Jaw-Jaw is Always Better than War-War

The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Vienna on 16 May 2016 in the presence of the representatives of the countries that co-chair the Minsk OSCE Group, the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov, the French Secretary of State for European Affairs Harlem Desir and the US Secretary of State John Kerry, the first meeting of the presidents in the wake of the events of 2-5 April 2016 in Nagorno-Karabakh known as “the four-day war”.

What are the implications of the Vienna meeting of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan?

The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Vienna on 16 May 2016 in the presence of the representatives of the countries that co-chair the Minsk OSCE Group, the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov, the French Secretary of State for European Affairs Harlem Desir and the US Secretary of State John Kerry, the first meeting of the presidents in the wake of the events of 2-5 April 2016 in Nagorno-Karabakh known as “the four-day war”.

The joint statement on behalf of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group distributed after the meeting says that the Presidents did not just “reaffirm their commitment to ceasefire and peaceful settlement of the conflict”, but agreed on an “early completion of the work on the OSCE mechanism to investigate the incidents” and “expand of the office of the personal representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office”. An agreement was also reached to hold a new meeting in June 2016 “at a venue to be mutually agreed upon for the purpose of resuming the negotiating process aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement”. Considering the recent aggravation of the situation in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, the mediators’ statement gives grounds for a measure of optimism. However, the results of the meeting should not be overestimated.

The very holding of the meeting was under question until last. On 25 April 2016 Serzh Sargsyan said in an interview with Bloomberg agency that he sees no point in negotiations, unless the provocations on the contact line stop. At about the same time a draft law was submitted to the National Assembly of Armenia on recognizing the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

Although the draft law was not, after all, put on the agenda, the message to Azerbaijan and the international community was clear: in the event of a fresh escalation Armenia would be ready to officially recognize the independence of the NKR. Nor was there a shortage of tough statements on the part of Azerbaijan. The day before the meeting the Defence Minister of Azerbaijan Zakir Gasanov said: ”thanks to the resolve of the President of Azerbaijan and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Alyev we will surely liberate the occupied territories”. The situation on the line of contact between Azerbaijan and NKR and also on the recognized border between Armenia and Azerbaijan remained tense: exchanges of fire took place throughout April and early May of 2016 with both sides accusing each other of violating the ceasefire. And yet the meeting did take place, an event international mediators have reason to consider a success, if only a modest one.

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The implementation of the measures aimed at strengthening the ceasefire is open to some doubt: the distance between declaring the agreement of the parties and actual implementation of these mechanisms may turn out to be considerable.

Another result of the Vienna meeting the mediators can claim is the agreement of the presidents to create a mechanism to investigate the incidents and expand the office of the personal representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. Up until now the ceasefire regime was maintained by the parties of the conflict practically without the participation of third parties. The OSCE presence in the conflict zone was limited to periodic visits by Minsk Group co-chairs and the work of the personal representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Andrzej Kaspsik, and his six assistants. None of them have the resources or powers to conduct effective monitoring of the ceasefire. Up until now all the proposals to set up such monitoring mechanisms have been blocked by Azerbaijan: Baku thought this would play in Armenia’s hands by contributing to the conservation and legitimization of the status quo.

In spite of the progress made, the situation in the conflict zone remains tense: the explosive situation in the wake of the April incidents cannot be neutralized by one or several meetings, even at the highest level. “The four-day war” radicalized society, which cannot but influence the behaviour of the political elites. Calls are voiced in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh “not to give away an inch of land to the enemy” and to regain the ground lost during the April fighting. These calls often go hand-in-hand with criticism of the authorities for not being prepared for the April spike in tensions, inability to root out corruption, which, critics say, undermines the country’s defence capability, and for not taking a tough enough stand in the negotiating process. For the Armenian authorities to make any concessions in these circumstances would mean to show weakness, which is fraught with unpredictable consequences for the country’s political elite. As for the NKR, it has always mistrusted the negotiating process, in which Stepanakert is not directly involved, and the April incidents did nothing to soften that approach.

As regards Azerbaijan’s position, there are no signs of a readiness for a compromise. Although territorial gains during the April incidents were rather insignificant, they brought Baku some dividends, notably in internal politics. The April events enabled the authorities to temporarily keep at bay internal instability caused by the fall of energy prices and socio-economic problems. The pro-government media are playing up the alleged successes in “the four-day war”, raising more expectations in society. In such an atmosphere Baku is unlikely to make any serious concessions which any compromise must involve.

It is hard to imagine that the next meeting of the Presidents due to be held in June would deliver a breakthrough in the settlement of the conflict. Nor is it likely that the mediators will manage to bring about the signing of any agreements, even if they do not go beyond reiteration of the fairly vague “Madrid principles”, which have in one way or another provided the basis of the talks over ten years. Moreover, even the implementation of the measures aimed at strengthening the ceasefire is open to some doubt: the distance between declaring the agreement of the parties and actual implementation of these mechanisms may turn out to be considerable. Even if these measures are adopted, as the experience of settling other conflicts shows, the presence of observers and investigation mechanisms does not guarantee that the ceasefire will be honoured. It is significant that the shootout on the line of contact, which claimed casualties on both sides, took place on the night of 17 May 2016, practically at the same time as the meeting of the Presidents in Vienna. Even so, the meeting of the Presidents does give grounds for admittedly a cautious hope that the negotiating process will be resumed and further escalation of the conflict will be prevented.