Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Priorities and Policies

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (the Organization of Islamic Conference prior to 2011) and joined the group as an observer. Ten years after Moscow began the relationship, it is quite appropriate to draw attention to the OIC's new role in the worldwide Islamic community, its ability to counter global challenges and solve its own problems, as well as the clear need for Russia to strengthen its bond with the organization, let alone the terms for closer cooperation if the rapprochement is found beneficial.

In late June 2005, Russia took part in the 32nd Council of Foreign Ministers Conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (the Organization of Islamic Conference prior to 2011) and joined the group as an observer. The accession process had been launched by President Putin in 2003 during his working visit to Malaysia, where he addressed the 10th OIC Summit in Putrajaya and declared the need for Russia to join because the country is "interwoven with the Islamic world." [1] Ten years after Moscow began the relationship, it is quite appropriate to draw attention to the OIC's new role in the worldwide Islamic community, its ability to counter global challenges and solve its own problems, as well as the clear need for Russia to strengthen its bond with the organization, let alone the terms for closer cooperation if the rapprochement is found beneficial.

President Putin convincingly argued that Russia's drive towards the OIC was necessary because its population of 20 million Muslims enjoy an undisputed right to be a part of the global Ummah. This statement is still valid to date. At the October 2013 meeting with the heads of Muslim Boards in Ufa, Mr. Putin stated that "the voice of Russia's Muslim leaders must be better heard in the Islamic world." [2] Both in the past and nowadays, the Kremlin would like to see this achieved in order to consolidate its domestic Islamic community, as well as to identify ways to resolve internal problems.

Establishing contacts with the OIC, Russian leaders hoped to engage the group and the Islamic Development Bank in order to attract foreign investment. The September 2003 visit of Abdullah ibn Abdul-Aziz, then Saudi Crown Prince, appeared promising for expanding Russian-Saudi relations. Riyadh's attitudes were also critical for the North Caucasus settlement that hinged on whether the Islamic world would recognized the regional status quo. While in Moscow, the future Saudi King said that the Chechen issue was Russia's "domestic problem" [3] and also voiced his "respect and understanding of Russia's initiative" aimed at cooperation with the OIC [4]. The Chechen issue was taken off the table when the group saw Ahmat Kadyrov, the then president of Chechnya, in the Russian delegation at the Putrajaya summit and heard Mr. Putin claim that Russia was not "associating" terrorism with "any religion," which resonated with the OIC's traditional approach.

During the current decade, Russia's interest in the OIC received another boost. The February 2013 Foreign Policy Concept of Russia underlines Moscow's willingness "to expand interaction with Islamic states" using its "observer status in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation." [5] In early October 2013, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and then OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu signed the Framework Agreement on Cooperation between Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and OIC Permanent Secretariat. Commenting on the event, Mr. Lavrov mentioned that "the agreement was building a solid legal base" for bolstering relations between the two sides [6]. When in Jeddah in June 2014, the Russian top diplomat visited the OIC's headquarters and met Secretary General Iyad bin Amin Madani, he pointed out that the OIC and Russia shared "common interests in advancing peace and the dialogue between the civilizations and religions." [7] In September 2014, they met again on the sidelines of the 69th General Assembly of the United Nations to outline the agenda for the forthcoming "bilateral political consultations." [8]

Political Priorities

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Organization of Islamic Cooperation

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington followed by the Global War on Terrorism have placed the Muslim world, with its established intergovernmental coordinates, under unrelenting pressures, materialized in greater Israeli assertiveness on the Palestinian issue and threats of U.S. strikes against Afghanistan and later Iraq.

