Oman and Russia: Aiming for Strategic Partnership

In 2023–2024, relations between the Sultanate of Oman and the Russian Federation saw major positive shifts. It is evident that amid Russia’s pivot “to the East” and unilateral Western sanctions, Muscat is emerging as a potential strategic partner for Moscow. Russia, in turn, is also becoming an important foothold for Oman in its policy of diversifying foreign relations and strengthening its multi-vector diplomacy. Of course, there should be no illusions about Oman maintaining close contact with certain Western countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, but dependence on them should not be overestimated either.

Oman’s multi-vector approach reflects changes in the foreign policy priorities of Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, who has decided to be more consistent in pursuing a “non-Western” direction in Muscat’s diplomacy. Oman has long tried to play its game, building its own regional alliances that could counterbalance both its Sunni Arab neighbors and Western influence, as well as Shiite Iran for good measure. This is why British and Chinese military facilities can appear in the country all at the same time, and Muscat can afford to conduct military exercises with the U.S., Iran, China, and Russia, or maintain secret ties with Israel (as was the case some time ago) and then face accusations of supplying Iranian weapons to Yemen’s Houthis, who use them against Israel.

The sultanate’s stance on Russia’s special military operation is particularly telling. When asked by French newspaper Le Figaro whether Russia had “made a mistake,” Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad bin Hamood Al-Busaidi said: “No, we don't say that, otherwise we would be stuck in a ‘blame game’ that doesn't allow for progress towards the end of this war.”

Muscat has taken its multi-vector approach much further than its closest GCC neighbors and started developing not only economic and political ties but also military cooperation with such opponents of the collective West as China and Iran. In particular, the fleets of Russia, Iran and Oman held trilateral naval drills dubbed IMEX (IONS) 2024 in the Indian Ocean in late October 2024. They were aimed at boosting collective security in the region and promoting multilateral cooperation.

Muscat is also trying to counterbalance Western military presence in the country by allowing leading BRICS nations to use its infrastructure for military and political purposes. In this regard, Russia could also make efforts to establish naval access points and dual-use logistics hubs in Oman. For Russia, which works closely with both China and India, developing its own transport and logistics infrastructure in friendly nations like Oman is necessary. This is also important, as it is not uncommon for Western-owned ports and other facilities in third countries to deny access to Russian-linked ships.

One of the most promising areas of cooperation between Russia and Oman could be the creation of transport and logistics networks, including as part of the Russian–Iranian North–South International Transport Corridor (ITC) project. Russia considers Oman as a promising partner and gateway to the $2 trillion Gulf market, and Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad bin Hamood Al-Busaidi said that Muscat is in the process of evaluating the economic viability and potential of the North–South ITC and does not rule out future involvement in it.

It is also important to note the promising economic partnership between Oman and the East African Community (EAC), which is rooted in historical ties and cultural heritage. This cooperation opens new markets for Omani products while positioning Oman as a key gateway for EAC exports to the Middle East. In this context, the sultanate’s involvement in the North–South project could also lead to the intensification of Russia’s trade with East Africa along this route.

Overall, when it comes to Russian–Omani trade and economic ties, Muscat is currently one of Moscow’s most promising economic partners in the Middle East. At the same time, Oman itself believes that the potential of relations between the two nations has not been fully unlocked and needs to be further expanded. Most importantly, Muscat counts on attracting Russian investors by developing the necessary infrastructure in the country, including special economic zones (SEZs), technology parks, logistics hubs and ports.

Experts and companies with firsthand experience also note that Oman offers Russian entrepreneurs quite acceptable conditions in the banking sector: accounts are opened and issues with money transfers are solved. So, in several areas, Oman can become a full-fledged alternative to the UAE, as Western pressure on the latter continues to mount.

With regard to individual areas of trade and economic cooperation between Russia and Oman, collaboration in the non-resource sector should be mentioned: export of pipe products for the oil and gas industry and corporate ties between Russian and Omani manufacturers. Significant potential for cooperation also exists in the agro-industrial complex. Russia is a key supplier of wheat to the sultanate (over 275,000 tonnes in 2023), while Oman primarily exports fish to Russia.

