For many months, the conflict in Ukraine and related sanctions have remained the key issue discussed by politicians, diplomats and journalists. Alexei Fenenko, leading research fellow at the RAS Institute of International Security Problems, shares his views on the impact of the sanctions on Russia and the potential resolution of the situation in eastern Ukraine as well as offers his vision on the most potentially dangerous conflict for Russia.
For many months, the conflict in Ukraine and related sanctions have remained the key issue discussed by politicians, diplomats and journalists. Alexei Fenenko, leading research fellow at the RAS Institute of International Security Problems, shares his views on the impact of the sanctions on Russia and the potential resolution of the situation in eastern Ukraine as well as offers his vision on the most potentially dangerous conflict for Russia.
Today the whole world is talking about the anti-Russian sanctions. Do you believe that sanctions will be imposed on the defense sector as well, and what effect is Russia being threatened with?
In my opinion, the opposite is true, since it is Russia that holds all the cards. There are things with which Russia can respond to the sanctions. If necessary, Russia can completely block all NATO cargo deliveries to Afghanistan, close the airspace, and withdraw from arms agreements that are disadvantageous for us. These are very painful and sensitive issues for the West. And I believe that if Russia had made them clear straight away, there wouldn’t probably have been the sanctions that we are facing now. In my view, the key error of the Russian attitude towards the Ukrainian issue was the failure to respond to the first wave of sanctions. The West felt that Russia was scared and stepped up its pressure, while the Ukrainian government decided that the West could effectively pressure Russia.
Will Russia suffer from sanctions imposed by Europe and the United States in the military sector?
As for the military sphere, the answer is no. We have no cooperation at all. We continue to treat each other as strategic opponents. The sanctions are rather symbolic and we can live with them without any trouble. Of course, we cannot let the imposition of sanctions stand against Russia, and, in my opinion, by all means have to mount an adequate response.
What has Russia managed to achieve in terms of the Ukrainian crisis, and what are the prospects of the latter’s settlement?
Russia succeeded in working out a cease-fire and in starting the negotiation process on its terms. The sheer fact that the Lugansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic have been recognized is an infallible success as compared with the situation in July and August. However, the Novorossia Project from Kharkov to Odessa has undergone dramatic changes since April. In addition, the basic problem of the lack of a land bridge to the Crimea has yet to be solved.
I can imagine several scenarios for future developments in Ukraine. If Donbass remains in the same status as Transnistria, it will become another unrecognized republic, completely dependent on Russia. The loss of Donbass per se is not critical for Ukrainian statehood.
The second possible scenario is the establishment of an expanded Novorossiya.
Presently, there are three key rival regions in Ukraine, namely Zaporozhye, a Donbass-Crimea link which, in my opinion, appears to be the most explosive region, and Kharkiv and Dnepropetrovsk, where Ihor Kolomoyskyi has, in fact, created his own military units, and may be reluctant to comply with the authorities in Kiev. In other words, Kiev may be facing a problem of taking over control of Dnepropetrovsk.
If the Ukrainian authorities had set the course for federalization in April, it would have only strengthened Ukrainian statehood. As it is now, Donbass is unlikely to accept federalization and the issue of confederation issue is coming to the fore.
In your opinion, how long will the Ukrainian crisis last?
I'm afraid that it will last at least a few years. So far, this conflict has shown that the Ukrainian statehood proved to be stronger than had been originally thought in spring. Of course, there is the question of how well Ukraine can hold up when winter comes. But I don’t share the rosy anticipations of those who believe that “in winter everything will fall apart.” It’s worth remembering that gas supplies to Ukraine were cut off on June 16. However, Ukraine has somehow managed to cope with this for the past three months.
What do you think of the prospects for the Eastern Partnership?
The Eastern Partnership initiative entails a geopolitical repartition of the whole region. In fact, this program changes boundaries, since it raises the issue of Russia’s genuine borders with the countries of Eastern Europe. The realization of this initiative will aggravate the status of unrecognized states and complicate Russia's relations with other countries, especially with Ukraine. Furthermore, it will intensify the struggle for certain territories and provoke a new round of confrontation between the supporters and the opponents of this project. I do not rule out new territorial changes in Eastern Europe, and the boundaries that were established in 1991 could turn out to be quite conditional.
In your opinion, what are some other potentially explosive regions?
Now we might refer to the return of the so-called Baltic-Black Sea conflict system, or Intermarium. I would like to remind you that this term was coined by the Russian political scientist Vadim Tsymbursky, who regarded the entire system from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea as a single geopolitical system Intermarium.
When NATO's eastward expansion started, a huge contested space appeared between Russia and NATOl the area stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Caucasus made up a single geopolitical corridor.
I would like to note an interesting transformation of the Russian interests. Although we are still arguing about the international order, in fact our priority now is the fight for the Baltic-Black Sea region.
What is happening now is the revision of the NATO-Russian Founding Act. And if NATO begins to build up its strength in the Baltic-Black Sea region, Russia will do exactly the same in response, and this can lead to potential conflicts.
At its summit in Wales, NATO spared no efforts to even the score on the Baltic Sea. An agreement was reached there on enhanced cooperation with Finland, and engagement with Sweden gained momentum. In addition, NATO announced plans to deploy troops in Estonia. If this happens, Russia will face a dangerous situation where the waters of the Gulf of Finland will be controlled by NATO and a close partner of NATO. Kaliningrad supply routes could be cut off. Generating tension for Russia on the Baltic Sea in order to counter its success on the Black Sea is a new aspect of United States policy towards this country. The Baltic region may well become the next hot spot. And that crisis will be far more serious than even the current Ukrainian one.
Prepared for publication by RIAC Program Assistant Maria Smekalova and RIAC Portal Coordinator Daria Khaspekova.