Keeping It Up? Where Friedrich Merz Will Take Germany’s Foreign Policy

The early elections to the Bundestag highlighted the irreversible transformation of German politics from a stable and somewhat boring process into a series of crises and scandals. Germany definitively bid farewell to the “Merkel era.” The government of Olaf Scholz took office in late 2021, handling the Kanzlerin legacy with utmost caution. Even after February 2022, changes in German politics were made with an eye to the recent past and were hampered by internal frictions within the traffic light coalition.

Now the chancellor’s seat will go to a longtime rival of Angela Merkel, who opposed “the upstart from East Germany” back in the early 2000s. Friedrich Merz is not just uncommitted to political continuity—he was elected to lead the CDU precisely to overhaul first the party itself and then Germany as a whole.

There is a combination of factors that may contribute to easing the most confrontational aspects in Russian–German relations. Among them, the overall dynamics of relations between Russia and the West carry the most weight. Germany will not single-handedly initiate the normalization of bilateral ties, nor can it confront Russia in isolation from Washington, let alone in defiance of its overseas ally.

However, even if the Merz government ignores all opportunities to normalize Russian–German dialogue, this is unlikely to be fatal for bilateral relations. Their collapse in 2022 gave Russia valuable experience in managing false expectations. The remaining connections in the economic and societal spheres are not too extensive, but they have become highly resistant to external challenges and are quite capable of surviving Friedrich Merz’s chancellorship.

The early elections to the Bundestag highlighted the irreversible transformation of German politics from a stable and somewhat boring process into a series of crises and scandals. Germany definitively bid farewell to the “Merkel era.” The government of Olaf Scholz took office in late 2021, handling the Kanzlerin legacy with utmost caution. Even after February 2022, changes in German politics were made with an eye to the recent past and were hampered by internal frictions within the traffic light coalition.

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Now the chancellor’s seat will go to a longtime rival of Angela Merkel, who opposed “the upstart from East Germany” back in the early 2000s. Friedrich Merz is not just uncommitted to political continuity—he was elected to lead the CDU precisely to overhaul first the party itself and then Germany as a whole. For some, the “right turn” he promised has never materialized, but the sense of a “wind of change,” at least in the ranks of the Christian Democrats, is hard to deny.

As in last year’s elections to the European Parliament and the legislatures of three eastern federal states, foreign policy loomed large in the election campaign. The main priorities of German voters—stabilization of the social and economic situation, migration, and security—were linked to the foreign policy dimension. This interdependence between domestic and foreign policy was initially set by Olaf Scholz in his Zeitenwende (“historic turning point”) vision. However, instead of addressing domestic problems through an active and effective foreign policy, Berlin faced the opposite situation, where ineffective diplomacy exacerbated problems at home.

There is no doubt that the Ukraine conflict is the central foreign policy issue shaping Germany’s domestic politics. Over three years of active hostilities, Berlin has become the world's second-largest donor of aid to Kiev (after the U.S.) and the largest within the EU. Nevertheless, this generosity has yielded little in return, while German hesitation in the early weeks of the conflict has eroded any reputational gains from its support. The U.S.–Russia negotiations in Riyadh further give the impression that Berlin, along with other European capitals, has been left at the kids’ table in discussions on resolving the conflict.

The Christian Democrats, who won the early Bundestag elections, are formally in favor of maintaining the weiter so (“keep it up”) principle in German foreign policy. However, this stance is more an element of positioning themselves in the German political space than a well-thought-out strategy. The Bundestag elections coincided with changes in the dynamics of the Ukraine crisis, and the new German government will have to take new realities into account in its actions.

The prevailing sentiment among analysts, both in Russia and abroad, is that Friedrich Merz will pursue a hard line on Russia. His campaign rhetoric reinforces this impression, as the CDU/CSU candidate threatened Moscow with increased support for Ukraine up to the point of supplying Taurus missiles to the Ukrainian military. Furthermore, the politician’s entire career has been closely linked to transatlantic structures, so it is hardly possible to expect any “special perspective” on Russian–German relations from him.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to assume that relations between Moscow and Berlin are locked into a downward trajectory under the new chancellor. Before 2022, Merz had supported the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, and in the summer of 2024, he spoke in favor of launching negotiations on the Ukraine conflict. With no past ties to Russia weighing on his record, Merz has the freedom to work without demonstrative distancing from Russia and to approach relations with Moscow with a clean slate—provided there is a political will to do so.

Finally, the foreign policy of the Federal Chancellery regarding Russia will develop amid dynamic processes in international relations and under the objective limitations of German diplomacy. It seems possible to identify several factors that will determine the direction of Russian–German relations.

