving them are dwindling. Within such context, there is great demand for dialogue at all levels, without which it will be impossible to find viable solutions and restore confidence. In this connection, the recent visit of Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel to Moscow and her talks with the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin are highly welcomed. I would like to hope that such meetings between our leaders will become less of an exception and rather a regular occurrence.

As the Federal Chancellor noted at the final press-conference in Moscow, “It is better to talk with each other rather than about one another because it helps one to understand the other side's arguments.”

Ambassador Brose suggested that during my opening remarks, we should pay more attention to relations between Russia and Europe. Naturally, this subject cannot be considered in isolation from the overall context of global developments. That’s why during a Q&A session we can also address other international issues.

If we attempt to assess the current state of Russia–Europe relations, we will be regrettably forced to admit that, in some respects, they are worse than they were during the Cold War. I say this based primarily on my own experience. During the Cold War, we at least had a clear understanding of what divided us and of the areas in which we could and should work together for the benefit of international security. Together, we developed effective international interaction mechanisms that allowed us to control the proliferation of arms, resolve regional conflicts, etc. Today, all of these written and unwritten rules either work partially or not at all. Consequently, international security is progressively becoming more fragile.

I can foresee that, at the Q&A session, there will be attempts to place the blame on Russia’s shoulders for the current state of affairs. Yes, Russia is probably not without blame, but neither are all the other leading global actors. However, it is not Russia’s fault that the world is in its current situation today, and you are perfectly aware of this. It was not Russia that withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty. It was not Russia that bombed Yugoslavia. It was not Russia that started the Iraq War, the repercussions of which we still feel today. And it was not Russia that withdrew from the INF Treaty, from the Paris Climate Agreement and the nuclear deal with Iran. And so on.

At the same time, I don’t think that it makes much sense to look for who is more to blame for the deterioration of relations that we see today. I believe it is far more productive that we objectively draw the right conclusions, and attempt to find ground for constructive dialogue and cooperation. And we really need such cooperation between Russia and Europe, given today's highly disturbing international situation.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, both Russia and the West believed that despite their legacy of problems, they would be able, through joint efforts, to build a new type of relations characterized by partnership instead of confrontation. Indeed, over a short period of time, we succeeded in developing a set of essential documents intended to regulate Russia’s relations with NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe etc. I believe that all these documents retain their value today.

I could spend a great deal of time talking about this stage in our relations, since I was directly involved in drafting and adopting many of the decisions that laid the new foundations of the relationship between Russia and Europe. When I turn over the documents of that time, I find it hard to believe that we succeeded in achieving so much. I remember how critics in Russia accused us, the country’s politicians, of making unjustified concessions to the West, of being naïve romantics and so on.

Personally, I still believe that Russia and the West had the historic opportunity in the 1990s and the early 2000s to start building new relations based on the consideration of each other’s legitimate interests and aimed at establishing the foundations of a new world order that should have replaced the bipolar world.

Regrettably, these plans did not materialize.

Problems between Russia and the West had started to appear long before the Ukrainian crisis. I would advise you all to go back and re-examine the speech that the President Putin, gave at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. I think it would make many of the things taking place today more understandable. That speech reflected the profound disappointment of the Russian leadership and public with western politics and policies. Moscow largely came to believe that its western partners essentially disregarded Russia’s interests and opinions, despite what they had said. And there was enough evidence supporting that, from the enlargement of NATO and the war in Yugoslavia to the organization of the so-called “colour revolutions” in the former Soviet republics and the discrimination against Russia’s economic interests.

The more I try to understand the real reasons for the serious deterioration of relations between Russia and the West, the more I come to the conclusion that the main thing was the loss at some stage of a strategic vision of what our relations should be. Maybe there was no strategic vision at all. Incidentally, this is why the “reset” policy in U.S.–Russia relations failed. We attempted to reset our relations on the basis of old principles and using outdated mechanisms. However, as soon as the political climate deteriorated, the entire structure collapsed. Something similar happened in Russia’s relations with Europe.

I pay so much attention to this issue because if we cannot explain the causes of the failures in our relations, then we will find it very difficult to set these relations right.

What lessons could we learn from the recent history of our relations in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes?

I see the principal problems in the security and humanitarian areas.

Of course, we in Moscow can blame the West for bringing NATO’s military infrastructure disturbingly close to Russia’s borders. In turn, the West will accuse Russia of illegally taking Crimea away from Ukraine and posing a potential threat to the Baltic States. And so on. Each side will refer to the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and other international treaties and agreements that the other side has violated. We have been doing this for more than 20 years, and still, things have not changed.

In saying this, I am not urging anyone to abandon their principles or give up on international norms and rules. On the contrary, I have always been a proponent of strict compliance with such documents. However, it is not enough to simply declare. We need to achieve our goals through negotiations. I remember the Dayton Peace Process (which I took part in), where representatives of Russia, Europe and the United States managed to not only reach an agreement among themselves but also convince the conflicting parties to sign the agreement. Even if the resulting agreements were not perfect, they are still in effect in Bosnia.

