Nuclear Doctrine and Strategic Stability

Over the past few years, public attention in Russia and abroad has focused on an unprecedented debate within Russian expert and political circles regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine. In 2024, this debate centered on amendments to Russia’s official Military Doctrine on nuclear deterrence, which were promulgated in November of that year. The issue gained even greater urgency following the victory of Republican candidate Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential election in November. These developments will have a tangible impact on the prospects for nuclear arms control, the arms race, strategic stability and the likelihood of nuclear war.

Russian leadership acknowledged that the country’s nuclear doctrine could be amended to take into account changes in the objective situation on the ground, compared to the time when the previous document had been adopted in 2020. These adjustments were reflected in the new edition of “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” published on November 9, 2024. Russian proponents of a doctrinal shift from nuclear deterrence to nuclear intimidation will likely consider the revision of the “Basic Principles” as a move in favor of their stance. Nevertheless, the amendments to the nuclear doctrine do not indicate its radical overhaul but rather a clarification of its provisions. There is no endorsement of a nuclear first strike, limited nuclear war, or the use of nuclear weapons as a functional means of achieving success in local or regional military operations. All the amendments refer specifically to retaliatory measures in the event of aggressive nuclear and conventional military operations against Russia and its allies.

The situation in this critical area of international relations is more in line with the proposals of the proponents of “reinforcing the nuclear factor in international affairs.” The U.S. set this process in motion in 2002 when, still reeling from the shock of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C, it withdrew from the ABM Treaty—without any compelling strategic justification. Since the late 2010s, this destructive process has been moving like an avalanche.

Regardless of the progress of the peace process in the Ukrainian conflict, resuming the U.S.–Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue will be a daunting challenge. In any case, the U.S. will likely make China’s involvement in arms limitation efforts a mandatory condition. Furthermore, one cannot rule out the possibility of Washington leaving the New START before its extended expiration date in February 2026 under the pretext of alleged Russian “violation” or as part of a broader effort to build up U.S. nuclear capabilities to counter the other two superpowers taken together. This was the rationale behind the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019. It seems that the Republican government will drop the talk on Russia’s “strategic defeat” but deliberately play on the threat of nuclear escalation to advance its policy on Ukraine and other sensitive international issues.

The threat of destabilization of strategic relations should not be underestimated. The arms control system, a cornerstone of strategic stability, is unraveling and may collapse entirely soon. This process is intertwined with the introduction of advanced weapon systems and potentially destructive technologies and is accompanied by the development of destabilizing strategic concepts.

Some of these trends will, if not destroy, then at least erode strategic stability in its classical definition: a state of strategic relations between the parties that removes incentives for a nuclear first strike.

In parrying these security threats, it is important for Russia not to engage in a quantitative and tit-for-tat arms race but to respond asymmetrically, a strategy that has often proven successful in the past. One can recall the Soviet Union’s lead in developing thermonuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, land-mobile ballistic missiles and ensuring the survivability of naval strategic forces with the help of other forces and means of the fleet, effective systems for overcoming missile defense (including its space-based components) and more. While making efforts to preserve the remaining arms control agreements and to restart the dialogue on strategic stability, Russia should firmly reject the concepts of a nuclear first strike, limited nuclear war, controlled nuclear escalation and the integrated use of nuclear and conventional weapons. In this effort, it would gain support from China, India and professional realistic circles in the U.S. and other Western countries.

Over the past few years, public attention in Russia and abroad has focused on an unprecedented debate within Russian expert and political circles regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons in the context of the armed conflict in Ukraine. In 2024, this debate centered on amendments to Russia’s official Military Doctrine on nuclear deterrence, which were promulgated in November of that year. The issue gained even greater urgency following the victory of Republican candidate Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential election in November. These developments will have a tangible impact on the prospects for nuclear arms control, the arms race, strategic stability and the likelihood of nuclear war.

