Obama`s Central Asian strategy

The beginning of the new presidential term for Vladimir Putin has coincided with the weakening of the Russian position in Central Asia. Back in May 2012, Russia increased friction with Tajikistan because of the conditions of its accession to the Customs Union. Against this background, the United States is strengthening its position in Central Asia. The elites in Central Asian governments are returning to projects in cooperation with the USA in the military-political sphere.

The beginning of the new presidential term for Vladimir Putin has coincided with the weakening of the Russian position in Central Asia. Back in May 2012, Russia increased friction with Tajikistan because of the conditions of its accession to the Customs Union.

On June 28 Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). On July 11 the Minister of Defense of Kyrgyzstan Talaibek Omuraliev said that the Kyrgyz side intended to raise the rent for the use of Russian military facilities on the territory of the Republic.

At the Third International Gas Congress, held on May 23 at Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan), Ashgabat confirmed the policy to diversify export routes for hydrocarbons started three years ago [1].

Against this background, the United States is strengthening its position in Central Asia. The elites in Central Asian governments are returning to projects in cooperation with the USA in the military-political sphere. The Obama administration uses these moods to strengthen the Washington position.

Five years ago, the thesis "America's withdrawal from Central Asia" was popular among Russian political scientists. In mid-2012 such ideas seem premature.

Central Asia: A View from Washington

The interest of the American elite in Central Asia came after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979. This event caused a painful reaction in Washington. The Jimmy Carter (1977-1980) and the Ronald Reagan (1980-1988) administrations feared that the Soviet Union had created a springboard to snatch the oil and gas resources of the Persian Gulf. The United States also supported the Afghan mujahedeen to weaken the position of the Soviet Union. American diplomacy has established a system of partnership with Pakistan and China on an anti-Soviet basis. By the end of the 1980s, the term “Central Asia” appeared in American analytics.

The American version of "Central Asia" is not identical to the Soviet "Central Asia". In the Soviet Union, the concept of "Central Asia" included Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen and Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republics. In the American view Central Asia must include Kazakhstan, western China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, sometimes the zone of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and Mongolia. Behind this there was read a political subtext: in the extended interpreting of the "Central Asia" term, the Americans did not recognize Russia's claim to a priority partnership with the republics of the former Soviet Union [2].

The George H.W. Bush administration (1989-1992) and William Clinton (1993-2000) discussed the new role of Central Asia in Washington's policy [3]. Washington's support of alternative export routes for Russian energy supplies took priority place in the documents of the 1990s. (In August 1997 the Bill Clinton administration declared the Caspian Sea to be an area of the “U.S. national interests”.

U.S. experts have expressed concern about the strengthening position of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Yet, by the end of the last century the problems of Central Asia had not been a priority for the United States. The turning point came after the Republican George W. Bush administration come to power in 2001. This was due to three reasons.

The first was the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). On June 15 2001, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan transformed "Shanghai process" into a fully-fledged organization. In parallel, on July 16 2001, Russia and China signed the Treaty on Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation (“Big Treaty").

The document recorded: 1) renunciation of the parties from the use of force in relations with each other, 2) adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence, 3) mutual respect for the right to choose their own path, 4) support for the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of sovereignty. These provisions are echoed in the policy documents of SCO. In Washington, there were fears that Russia and China had created in Central Asia a system of regional security without U.S. participation after the first Cold War.

The creation of SCO was also unfavorable to America's ideological subtext. In the second half of the 1990s the Clinton administration had instilled in international relations, the practice of forced regime change under the banner of "humanitarian intervention". In 2001, the Russian-Chinese "Big Treaty" and the SCO documents condemned the practice of limiting sovereignty. For the USA, this meant the appearance of a block which, declaratively, did not agree with Washington’s policies.

