On the Enduring Value of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), ratified by our country on November 24, 1969, is often referred to as the cornerstone or the foundation of the modern system of international relations. In many respects, this description holds true. Despite its near-universal membership, the NPT has faced tough challenges and pressure throughout its existence, both from within and from the outside. This pressure extends to all three of its pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The NPT’s most fundamental and vulnerable feature is its, dare we say, colonial nature: a group of countries decided (through prior agreement) that only a state “which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967” could possess nuclear weapons, while others absolutely could not. In exchange for enshrining this provision, the nuclear powers pledged to reduce their arsenals (although any significant reductions only began closer to the mid-1980s, and even this process is showing signs of reversal) and to promote the use of nuclear technology in energy, medicine and science in general.

Since 1967, as many nuclear-weapon states have emerged as there were prior to it. One of them (South Africa) later disarmed, another (Israel) maintains strategic ambiguity regarding its nuclear status, North Korea withdrew from the NPT with much difficulty before building its nuclear arsenal, while two others (India and Pakistan) are primarily focused on each other in nuclear terms. While a dozen other countries have the resources and technology necessary to develop nuclear weapons, only Iran might soon decide to join the “nuclear club” without prior arrangement. However, if Iran unveils its nuclear bomb, the repercussions will be seismic, at least on a regional scale in the Middle East.

The Nuclear Five (P5), a permanent grouping of officially recognized nuclear-weapon states, is a byproduct of the NPT regime, in a sense. The original idea was to enable them to coordinate their approaches in countering “nuclear abolitionists” and other radicals demanding immediate “nuclear zero,” i.e. complete nuclear disarmament. Today, however, this format remains virtually the only platform for substantive discussions on nuclear risks, threats and nuclear doctrines at the level of official representatives of Russia, the US, France, the United Kingdom and China.

For all its flaws and complexities, the NPT undeniably plays a massive, defining role in ensuring, to borrow a Soviet catchphrase, world peace.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), ratified by our country on November 24, 1969, is often referred to as the cornerstone or the foundation of the modern system of international relations. In many respects, this description holds true. A vivid illustration of this fact is the complete, albeit largely incidental, overlap between the officially recognized nuclear-weapon states under the NPT and the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

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Despite its near-universal membership, the NPT has faced tough challenges and pressure throughout its existence, both from within and from the outside. This pressure extends to all three of its pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The interconnection of the pillars and synchronization of efforts in these domains have resulted in a kind of “global treaty,” primarily aimed at preventing uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has rightly been seen—both historically and today—as a factor increasing the risk of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. It is worth noting that such weapons have not been used since 1945, even though the world has come close to the “nuclear threshold” more than once.

The NPT’s most fundamental and vulnerable feature is its, dare we say, colonial nature: a group of countries decided (through prior agreement) that only a state “which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967” could possess nuclear weapons, while others absolutely could not. In exchange for enshrining this provision, the nuclear powers pledged to reduce their arsenals (although any significant reductions only began closer to the mid-1980s, and even this process is showing signs of reversal) and to promote the use of nuclear technology in energy, medicine and science in general.

It is worth noting that the NPT was not originally conceived as a permanent agreement; it was extended indefinitely only in 1995 during a Review Conference, a regular event mandated by the treaty. This speaks to the success of the NPT and its verification regime, as demonstrated by a very limited scale of nuclear proliferation: since 1967, as many nuclear-weapon states have emerged as there were prior to it. One of them (South Africa) later disarmed, another (Israel) maintains strategic ambiguity regarding its nuclear status, North Korea withdrew from the NPT with much difficulty before building its nuclear arsenal, while two others (India and Pakistan) are primarily focused on each other in nuclear terms.

While a dozen other countries have the resources and technology necessary to develop nuclear weapons, only Iran might soon decide to join the “nuclear club” without prior arrangement. However, if Iran unveils its nuclear bomb, the repercussions will be seismic, at least on a regional scale in the Middle East. New would-be nuclear powers are sure to crop up. This scenario is somewhat ironic given the ongoing preparatory work to establish a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. It is quite amusing that neither Israel nor the United States is involved in this effort, even though the latter co-sponsored the relevant decision at the 1995 Review Conference.

Speaking of Review Conferences, it is worth noting that even in the absence of adopted final documents, the exchange of opinions—often quite heated—during these events and their preparatory committees is an extremely useful tool. It helps gauge the “international temperature” around pressing nuclear issues and allows key global players to promote their narratives.

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The Nuclear Five (P5), a permanent grouping of officially recognized nuclear-weapon states, is a byproduct of the NPT regime, in a sense. The original idea was to enable them to coordinate their approaches in countering “nuclear abolitionists” and other radicals demanding immediate “nuclear zero,” i.e. complete nuclear disarmament. Today, however, this format remains virtually the only platform for substantive discussions on nuclear risks, threats and nuclear doctrines at the level of official representatives of Russia, the US, France, the United Kingdom and China.

The benefits of nuclear nonproliferation are also occasionally debated, from the perspective that nuclear weapons, as the “ultimate” guarantee of state security, might help stabilize and balance international military-political relations and bolster the independence of individual nations. Yet it seems that we have observed in recent years that the guarantees provided by nuclear weapons in terms of military security are far from universal. On the contrary, even when nuclear deterrence is in place, countries with deep-rooted disagreements tend to seek ways to weaken each other without crossing the nuclear threshold, instead of launching the process of peaceful settlement.

For all its flaws and complexities, the NPT undeniably plays a massive, defining role in ensuring, to borrow a Soviet catchphrase, world peace.

First published in Russian in Vedomosti.