It, therefore, appears to me that today, when the mechanisms of the Russia–West dialogue is out of sorts, when confidence has been undermined and there is no mutual understanding on the key issues of international affairs, that we should gradually restore the negotiation process on priority security issues that concern both parties. I remember that at the last summit of the NATO–Russia Council in 2010, the sides agreed on a list of common security threats that were to form the core of our joint work. Why don't we go back to that list and launch the relevant consultations? I would like to emphasize, once again, that resuming dialogue does not mean unilateral concessions or one of the parties abandoning its principle position. The profound differences between us make resuming dialogue more pressing and urgent, not less so.

We, for example, have already started consultations on cybersecurity with some countries — for example, France. The two parties are satisfied with the exchange of opinions that has been launched. Russia is ready to initiate such dialogue with other states as well.

Speaking about the need to restore bilateral dialogue, I do not mean that we should ignore NATO or the European Union. We understand perfectly well that, ultimately, any key decisions that may be developed will need to be adopted jointly with those bodies. However, in practice, if we want to start discussions, it is easier to do so with states that are ready.

I believe that it is precisely the resumption of security talks, no matter how complicated security problems might be, that could open the path to gradually rebuilding understanding and confidence.

Another area in which Russia and the West regularly clash as a result of the fundamental differences in their stances is the humanitarian sphere. I remember the negotiations of Russia's accession to the Council of Europe very well. Our opponents were rather emotional in asserting that Russia does not hold the same values as the West. I spent a lot of time explaining to them that, at that time, all Russian generations had been born and raised in the Soviet Union and, accordingly, they had their own values that might not be entirely identical to those of Europeans. It is impossible to impose one's values on anyone artificially. It would be far more productive to talk about co-existence of different views based on the specific historical, cultural and religious features of particular states. Russia was accepted to the Council of Europe, but the polemic surrounding values did not cool off.

Domestic political concerns sometimes dictate this discussion. This, in my estimation, is both inevitable and necessary. The main thing here is to prevent such discussions from becoming an insurmountable obstacle in the way of constructive dialogue between Russia and western states, a dialogue on specific issues of common interest. As the Federal Chancellor noted in Moscow, "We from the German side represent our interests first of all. Russia represents its own. And here we need to look at where there are common interests in this process."

As I said at the beginning of my speech, if we wish to lay a solid foundation for our relations, we should, when dealing with specific problems, simultaneously answer the core questions that determine the nature of our relations. To put it simply, we need to decide what we are for each other — adversaries, partners or something else. Without answering this question, we will find it hard, if not impossible, to look towards the future of our relations. And it is okay if the answer to this question is not as optimistic as we would have liked it to be. The most important thing is to avoid ambiguity and excessive expectations. The last 30 years of our relations have shown that, sooner or later, these ambiguities and such expectations will lead to a crisis.

If we are adversaries, which we were for the greater part of the second half of the 20^th century, then our relations will have to be structured accordingly, taking care of our own security interests first. At the same time, we will need to establish relevant communication channels to guard ourselves against unintentional incidents and misunderstandings. On the other hand, we will have to do as much as possible to reduce the material costs of rivalry and prevent an uncontrolled arms race on the European continent. This would mean essentially reproducing the communication mechanisms of the Cold War era and adapting them to new realities.

The other option is partnership. This was something we proclaimed in the 1990s but failed to implement. There were summits of the NATO–Russia Council, regular meetings between ministers of foreign affairs and defence, meetings between chiefs of the general staff, etc. Still, things never progressed beyond general political statements. The most obvious example of this is the deployment of elements of the U.S. missile defence system in Europe. Russia repeatedly suggested developing that system together. The American side rejected all of our proposals. The same happened in 2008 when Russia proposed starting joint work on a European Security Treaty that would make it possible to create a single, undivided Euro-Atlantic security space. Our western partners did not even see the point in considering the draft Treaty Russia had submitted.

Therefore, we need to decide what we are to each other and start a serious conversation.

The same approach applies to trade and economic relations between Russia and the European Union. Today, our relations are regulated by the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. There were plans to create a common economic space, but since 2014, all contacts have been frozen. I would like to remind you before that, we held two Russia–EU summits a year, as well as a significant number of meetings at other levels. This means that our relations did not stand the test of time. The sanctions and counter-sanctions constitute another example: everyone understands they are pointless, yet would never get rid of them.

Russia and Europe are parts of a great, dynamically developing Eurasian space. There are many other actors here. Everyone has their own interests and plans. It is up to us to decide whether Russia and the EU will act as partners or as competitors. However, we do not have much time to make that decision. Other actors will not wait.

In conclusion, I would like to say that today's world is going through a complicated process of transition. Russia and Europe will remain among the key international actors, and their relations will continue to influence the development of the global situation. Working together we will strengthen each other’s standing in creating the new world order.

World War II ended 75 years ago. We should all learn the lessons of that tragedy and make the world safe for everyone.