Islamic State in Africa: Affiliates and Competition

It is highly likely that the Islamic State in Africa will remain very active. This can be explained by the weakness of local governments and a lack of real administrative control over entire regions, which are held by various criminal and insurgent groups, and could become new bases for the Islamic State.

The ideological basis of IS activities in Africa is also important, since terrorists can claim that they are not only fighting “apostate” Moslem governments, but are also directly engaged in spreading Islam to new territories that are under the rule of non-Moslem governments. Especially because the IS can probably acquire supporters among new converts to Islam. In addition, some IS affiliates create effective administrative systems of governance that attracts locals tired of the incompetence of national governments.

Thus, vast territories under weak government control make Sub-Saharan Africa an attractive region for IS expansion. And confronting them will not be easy. Logistical problems in the African expanse make it difficult for European nations and the United States to conduct counterterrorism operations. Disagreements between European states and local governments also reduce the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures, as exemplified by Mali. There, instead of the national government, French troops and Russian PMCs joining hands, it turned out that Paris withdrew its troops after learning that Bamako had made a deal with Russian private military contractors. The peripheral nature of sub-Saharan Africa gives terrorists a foothold there, unlike the Middle East and North Africa which are much more closely integrated with Europe.

One might expect IS actions in Sub-Saharan Africa to focus on seizing territory to form its own quasi-states in that region instead of launching terrorist attacks in Europe. That said, the history of terrorist Islamist groups entering Africa shows that there is a lot of division within them that prevent their unification.

Islamic State (IS; recognized as a terrorist organization and banned in Russia) affiliates and networks in Mozambique, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Mali remain particularly active, perpetrating terrorist attacks against civilians and security forces. The year 2023 has brought in new challenges due to the uncertainty of some local governments about Russian support in the wake of the “Wagner case” amid a lack of apparent successes in counterterrorism. Any reduction in the presence of external forces in the regions of IS activity in Africa could lead to new zones where terrorists hold territorial control, which, in turn, will serve as a “showcase” for the success of the IS project, giving terrorists new opportunities to attract adherents and find new sources of funding.

Africa: the second front for IS

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In summer 2022, in its al-Naba newsletter, IS again singled out Africa as the area where it would most likely succeed in re-establishing a “territorial caliphate”. In an editorial published by the weekly Arabic-language terrorist newsletter in June 2022, IS advised its adherents who had not made the hijrah (“emigration”) to Iraq, Syria or elsewhere in the past—to seek “resettling” with their “brothers in the land of Africa, for today this is the land of hijrah and jihad.” IS has thus confirmed that Africa is now the center of the “caliphate”, despite the fact that the leaders of the terrorist organization are still appointed from among the ranks of the “central” IS, i.e. the Islamic State currently operating in Iraq and Syria, even if underground.

An editorial published by this terrorist periodical in early May 2023 also hailed “today’s Moslem jihad in Mozambique.” In particular, it made a point that non-Moslem rulers and “apostate rulers” are now finally realizing that they are in a “new era” which “they feared, but now the time has come.” This was talking, above all, about African rulers, though the threats of terrorism from the African affiliates of the IS are fraught with spilling beyond the continent’s borders.

In late 2016, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the first leader of the Islamic State, probably realizing that the radicals were being defeated in Syria and Iraq, declared the group’s need to “expand and move some of their command, media and resources” to Africa, which was destined to transform into its “second front”. From that point on, we should reckon the unprecedented growth of IS activity in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the IS leadership directed financial resources, preachers and military advisors.

Meanwhile, the IS activity in Africa did not start with a clean slate. The basis for the “caliphate” expanding into those regions was a terrorist presence in the form of a whole constellation of Salafi-jihadist terrorist groups spiritually close to the IS, of which many had rallied under its banners even before the declaration made by al-Baghdadi. Thus, the emergence of the “Islamic State” in Africa only consolidated the “jihadist” organizations already operating on the continent, giving a new impetus to their activities. But it was not an export or redeployment of IS structures directly from the Middle East and North Africa to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Since the “persist and expand” slogan carries fundamental ideological and propaganda meanings for the Islamic State, it is now relevant primarily for the group’s “expansion” into Sub-Saharan Africa. Only there is the “Islamic State” able to maintain territorial control and establish “tamkin”—an Islamic definition that is close in meaning to what is called “sovereignty”, where power and territorial control, as well as population, are indispensable attributes, as there can be no power and government among Moslems without them.