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To begin with, Friedrich Merz’s first task in foreign policy will be to synchronize positions with Washington on a wide range of issues. Donald Trump’s return to the presidency came as a surprise to the German political establishment, which had been betting on the victory of Democratic candidate Kamala Harris until the very last moment. Trump’s bold statements on the Ukraine crisis, the blistering speech by Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference, and the talks between Russian and American officials in Riyadh left Berlin utterly perplexed. For many German politicians, the decades-old foundations that made Germany what it is today have been shaken.

As a devoted Atlanticist, Merz prioritizes Germany’s allied commitments to NATO. While he may not have much sympathy for Trump, he will seek to establish a working relationship with the U.S. president and understand what the latter wants from Germany. Despite signs of uncertainty within the Alliance, Berlin is keen to avoid resonating with them.

If the course toward restarting dialogue between Russia and the U.S. takes a long-term and structured form, Washington’s key European allies will likely choose to align with this trend rather than oppose it. For Germany, this could present a window of opportunity to revise its foreign policy toward Russia.

Second, Friedrich Merz has extensive connections in German business circles. He is probably well-informed about the deep frustration among German entrepreneurs struggling with high energy prices. Since 2022, efforts to address this issue—whether through diversifying suppliers or turning to renewable energy sources—have failed. While the argument about the deindustrialization of Germany is largely emotional, it nonetheless reflects a broader pessimism about the country’s economic outlook.

Bringing the surviving line of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline into operation may partially alleviate German industry's problems. Russia has repeatedly confirmed its readiness to resume energy cooperation with its German partners. This issue was also raised during the latest phone talks between Vladimir Putin and Olaf Scholz in November 2024. The ball is now in Berlin's court.

Right now, the idea of launching Nord Stream 2 may seem far-fetched. However, for Merz, it is the only opportunity to quickly address one of the most important problems crippling the German economy. German voters, tired of the tensions within the traffic light coalition, expect swift and effective solutions from the new government. Such a dramatic move could not only stabilize energy prices but also dispel doubts about Berlin’s capacity for effective goal-setting.

Third, Merz has to take into account public sentiment in Germany. More than a third of those who went to the polls in February 2025 voted for the opposition parties—Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Left, and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance. The platforms of each of these parties included criticism of Berlin’s foreign policy, including in the Russian direction. This outcome sends a strong message that German society is dissatisfied with the traffic light coalition’s actions aimed at breaking Russian–German ties. Public opinion polls also suggest that fewer Germans support continuing aid to Ukraine at the same level as before.

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Supporters of the opposition forces—primarily the AfD—are facing ostracism from the German political mainstream. However, the strategy of building a so-called firewall around the party shows its limited effectiveness. Despite unprecedented pressure, the AfD managed to double its vote share compared to the 2021 elections. Even if this does not lead to normalization of this party in German politics during the current election cycle, it will be difficult to dismiss protest votes as merely a product of malicious external influence.

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Thus, there is a combination of factors that may contribute to easing the most confrontational aspects in Russian–German relations.

Among them, the overall dynamics of relations between Russia and the West carry the most weight. Germany will not single-handedly initiate the normalization of bilateral ties, nor can it confront Russia in isolation from Washington, let alone in defiance of its overseas ally. Willy Brandt’s Neue Ostpolitik was only possible in the unique climate of détente in the 1970s. While historical parallels are never exact, there is no reason to believe that the logic of relations within the transatlantic community has changed dramatically since then.

A separate question is the composition of Friedrich Merz’s future cabinet. If a “grand coalition” government is formed between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, the Foreign Minister’s seat will likely go to a Social Democrat. Who will the new head of German diplomacy be: an heir to the Ostpolitik tradition or a staunch advocate of transatlanticism? While acknowledging the formula where German foreign policy is “cooked” by the Federal Chancellery and merely “served up” by the Foreign Ministry, it is worth noting that the experience of the traffic light coalition has shown new limits to the Foreign Ministry’s initiative. If Berlin decides that moving away from confrontational rhetoric against Russia is in its best interest, the personal engagement of Germany’s top diplomat could help embrace a constructive approach once again.

However, even if the Merz government ignores all opportunities to normalize Russian–German dialogue, this is unlikely to be fatal for bilateral relations. Their collapse in 2022 gave Russia valuable experience in managing false expectations. The remaining connections in the economic and societal spheres are not too extensive, but they have become highly resistant to external challenges and are quite capable of surviving Friedrich Merz’s chancellorship.