In October 2001, Doha hosted the 9th Emergency Meeting of OIC Foreign Ministers devoted exclusively to the fallout of the U.S. events and their global impact. The participants condemned the "monstrous acts of terrorism", demanding the prosecution, trial and punishment for the perpetrators and stressing that such doings are incompatible with "the teachings of monotheistic religions and norms of human morality." The gathering rejected any link between terrorism and Islam, underlining the articles of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam that are focused on "the divine value of human life." The OIC vowed to "participate in the UN-led international efforts", develop "the definition of terrorism" and "eradicate its causes", emphasizing that blurring the line between Islam and violence would undermine the "fight against terrorism" which should rest on "universal humanistic foundations of monotheistic religions and global civilizations." [9]

In April 2002, the 10th Emergency Meeting of OIC Foreign Ministers in Kuala Lumpur adopted the Declaration on International Terrorism with the "unconditional condemnation of terrorism as a threat to peace, international security and human rights." The document also denounced the "state-sponsored terrorism" pointing on Israel [10]. At the same time, the August 2012 OIC Emergency Summit in Mecca adopted the Charter on Strengthening Islamic Solidarity proclaiming the "inadmissibility of links between Islam and extremist ideologies", the importance of the "dialogue between religions and civilizations", and "determination to fight against terrorism until a clear victory." [11]

Without naming Afghanistan, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration stated that "a unilateral action against a Muslim country under the pretext of countering terrorism would narrow the antiterrorist efforts." After the U.S. military operation and the fall of the Taliban, the OIC kept up its stance, insisting that "all nations have a right to independently select their political, economic and civil systems in the absence of external interference, and do their best for reconstructing Afghanistan" (see the papers of Khartoum meeting of OIC foreign ministers in June 2002) [12]. Acting likewise in the case of Iraq, during the 57th UN General Assembly, the OIC held its annual coordination meeting of foreign ministers to proclaim the inadmissibility of military action, regarding the eventual operation in Iraq as "an attempt against national security of all Muslim states." [13] After the U.S. intrusion in Iraq, the OIC concentrated on creating conditions for its domestic reconciliation.

The OIC balanced its temperance on Afghanistan and Iraq with toughness over Israeli actions in the Palestinian territory and moved in step with Saudi Arabia in hailing the Madrid peace process. Riyadh very well understood that the nascent irreversible changes in the region should, despite all difficulties, facilitate the emergence of a regional Middle Eastern space incorporating the Arab world and Israel. Riyadh was eager to lead the emerging process and the OIC extended a helping hand through supporting the al-Aqsa Intifada and condemning the Israeli response to its advance. By adopting the June 2002 Arab peace initiative at the Khartoum meeting of foreign ministers, the OIC brought the entire Muslim world into the circle of the initiative's backers [14]. At the same time, the OIC would not partner with Hamas, considering the Palestinian National Authority as the only representative of Palestinian aspirations, including accession to the UNESCO and to the observer status in the UN. Denouncing the Israeli punitive action in the Gaza Strip, including Operation Protective Edge in July 2014, the OIC has qualified its consequences as "a humanitarian disaster for the Palestinian people". The OIC took part in the organization of the international conference of donors for Gaza and maintains contacts with the Palestinian Authority [15].

New Challenges

Between 2010 and 2014, stability and territorial integrity, the OIC's staples, definitely came to the forefront, basically due to such convincing circumstances as the Arab Spring and destabilization in Mali after the regime change and the outburst of the Touareg separatism in spring 2012, which have shaken the system of regional relationships and given rise to terrorist and separatist groups.

As for Mali and the entire Sahel, the OIC sees the source of destabilization in transnational criminal cells linked to al-Qaeda. The OIC foreign ministers' meeting in Djibouti in November 2012 demanded that member states engage in "deeper cooperation in countering terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking" and also expressed support for UN-led international efforts aimed to restore territorial integrity of Mali. The meeting's participants unanimously voiced their readiness to cooperate with all parties interested in the stabilization [16].