In Syria and Iraq, there was a loss of territorial control, population and resources, without which the Islamic State, according to its own ideological concept, cannot be called a “state”. This is why Africa currently finds itself at the core of the IS strategy.

Islamic State’s Wilayat — West Africa

For many years, the Sahel region has been the place of concentration and mounting activity for numerous jihadist groups of various strains. Such terrorist factions as Boko Haram (recognized as a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) and Al-Qaeda (recognized as a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) along with smaller alliances of radicals have been waging a full-scale war against the five states of the region—Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso—since 2007. After the emergence of local IS cells in the region, all these groups have entered into a confrontation among themselves, to boot.

Among other regional specifics is that local organized crime, often linked to power structures, has used the banner of jihadism to cover its criminal interests—drug, arms and human trafficking—which has also affected the logic of transforming local terrorist groups [1], complicating the counterterrorism efforts for local governments and the international community. The results of fighting terrorism in the Sahel region remain unsatisfactory: during 2022, terrorist activity kept thriving and spreading to other countries such as Togo and Benin, expanding the territorial base of jihadist groups [2].

In this part of Africa, Al Qaeda affiliates have also stirred to higher activity. For instance, Ansaru has shifted its focus from cooperation with criminal elements to operations against government forces along Nigeria’s border with Benin, where the Malia faction and the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM), both affiliated with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, recognized as a terrorist organization banned in Russia), also operate.

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In turn, GSIM is expanding its activities to the neighboring Togo. For the first time in July 2022, the organization claimed to have attacked the military in that country. Togo was previously considered “operational territory” for Ansaru, a group active in northwestern Nigeria and the border regions of Togo. In 2022, GSIM also attacked Benin, Togo’s neighbor that borders northwestern Nigeria.

For its part, the Wilayat IG West Africa (IG-WA) has been able to make meaningful gains not only in fighting its rivals and confronting government forces, but also in its efforts to establish territorial control, which is considered an indispensable attribute of IS quasi-statehood. By the way, it distinguishes this jihadist project from al-Qaeda, which prefers to operate from the underground.

In particular, IS-WA has developed its own rudimentary administration, operating on the principle of “taxes in exchange for security,” also capable of providing limited social, utility and municipal services. The terrorist-controlled areas have developed their own media and warning system. In particular, there is an information campaign conducted via phone texts and WhatsApp messages urging civilians to leave government-controlled areas and move to IS-WA-held territories to engage in agriculture and trade on more favorable terms. Some aspects of governance that had already been used in Iraq and Syria at the height of the “central” IS success were also implemented there. This applies, for example, to imposition of zakat taxation, governance, the judicial system and the functional Hisbah (morality police) apparatus.

Underpinning the IS success in this part of Africa has been the “clarion call” to another jihadist group, Boko Haram (Jamaat ahl al-Sunna lid-Dawa wa wa-al-Jihad). It cropped up in the early 2000s in Nigeria as an Islamic call organization, but became starkly radicalized in 2009, when Abubakar Shekau took over and tried to transform that organization into an independent center of “global jihad”. This prompted him in 2014 to simultaneously express support for IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Nevertheless, that strategy proved unjustified, and Shekau had to take sides in March 2015 choosing al-Baghdadi as his “overlord” to whom he swore an oath.

Thus, Boko Haram turned into Wilayat IS West Africa. Meanwhile, Abubakar Shekau proved too radical even for IS, so al-Baghdadi decided to replace him with Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the son of Boko Haram founder and first emir Muhammad Yusuf, who had previously led the al-Qaida-affiliated Jama’atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan. The latter also split, with some Ansar supporters remaining loyal to al-Qaida (known as Ansaru) and rejecting al-Baghdadi's caliphate; yet, the faction’s activity is now thought to be low.