Nuclear weapons in Russia’s Military Doctrine

The Stabilizing “Basic Principles”: Moscow Reduces Options for Pre-Nuclear Escalation. Russia’s leading experts on the new Russia’s nuclear doctrine

The topic of nuclear war has been a matter of concern since the beginning of the armed conflict in Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, in an address announcing the start of the special military operation, President Vladimir Putin said: “As for military affairs, even after the dissolution of the USSR and losing a considerable part of its capabilities, today’s Russia remains one of the most powerful nuclear states. Moreover, it has a certain advantage in several cutting-edge weapons … No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history. No matter how the events unfold, we are ready. All the necessary decisions in this regard have been taken. I hope that my words will be heard.” To reinforce his message, on February 27, 2022, at a meeting with then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, the Russian president issued orders to put the Russian deterrence forces on a special regime of combat duty.

Nuclear deterrence can essentially be interpreted as a specific foreign policy tool—the threat to use nuclear weapons to prevent an adversary from implementing certain actions. The 2020 policy paper “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence” spells out the possible actions by other states that should be prevented through the capacity and readiness to launch a nuclear strike. First, is “the reception of reliable information on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” This is the concept of a so-called counter-retaliatory strike (known as launch-on-warning in the West), which President Putin has eloquently described many times. This means that Russia would launch its strategic missiles as soon as satellite systems detected an enemy missile launch (within 1.5 minutes) and land-based radars of the early warning system confirmed the attack (within 10–15 minutes)—before the incoming nuclear warheads reached Russian soil (given that the flight time for Minuteman III land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is around 30 minutes, and for Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) is 20 minutes).

Second, is “the use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” This clearly refers to a nuclear attack delivered by other means (such as aircraft and cruise missiles), which, unlike ballistic missiles, are not detected by the early warning system.

Third, Russia’s use of nuclear arms in response to an attack that does not involve such weapons. This applies to an act of aggression with conventional weapons “when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” Experts sometimes draw a tenuous line between the concepts of a first and a preemptive nuclear strike. In theory, a first strike is supposed to ensure that one’s own attack is successful, while a preemptive strike is meant to prevent the attacking enemy from achieving success. In politics, these concepts are often used synonymously. Fourth, “an attack by an adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions.” Since acts of aggression involving weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons are listed separately, this case likely refers to cyber or radio-electronic warfare targeting the information and command-control system of Russia’s strategic forces.

The nuclear debate in Russia

As the hostilities in the special military operation continued and Western support for Ukraine increased, the nuclear debate took center stage in Russian and foreign discourse. In Russia, some politicians and experts have advocated blocking arms supply routes to Ukraine by escalating strikes against military and infrastructure facilities in Ukraine and, if necessary, beyond its borders, including the use of nuclear weapons.

Time and again, Russia has officially dismissed speculation about intentions to escalate the conflict into a nuclear phase. For example, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said: “Russia does not consider the possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine, we are talking only about conventional weapons.” Former Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu noted: “From a military point of view, there is no need to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine to achieve the set goals. The main purpose of Russian nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack.”

Meanwhile, Western reactions to the nuclear debate in Russia grew increasingly harsh. While NATO’s potential response was discussed in rather vague terms, the administration’s officials and experts generally agreed that the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine would prompt a massive air-space attack on Russia’s armed forces, military industry, and infrastructure using ballistic and aerodynamic carriers in a non-nuclear configuration. While discussing a potential nuclear strike on any NATO country, officials made pointed hints of an even more devastating blow: “… [It] would be catastrophic not just for Ukraine and the world. It would be absolutely catastrophic for … Russia too.” Since then, this topic has occasionally resurfaced at the forefront of security discussions at the official level as well as in political and expert circles in the West.

The campaign of Russian hardliners also went into high gear. First of all, arguments were made in favor of Russia using nuclear weapons first, dismissing the likelihood of NATO responding in kind. Their uninhibited operational and strategic improvisations on this topic include single nuclear strikes against Ukraine; group strikes against Ukraine; single and then group nuclear strikes against NATO states both near the conflict zone (Poland, Romania, the Baltic states) and farther away (the United Kingdom, France, Germany).