The second reason was the confrontation between the USA and China. In 1995, the Bill Clinton administration proclaimed the transition to the "containment of China” strategy. Yet, by the end of 1990`s the USA waived between the politics of power demonstrations and the desire to "engage" China into integration associations of the Pacific. Only during the 2000 presidential campaign, the Republican candidate George W. Bush called China a "strategic adversary" of the USA. This conclusion was confirmed by the National Security Strategy of the United States in 2002 and 2006.

Hence, the Republicans intensified interest of the United States in Central Asia. After the unrest in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Spring 1997), in American analytics there began flickering mentions of the "weakness" of the western border of China. This conclusion was confirmed by military considerations: exactly on the western border the majority of Chinese ballistic missiles are located. We can argue about the motives behind the opening of U.S. military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, after their opening, Chinese strategic nuclear forces were within range of U.S. tactical aviation. The third reason was the conduct of NATO antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan. After the attacks of September 11, 2001 the U.S. opened military bases in Central Asia in Karshi-Khanabad (Uzbekistan) and Manas (Kyrgyzstan). The U.S. Air Force also received the right to use airports in Tajikistan (Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube) and Kazakhstan (Lugovoy) for transit purposes. The U.S. military presence appeared in the region is associated with the deployment of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the turn of 2001-2002, for the first time in American history, American experts were saying that America had become a "Eurasian power".

A new look at the role of Central Asia was enshrined in the National Security Strategy of the United States in 2002. "Eurasia" and the Middle East were declared priority regions in terms of the United States national interests. At the same time, the traditional priority region, Europe, was relegated to third position. The document stated that "Challenges and Opportunities" for the U.S. in the new century were focused in Central Asia. The challenges include transnational terrorism, radicalization of Islam and drug trafficking. The opportunities include the presence of large (albeit unproven) reserves of hydrocarbons and the possibility of limiting the influence of China.

The George W. Bush administration thus voiced the basic idea of a Central Asian policy for the United States. Firstly, Central Asia is important for America, Washington does not intend to leave it. Secondly, its presence in Central Asia allows the U.S. solving a set of military and political objectives: from the struggle against transnational terrorism to the restriction of the Russia’s resources and policy of China’s “containment”. Thirdly, neither the Tashkent Treaty in 1992, nor the SCO have interfered with the United States building its own system of relations with Central Asian states. This system may or may not coincide with the interests of Russia and China.

Breakthrough Strategy

At the beginning of the century the George W. Bush administration attempted to be actively involved in Central Asian policy. [4] On March 13, 2002, the United States and Uzbekistan signed the Declaration on Strategic Partnership on the basis of cooperation. On April 18, 2002, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan Talbak Nazarov and Richard Lee Armitage, the United States Deputy Secretary of State made a joint statement of intent to build a "completely new long-term relationship based on solving common problems." On July 1, 2002, Central Asia was included in the Central Command area of responsibility of the U.S. armed forces.

In the spring of 2002, the George W. Bush administration began to probe the possibility of entering the United States into SCO or the provision of associate SCO membership to the USA. This proposal of the White House put SCO on the brink of crisis. [5] Uzbekistan supported the American proposal. China has opposed Washington's entry into SCO. Russia found itself in a difficult position: it sought to preserve the unity of the organization and at the same time did not want to quarrel with the Americans (in 2002 the latter meant difficulties in relations with Uzbekistan.) Only by ignoring the issue of the American presence, did the SCO countries adopt the Charter of the organization at the St. Petersburg summit on June 7, 2002.

The U.S. media discussed more ambitious projects. In the event of the failure of negotiations on the participation of the United States in SCO, American experts suggested the possibility of signing of an "anti-terror pact" with the participation of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and the United States and possibly Tajikistan. Another project involved the reconstruction of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

This organization created on the basis of "Baghdad Pact" in 1955, included Turkey, Iran, Iraq, the UK and Pakistan. The United States participated in the work of its bodies as an observer. Now, we can talk about creating a "renewed CENTO," formally intended to combat transnational terrorism, with the participation of the United States, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

However, the George W. Bush administration took a course on "rapid democratization" of Central Asia. On January 14, 2003 the U.S. Congress passed the McCain-Lieberman resolution.