After the appointment of A.M. al Barnawi as head of IS-WA, A.B. Shekau refused to submit to al-Baghdadi and resumed his activities as leader of Boko Haram with part of his supporters. In May 2021, IS launched an offensive against them in Sambisa Forest, which was considered A.B. Shekau’s stronghold. There, he was surrounded by IS militants and blew himself up with a “suicide vest.” After that, Boko Haram was taken over by Bakura Sahalabi, and the organization focused primarily on fighting IS-WA that was declared the main enemy.

In January 2023, Boko Haram was able to launch a successful offensive against IS-WA. The fighting resulted in the shrinking of IS-controlled areas in the marches of Lake Chad and in serious losses of manpower and weapons. The Boko Haram faction captured several island strongholds in that area that was home to arms depots and prisons of IS-WA. Hundreds of fighters on both sides were then killed in action. The clashes fueled internal divisions within IS-WA, resulting in several hundred fighters defecting from IS to Boko Haram.

All of this led to a temporary weakening of IS capabilities in northeastern Nigeria, which government and regional counterterrorism forces took advantage of by launching their own offensive in April 2023. So far, these actions have not led to a serious decrease in terrorist activity, although security reports indicate that more and more communities have been liberated from IS.

It should be borne in mind that the Nigerian Army and regional forces are trying to destroy the rural sanctuaries of the IS-WA using airstrikes, while the ground forces remain largely garrisoned in the major cities. As a result, terrorists who leave a particular location then return to it unhindered, while the lack of sustainable security prevents the government from returning internally displaced persons and developing the areas cleared of IS. This has happened before and allowed the Islamic State to re-establish its territorial presence. Climate change further exacerbates this cycle due to the growing scarcity of resources, persistent droughts and flooding in the Lake Chad basin, which also prevents the return of civilians to areas liberated from IS-WA [3].

IS in the Sahara and its terrorist rivals

Other sub-Saharan affiliates of IS have not achieved the level of success enjoyed by the Islamic State in West Africa, and yet they pose ever-increasing threats to security for local governments and their militaries. Thus, according to UN investigators, IS-WA has relation to another IS faction known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) operating in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It emerged from a split in Al Mourabitoun, a Salafi-jihadist militant organization in the Sahel region that was linked to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. However, it is not entirely clear whether the ISGS is an independent group or one of IS-WA affiliates.

In turn, there is also a faction of al-Qaeda operating in the Sahara region (primarily in Mali), called Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM). This one came into existence in 2017 as a result of the merger between the Tuareg-based Ansar al-Din, parts of Murabitoun that did not join the IS, and Katibat Machina. The given organization is a rival of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara region. In the spring of 2023, Abu Yasser al-Jazairi, a leading figure and ideologue in AQIM, delivered a speech in which he called on JNIM to continue the fight against the Kharijites (he meant the IS, though this term has a broader implication in the Sunni, designating those who are considered extremists violating the rights of other Moslems). While within IS propaganda narratives in the Sahel region fighting against al-Qaeda is portrayed as a crackdown on “apostates” from Islam, this is also consistent with the IS views on al-Qaeda as an “apostate” organization because of its alleged “betrayal of true Moslems and collusion with the enemies of Moslems,” according to the official IS rant.

Nevertheless, both JNIM and IS in the Greater Sahara region together oppose the governments of Mali and neighboring states. Previously, they also fought French troops and other international forces deployed in that part of Sahel in the course of Operation Serval. Now they are also confronted by Russian PMCs that arrived in Mali at the invitation of the local government, which is too dependent on external assistance, because any reduction of the latter could lead to a collapse of the entire security system in the region, as all countries here are interconnected.

Wilayat IS Central Africa

African Pressure Points: Sahel (situation review and future prospects). RIAC and ICRC Report

Wilayat IS Central Africa emerged in 2014 as a spin-off from the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist insurgent organization operating in Uganda and the Great Lakes region, as well as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). What is noteworthy is the transformation of the ADF group from a typical “black African” insurgency that came into being without a single hint at an Islamic component, having few Moslems in its ranks, into a radical jihadist group within the IS.