The second direction was reflected in proposals to radically change the nuclear section of Russia’s current Military Doctrine. The existing doctrine was labeled as “irresponsible,” with demands to lower the threshold for nuclear weapons use and openly embrace a first-strike strategy. In general, proponents called for a decisive “reinforcement of the nuclear factor in international affairs,” otherwise, they argued, a world that no longer feared nuclear weapons would spiral into a series of wars, inevitably turning nuclear and leading to World War III.

The third direction evolved over a longer period, progressing in parallel in Russia and in the West, as a response to the unprecedented achievements in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in 1987–2011. Some prominent figures propose completely dismantling the entire nuclear arms control system: to resume tests of nuclear weapons first underground, then in the atmosphere and in space (thus violating the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty).

Revising the nuclear doctrine

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During his visit to Vietnam in June 2024, the Russian president noted: “We do not need a preemptive strike yet, because the enemy will destroyed with assurance in a counter-retaliatory strike…” At the same time, Russian leadership acknowledged that the country’s nuclear doctrine could be amended to take into account changes in the objective situation on the ground, compared to the time when the previous document had been adopted in 2020. These adjustments were reflected in the new edition of “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” published on November 9, 2024.

Doctrinal provisions outlining scenarios when Russian nuclear weapons could be used in retaliation to nuclear aggression or in the event of attempts to thwart the response of its nuclear forces (points one, two and four of the 2020 document) remained unchanged. However, there have been some new additions. First, the updated document expanded the category of states and military alliances subject to nuclear deterrence. It stated that “aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state is considered as their joint attack.” This appears to apply to Ukraine and NATO nuclear powers, which are supplying Kiev with missiles of ever-increasing range and authorizing their use deep into Russian territory. In this context, the strike on Ukraine on November 21, 2024, using Russia’s new Hazel Tree (Oreshnik) intermediate-range ballistic missile had a significant effect, especially since it was the first combat use of a strategic weapon with a non-nuclear payload. Traditionally, intermediate-range ballistic missiles were part of the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) of the Soviet Union.

Second, it asserts Russia’s right to use nuclear weapons in the event of “aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) the Republic of Belarus as participants in the Union State with the employment of conventional weapons, which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity.” This effectively extends so-called “positive nuclear security guarantees” to Russia’s closest ally in response to non-nuclear aggression for the first time. Hence, since 2023, Belarus has been hosting tactical nuclear weapons, with its military undergoing training for their use. In the event of war, these arms could be jointly deployed by both nations, similar to the long-standing “nuclear sharing” arrangement between the United States and its NATO allies.

Third, a key change is that previously aggression against Russia “with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy” was considered a reason for a nuclear response, but now nuclear deterrence applies to non-nuclear aggression against Russia and Belarus that “creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and (or) territorial integrity.” The latter threat may seem less fundamental than the former one, but even in the second case, it does not merely involve a violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity but a “critical threat” to these attributes of statehood. This provision could be interpreted as somewhat lowering the nuclear threshold, although the new formula leaves room for theoretical interpretations. In any case, however, its correct interpretation and practical implementation rest with military-political leadership. It should be emphasized that doctrinal provisions are not, in fact, addressed to the Russian president (although he frequently refers to them), but rather to potential adversaries.

Fourth, another new point defines what constitutes conventional military aggression that could trigger Russia’s nuclear response: “the receipt of reliable information on the massive launch (take-off) of air and space attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation.”

This addition can be seen as a clarification of the previous formula “when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” After all, the reference to a “massive launch of air and space attack means” suggests, from a military perspective, that such an assault would target critical administrative, military and economic infrastructure crucial to the state’s survival.

There is likely to be a discussion among experts in Russia and abroad regarding certain technical provisions of the new document. For example, what qualifies as a “massive launch” (especially since Ukraine sometimes sends out over a hundred drones at a time and now missiles). How to gather “reliable information” about such launches to enable a response similar to Russia’s concept of a counter-retaliatory missile strike, if the carriers listed above, unlike ballistic missiles, are not detected by existing space- and land-based components of early warning systems?