This provided for increased funding for democratic institutions in the Central Asian states. In the fall of 2004, the U.S. Congress froze its military cooperation with Uzbekistan, under the pretext of "human rights violations" in this country. In March 2005, the George W. Bush administration supported the "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan. In May 2005, Washington condemned the Uzbek President Islam Karimov's "disproportionate" use of force in suppressing the rebellion in Andijan. In response, on July 29, 2005, the Uzbek Foreign Ministry demanded that the U.S. military presence in the country be terminated by the end of 2005.

Limited Presence

The phasing out of military bases in Uzbekistan has reduced American resources in the region. Only the NATO military base in Manas (Kyrgyzstan) remained available to Washington (In October 2005, the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev agreed on the transfer of the U.S. military base from Uzbekistan to Manas). In fact in the second half of the 2000s, the U.S. policy in Central Asia was reduced to retaining its military presence in Kyrgyzstan.

However, despite the reduced resources, the USA did not stop its foreign policy activity in Central Asia.

In 2006, the U.S. State Department established a new body, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. In May 2007, during the visit to Washington, the Kazakhstan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marat Tajin, a start was given to the resumption of the U.S.-Kazakh dialogue. On June 22, 2009, after intense negotiations, Kyrgyzstan and the USA agreed to the realigning of the airbase at Manas to the Transit Center at the international airport of Manas.

The United States held a dual policy with regard to the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The organization was founded on April 29, 2003 at the Dushanbe summit of the participating countries of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty. Neither the U.S.A., nor NATO recognized CSTO. There was no official reaction in Washington and Brussels to the proposal of the CSTO Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha voiced on July 8, 2004 on cooperation with NATO. Yet, since 2008 the United States has intensified cooperation with Russia in a joint struggle against the production and shipment of drugs from Afghanistan. Washington has officially supported the activities of CSTO to fight back on the Afghan drug trafficking.

The second administration of George W. Bush (2005-2008) considered the development of a partnership with India more promising. On March 2, 2006, was signed an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which meant a partial recognition by the United States of the nuclear status of India. On March 15, 2007, "an initiative of four" - the practice of joint naval exercises of the U.S., Australia, India and Japan was launched. On July 19, 2009 this was followed by the End Use Monitoring (EUM) provision between India and the U.S.A. The Indian side has the right to purchase U.S. military equipment, and the United States - the ability to send military missions to the Indian army. Partnership with India allowed the U.S.A. to be constantly present in close proximity to Central Asia and, more importantly, to get Delhi as an ally for the promotion of regional security initiatives.

Lisbon Turn

NATO's Lisbon Summit on 20-21 November 2010 became the impetus for the new U.S. proactive policy in Central Asia. The Summit decided to withdraw in 2014 the NATO troops currently deployed in Afghanistan. In the end of days, the NATO forces in Afghanistan will be restricted to only support troops, which will stay to support and train the Afghan defense forces after 2014. The question on how to take out the NATO contingent was raised before the U.S.A.

Theoretically, the withdrawal of the Alliance’s forces can be achieved in two ways. The first route - "Southern" – could be through Pakistan and possibly India. The second - "Northern" – could be through Central Asia. After the conflict with Pakistan in late 2011 the prospects of using the "Southern" route is questionable. Hence, the White House has been paying growing attention to the "Northern" route. This involves the expansion of interaction between the U.S.A., Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

In turn, the Central Asian countries have shown interest in the revival of cooperation with the United States.

On September 27, 2010, an agreement was signed between China and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. On June 3 2011, at the SCO Summit in Astana the leaders of Russia and China raised the question of consolidating their positions on an organizational level. These events caused a cautious attitude in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which were concerned about the growing influence of Russia and China. Washington tried to take advantage of this opened "window of opportunities" in Central Asia.

Selective Partnership

President Obama's diplomacy is based on establishing a partnership with Central Asian countries in various sectors.

