After Vienna: the roadmap of Russia’s political strategy for Syria

The talks over ways to end the crisis in Syria that concluded in Vienna have paved the way for a crucial political and diplomatic process. Apparently, over the almost three years of hostilities in that country, there have been repeated diplomatic efforts to put an end to the war. However, as new dimensions were added to the conflict, and as the military front expanded, hopes of a political resolution grew fainter.

The talks over ways to end the crisis in Syria that concluded in Vienna have paved the way for a crucial political and diplomatic process. Apparently, over the almost three years of hostilities in that country, there have been repeated diplomatic efforts to put an end to the war. However, as new dimensions were added to the conflict, and as the military front expanded, hopes of a political resolution grew fainter. The success of ISIS and the opposition in their struggle against the governmental forces and the fact that they have captured new areas turned the threat of a disintegration of the Syrian state — and subsequent spreading of instability across the entire Middle Eastern region — into an alarming reality of a turbulent future.

Naturally, the Russian military operation in Syria implies serious risks, primarily for Russia itself, and is far from accomplishing its original objectives; albeit certain progress has been achieved. However, as a rule military success “on the land” matters not so much for resolving the conflict itself as for gaining political benefits for the following negotiation process. The very fact that the inefficient UN missions and biting rhetoric of direct and indirect parties to the conflict targeted against each were eventually replaced by a full-scale international format encompassing all of the stakeholders suggests that the Russian operation was to serve that task, anyway if there was such a task at all. The operation triggered the originally sluggish mechanism of political and diplomatic resolution of the conflict — but it came with a price.

The nine-point final declaration on the results of the talks also builds upon the ideas previously voiced by official Moscow. Obviously, this is not the result that Russia wants. Moreover, no one can be certain that those who signed the points will stick to them; it is more likely that it will be the other way round. However, they might serve as “tracks” to pave the way for more specific practical results.

It should be noted, though, that some of the countries (that were not named by media) remained dissatisfied with the declaration, since it “failed to reveal the true contradictions between the parties to the conflict.” This indicates that — not surprisingly — there is a variety of positions within the negotiating team, but there are also significant contradictions in the definition of objectives, as well as the commitment to stonewall all of the initiatives that Russia believes to be the optimum starting points for implementing further steps. Therefore, the significant diversity of the negotiators that was a major talking point before the negotiations started not only fails to guarantee any constructive decisions on the basis of the discussion, but also is a factor that prevents such decisions. The creative potential of some of the participants remains minute, whereas the destructive power to upset the fragile balance is abundant.

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It is not the quantitative representation that is critical, but the involvement of those who possess the real capacity to address the problem in a constructive manner.

In this respect, it is not the quantitative representation that is critical, but the involvement of those who possess the real capacity to address the problem in a constructive manner, and without whom no decision could be properly implemented. The involvement of Iran in this context is not a necessity, but imperative, however uncomfortable its opponents in the region might feel. The fact that Iran has “some exciting scenarios to address the challenge” and therefore “Washington’s opposition should not become a problem” was mentioned by Russia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin before the talks started. The statement by the Russian diplomat means that being outnumbered in the previous negotiating format consisting of Russia, the United States and Turkey, and finding it increasingly hard to get through to its counterparts, Russia is willing to balance the previous negotiating format.

There is no doubt that the regional leaders —Iran and Saudi Arabia — would like to see Russia as the most ambitious external party to the Syrian conflict “on its side,” whereas Turkey is not ready to treat Russia the same way. Although currently the Russian military operation is closely coordinated with that conducted by Iran, and Teheran shares Russia’s vision on Syria, it is critically important for Moscow, as it is for Washington, to resist the pressure of the regional players. In this connection, the ability to avoid the substitution of Russian interests with the interests of Iran, Bashar al-Assad, the Kurds, etc. appears to be a serious challenge to Moscow’s initiative. There have been many speculations on this point in the region, and they will inevitably be projected onto the internal Russian audience in the media field.

In order to effectively complete the Syrian operation and, more importantly, to ensure postwar political settlement, Moscow needs to make it clear that its presence has a definite objective, which is in harmony with its own and regional security interests, and this objective is to stabilize the Middle East, rather than interfere in the home affairs of its states. Otherwise Russia will get such a negative response that Moscow will lose any chance of wielding constructive influence on regional processes in the Middle East for many years to come.