Russia and Oman are working to establish an intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation. Active cooperation is already supported, among other things, through the efforts of various organizations such as the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Russian–Omani Business Council, the Russian Export Center (REC), the Moscow Export Center, Mosprom and others.

In addition to trade and economic ties, cooperation in tourism is also developing. Oman’s Ministry of Cultural Heritage and Tourism has opened representative offices in Russia (Moscow and St. Petersburg) in order to boost the number of Russian tourists. In fact, tourist arrivals from Russia to Oman surged by an impressive 350% in 2023 compared to the previous year.

Achievements in tourism are complemented by close cooperation in education between the two countries. In February 2024, a visit of the Vice-Rector of Kazan Federal University (KFU) to Oman reinforced inter-university ties: a cooperation agreement was signed with Sultan Qaboos University, outlining further development of joint projects, including double degree programs and publications initiated by KFU’s Institute of Geology and Petroleum Technologies.

Russian–Omani relations also encompass cultural and religious dimensions. In particular, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Russian Federation (DUM RF) maintains close ties with the cultural and religious elite of Oman.

Given the history of Russian–Omani relations, it is fair to say that Russia currently maintains closer relations with the Sultanate of Oman than ever before.

Muscat’s multi-vector policy and the diversification of its foreign relations, not only economic but also military and political, will further strengthen the partnership between Russia and the sultanate. In addition, distinct characteristics of Oman's economy and the trend toward its progressive development will enable the expansion of economic engagement in the future, while investment attractiveness will spark the interest of the Russian business community in joint projects.

In 2023–2024, relations between the Sultanate of Oman and the Russian Federation saw major positive shifts. This period can be considered a breakthrough in collaboration between the two countries. It is evident that amid Russia’s pivot “to the East” and unilateral Western sanctions, Muscat is emerging as a potential strategic partner for Moscow. In fact, it is already fair to say that the ties between the two nations have taken on a strategic dimension. Russia, in turn, is also becoming an important foothold for Oman in its policy of diversifying foreign relations and strengthening its multi-vector diplomacy.

Of course, there should be no illusions about Oman maintaining close contact with certain Western countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, but dependence on them should not be overestimated either. Beijing and New Delhi have long been Muscat’s primary trading partners, and Oman is also building up its military-political cooperation with the two Asian giants, which helps counterbalance Western influence in the country. In addition, this influence keeps declining faster than ever, as the Gaza conflict has turned most Omanis against not only Israel but also the West in general. This stands in sharp contrast to other Gulf states, where anti-Western sentiment is also present, but remains less widespread.

Somewhat worryingly for the UK, formerly an important partner of Oman, is that Omanis interviewed by the London-based Middle East Eye website said that British support for the Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip since October 2023 has made “the UK one of the most hated countries in the world” among ordinary Omanis, along with the U.S.

Destined for multi-vector foreign policy

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Oman’s multi-vector approach reflects changes in the foreign policy priorities of Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, who has decided to be more consistent in pursuing a “non-Western” direction in Muscat’s diplomacy, despite pressure from Washington, London and Brussels. However, even during the reign of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Oman also tried to maintain an independent foreign policy, a course rooted in the country’s deep historical foundations.

Oman is the only Ibadi state in the world. It is Ibadism, the third branch of Islam separate from Sunni and Shiite traditions, that is practiced by members of the ruling house, the political and religious elite of the sultanate, so Oman is destined not just to build delicate ties with its Sunni and Shiite neighbors, shaped by a history of distrust and conflict, but strike a balance in relations with major European powers, and later with the U.S., China and India.

Contrary to popular stereotypes, as noted above, anti-British sentiment is widespread in Oman, fueled not only by the ongoing war in Gaza, but also by historical memory of the war between the Sultanate of Muscat, which was supported by British troops, and the Imamate of Oman, the theocratic Ibadi state in the country's interior, which was ultimately destroyed by Muscat with British support in 1958. British bombers and SAS units played a decisive role in the sultanate’s victory over the imamate. Following this, the whole country adopted its modern name, the Sultanate of Oman.