It is, above all, a partnership in the upcoming issues of the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan. The U.S.A. is also probing the ability to save the American presence in the region after 2014.

A key player in the U.S. strategy is Uzbekistan. Back in October 2009, in Washington, the U.S.-Uzbek political consultations, which had been interrupted in 2005, were resumed. In February 2011, in Tashkent consultations on the prospects of developing relations between Uzbekistan and the United States on a wide range of political and economic cooperation areas were held. On September 22, 2011, the U.S. Congress repealed sanctions effective since 2004 on military assistance to Uzbekistan. On 22-23 October 2011, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made an official visit to Tashkent. Details of the talks with Uzbek President Islam Karimov remain undisclosed. But one cannot exclude that in the course of these negotiations, an agreement to suspend the Uzbekistan’s membership in CSTO was reached.

The U.S.-Uzbek partnership expansion trend intensified after the suspension by Tashkent of its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. On July 26, 2012, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake said the U.S.A. was willing to extend its partnership with Uzbekistan on a wide range of issues, including security. Details of the interaction will be the subject of negotiations in the R. Blake upcoming visit to Tashkent in August 2012.

A similar approach is used by the U.S.A. in its diplomatic relations with Kyrgyzstan. In May 2010, Washington gently spoke against the possible entry into the country of the CSTO peacekeeping forces. This led to a desire to strengthen the leadership of Kyrgyzstan's contacts with the United States. The NATO military base at Manas, as already noted, received in December 2011 the status of Transit Center, which is valid until December 2014.

On March 13, 2012, the United States Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta spoke on the intention of Washington to use the Transit Center at Manas after 2014. The Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan reacted positively to this statement. On May 22, 2012, Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement with NATO on the possibility of transit of NATO goods to Afghanistan via land routes through Kyrgyzstan territory.

Less clear are the prospects for cooperation of Washington with Tajikistan. The Obama administration is trying to build a dialogue with this country. On April 12, 2011, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs R. Blake and Tajik Foreign Minister Zarifi Hamrokhon held talks on cooperation on a wide range of issues, including the fight against transnational terrorism. These issues were addressed in the course of the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Dushanbe, which took place on 20-21 October 2011.

On July 4, 2012, the President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, informed on his intention to strengthen cooperation in a congratulatory message on the occasion of the Independence Day in the U.S.A. This statement was confirmed at a meeting held on July 5, 2012 between a delegation of the U.S. Congress and the Tajik President. The dialogue continued during the visit to Dushanbe made by the Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Security Council Alice Wells, which took place on 17-18 July, 2012. The subject of the talks was not only the issues of security cooperation, but also economic cooperation including the possible introduction of Tajikistan to WTO.

However, for the time being Tajikistan remains a priority partner for Russia in Central Asia. Dushanbe supports Russia's proposals to strengthen CSTO. In July 2012, Russia and Tajikistan managed to resolve the issue of extending the stay in the country of the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division. The leadership of Tajikistan has strong concerns about instability in Afghanistan. These circumstances could adversely affect the prospects of Washington's major success in Tajikistan.

The Turkmen Factor

Shifts are being seen in the relations between the United States and Turkmenistan. During the George W. Bush administration, the U.S.-Turkmen relations were strained. The U.S. considers the political regime of that country as undemocratic and to date has no full-fledged ambassador in Ashgabat. Moreover, in 2002-2003 the U.S. media discussed the proximity of the regime of Saparmurat Niyazov to the countries of the "axis of evil" [6]. A Full-scale military strategic partnership with the United States is impossible for Turkmenistan due to the current status of neutrality that has existed since 1995.

The rethinking of the role of Turkmenistan in American Political Science began after Niyazov's death on December 21, 2006. During spring and summer 2007, a series of publications about the fact that the new president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov was going to start a cautious liberalization policy of the Turkmen political system was published in the U.S.A.

