On Russia’s Fulfillment of Obligations under the Convention on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

IMEMO Report

In connection with Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, a number of American and European experts and officials have repeatedly expressed concerns that the Russian armed forces could hypothetically, if not intentionally, use chemical weapons. IMEMO specialists decided to analyze the dynamics of Russia’s fulfillment of obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to determine what real grounds American and European experts, and even more so officials, could have for such serious accusations and suspicions.

In November 2012, the destruction of 70% of the arsenal was completed, in April 2014—78%. As of November 2015, Russia destroyed 92% of its chemical weapons stockpile, by which point six of the seven sites have been completed. The liquidation of 100% of declared CW stockpiles was reported on September 27, 2017.

Assessments of Russia’s fulfillment of its obligations under the CWC regarding the elimination of chemical warfare agents and their means of delivery, as a rule, vary depending on which side the document where they are expressed comes from. Thus, the OPCW and UN documents, based on information provided by the Russian side and obtained by external experts during regular inspections, demonstrate full confidence that Russia is in full compliance with the Convention and has eliminated its CW stockpiles. Statements by U.S. officials and governmental bodies constantly express contrary assessments. They tend to be based on value judgments rather than inspection results.

Even the most general analysis of the fulfillment of Russian obligations under the CWC demonstrates that all attempts to make accusations of keeping chemical warfare agents on its territory that go beyond the limits and norms allowed by the CWC, and even more so alarmist warnings from U.S. officials about the intention of the Russian Armed Forces to use chemical weapons in Ukraine not only have no real basis, but also look primarily as part of an anti-Russian information and psychological campaign. Such actions by Washington, aimed at turning the topic of chemical weapons into an instrument of propaganda confrontation with Russia, can have the most negative impact on the stability of the CWC regime in the long term and will definitely not contribute to the strengthening of this regime, in which all responsible member-states should be interested.

IMEMO Report

In connection with Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, a number of American and European experts and officials have repeatedly expressed concerns that the Russian armed forces could hypothetically, if not intentionally, use chemical weapons. IMEMO specialists decided to analyze the dynamics of Russia’s fulfillment of obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to determine what real grounds American and European experts, and even more so officials, could have for such serious accusations and suspicions.

Commitments and the Dynamics of Implementation

The CWC was signed on January 13, 1993 and entered into force on April 29, 1997. The Russian Federation formally ratified the CWC on December 5, 1997.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has had the largest arsenal of chemical weapons (CW), which exceeded 40 thousand metric tons. In total, Russia and the United States accounted for 99% of the world’s CW arsenal. Russian stockpiles of chemical warfare agents and their means of delivery were distributed among seven special facilities: Gorny (Saratov region), Kambarka (Udmurt Republic), Kizner (Udmurt Republic), Shchuchye (Kurgan region), Maradykovsky (Kirov region), Leonidovka (Penza region), Pochep (Bryansk region). The elimination of such a large stockpile of chemical warfare agents required not only the availability of appropriate infrastructure, but also significant financial resources, which, despite the difficult situation of the 1990s, were found. All measures to eliminate chemical weapons and their means of delivery were carried out under international control by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

In 1996, the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of March 21, 1996 No. 305 approved the Federal Target Program “Destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation”. According to this document, CW stocks in Russia included:

• Category 1 CW (39966.59 tons of toxic chemicals)—chemical munitions filled with toxic chemicals of Schedule 1 of the Convention (VX, sarin, soman, lewisite, mustard-lewisite mixtures), as well as toxic chemicals of Schedule 1 of the Convention (mustard gas, lewisite, mustard-lewisite mixtures), stored in containers;

• Category 2 chemical weapons (10.62 tons of toxic chemicals)—chemical munitions filled with the poisonous substance phosgene;

• Category 3 CW (330,024 storage units)—unfilled chemical munitions, as well as gunpowder and explosive charges for them.

Approximately 4/5 of the stocks were nerve agents, while 1/5 were blister agents. The greatest threat was represented by the lewisite reserves at the Kambarka site, which accounted for 15.9% of the total arsenal, due to design errors made when creating the toxic chemicals storage system in the second half of the 1950s.

Destruction of CW of category 3 was completed in 2001, category 2—in 2002. The fulfillment of the first stage of obligations under the CWC was completed with the destruction of 400 tons of stored agents of category 1 (1% of stocks). By April 2007, more than 20% of category 1 toxic chemicals stockpiles had been destroyed and the completion of the second stage of Russia’s obligations under the CWC was announced. In November 2009, 45% was destroyed, which meant the completion of the third stage of obligations under the CWC.

In November 2012, the destruction of 70% of the arsenal was completed, in April 2014—78%. As of November 2015, Russia destroyed 92% of its chemical weapons stockpile, by which point six of the seven sites have been completed. The liquidation of 100% of declared CW stockpiles was reported on September 27, 2017.