Even during the reign of the previous sultan, Qaboos bin Said, Oman sought to diversify its security ties while maintaining close contact with London and Washington. For example, during the Dhofar War against Marxist rebels in the 1970s, the sultan invited imperial Iranian forces into the country to the surprise of the British, Muscat’s main ally at the time.

In the 1970s, the policies of Iran’s Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi were increasingly frustrating for the U.S. and the UK, especially his ambitions to replace them as a regional power. Then the 65th Iranian Airborne Brigade unexpectedly arrived in Oman and assisted the Royal Omani Army in suppressing the communist insurgency in Dhofar.

That decision of Sultan Qaboos was aimed at reducing the country’s dependence on British and American military aid. As a result, Iranian imperial troops remained in Oman after the rebellion was crushed. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, relations between Iran and Oman soured, and Iranian commandos left the sultanate. However, Sultan Qaboos was then looking for other footholds in the region to replace the Shah of Iran, such as the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which asserted its claim to regional leadership by waging war against Iran.

In 1980, Oman was ready to sign a military pact with Iraq and host an Iraqi military base. It was understood that Iraqi airplanes and helicopters would use it for strikes on tankers carrying Iranian oil and Iranian bases on islands in the Strait of Hormuz. But this information was leaked, and Muscat did not have time to present its Western partners with a fait accompli, so they began to put pressure on the sultan to abandon the plan, even though Iraqi forces had already arrived in Oman.

Also, despite a period of thawing relations with Israel and even a visit of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Oman, Muscat took the most pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli stance among all Gulf states during the Gaza conflict, as mentioned above. This was also accompanied by a serious cooling in Omani sentiment toward the West in general, which was seen as the main sponsor of Israeli aggression.

In particular, the Grand Mufti of Oman, Sheikh Ahmad bin Hamad al-Khalili, openly voiced his support for Hamas, referring to its fighters as mujahideen and those killed in action as shahids, while denouncing Israel as “aggressors and occupiers” against whom, according to the Mufti, the entire Islamic world should band together. His support also extended to Hamas’ allies—Iran, Hezbollah and Ansar Allah. He was the only Gulf representative to publicly offer condolences not only to slain Hamas leaders but also to Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli strike.

Khalili said in a post on X that he also supports “the Houthis' jihad” and called on “the entire brotherly Yemeni people to rally around this great religious principle in support of the oppressed and persecuted among our brothers [in Palestine].”

The Grand Mufti is not the only senior Omani figure who has spoken out about geopolitical shifts and criticized the West. At a meeting in Moscow between Oman’s de facto crown prince, Theyazin bin Haitham Al Said, and Russian President Vladimir Putin in December 2023, the sultan’s son said: “I share all your [Putin’s] assessments of the current international situation, primarily with regard to the necessity of ending the current unfair world order and the dominance of the West, as well as to build a new fair world order and economic relations without double standards.”

Thus, Oman has long tried to play its game, building its own regional alliances that could counterbalance both its Sunni Arab neighbors and Western influence, as well as Shiite Iran for good measure. This is why British and Chinese military facilities can appear in the country all at the same time, and Muscat can afford to conduct military exercises with the U.S., Iran, China, and Russia, or maintain secret ties with Israel (as was the case some time ago) and then face accusations of supplying Iranian weapons to Yemen’s Houthis, who use them against Israel (the U.S. Department of State said that the country accuses Omani companies of facilitating arms shipments to the Houthis). Muscat never closed its airspace and ports for use by the U.S. and allies in operations against Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Houthis) in January 2024, but consistently maintained and developed relations with the movement, even when all Arab neighbors, backed by the U.S. and the UK, joined an anti-Houthi coalition and fought against them.

During the reign of Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, Oman continued to strengthen engagement with Russia, China and Iran, while deepening cooperation with its neighbors—the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, including in those areas that define these countries’ policies as multi-vector and nationally oriented.