Some authors have even compared the situation in Turkmenistan with events in the Soviet Union, which took place in the period between the death of Stalin (1953) and the CPSU XX Congress (1956). These discussions have not prompted the George W. Bush administration to change its attitude to Turkmenistan, but they proved that such an improvement was possible if the Turkmen leadership would be "more liberal". Against the background of a successful visit of the new president of Turkmenistan to Moscow, which was held on April 23, 2007, Russian experts have paid little attention to this shift in American political science. Meanwhile, it has led to major changes.

Advances in the U.S.-Turkmen relations have become evident from the end of 2010. On December 1-2, 2011, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs R. Blake and Turkmen President G. Berdymukhamedov held talks in Ashgabat. The parties announced their intention to cooperate on security issues. R. Blake also spoke in support of Turkmenistan's energy strategy. On July 12, 2012, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus visited Ashgabat.

Thus, Washington is trying to create mechanisms for bilateral cooperation with Ashgabat.

The U.S. heavily supports the Trans Afghanistan Pipeline (TAPI) project. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration contributed to this project through the support of Unocal Corporation. After the bombings by Taliban of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, the company withdrew from the CentGaz consortium. The Obama administration is reviving this strategy. The Senior Advisor to Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy at the U.S. Department of State Daniel Stein and the Spokesperson for the United States Department of State Victoria Nuland spoke in support of TAPI. The latter pointed out that the White House was not ready to participate in the TAPI project, but was willing to provide political support.

This policy helps the Americans strengthen their positions regardless the prospects for the implementation of TAPI. The U.S.A. has demonstrated its support for projects to diversify the export of Caspian energy resources exacerbated tensions between Gazprom and the Central Asian countries, and strengthened the partnership with India by demonstrating the U.S. support for India’s energy interests. Washington makes it look like (it does not matter whether it is real or illusory) that Caspian energy can go to the east and south - towards the Indian Ocean. This reinforces the rivalry between India and China.

The problem for SCO

In the spring of 2011, the United States began raising the issue of strengthening cooperation with SCO again as in 2002. In the fall of 2011, the Obama administration twice confirmed these intentions. In the course of the Central Asian trip in October of 2011, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated that Washington was ready to begin negotiations with SCO on a format for cooperation. At the same time American diplomacy does not exclude that there are two possible statuses for the United States – the observer or the dialogue partner status.

If the U.S. proposals are implemented the SCO format will change. First, the White House seeks to gain access to the SCO political decisions. The dialogue partner status does not imply access to classified documents. But a partner may have access to their content, by referring to the request of one of the SCO member states, such as Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan.

Secondly, Washington supports projects that are to increase the number of the SCO partners. The Americans have supported Turkey's bid for the status of partner, the SCO called for the integration into the SCO of Pakistan and India - countries that are actively cooperating with the USA on military and political issues. In addition, Washington has the Japanese initiative of 2003 to establish a security system in Asia, which can be also used.

The U.S. policy, as has been seen in recent years, corresponds to a tendency to expand SCO. As early as 2004-2005, observer status in the organization was given to Mongolia, India, Pakistan, and Iran. At the Beijing Summit, which was held on 6-7th June 2012, Afghanistan received and observer status and Turkey received that of a dialogue partner. At the Beijing Summit, the issue of India and Pakistan joining SCO was also discussed. In the case of the adoption of the "reforms through expansion” option Washington will be able to use the resources of medium-sized countries, and India for blocking the leading role of Moscow and Beijing within SCO.

The new areas in the U.S. politics towards SCO were identified at the Conference held in Kabul on June 14, 2012 and dedicated to the restoration of Afghanistan’s security and economic revival. At this conference, the SCO countries spoke with one voice, developed at the Beijing Summit. The White House supported the participation of SCO as an organization at the Kabul Conference. This was an example of unprecedented cooperation between Washington and SCO as a dialogue partner.

The Americans do not exclude cooperation with SCO on specific issues. However, the White House would like to see SCO, in which Americans (it does not matter - either directly or through allies) would be able to influence the decision-making process. In this sense, the actions of the United States are aimed at weakening rather than strengthening SCO.

