Iranian Nuclear Issue: Resolution Underway

After a decade-long deadlock in negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue (INI), there have been some noticeable positive developments in the positions of the two key opposing sides: Iran and the U.S. The negotiators agreed on a road map of reciprocal practical steps that would lead to the realistic possibility of a speedy and comprehensive solution to this longstanding problem.

After a decade-long deadlock in negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue (INI), there have been some noticeable positive developments in the positions of the two key opposing sides: Iran and the U.S. The negotiators agreed on a road map of reciprocal practical steps that would lead to the realistic possibility of a speedy and comprehensive solution to this longstanding problem.

Softer Confrontation

It is in Tehran’s interests to arrive at a mutually acceptable resolution, since the international community’s economic sanctions against Iran hurt the national economy and slow the implementation of its nuclear program. According to Russian expert V. Sazhin, oil production in Iran dropped from 3.8 to 2.7 million bpd between January 2012 and March 2013, with exports cut from 2.4 to almost 1 million bbl. [1] . Iran's oil revenues plummeted, causing a severe budget deficit in the country, which had serious repercussions for its social and economic positions.

The U.S. leadership in turn, concerned by growing instability in the Greater Middle East following the planned drawdown of allied NATO forces from Afghanistan, in fact needs Tehran's stabilizing role in the region. Washington seems to be beginning to understand that Iran’s nuclear program cannot be stopped by brutal pressure alone. Indeed, that approach could instead push Tehran to speed up its acquisition of nuclear arms. At this stage, even the use of force against Iran, unless it comes complete with full-fledged military occupation of the country, will merely slow the completion of the nuclear program. But it is thought that, under this scenario, Iran would expel all IAEA inspectors and intensify its efforts at nuclear arms development [2].

Now that the incumbent president, Iranian moderate Hassan Rouhani, has said (with the approval of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei) that the urgent resolution of this issue should be one of the country's foreign policy priorities, U.S. President Obama's administration has been given a long-awaited opportunity to implement Washington's longstanding plans to normalize relations with Tehran in order to strengthen its positions in the region.

The fact that both countries seek a mutually acceptable solution can be deduced from the resumption of the U.S.-Iranian bilateral dialogue, which, for the first time in three decades, was held, at the highest level, in late 2013. It started with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry meeting with Iran's Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Zarif on September 26, 2013 in New York, followed by a telephone conversation between President Obama and President Hassan Rouhani. During their exchange, the U.S. leader said: “there is a basis for a resolution.” As the key prerequisite for a breakthrough on the INI, he pointed to “meaningful, transparent, and verifiable actions” to be taken by Iran [3]. Earlier, in his address to the UN General Assembly, President Obama, for the first time at this level, also announced that the U.S. “respects the right of the Iranian people to access peaceful nuclear energy,” providing Iran meets its obligations under the NPT [4].

Photo: farsi.khamenei.ir

However, the Obama administration’s stance is still opposed by more conservative U.S. congressmen and policy-makers and their peers in Israel. They all insist that Iran completely abandons its nuclear plans, eliminates all of its nuclear fuel stockpiles and shuts down all nuclear plants. These forces are bent on resisting, stubbornly, any weakening of sanctions against Iran. Should Tehran fail to comply with their demands, U.S. Congress has drawn up a new, even more severe, package of sanctions, which would block international investment in Iran’s mining and construction sectors by closing Iran’s foreign exchange accounts at foreign banks. Faced with the Senate’s intransigence regarding a more relaxed position on the INI, the White House was forced to maneuver between these two opposing factions to try to reach agreement with both sides. The Obama administration assured the congressmen that additional sanctions could be introduced later, should Iran fail to comply with its Geneva commitments [5].

Negotiation Process: New Impetus

At the talks with the group of P5+1 international mediators in Geneva in October – November 2013, Iran offered reasonable proposals to address key concerns regarding its nuclear program and expressed willingness to respond to all the IAEA’s questions with unprecedented transparency. Iran’s new, more flexible, position on the INI, while striving to ensure the independence of its peaceful nuclear program, allowed for certain restrictions on uranium enrichment in Iran and the suspension of the plutonium operations. It also opened up an opportunity for Iran to assume legally binding obligations allowing inspectors access to nuclear facilities of the IAEA’s choice. In exchange, Tehran insisted on the recognition of Iran’s legitimate right to have peaceful nuclear power, and on the weakening (and later lifting) of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, as well as the U.S. and EU unilateral sanctions. Iran also demanded firm political assurances from the West that it would desist from any attempt at regime change in Tehran.