This was facilitated by the fact that Islam was rapidly spreading in the East and North-East of the DRC after the so-called Great African War, with ADF moving its activities from Uganda to this particular area. At that time, large groups of neophytes appeared there, including under the influence of peacekeepers, who carried out operations under the auspices of the UN, from Moslem countries, Islamic proselytizing in the DRC being very successful. But this led to a direct conflict with the government structures and official Moslem organizations in this country, which oppose external influence on the Islamic life in the DRC. Therefore, the base of support for IS in the DRC, among some other groups, were local “new Moslems” in conflict with their communities and with the state structures. Jihadist groups from Uganda, penetrating the DRC, have found new supporters among these people too.

The ADF was founded in 1995 and has been led since 2015 by Jamil Mukulu, a former Catholic converted to Islam, who was able to ensure a relative success of his campaign. After his arrest in Tanzania and imprisonment in 2019, the organization was headed by Musa Baluku, who began to cooperate with the Islamic State, which eventually led to ADF fighters rallying under the banners of the “caliphate”, while Baluku also swore an oath to the IS. Thus, the foundation of ISCA was laid.

Due to the actions of the ISCA, the DRC Ituri region and neighboring North Kivu province have been under a “siege” since 2021, when all governance of these areas was concentrated in the hands of security officials who run local civilian authorities in an attempt to eradicate violence. That same year, the DRC and Uganda launched a joint offensive to dislodge ISCA from their Congolese strongholds, but these measures have not resulted in a turning point and have so far failed to put an end to the group’s attacks. In 2023, ISCA continued to launch attacks against government forces in the DRC and neighboring states, in addition to carrying out massacres of civilians who refused to cooperate and assist the terrorist group.

In the meantime, ISCA activity in the region is increasingly shifting to the DRC, where the organization is establishing new strongholds, with less focus on Uganda and neighboring Tanzania, because in those two countries the terrorist support base is small, despite a significantly larger Moslem population there.

ISCA has also been at work in Mozambique since the local jihadist faction Ansar al-Sunna, which has been active in the country since 2015, swore allegiance to IS. This ISCA affiliate is known by several names—in addition to the Ansar al-Sunna still in use today, the group has also called itself “Ahlu al-Sunna wal Jamaa” and “al-Shabaab” (although it has no connection to the Somalia-based terrorist alliance al-Shabaab), or “IS-Mozambique”.

Anyway, this terrorist arm of ISCA has been able to take over large areas in Northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, including a number of towns that the group has not attempted to hold, but for which fierce battles with government forces occasionally erupt. For example, a four-day assault on the city of Palma that began on March 24, 2021, left at least 87 civilians dead, including dozens of foreigners. It is believed that as of 2017 IS-Mozambique has been responsible for more than 3,100 deaths and the displacement of more than 800,000 people.

The situation in this predominantly Moslem region of Mozambique is complicated by the fact that on the side of the government forces, along with units from neighboring states and PMCs, various irregular formations, some of them openly criminal, are active. As part of the fight against ISCA, they commit crimes against local Moslems, groundlessly accusing them of sympathizing with the Islamic State, which turns these citizens against the government.

These circumstances were naturally taken advantage of by the IS-Mozambique, which began a vigorous struggle for “hearts and minds.” In particular, in early 2023, local media and conflict observers reported more concerted efforts by IS-Mozambique to build relationships with civilians, where Islamic State fighters portrayed themselves as an ally of the general public rather than their enemy.

For example, according to Mozambiquan media reports, IS militants in the Mosimboa da Praia neighborhood contacted refugees to reassure them of their safety. They also bought overpriced goods from locals and repeated this at least twice in different parts of the province during the following weeks to gain their support.

After the attack on Nairoto, Montepuez County, in mid-February 2023, in which IS terrorists seized the settlement, the group left letters in Arabic and local languages informing civilians that they had taken only the essentials and offered a compensation to Moslems affected by the attack, urging Christians to convert to Islam to avoid paying the IS tax.