The documents of the 12th Summit in Cairo in February 2013 reflect the OIC's approach toward the Arab Spring countries. Wary of the political change in Egypt and Tunisia, which has paved the way for Islamists, as well as Qatar's support for these processes, Riyadh insisted that the final communiqué should neglect the situation in both countries. Strained relations with Libya and Qatar's support of the Libyan opposition have been the key makers of Riyadh's approach to Tripoli, as the final communiqué welcomed the changes in Libya expressing hope for "emergence of effective state institutions." At the same time, because of Iran's attitude towards Bahrain, the document omitted the mention of the invasion of the Gulf States and only appealed to the Bahraini monarch about the need for "national dialogue." [17] As far as Yemen is concerned, the OIC was located in the wake of the Saudis and their allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council and used the June 2011 foreign ministers' meeting in Astana to shore up demands from the opposition over the resignation of the president and establishment of a national reconciliation government [18]. The November 2012 ministerial in Djibouti supported the government's drive towards national dialogue [19]. However, Iraq and Syria have been the OIC's main concern.

The August 2012 4th OIC Emergency Summit in Mecca suspended Syria's membership [20] and emerged as a milestone in the development of the organization's approach to the Syrian crisis. The November 2012 meeting in Djibouti provided more details by placing the responsibility for "continued violence" on the Syrian government and demanding the "respect of Islamic values and human rights." In fact, it was the choice in the opposition's favor that matched the approach of Riyadh [21]. The Djibouti Declaration called upon the world community to "take a resolute stand for stopping violence" and welcomed the formation of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces [22].

The work on Syria was continued at the February 2012 12th OIC Summit in Cairo, which suggested that the Coalition should set up a transitional government without members of the regime whose "hands are stained with blood" and slam on the interference of "foreign forces" in the Syrian conflict [23], implying the military groups of the Hezbollah that supports Damascus and is seen by Riyadh as an ally of Tehran.

REUTERS/Saudi Press Agency
The August 2012 4th OIC Emergency Summit in
Mecca suspended Syria's membership and
emerged as a milestone in the development of
the organization's approach to the Syrian crisis.

Willing to participate in a Syrian settlement, the OIC supported the Action Group on Syria set up in June 2012 and took part in the Geneva-2 conference. Speaking last February 2 at its platform, Mr. Madani underlined that the events in the Syria boil down to "struggle of the people for dignified and free life without oppression, violence and tyranny" and that the OIC would welcome mutual understanding of the UN Security Council permanent members and help creating conditions for "bringing together the regional states to prevent the transformation of Syria into the battlefield for expanded influence." [24] The approach has implicitly condemned Russia and Iran to echo the Saudi attitudes.

The OIC has been treating eternally unstable Iraq with a focus on humanitarian issues because of Saudi-Iranian competition and related divisions between the Iraqi Sunnis allied with Riyadh and Tehran-linked Shiites. In 2012 and 2013, the situation in Iraq was seen through the prism of "compassion for the victims" of terror, the threat of "confessional frictions for the country's future" and calls for an end to the conflict. At that, the OIC has offered several initiatives aimed at overcoming the Sunni-Shiite controversy. The Mecca Charter of August 2012 included the Saudi proposal to establish the Center for the Dialogue of Islam Legal Schools matching the King Abdullah International Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue set up in Vienna in November 2012. The Center will be headquartered in Mecca and engage "the wise men of Islamic Ummah" co-opted by the OIC Permanent Secretariat and Council of Foreign Ministers [25].

The expansion of ISIS in Syria and its invasion of Iraq last summer have made the OIC adapt its rhetoric, leaving key reference points intact, among them the "consolidation of all Iraqi political forces" and "comprehensive national reconciliation" for countering the "extremist threat." The OIC has unconditionally condemned ISIS violence toward non-Muslim minorities in Syria and Iraq, as well as the executions of foreign hostages [26]. Hailing President Obama's strategy of countering the Islamic State and the participation of some Arab states in its implementation, the OIC insists that the list of terrorists cannot be limited to the ISIS, al-Qaeda or Boko Haram but should also include extremist groups advocating hatred for "religious minorities in all countries of the world." Besides, "no harm can be made to the Syrian moderate opposition fighting against the Damascus regime." [27]

1. Hereinafter cited by Russian President's Address at the 10th Meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of Islamic Conference. October 16, 2003. Purajaya, Malaysia. http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/10/54103.shtml

2. President of Russia. Opening of the Meeting with Heads of Russia's Muslim Boards. October 2013, Ufa. http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/19474.