Iran’s new constructive position has undoubtedly delivered a dynamic new impetus to the Geneva talks, making it possible to launch a meaningful dialogue that also involves a preliminary agreement for 6 months or more and a package of immediate measures according to which Iran will suspend any further actions under its nuclear program, as well as some key elements of the ultimate solution.

Along with its talks with the P5+1, Iran has continued an intense dialogue in Vienna to explore ways of deepening its collaboration with the IAEA and discussing the list of questions that the agency presented to Iran.

On November 11, 2013, Tehran and the IAEA in Vienna reached an important framework agreement facilitating more transparent cooperation and the comprehensive resolution of all problems, past and present. Iran pledged to provide the IAEA, within three months, with data and regulated access to all its nuclear facilities, including the heavy-water reactor in Arak and the Gchine uranium mines, together with the information on all 16 proposed nuclear power plants (including their location), and new research reactors [6].

Photo: aljazeera.com
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani greets
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Tehran

This time, Tehran set out almost immediately to work on the agreement and allowed the IAEA inspectors to hold a preliminary inspection of the Arak facility. This was, arguably, an important shift in Tehran’s position, with a positive impetus on the progress of the soon-to-be-resumed Geneva P5+1 negotiations with Iran, improving the chances for an interim agreement on the INI.

Settlement Road Map

As a result, by November 24, 2013, following a round of very difficult negotiations, the parties agreed on the Joint Plan of Actions for the next six months. It provided for the temporary restrictions in the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for the weakening of unilateral anti-Iranian sanctions by the U.S. and EU outside the framework of the UN Security Council’s sanctions. According to Russia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, these understandings are based on the policy concept put forward by Russian President Vladimir Putin. It focuses on the recognition of Iran’s uncontested right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program, including the right to enrich uranium, provided that the program is subject to close international monitoring. It also provides for the removal of all sanctions against Iran, including the unilateral ones that Russia has always argued to be illegitimate [7].

More specifically, the JPA states that Iran will: discontinue uranium enrichment to 20 percent and deplete accumulated enriched uranium to under 5 percent; freeze the commissioning of the Arak heavy-water reactor, which is believed to be capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium; suspend the fitting of new centrifuges at uranium enrichment plants or the commissioning of advanced centrifuges in Natanz and Fordow; and stop designing new enrichment facilities.

At the same time, Iran retains the right to produce 3.5-5 percent enriched uranium for use as fuel in nuclear reactors. Tehran undertook to remove all restrictions to IAEA inspectors accessing its nuclear facilities, both those that are currently in operation and those that are under construction, including plants that produce centrifuges and their warehouses; and uranium mines and uranium ore processing factories. The IAEA will receive information about the Arak reactor design and detailed data on the proposed construction of any new nuclear facilities [8].

In return, the U.S. and EU agreed to relax their unilateral sanctions against Iran, meaning that Iran will be able to sell oil and petroleum products to world markets, trade in gold and precious stones and some of Iran’s frozen financial assets in foreign banks will be released. However, the bulk of the country’s foreign exchange assets, which, by different estimates, total from USD 50 to almost 100 billion in Western banks, will remain frozen. The key international sanctions introduced by the UN Security Council against Iran’s oil and financial sectors will remain in force until a long-term comprehensive solution on the INI has been achieved [9].

A joint commission comprising the parties was set up to monitor the agreement; and it is expected to cooperate with the IAEA.

Elements of further steps developed by the negotiating parties to achieve a lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue form an integral part of this agreement. A comprehensive solution would center on a mutually agreed uranium enrichment program with mutually defined restrictions on the scope and level of enrichment and relevant capacities. It would also have to fully address concerns over the Arak reactor. Iran will also undertake to ratify and properly observe the Additional Protocol. In exchange, Iran will have access to civilian cooperation in the nuclear sphere, including, inter alia, purchases of more advanced light-water nuclear energy and research reactors and related equipment, together with the supply of fuel and agreed R&D [10].

Roles for Russia and China

Any analysis of the progress achieved on the INI in Geneva would have been incomplete without an insight into the role of Russia and China in that process. The two countries’ close positions on the Iranian resolution allowed them to strengthen their interaction on nuclear issues both at the UN Security Council and the IAEA, and in the group of P5+1 international mediators.