Following the destruction of the last batch of chemical weapons at the Kizner facility, the relevant unequivocal official statements by the OPCW underline that Russia has fulfilled all of its earlier commitments to eliminate its chemical arsenal.

The Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia, within the scope of its mandate, communicates the following information to the OPCW:

• annual report on the activities of 16 converted former CW production facilities;

• announcements on the activities of chemical industry enterprises in the production, processing and consumption of chemicals controlled by the CWC, the volume of exports/imports of chemicals in lists 2 and 3 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention;

• announcements of alleged activities of chemical industry enterprises in the production, processing and consumption of chemicals controlled by the CPC;

• annual announcements on national protective programs.

In addition, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia is working on a phased involvement of property complexes of objects for the destruction of chemical weapons in economic circulation in the interests of industries related to ensuring the defense capability and security of the state, as well as in the interests of other industries.

External Assessments of Russia’s Compliance with CWC Regimes

Assessments of Russia’s fulfillment of its obligations under the CWC regarding the elimination of chemical warfare agents and their means of delivery, as a rule, vary depending on which side the document where they are expressed comes from. Thus, the OPCW and UN documents, based on information provided by the Russian side and obtained by external experts during regular inspections, demonstrate full confidence that Russia is in full compliance with the Convention and has eliminated its CW stockpiles. Statements by U.S. officials and governmental bodies constantly express contrary assessments. They tend to be based on value judgments rather than inspection results.

Resolution 76/29 adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 6, 2021 “welcomes the fact that the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, based on information received from the Russian Federation and independent information received from the inspectors of the Organization, confirmed in his report from October 5, 2017 the completion of the total destruction of chemical weapons announced by the Russian Federation.”

The U.S. Department of State report on compliance with the CWC (as of April 2021) grouped the allegations against Russia as follows:

1. Notable events in 2018 and 2020 around the so-called Novichok nerve agents are considered evidence of the persistence of undeclared elements of the CW program, as well as a violation of the obligation not to develop or use CW.
2. The comprehensive support of the Syrian Arab Army in the fight against international terrorism in connection with the events in Douma and Eastern Ghouta in 2018 is considered a violation of the obligation not to help “anyone” in activities prohibited by the CWC.
3. The use of “substances based on fentanyl derivatives” during the Dubrovka hostage rescue operation in 2002, as well as the discussion around the “aerosol use of chemicals that affect the central nervous system for law enforcement purposes” is considered a sign of the development of these substances in the military (“offensive”) purposes by “exploiting” the provisions of the CWC on “non-prohibited activities”.

Russia denies all these accusations and, in particular, considers it expedient to have a substantive discussion of the issues from paragraph 3 at the expert level. At the same time, states have the right to accumulate toxic chemicals under Schedule 1 of the CWC (prohibited high-risk combat agents) for research, protective and other secondary scientific and medical purposes (“not prohibited by the convention”), however, in an aggregate amount not exceeding 1 metric ton [1]. The production of such substances can be carried out in laboratory conditions with small-scaled facilities [2], is subject to inspection checks [3], while the annual production of more than 100 grams must be declared through the established procedures of the OPCW. On none of these counts, the OPCW has ever found a violation of obligations on the Russian side, and all accusations on count 1 have not yet received any confirmation, despite the severity of the accusations against Russia repeatedly made by Western officials.

The production, stockpiling and use of police agents (“riot control chemicals” as defined by the CWC [4]) does not fall within the scope of the convention, constituting “law enforcement purposes, including domestic riot control” [5] (i.e. on national territory). Such chemicals must be duly registered with the OPCW [6]. Here, the OPCW has never made any claims against Russia either.

Even the most general analysis of the fulfillment of Russian obligations under the CWC demonstrates that all attempts to make accusations of keeping chemical warfare agents on its territory that go beyond the limits and norms allowed by the CWC, and even more so alarmist warnings from U.S. officials about the intention of the Russian Armed Forces to use chemical weapons in Ukraine not only have no real basis, but also look primarily as part of an anti-Russian information and psychological campaign. Such actions by Washington, aimed at turning the topic of chemical weapons into an instrument of propaganda confrontation with Russia, can have the most negative impact on the stability of the CWC regime in the long term and will definitely not contribute to the strengthening of this regime, in which all responsible member-states should be interested.

1. Subp. C, P.2, Section A of the CWC Verification Annex, Part VI: "Activities not prohibited under this Convention in accordance with Article VI". Available at: https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CWC/CWC_en.pdf

2. Section C “Production” of the CWC Verification Annex, Part VI: “Activities not prohibited under this Convention in accordance with Article VI.”

3. P. 3, Art. VI of the CWC.

4. P. 7, Art. II of the CWC.

5. Subp. D, P. 9, Art. II of the CWC.

6. Subp. E, P. 1, Art. III of the CWC.