3. Prince Abdullah: The Chechen Issue is Russia's Domestic Affair. http://izvestia.ru/news/280837.

4. President of Russia: Talks between the Russian President and Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Abdullah ibn Abdul-Aziz al Saud. http://www.kremlin.ru/news/29294.

5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by President Putin on December 12, 2013. http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F.

6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Report and Answers of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the Signing of the Framework Agreement on Cooperation between Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and Permanent Secretariat of the OIC. Moscow, October 1, 2013. http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/78E13F7BB94E560244257BF70043DCAB.

7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Meeting between Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Iyad bin Amin Madani. http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/3FBD0CB07498416844257CFE005C22DA.

8. OIC Secretary General Meets UN Secretary General and Russian Foreign Minister, New York, September 28, 2014. http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_ref=3743&lan=ar.

9. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Final Communiqué of the 4th Emergency Session of Foreign Ministers, Doha, October 10, 2001. http://www.oic-oci.org/arabic/conf/fm/Ext/doha%20extraordinary%20final.htm.

10. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The 9th Emergency Session of Foreign Ministers, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on International Terrorism. http://www.oic-oci.org/arabic/conf/fm/Ext/11th-ext-icfm.htm.

11. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The Mecca Charter on Strengthening Islamic Solidarity. Mecca, August 15, 2012. http://www.oic-oci.org/arabic/conf/is/ex-4/is_ex4_pact_ar.pdf.

12. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Final Communiqué of the 29th Session of Foreign Ministers Meeting, Khartoum, June 27, 2002 http://www.oic-oci.org/arabic/conf/fm/29/29%20icfm-final-a.htm.

13. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Final Communiqué of the annual Coordination Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OIC Member States, United Nations Headquarter – N.Y., 17 September 2002. – http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/acm/ny2002-FC.htm.

14. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Муназзама ат-таавун аль-ислямий. Аль-Байян аль-хитамий ли ад-даура ат-тасиъа ва аль-ишрун ли вузара аль-хариджийя.

15. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The OIC at International Forum of Donors for Gaza Reconstruction. October 12, 2014. http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_id=9397&t_ref=3749&lan=ar.

16. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Political Resolutions Adopted by the 39th Session of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Djibouti, November 17, 2012. http://www.oic-oci.org/arabic/conf/fm/39/POL-RES%20Rev%202_%20ARABIC-2.pdf.

17. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The Final Declaration of the Cairo Summit. Cairo, February 7, 2013. http://www.oic-oci.org/external_web/is/12/ar/docs/final/CFC-12-SUM-Final%20Arabic-revised.pdf.

18. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Political Decisions of the 38th Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Astana, June 30, 2011. http://www.oic-oci.org/38cfm/ar/documents/res/POL-Res2.pdf.

19. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Муназзама ат-таавун аль-ислямий. Карарат аш-шуун ас-сиясийя ас-садыра ан ад-даура ат-тасиъа ва ас-салясин ли иджтимаа вузара аль-хариджийя.

20. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Resolutions of the 4th Emergency Summit. Mecca, August 15, 2012. http://www.oic-oci.org/arabic/conf/is/ex-4/is_ex4_res_ar.pdf.

21. Ibid.

22. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Муназзама ат-таавун аль-ислямий. Иъалян Джибути.

23. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Муназзама ат-таавун аль-ислямий. Байян Аль-Кахира аль-хитамий.

24. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Opening Remarks of Secretary General Iyad Madani at Geneva-2 Conference. Montreux, February 2, 2014. http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_id=8844&ref=3547&lan=ar.

25. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Муназзама ат-таавун аль-ислямий. Мисак Макка Аль-Мукаррама ли таазиз ад-тадамун аль-ислямий.

26. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The OIC Condemns the Killing of U.S. Journalist and Support International Efforts to Counter the ISIS. August 22, 2014. http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_id=9296&ref=3714&lan=ar.

27. Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The OIC Welcomes the Call of President Obama for Countering Extremist Ideology. http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_id=9364&ref=3737&lan=ar.