REUTERS/Carolyn Kaster
Gevorg Mirzayan:
Between Camp David and Munich

Thanks to their consistent efforts, Russian and Chinese officials succeeded in pushing their Western partners towards ensuring that negotiations with Iran become a regular occurrence, held behind closed doors, and not exploited by the parties as a pretext to unleash hostile propaganda against each other. Russia and China were quite convincing in substantiating their idea of a phased INI solution through reciprocal steps: they stressed that Tehran should not be forced into a corner by more and new sanctions which, they argued, would only push Iran to ever more extreme actions. At the same time, Russia, as one of the NPT founders and depositories, has no interest in acquiring another nuclear state on its southern borders, and has been working hard, diplomatically, to preempt it. According to its political leaders, Russia is “prepared to continue to look patiently for a comprehensive, mutually acceptable solution that […] could ensure Iran its inalienable right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program in the context of the IAEA control and security for all nations.” [11] In fact, the aim of more frequent contact between Russian and Chinese high-level diplomats and their Iranian counterparts, was to discuss issues of political, commercial and economic collaboration between the countries, in addition to the INI agenda.

Importantly, to date, commitments made during the first phase of the Geneva process have been observed by the relevant parties strictly within the time agreed. Consequently, according to all parties involved, the next round of negotiations held in Vienna on February 18-20, 2014 proved productive. It helped reach an understanding on the modalities of the talks to follow, aimed at elaborating an agreement on a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and detailing the key aspects that would underpin this lasting agreement.

***

To summarize, 2014 will be a decisive year in work to resolve the INI. Obviously, negotiations will have their ups and downs. But since the various different parties involved have broadly agreed that there is no alternative to a peaceful diplomatic resolution this issue, there is every chance that a mutually acceptable solution will be found. This will, without a doubt, help stabilize the situation in and around Iran, and will have a positive effect on the broader situation in the Greater Middle East. Obviously, a great deal will depend on Barack Obama’s administration’s ability to contain U.S. and Israeli opponents to this kind of diplomatic engagement with Iran. The White House and the U.S. Department of State will do their best to convince the U.S. Congress to postpone deliberations on new tough sanctions against Iran, thus giving the American position a certain degree of flexibility. It is equally apparent that the Iranian government will need to persuade its own opponents of restrictions in the nuclear area that there are certain benefits from a mutually acceptable resolution for INI purposes.

Iran and the West will continue to rely on joint Russia-China initiatives aimed at overcoming differences between the parties and to achieve a speedy and mutually acceptable solution to the INI. Therefore, the two countries must continue their joint endeavors, in close contact with other members of the P5+1 group and Iran, in developing provisions for the forthcoming comprehensive agreement on the INI.

Russia and China also need to offer firm resistance to any attempts to isolate Iran, politically and diplomatically, by involving it in active international interactions on issues of security and the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking, on Syria, and the need to convene a conference on nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Tehran has been playing a significant and broadly constructive role in these issues for some time. There is a clear need to continue to insist that Iran is offered reliable security safeguards and a worthy role in addressing the growing tensions in the Greater Middle East.

1. Sazhin V. Iran: Rouhani’s dire legacy. July 16, 2013. Rambler, http://news.rambler.ru/20110904 (in Russian)

2. Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle. Report by Arms Control Association. October 11, 2013. http://www.armscontrol.org/print/6000

3. Background Briefing on Iran. The White house. Office of the Press Secretary. September 27, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office

4. Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly. September 24, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly

5. Assessing the P5+1 Joint Plan of Action with Iran. Written Statement by W. Sherman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs before the Senate Committee on Banking. December 12, 2013. http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2013/218639.htm

6. IAEA, Iran Signs Joint Statement on Framework for Cooperation. IAEA Press Release 2013/21. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2013/prn201321.html.

7. Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the results of the negotiations between the foreign ministers of the P5+1 international mediators and the Iranian delegation on the situation around Iran’s Nuclear Programme, Geneva, November 24, 2013. http://www.mid/ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/

8. Joint Plan of Actions. Annex to the Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the results of the negotiations between the foreign ministers of the P5+1 international mediators and the Iranian delegation on the situation around Iran’s Nuclear Programme, Geneva, November 24, 2013, http://www.mid/ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/

9. Assessing the First – Phase Deal to Guard Against a Nuclear – Armed Iran. Arms Control Today, Vol 4, Issue 15, December 2, 2013. http://www.armscontrol.org/print/6056

10. Joint Plan of Actions. Annex to the Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the results of the negotiations between the foreign ministers of the P5+1 international mediators and the Iranian delegation on the situation around Iran’s Nuclear Programme, Geneva, November 24, 2013 http://www.mid/ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/

11. Interview of the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister to the Russian Interfax News Agency, December 21, 2013. http://www.mid.ru