The presence of numerous foreign mining operations in southern Cabo Delgado provided IS-Mozambique with a new opportunity to strike the government economically, even when its attacks are not directly targeted at the mines per se. Attacks on mining operations in southern Mozambique commenced in June 2022, forcing many companies doing business in the area to temporarily suspend operations in response to growing militant activity. For example, Australian mining company Syrah Resources suspended operations at its large graphite mine in Balama in June 2022 after attacks near a key road raised the issue of unsafe transportation of products, whereas heightened tensions around the mine itself forced the company to briefly evacuate personnel in November 2022. Another Australian mining company suspended operations in June 2022 after two employees were killed in an attack on its graphite mining operations. Gemfields, which holds a 75 percent stake in the Ancuabe ruby mining operation, has suspended operations twice since June 2022 due to the activity of insurgents near its mines.

Thus, despite the efforts of the Mozambican government and units from the neighboring states joining counterterrorism operations, ISCA in Mozambique has not decreased its activity and probably has the resources and potential to repeat large-scale attacks, with entire cities falling under the group's control as a result. Another issue is that such a strategy has been rejected by the terrorists themselves as not yielding the desired results.

Wilayat IS—Somalia

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Yet far from all African radicals have found it acceptable to embrace the leadership of IS. For example, the “veterans” of African jihadism, the Somali group al-Shabab, against which the combined forces of several African states from AMISOM (African Union Mission to Somalia) have been fighting (under the guise of “peacekeeping”) with varying success since 2007, as well as the Ethiopian military, which until 2016 had supported the government in Mogadishu. In 2015, IS leader al-Baghdadi called on al-Shabab to accept his command and become part of the “caliphate”, but Somalia-based jihadists decided to remain loyal to al-Qaida since they had sworn allegiance to its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri back in 2012.

It was not until late 2015 that a small group of al-Shabab fighters declared themselves part of the Islamic State as Wilayat IS Somalia, while that affiliate’s activity was largely limited to the part of the country where the self-proclaimed state of Puntland was established. This IS cell was not completely destroyed in 2016 only due to intense skirmishes between the Sufi militia, the so-called Dervishes of Puntland, and al-Shabab. The latter had been close to eliminating the IS in Somalia shortly before the conflict with the Dervishes. Today, al-Shabab is still more influential in Somalia than IS and controls some hard-to-reach areas, although its activity has significantly decreased over the past 5-7 years.

***

It is highly likely that the Islamic State in Africa will remain very active. This can be explained by the weakness of local governments and a lack of real administrative control over entire regions, which are held by various criminal and insurgent groups, and could become new bases for the Islamic State.

The ideological basis of IS activities in Africa is also important, since terrorists can claim that they are not only fighting “apostate” Moslem governments, but are also directly engaged in spreading Islam to new territories that are under the rule of non-Moslem governments. Especially because the IS can probably acquire supporters among new converts to Islam. In addition, some IS affiliates create effective administrative systems of governance that attracts locals tired of the incompetence of national governments.

Thus, vast territories under weak government control make Sub-Saharan Africa an attractive region for IS expansion. And confronting them will not be easy. Logistical problems in the African expanse make it difficult for European nations and the United States to conduct counterterrorism operations. Disagreements between European states and local governments also reduce the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures, as exemplified by Mali. There, instead of the national government, French troops and Russian PMCs joining hands, it turned out that Paris withdrew its troops after learning that Bamako had made a deal with Russian private military contractors. The peripheral nature of sub-Saharan Africa gives terrorists a foothold there, unlike the Middle East and North Africa which are much more closely integrated with Europe.

One might expect IS actions in Sub-Saharan Africa to focus on seizing territory to form its own quasi-states in that region instead of launching terrorist attacks in Europe. That said, the history of terrorist Islamist groups entering Africa shows that there is a lot of division within them that prevent their unification.

1. Global Terrorism Index, 2022

2. D'Amato and Baldaro, 2022

3. ISW SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT WEEKLY UPDATE, MAY 17, 20