The sultanate’s stance on Russia’s special military operation is particularly telling. When asked by French newspaper Le Figaro whether Russia had “made a mistake,” Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad bin Hamood Al-Busaidi said: “No, we don't say that, otherwise we would be stuck in a ‘blame game’ that doesn't allow for progress towards the end of this war.” Also, unlike its neighbors, Muscat abstained from participating in the so-called “peace summit” held in Switzerland in 2024.

The intensification of contacts between Russia and Oman during the period of Russia’s special military operation is showcased by the first visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Muscat since 2016 and a visit of the Sultanate’s Foreign Minister to Moscow in July 2023, which took place as part of the Russia–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) negotiations. In September 2023, a Russian delegation headed by then-Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev arrived in Muscat and included representatives from security agencies, Rosatom and the Bank of Russia. Then in December of the same year, Oman’s Crown Prince and Minister of Sports Theyazin bin Haitham Al Said traveled to Moscow and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

In May 2024, Chairman of Oman’s State Council Abdulmalik Al Khalili visited Moscow at the invitation of the Federation Council. In June, Oman was a guest of honor at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), where it was represented by a delegation. And in September 2024, Khalid bin Hilal Al Maawali, Chairman of the Consultative Assembly of Oman, paid an official visit to Russia at the invitation of the Chairman of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin.

In October 2024, President Putin invited Sultan Haitham to visit Moscow.

Military and political aspects

Muscat has taken its multi-vector approach much further than its closest GCC neighbors and started developing not only economic and political ties but also military cooperation with such opponents of the collective West as China and Iran. Russia also has good prospects to step up its engagement in this sphere both bilaterally and multilaterally. The latter refers to the possibility of cooperation within the Russia–Iran–Oman and Russia–China–Oman triangles.

In particular, the fleets of Russia, Iran and Oman held trilateral naval drills dubbed IMEX (IONS) 2024 in the Indian Ocean in late October 2024. They were aimed at boosting collective security in the region and promoting multilateral cooperation. Previously, Muscat and Tehran held joint military maneuvers annually, with the latest iteration held in December 2023.

Muscat is also trying to counterbalance Western military presence in the country by allowing leading BRICS nations to use its infrastructure for military and political purposes.

For example, in October 2023, then-U.S. President Joe Biden was briefed on China’s plans to establish a naval base in Oman. According to Western analysts, China’s investments in the Duqm economic zone in Oman may help Beijing build a permanent military facility there. They argue that the use of the port by U.S. and British fleets would not thwart Beijing’s plans, citing Djibouti as an example, where a Chinese military base is located near U.S. and French ones.

It is telling that the Omani port of Salalah, around 480 kilometers southwest of Duqm, is the most frequently visited port for Chinese warships, along with Djibouti. Although no official decision has been announced regarding PLA Navy deployment in Salalah, unlike in Djibouti, the port serves as a de facto facility.

Another BRICS leader, India, has also gained access to the port of Duqm for use by the Indian Navy. Oman is the only country in the Gulf region that conducts regular bilateral exercises and staff maneuvers with all three branches of India’s armed forces. Oman also provides critical operational support to Indian naval anti-piracy missions in the Arabian Sea.

In this regard, Russia could also make efforts to establish naval access points and dual-use logistics hubs in Oman. For Russia, which works closely with both China and India, developing its own transport and logistics infrastructure in friendly nations like Oman is necessary. According to Russian experts, this is also important, as it is not uncommon for Western-owned ports and other facilities in third countries to deny access to Russian-linked ships.

In the long run, Oman may also turn into a backup platform for Russia to maintain its political presence in Africa amid the turbulence after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, where Russian bases are located. Oman has access to East Africa and strong positions in the countries of that region, which could also be leveraged to promote Russian interests for the mutual benefit of both countries.

Russia, Oman and the North–South ITC

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One of the most promising areas of cooperation between Russia and Oman could be the creation of transport and logistics networks, including as part of the Russian–Iranian North–South International Transport Corridor (ITC) project.

