Is Iran Ready for Change?

Iran today is a country burdened by numerous international sanctions that hamper both its economic development and its ability to cooperate with other states, including Russia. The inauguration of its new president may help change the situation and bring Iran out of isolation, helping prepare the country for significant internal transformations. In an exclusive interview, RIAC expert Viktor Averkov shares his insights on Hassan Rouhani's role in Iranian domestic and foreign politics.

Interview

Iran today is a country burdened by numerous international sanctions that hamper both its economic development and its ability to cooperate with other states, including Russia. The inauguration of its new president may help change the situation and bring Iran out of isolation, helping prepare the country for significant internal transformations. In an exclusive interview, RIAC expert Viktor Averkov shares his insights on Hassan Rouhani's role in Iranian domestic and foreign politics.

On August 4, 2013, Hassan Rouhani was inaugurated as the next president of Iran. Some pundits insist that his election reveals the scale of discontent and the need for reforms. What kind of initial steps do you expect from him? Will Iran's domestic policies change?

Essentially, the presidency in Iran is not that similar to that in Russia. Using Russian analogies, I would say that Rouhani is not Gorbachev, but rather Medvedev. When Mohammad Khatami, known as an Islamic liberal, was elected president in the 1990s, many westerners expected him to turn the tide of the Islamic revolution, make Iran more open and democratic, and bring it back to the pro-Western track. But it did not happen, although the Americans had praised him as highly as they did Gorbachev. In fact, the Western public is fond of discovering Gorbachev-style politicians. So, let me repeat that Rouhani is not Gorbachev, but Medvedev.

The election of Rouhani is a signal to foreign audiences, primarily American, that Iranian leader Ali Khamenei is again open to certain dialogue. Of course the national leader makes political and strategic decisions only after lengthy negotiations with the national elite. This is why Rouhani is not able to do anything on his own. His mission is to alter Iran's position in the world and gain acceptance by the West, unlike Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who became a persona non grata due to his statements and overall behavior. I don't expect harsh words on Israel, the United States and other countries from the new Iranian president, at least for the time being.

Despite the burdensome sanctions, Iran has been steadily progressing, until recently demonstrating stable economic growth [1], with many infrastructural projects underway.

Hence, any changes in domestic politics will come from tipping the balance within the Iranian elite. Key domestic issues include fuel and food subsidies, as well as the redistribution of resources between the raw materials sector, first of all hydrocarbons, and the rest of the economy. These are the basic internal concerns, as well as the issue of control over the internal financial flows. However, these fundamental needs have only a limited impact on Iran's foreign policy.

Iran's basic risk is the age and condition of the spiritual leader. Wounded in his time, he suffers from poor health, while the matter of succession is of paramount importance.

If the leader leaves the scene due to natural causes, Rouhani may play, main role since during the transition period it is the president who must guarantee stability. Rouhani belongs to the conservative wing but has offered quite a liberal program including the normalization of relations with the West. Hence, shored up by the conservatives, he has also obtained votes from the liberal camp. And the leader has supported him as a compromise figure. For Ali Khamenei, Hassan Rouhani is not just a signal to the West about a possible thaw but a guarantor of a peaceful power transition in case of Khamenei's departure.

When in power, Ahmadinejad was not to become the figure of this kind. On the contrary, he was selected to smash the opposition and exacerbate the atmosphere vis-à-vis the West. With time, he collided with key Iranian interest groups to such an extent that the leader even pondered abolishing the post of the nationally elected president.

Rouhani is known to have represented Iran at the nuclear talks in 2003, when the problem was partially resolved until 2005. Do you think his experience will help settle the Iranian nuclear program issue? Or Tehran will continue to seek an independent nuclear program?

Although Rouhani headed the Iranian delegation at the nuclear talks, it was actually the national leader who was made the key decisions using informal mechanisms, but practically without the approval of the ruling elite. In 2002-2003, it was decided to freeze separate seemingly available components of the military nuclear program and suspend certain segments of the peaceful program. In fact, Rouhani just explained the decision as nothing more than a technical move. In those days, the leader was inclined to peaceful resolutions in order to avoid the Iraqi scenario.