Russian proponents of a doctrinal shift from nuclear deterrence to nuclear intimidation will likely consider the revision of the “Basic Principles” as a move in favor of their stance. Nevertheless, the amendments to the nuclear doctrine do not indicate its radical overhaul but rather a clarification of its provisions. There is no endorsement of a nuclear first strike, limited nuclear war, or the use of nuclear weapons as a functional means of achieving success in local or regional military operations.

All the amendments refer specifically to retaliatory measures in the event of aggressive nuclear and conventional military operations against Russia and its allies. Contrary to the suggestions of proponents of gradual nuclear escalation, the revised document emphasizes: “The state policy on nuclear deterrence … guarantees the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, and—in the event of an outbreak of a military conflict—the prevention of the escalation in hostilities and their cessation on terms acceptable to the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.”

In contrast to the position shared by advocates of the “reinforcement of the nuclear factor in international affairs,” the “Basic Principles” stress that “the Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, the employment of which is an extreme and compelled measure, and makes all the necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent aggravation of interstate relations that could trigger military conflicts, including nuclear ones.”

Nuclear arms control

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The situation in this critical area of international relations is more in line with the proposals of the proponents of “reinforcing the nuclear factor in international affairs.” The U.S. set this process in motion in 2002 when, still reeling from the shock of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C, it withdrew from the ABM Treaty—without any compelling strategic justification. Since the late 2010s, this destructive process has been moving like an avalanche. In 2018, the first Trump administration pulled the U.S. out of the multilateral nuclear deal with Iran, undermining nuclear non-proliferation efforts. In 2019, the U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), and in 2020 it abandoned the Treaty on Open Skies.

These steps did not go unanswered by Russia, especially amid the escalating conflict in Ukraine. In February 2023, Moscow announced the suspension of its participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, citing the anti-Russian policy of the U.S. and NATO, which openly aimed to “inflict a strategic defeat on Russia.” In November of the same year, Russia revoked its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to “mirror” the posture of the U.S., which signed the Treaty in 1996 but never ratified it, seriously hindering its entering into force. Moscow later rejected Washington’s proposals to resume talks on strategic stability, which had begun in the summer of 2021, until “Washington reviews its hostile policy towards Russia and abandons its line of building up threats to our national security.”

Trump’s Second Coming

Donald Trump and his government’s nuclear weapons record leaves little reason for optimism. Toward the end of his first term, after a series of destructive steps mentioned above, the Republican president rejected a five-year extension of the New START. President Joe Biden, in turn, extended the treaty immediately after taking office in February 2021. He also authorized consultations with Russia on strategic stability, which were underway in the summer and fall of that year but were halted by Washington after the start of the special military operation in February 2022. Members of the Trump administration also floated the possibility of abandoning the CTBT and resuming full-scale nuclear tests. There is now reason to expect such a move from the second Trump administration, which would deal a heavy blow to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), closely linked to the CTBT. In fact the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was conditioned by the Treaty non-nuclear-weapon states on the progress of the nuclear-weapon states toward disarmament, as required by Article VI of the NPT, and above all on the adoption of the CTBT.

In a worst-case scenario, several states with some assets in nuclear energy, dual-use technologies and materials could pursue nuclear weapons—either through secret programs or by formally withdrawing from the Treaty under Article X (1), with three months' notice. Countries with substantial technical expertise in this field include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Ukraine. All of them are NPT members but could withdraw if major powers resume nuclear testing. Most of these nations are within the range of short- and intermediate-range carriers capable of reaching Russia, while their relations with Moscow are unfriendly or, at best, uncertain. It is no coincidence that serious discussions have recently unfolded in Germany, Japan and South Korea, as well as in Taiwan and Ukraine, about the costs and benefits of acquiring their own nuclear weapons.