Russia considers Oman as a promising partner and gateway to the $2 trillion Gulf market; this, in particular, was stated by Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov during the Russia–Oman business dialogue at SPIEF in June 2024. And Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad bin Hamood Al-Busaidi said that Muscat is in the process of evaluating the economic viability and potential of the North–South ITC and does not rule out future involvement in it.

Meanwhile, even without formalized participation in the project, the sultanate could benefit from its implementation, and Russia could gain new opportunities to use this transport route. First of all, it is important to highlight Oman’s unique geopolitical position, which connects the Arab monarchies of the Gulf, Yemen, Iran and East African countries. So Oman could be a natural extension of the North–South route, considering that the only thing that separates the sultanate from Iran is the narrow Strait of Hormuz. As a result, the role of land routes passing through Oman to Yemen, then via the narrow Bab al-Mandab Strait and on to African countries will increase in the future.

In addition, regular shipping lines could be launched, ports handling cargo transportation between Iran and Oman in the interests of Russia could be built or modernized, and, finally, a network of railroads in the sultanate could be created, extending into the territory of Yemen. Oman recognizes the role and place that it can play in enhancing connectivity and transport routes between Africa and Eurasia, which is why Muscat goes to great lengths to settle the Yemeni conflict.

During negotiations with Iran in May 2023, Omani Minister of Transport Saeed bin Hamoud Al Mawali already stated that Oman’s private sector was ready to invest in logistics and port zones in Iran, also mentioning the need to implement the Ashgabat Agreement on trade between Oman and Central Asia via Iran. Russia’s North–South initiatives would fit well into this context, so additional trilateral talks and consultations could also be held. In particular, joint projects with Iran and Oman for the development of the Shahid Rajaee port, in which Oman has already shown interest, could be on the table.

It is also important to note the promising economic partnership between Oman and the East African Community (EAC), which is rooted in historical ties and cultural heritage. This cooperation opens new markets for Omani products while positioning Oman as a key gateway for EAC exports to the Middle East. In this context, the sultanate’s involvement in the North–South project could also lead to the intensification of Russia’s trade with East Africa along this route.

The EAC, with a population of over 283 million people and a GDP of $312 billion, offers significant investment opportunities in sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing industries, tourism and renewable energy. The partnership aims to reduce tariffs, simplify customs procedures, protect investments and develop infrastructure that will help diversify Oman’s economy while boosting the industrial and agricultural potential of EAC nations.

In addition, enduring historical ties between Oman and East Africa, shaped by the centuries-long presence of the Omani diaspora in the region [1], play an important role in the development of modern economic relations between Oman and the EAC. In countries like Tanzania, Kenya and Burundi, the Omani diaspora could make a difference in politics due to its remarkable leverage and demographic strength. In Burundi, the diaspora’s economic standing—reflected in various business ventures—could enable it to engage in lobbying. In Tanzania and Kenya, the Omani diaspora is active in business, especially in cities such as Zanzibar and Mombasa, where its economic activities strengthen local communities and create opportunities for cooperation.

So Russia and Iran, by building trilateral cooperation with Oman, including through its informal involvement in the North–South project, can count on Muscat as a link for extending trade routes into East Africa. It is also important for Moscow to solidify its political presence in Africa. Oman, acting solely in its own interests and drawing on its historical connections, could be interested in harmonizing its steps toward strengthening its influence in Africa with Russia.

The possibility of launching trilateral transport and logistics initiatives between Oman, Pakistan and Russia also deserves attention. The potential for such cooperation between Oman and Pakistan remains largely untapped, but Russia has an opportunity to push it under new conditions, including in relation to the construction of the Pakistan Stream gas pipeline. Incidentally, Pakistan’s most promising port, Gwadar, was under the control of Oman until the 1950s before being sold to Pakistan in 1958. That is, even historically these routes had a lot of geopolitical significance for the sultanate. Now, as the national component of Oman’s foreign policy keeps growing in importance, Muscat will gradually revisit its historical interests.