The Implications for Russia

The more proactive U.S. policy towards Central Asia has led to serious consequences for Russia. The most painful events were Uzbekistan leaving CSTO and the resumption of US-Uzbek dialogue on the military issues. On June 4, 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Tashkent with the official visit. The results of this visit were the signing of the Declaration on the Deepening of the Russian-Uzbek Strategic Partnership and a Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries on further joint measures for the accession of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the Free Trade Zone Treaty within the CIS. The withdrawal of Tashkent from the Collective Security Treaty Organization just three weeks after the signing of these documents looked like a failure of the Russian diplomacy.

The failures of Russia in the "Uzbek direction" are part of an overall trend. The current Russian policy in Central Asia was formed under the influence of diplomatic successes of mid-2000s. In the period from 2003 to 2007, Moscow succeeded in creating CSTO, return to this organization Uzbekistan, sign lucrative contracts for the transit of Turkmen gas and to start negotiations on the establishment of the Customs Union. A series of successes gave rise to the idea that the Central Asian states were doomed to partnership and even alliance with Moscow. In Russia, the prevailing view is that the Central Asian leaders have learned the "lessons of Andijan."

"The Uzbek crisis" demonstrated the erroneous nature of such approach. Most of the Russian diplomatic successes were due to the mistakes made by the United States previously. The Barack Obama’s updated strategy has created serious problems for Russia. In the near future, Moscow again, as it happened in 2002, will have to face a fundamental question: how to build a dialogue with the United States regarding SCO at a time when Washington is interested in dialogue with the Central Asian nations in order to bypass Russia and China?

Moscow’s resources are now more limited than they were in the early 2000s. The George W. Bush administration relied on the induction of crisis in SCO and change of the Central Asian elites. This led to distrust to the U.S. policy in Central Asia. The Obama administration acts smarter. Washington withdrew the slogan of "regime change" or postponed it "until better times." But the U.S.A. claims to be a "critical balancer" with regard to the growing influence of Russia and China in the region. This increases the U.S. chances for forming partnerships with the Central Asian countries.

***

Ten years ago, the United States reorganized the Central Asian region. One of the most closed regions of the world has become an open space of interaction between the "great powers". The American presence has not undermined the leading role of Russia and China in regional politics. But Washington has, by the military and political partnerships with the Central Asian countries, managed to create a system of constraints of Russian and Chinese influence. Despite its weakening in 2005, the U.S.A. maintained this role in the regional politics.

The Obama administration is trying to return to the ambitious project, which was a decade ago. Since 2011, Washington has wanted to join the existing political decision-making mechanisms in Central Asia. In parallel, the U.S.A. again, as in 2002-2003, has been trying to build a set of independent military and political (and ideally, energy) ties with the Central Asian states. This policy is designed to erode the special nature of SCO as the first organization to ensure regional security without the participation of the United States. In this regard, Russia's foreign policy faces new challenges: to evaluate the potential of the U.S. influence in Central Asia and to develop an updated strategy for cooperation with the former Soviet republics in the context of growing competition for influence in the region.

1. At the Third International Gas Congress in Turkmenbashi, the Indian GAIL Ltd. and the Pakistani Inter State Gas System (Private) Ltd.2 signed with Turkmengaz an agreement on the construction of the TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan - Afghanistan - Pakistan - India). At the same time, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on long-term gas cooperation.

2. Anderson G., The International Politics of Central Asia. Manchester; N.Y., 1997.

3. After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia / Ed. by J.C. Snyder. Washington, 1995.

4. Fenenko A.V., The U.S. Factor and the Crisis of the American Trans-Eurasian Space. Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2003, No 3 (27), pages 16-26.

5. McDermott R. The Russian Central Asia Security Program. Central Asia and the Caucasus, 2002, No 2 (20).

6. Panfilova V, Mogilevski A., A Countdown for Turkmenbashi: Uncle Sam Wants to Have a Nephew in Ashgabat. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 09.10. 2002.