Regardless of the progress of the peace process in the Ukrainian conflict, resuming the U.S.–Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue will be a daunting challenge. In any case, the U.S. will likely make China’s involvement in arms limitation efforts a mandatory condition. Furthermore, one cannot rule out the possibility of Washington leaving the New START before its extended expiration date in February 2026 under the pretext of alleged Russian “violation” or as part of a broader effort to build up U.S. nuclear capabilities to counter the other two superpowers taken together. This was the rationale behind the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019.

The Trump administration inherited a modernization program for all three components of the strategic triad from the Democrats, with a total cost of up to $1.7 trillion over the next quarter-century, plus $28–37 billion for new nuclear warheads, depending on the choice of their types and production rates. If all restrictions under the New START collapse, the U.S. strategic forces program may be significantly expanded and accelerated (with the need to counter China’s capabilities in mind), and its costs would increase by $440 billion or more.

Innovations in U.S. military programs will become clearer with the release of official documents from the Trump administration. However, there is already a long “menu” of proposals in this regard from influential politicians, military and civilian experts, most of whom are close to the Republican leadership. The most important and urgent initiatives are as follows.

First, retrieve from storage the reserve nuclear warheads removed earlier from land- and sea-based strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. According to independent experts, this would increase U.S. strategic forces to a total of around 3,400 warheads in the actual arsenal (together with the full heavy bombers’ load). This average estimate is based on the possibility of adding two W78 warheads to each of the 200 Minuteman III ICBMs and 3–4 W76/88 warheads to each of the 240 Trident II SLBMs. Such measures would take no more than a year and would cost about $100 million. According to expert estimates, Russia’s “upload potential” is considerably smaller. However, there are higher estimates: bringing the U.S. strategic nuclear forces to 7,130 warheads by returning 50 Minuteman III ICBMs and 48 Trident II SLBMs to empty launchers, equipping them with the maximum number of warheads (up to 14), and reassigning the B-1B bombers for nuclear missions while equipping all aircraft with the maximum number of cruise missiles and bombs.

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Second, provide for the deployment of the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles and in a land-mobile version.

Third, increase the planned production of new long-range standoff (LRSO) cruise missiles, add more B-21 Raider heavy bombers and tanker aircraft to support them. Begin preparations to keep some of the new B-21 bombers on permanent air patrol.

Fourth, expand the construction program for new Columbia-class nuclear missile submarines and their Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as accelerate the development and deployment of new SLBMs (D5 LE2).

Fifth, accelerate the development of advanced penetration aids against the integrated air and missile defense systems of Russia and China.

Sixth, accelerate programs to develop an integrated U.S. air and missile defense systems, including space-based components.

Seventh, reconvert SLBM launchers and B-52 bombers, which were converted to non-nuclear missions under the New START, to restore their nuclear weapons capability.

Eighth, provide sufficient funding to extend the service life of existing nuclear weapons, command-control and communication systems, as well as Trident/Ohio-class missile submarines.

A wide range of measures has also been proposed for the development of non-strategic nuclear weapons and dual-use systems. Along with finalizing the integration of variable-yield B61-12 guided bombs into tactical and part of strategic aviation, these recommendations include returning to the fleet the Tomahawk nuclear cruise missiles (BGM-109A TLAM-N) that had been taken out of naval service in 2011; stationing high-precision subsonic (Tomahawk/Gryphon), supersonic (Typhon) and hypersonic (Dark Eagle) land-based intermediate-range cruise missiles in Asia and Europe; as well as equipping the navy with hypersonic boost-glide missile systems (modified Dark Eagle missiles).

Major investments will go toward breakthrough military and dual-use technologies, such as multiple satellite constellations and other space-based systems, tools and technologies for cyber warfare, autonomous systems for various purposes, advanced land and sea surveillance sensors, quantum computers for Big Data analysis powered by artificial intelligence (AI), as well as information warfare capabilities. Unlike its predecessors, the Republican leadership intends to prioritize the speed and autonomy of command-control systems in integrating AI rather than preserve human control over decisions on the use of weapons.