Focus on improving trade performance

Overall, when it comes to Russian–Omani trade and economic ties, Muscat is currently one of Moscow’s most promising economic partners in the Middle East. At the same time, Oman itself believes that the potential of relations between the two nations has not been fully unlocked and needs to be further expanded. Thus, the sultanate is keen to strengthen economic cooperation with Russia and aims to find new ways of engagement.

As part of its multi-vector foreign policy, Oman, in particular, seeks to diversify both its political and economic relations and has been actively investing in the Russian economy since the start of the special military operation. But, most importantly, Muscat also counts on attracting Russian investors by developing the necessary infrastructure in the country, including special economic zones (SEZs), technology parks, logistics hubs and ports.

Industrial zones with preferential regimes are being developed by the government body Madayn (“Cities”). There are 12 zones, including those still in the making, with a total investment of $19.4 billion. Many of them are export or re-export oriented, as the domestic market is rather small. In addition to the flagship Duqm SEZ, the country has other free and special economic zones such as Sohar, Salalah, Al Mazunah and Knowledge Oasis Muscat, with a combined investment of $52 billion. They are home to industries ranging from pharmaceuticals and food production (in collaboration with India and other countries) to solar panels and silicon manufacturing for them (in partnership with China). To facilitate foreign investment, Oman has a dedicated body—the Oman Investment Authority.

Muscat’s active efforts to attract Russian business circles confirm its interest in establishing joint ventures with Russian companies and localizing Russian businesses. Experts and companies with firsthand experience also note that Oman offers Russian entrepreneurs quite acceptable conditions in the banking sector: accounts are opened and issues with money transfers are solved. So, in several areas, Oman can become a full-fledged alternative to the UAE, as Western pressure on the latter continues to mount.

It is important to emphasize that Oman has signed 29 bilateral investment treaties (BITs)—agreements between two states that stipulate legal framework for the protection and promotion of investments by one party in the territory of the other—with the following countries: Algeria, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, the UK, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Yemen.

So the active work of ministries and specialized bodies, along with the development of the necessary tools and the institutionalization of this sector in general, indicates that the country is committed to improving its business environment and investment attractiveness amid regional competition, which naturally piques the interest of Russian businesses.

With regard to individual areas of trade and economic cooperation between Russia and Oman, collaboration in the non-resource sector should be mentioned: export of pipe products for the oil and gas industry and corporate ties between Russian and Omani manufacturers. As early as 2017, a plant to manufacture electric submersible pumps, built by a Russian company, was launched in Sohar. The growth in trade turnover is driven by the interest of Russian businesses, particularly in the high-tech and gaming equipment sectors, which are already actively cooperating with regional partners.

Significant potential for cooperation also exists in the agro-industrial complex. Russia is a key supplier of wheat to the sultanate (over 275,000 tonnes in 2023), while Oman primarily exports fish to Russia. Russia has a considerable trade advantage in supplying agricultural products to Oman. Russian meat producers also have good prospects in the Omani market, and some companies from Russia have already started shipping meat and poultry to the sultanate.

Institutionalization of engagement

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Russia and Oman are working to establish an intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation. Moscow is awaiting Muscat’s response on this matter. Nevertheless, active cooperation is already supported, among other things, through the efforts of various organizations such as the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Russian–Omani Business Council, the Russian Export Center (REC), the Moscow Export Center, Mosprom and others.

For example, in October 2024, a multi-industry business mission Made in Russia was held in Muscat with the support of the REC. The event brought together 39 Russian companies showcasing a wide range of products, from agricultural goods to high-tech and robotics. The project was aimed at strengthening business ties between Russia and Oman and expanding the presence of Russian manufacturers in the sultanate’s market. Over 300 meetings with more than 50 Omani companies were held during the two-day negotiations, paving the way for mutually beneficial cooperation. The export potential identified during the negotiations amounted to $38 million. Omani partners showed particular interest in Russian products—from agriculture to innovations in oil production designed to address the problem of water intrusion in reservoirs.