Photo: nydailynews.com

Since Rouhani is more acceptable for the West, Iran's contacts with the outer world should become less tense and less contentious. Psychological strains should also decrease. But I would like to repeat that it is not the president, but the national leader and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps who handle the nuclear program issues.

Definitely much will depend on the U.S.’s ability to change its attitude to Iran. For now, we are observing quite conflicting trends as Washington is obviously maneuvering. On the one hand, the U.S.A. is pressuring Iran politically, economically and otherwise in order to undermine the regime, aiming either to eventually change it or drive Tehran to capitulation. On the other hand, the Americans are using Iran as a scarecrow to streamline their relations with partners and allies all over the world and to substantiate their own offensive operations, for example the BMD program.

Photo: kaleme.com

During the election campaign, Rouhani spoke of improving relations with the EU and the U.S.A., and bringing Iran out of international isolation. Should we expect a breakthrough, say the restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States broken after the Islamic Revolution? What are the factors that would allow such a move?

For Iran, the nuclear program is a matter of prestige, national sovereignty and ideology. It is also a tool for political and psychological pressure on neighbor states. It is only official U.S. security guarantees that could encourage Iran to give up its nuclear project. The official American legal guarantees should imply not so much Iran's military security as the recognition of the Tehran regime.

I don't see any sort of breakthrough in the Iran-U.S. relations in the offing. Barak Obama will not be able to consolidate the American foreign policy establishment. The U.S.A. has de facto recognized Iran's peaceful nuclear program but keeps pressurizing the country with sanctions in order to obtain concessions on Syria and the Gulf states.

In what way could the election of the new Iranian president influence the overall situation in the region? Will Tehran go ahead with its desire for regional leadership? Will it continue to support Assad's regime in Syria?

Iran's approach to Syria will remain intact. According to some sources, Iran will provide Syria with a 3.6-billion-dollar loan for oil product purchases. In fact, Tehran is ensuring the subsistence of Damascus, and providing it with personnel and information. Syria is a formidable Iranian resource, more important than the nuclear program.

Just like Iran, Syria needs U.S. security guarantees, while Americans are not going to extend them. One of their specific traits after the Cold War is to refrain from any guarantees and create room for unilateral action and the revision of any relations.

On the whole, I don't expect any changes, as Obama lacks domestic resources to radically alter U.S. foreign policy.

What are the key problems in the Russian-Iranian relationship? What should be done to overcome them? What are the prospects for bilateral dialogue? What areas do you see as most promising for advancing cooperation between the two states?

Photo: The Voice of Russia

We are being held hostage to the oppressive U.S. sanctions against Iran, as companies investing in the Iranian fuel-and-energy complex may be penalized. As a result, we are investing almost zero in Iran and are not allowing Iranian capital into Russia, extending only limited cooperation in maintaining the operation of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and in other areas. One more sore point is the lawsuit on the S-300 antiaircraft system. Tehran wants its money back and compensation of expenses, while Russia is not exactly eager to do so.

Let me repeat myself: we cannot develop full-fledged economic and trade relations while Iran is under sanctions. The election of Hassan Rouhani is a signal that Iran is ready for change and the situation may return to normal.

Had it not been the all-inclusive coverage of the American sanctions, Russia, just like China, would have preserved the privileged status in relations with Iran it enjoyed in the mid-2000s. Hence, do not expect major energy or military deals in the near future, although there is a chance of smaller agreements on defense weapons like short-range surface-to-air missile systems Tor and Buk. However, Russian policymakers are highly apprehensive about disturbing the Americans and Israelis with such a move.

1. According to the World Bank, in 2010-2011 Iran's GDP increased from 422 to 514 billion dollars.

Interviewer: Alexander Eliseev, RIAC Program Coordinator

RIAC thanks Alexei Davydov for assistance in preparing the material