The nuclear doctrine proposals addressed to Trump include a well-known set of concepts ranging from launch-on-warning and delayed second strikes against an expanded list of targets (including numerous new sites in China) to “tailored” and selective attacks, encompassing the integrated use of nuclear and conventional weapons and “multi-domain warfare” on land, at sea, in the air, as well as in space, cyber and information spheres. Washington will not seek superiority or at least parity with the combined nuclear forces of Russia and China. Instead, it will opt for an asymmetric response, focusing on the qualitative characteristics of nuclear and conventional weapons, intermediate-range forward-deployed land- and sea-based weapons, as well as command-control systems, especially in space. All U.S. strategic weapons and a significant portion of intermediate-range systems can be retargeted from China to Russia and vice versa. At the same time, the “China factor” is already being leveraged—and will continue to be—to justify a significant expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the abandonment of parity with Russia.

Of course, not all these initiatives will be put into practice given economic and technical constraints, as well as considerations of strategic expediency. However, Trump’s first term showed that he is prone to bravado, bluffing and dashing improvisation when it comes to nuclear matters. Under Republican leadership, nuclear weapons will undoubtedly take on a greater role in U.S. military and foreign policy than under the Democrats. In this sense, the idea of the “reinforcement of the nuclear factor in international affairs” will get a strong push from the U.S.—albeit not in the way its former advocates outside the U.S. had envisioned.

The Biden administration sought to “inflict a strategic defeat on Russia” in the context of the Ukrainian conflict while carefully trying to avoid nuclear escalation of the crisis. It seems that the Republican government will drop the talk on Russia’s “strategic defeat” but deliberately play on the threat of nuclear escalation to advance its policy on Ukraine and other sensitive international issues. It should be noted that during his first presidency, Trump decided to expand the possibility of limited nuclear strikes: some Trident II SLBMs were equipped with low-yield nuclear warheads (W76-2), plans were made to return to the fleet the Tomahawk (TLAM-N) nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (that had been taken out of naval service in 2011), to develop and deploy variable-yield guided bombs (В61-12) in Europe for tactical aviation, as well as to build new long-range standoff (LRSO) cruise missiles for strategic aviation.

Prospects for strategic stability

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The concept of strategic stability has many different interpretations, with some broadening it to include the idea of comprehensive security, which inevitably shifts the discussion into the realm of political rhetoric. In contrast, the narrow definition of strategic stability has a clear logic and content, based on specific military-technical criteria in the crucial issue of security—strategic relations between the Soviet Union/Russia and the U.S. The concept emerged not for the sake of theory or propaganda but as a practical framework for negotiations on the START I Treaty, when it became clear that new offensive and defensive strategic weapons had made previous principles inadequate. In particular, this referred to the principle of “equality and equal security,” which was more or less equivalent to the concept of “parity.”

In 1990, the first and so far last version of the concept of strategic stability was formulated in the Soviet-United States Joint Statement. Despite a rather disarrayed wording of the Statement, the essence of the concept was expressed quite clearly—as a state of strategic relations between the parties that removes incentives for a nuclear first strike. The measures to strengthen stability include predictability and the implementation of “stabilizing reductions,” taking into account the interrelationship between offensive and defensive (missile defense) weapons, as well as through reducing the concentration of warheads on carriers and giving priority to highly survivable systems. This eliminated the possibility of either side launching a disarming nuclear strike to prevent devastating retaliation.

Accordingly, the START I Treaty not only physically reduced the intercontinental nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the U.S. to equal levels but also diminished through structural limitations the mutual capability for a first (disarming) nuclear strike. It laid the foundation for the five subsequent treaties and agreements signed over the next 20 years. The last of these was the New START signed in 2010, whose significance is not so much in the quantitative reductions of strategic arms, as in enhancing strategic stability in accordance with the criteria mentioned above. Today’s strategic balance between Russia and the U.S. rules out the possibility—and thus the incentives—for a nuclear first strike, as it would fail to significantly degrade the adversary’s retaliatory potential and would therefore be suicidal for the initiator. The Treaty’s verification system, which allowed for compliance monitoring, ensuring transparency and predictability in the development of strategic relations for many years to come, is also extremely important. Since the New START was implemented, in addition to monitoring through national technical means (NTM) such as reconnaissance satellites, variously based radio-electronic systems and HUMINT sources, the parties have conducted over 330 on-site inspections at strategic nuclear weapons bases and exchanged more than 25,000 notifications of military activities in this area, while the Bilateral Consultative Commission held 19 meetings to resolve contentious issues.