In parallel, a business mission was organized in October as part of the Moscow Export Center’s business visit, which was attended by 15 Moscow-based high-tech companies. During the business mission, negotiations were held, which facilitated the establishment of business contacts with key Omani partners, including the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Oman Investment Authority and Oman Food Investment Holding. Special attention was paid to the deepening of cooperation with the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Initial contacts with it were established earlier at SPIEF 2024, where Oman participated as a partner country. There was also much interest in engagement with the state-owned corporation Madayn, which manages industrial zones, and the logistics provider Asyad Group, whose portfolio includes three deepwater ports, one dry port and free economic zones, including the first free trade zone at an aviation hub. Negotiations with Madayn and Asyad Group resulted in agreements on practical steps to develop systematic collaboration with the Moscow business community.

A successful case study of the development of Russian–Omani ties is the growing engagement between certain Russian regions and the sultanate. At the very end of 2024, the head of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov paid a working visit to Oman. The leadership of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Russian Federation (DUM RF) also supports the process of establishing connections between various Russian regions and Oman as well as organizing relevant meetings. For example, a delegation from the Chelyabinsk Region, which included six major companies, visited Oman in June 2024 with the participation of DUM RF.

Tourism, culture, religion

In addition to trade and economic ties, cooperation in tourism is also developing. Oman’s Ministry of Cultural Heritage and Tourism has opened representative offices in Russia (Moscow and St. Petersburg) in order to boost the number of Russian tourists. In fact, tourist arrivals from Russia to Oman surged by an impressive 350% in 2023 compared to the previous year. Against this background, direct flights by Oman Air on the Moscow–Muscat route were resumed (three flights per week from November, increasing to six by late December). In an effort to further develop its tourism sector, the Omani government plans to invest around $5.6 billion in tourism infrastructure across more than 360 projects.

Achievements in tourism are complemented by close cooperation in education between the two countries.

This is evidenced by several significant events that took place in 2024. In February, a visit of the Vice-Rector of Kazan Federal University (KFU) to Oman reinforced inter-university ties: a cooperation agreement was signed with Sultan Qaboos University, outlining further development of joint projects, including double degree programs and publications initiated by KFU’s Institute of Geology and Petroleum Technologies. In addition, a month-long Arabic language internship, organized by KFU’s Al-Hadara Center for Arab Culture with the support of Sultan Qaboos University, was successfully completed. It involved more than 60 students from leading Russian universities and included language practice and cultural exchange.

As part of an Omani delegation’s visit in July 2024, Sultan Qaboos University signed agreements with Moscow State University (MSU) and St. Petersburg State University (SPbU) on partnership in education and science, which provide for academic exchanges and research cooperation. The inter-university agreement covers a wide range of joint academic and scientific initiatives, including the development and implementation of research projects aimed at expanding knowledge in various fields, as well as the organization of academic and scientific exchanges that strengthen international ties. Cooperation between the University of Nizwa in Oman and SPbU is getting under way. Other universities in Russia and Oman are also following the same path.

Russian–Omani relations also encompass cultural and religious dimensions. In particular, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Russian Federation (DUM RF) maintains close ties with the cultural and religious elite of Oman. For example, in 2019, then-Minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman, Abdullah Mohammed Al-Salimi, arrived in the Russian capital to participate in the 7th Reporting and Election Congress of DUM RF. These contacts have continued in the years that followed. In April 2024, Ildar Galeev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian muftis Council and Head of the International Affairs Department of DUM RF, met with Muhammad Al-Maliki, Head of the International Department at Oman’s Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs.

***

Given the history of Russian–Omani relations, it is fair to say that Russia currently maintains closer relations with the Sultanate of Oman than ever before.

Muscat’s multi-vector policy and the diversification of its foreign relations, not only economic but also military and political, will further strengthen the partnership between Russia and the sultanate. In addition, distinct characteristics of Oman's economy and the trend toward its progressive development will enable the expansion of economic engagement in the future, while investment attractiveness will spark the interest of the Russian business community in joint projects.

1. International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change. www.ijicc.net Volume 15, Issue 7, 2021. The Omani Diaspora in Eastern Africa https://www.ijicc.net/images/Vol_15/Iss_7/15714_Yenigun_2021_E1_R.pdf