It is worth noting that despite the acuteness of the Ukrainian crisis and the widespread discussion of the possibility of nuclear escalation in Russia and abroad, the strategic forces of the U.S. and Russia are not part of this discourse. The focus is instead on tactical nuclear weapons and limited nuclear strikes. This contrasts with the situation during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the expectation of massive nuclear strikes by strategic weapons and intermediate-range systems was at the center of public attention. There is no doubt that the current situation would be far more dangerous if not for six decades of largely successful nuclear arms control efforts.

Even if many of the proposals addressed to Trump to increase nuclear and other military capabilities are implemented, it will take decades, giving Russia the opportunity to respond adequately by maintaining its defense and security. For example, consistent development of Russia’s naval strategic forces, increasing their portion on permanent naval patrol (combat duty) and their defense by other military forces and means of the fleet, as well as deployment of an optimum mix of fixed-based and land-mobile missile systems, supported by air and missile defense systems, improvement and increased survivability of combat command-control systems—all these and other measures can offset the impact of the U.S. buildup of disarming nuclear strike capabilities. This is all the more true given Russia’s growing ability to overcome any U.S. air and missile defense systems designed to shield the U.S. territory from massive retaliation.

Nonetheless, the threat of destabilization of strategic relations should not be underestimated. The arms control system, a cornerstone of strategic stability, is unraveling and may collapse entirely soon. This process is intertwined with the introduction of advanced weapon systems and potentially destructive technologies and is accompanied by the development of destabilizing strategic concepts.

Some of these trends will, if not destroy, then at least erode strategic stability in its classical definition: a state of strategic relations between the parties that removes incentives for a nuclear first strike. This includes the following military innovations.

• Plans to launch strikes with high-precision conventional systems against strategic forces, their control and information support centers, as well as other critical facilities. These operations are particularly dangerous due to the introduction of dual-use weapon systems, the concepts of integrated use of conventional and nuclear weapons and “multi-domain warfare.”
• Development of anti-satellite capabilities (especially those targeting early warning satellites), alongside cyber and other hostile attacks against space assets.
• Deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons and dual-use systems, especially hypersonic carriers, on forward bases and attack submarines (which shortens the warning time of a possible attack).
• Plans to reassign part of the U.S. strategic aviation fleet to permanent air patrol with new long-range air-launched cruise missiles. These include the JASSM-ER and LRSO systems and, even more so, potential hypersonic air-launched missiles. The U.S. was developing such a system (AGM-183A ARRW), but after a series of failed tests in recent years, the program was scrapped. However, it remains in the Air Force’s procurement plans, contingent on successful finalization. This move could dangerously “resonate” with Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine, which allows for a nuclear response upon receiving “reliable data on the massive launch (take-off) of air and space attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles).”
• Development of concepts and capabilities for limited nuclear war involving tactical nuclear weapons along with strategic and intermediate-range systems.

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In parrying these security threats, it is important for Russia not to engage in a quantitative and tit-for-tat arms race but to respond asymmetrically, a strategy that has often proven successful in the past. One can recall the Soviet Union’s lead in developing thermonuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, land-mobile ballistic missiles and ensuring the survivability of naval strategic forces with the help of other forces and means of the fleet, effective systems for overcoming missile defense (including its space-based components) and more. While making efforts to preserve the remaining arms control agreements and to restart the dialogue on strategic stability, Russia should firmly reject the concepts of a nuclear first strike, limited nuclear war, controlled nuclear escalation and the integrated use of nuclear and conventional weapons. In this effort, it would gain support from China, India and professional realistic circles in the U.S. and other Western countries.