One of the main objectives for Russia’s presence in Syria — to put in place a security system in the Middle East that is capable of self-regulating regional challenges and restraining threats — must and can be implemented not only with the institutional engagement of all of the stakeholders, but also with due consideration for their interests. In order to keep its leading positions in this process, it is crucial for Moscow to avoid the perception of its policy as having an obvious “Shiite bias,” even though Moscow’s most fundamental differences are with the leaders of the Sunni states of the region — Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Currently there are prerequisites for speaking about this bias — either real or perceived to be real. Therefore, it is important to engage — at the political, if not military and operational level — the Sunni states that gave Russia’s operation in Syria “tacit approval,” such as, say, Egypt. This will enable Moscow to retain its role of the leader of the anti-Salafi struggle in the region instead of finding itself in the epicenter of the Shiite–Sunni rift in a broader regional context — also subject to exceptionally dangerous internal consequences.

In order to keep its leading positions in this process, it is crucial for Moscow to avoid the perception of its policy as having an obvious “Shiite bias”.

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So far Moscow enjoys more autonomy that Washington in making its own decisions independent of its allies.

Paradoxically, so far Moscow enjoys more autonomy that Washington in making its own decisions independent of its allies. However, Russia’s political and informational capability to influence the reputational costs in the region and in the world is more limited than that of the United States, while security risks — their degree depending on the success of the Syrian campaign — are obviously higher. Therefore, any mistakes in this area can cost Moscow far more dearly than Washington, meaning that Russia’s stakes in the negotiation process for Moscow to implement its initiative appear to be a lot higher. Likewise, it is more important for Russian diplomacy to discuss topics that have a strategic imprint on security than issues that at the current stage have no practical value in the fight against ISIS and preservation of the integrity of the Syrian state, even though such issues may be important to a massive group of negotiating states and the entire settlement process.

Therefore, the differences between Moscow and Washington are a result of not so much the U.S.’ antipathy to the Syrian president — the American diplomacy has shown certain flexibility in this department — as, on the one hand, the projection of the need to account for the interests of the Gulf allies, and, on the other hand, the response by the administration to an internal political demand.

Even given the differences with Moscow and current confrontational environment, the Obama administration is not Washington’s most “hawkish” power. The White House seeks to avoid making mistakes that could get it deeper in the conflict and leave a poisonous legacy for the next president. This is why President Obama wants his team to “brainstorm new potential approaches to Syria.” Apparently, some officials — at all levels and institutions that formulate the country’s policy on Syria—interpret this approach as a signal of Obama’s indecision, weakness, and inability to lead, let alone the Congress with its Republican majority, which makes use of this easily available resource to improve its electoral appeal in the heat of the election campaign. Obama cannot but reciprocate, but public rhetoric, even though stringent, is the only arsenal that it will be using trying to gain the necessary elements of “additional resolution and toughness.” These subtleties should also be taken into account when delimiting real discrepancies between states and components of the public policy of self-fulfillment.

Finally, the Syrian conflict is a war with a large number of “actors beyond sovereignty.” They do not come to the negotiating table, but they act as both subjects and objects of the conflict at the same time. One of the nine points of the final declaration that stipulates the need to designate specific terrorist groups, including those currently referred to as the “opposition,” is an appeal to all of the stakeholders at the level of states to forget about “political half-tones.” Those who have any influence on these groups should make use of it to draw them out of the conflict, and the rest should show their true intention to fight terrorism and contribute to the neutralization of these groups as a result of military operations.

Naturally, the talks in Vienna did not substitute for the multi- and unilateral initiatives of the main players in Syria. They had virtually no chance of doing that, because too much time has passed from the start of the conflict, the stakes are too high for all of the participants, and each seems to have too much “political luggage.” Moreover, this negotiating format has a different objective — to find points of coincidence in the cacophony of positions and policies that the dozen stakeholders are putting in place in Syria, rather than for one party to impose its vision of the challenge and ways to address it on the other party. Therefore, expectations should not be very high about the Vienna talks and the results of the first round of discussions in this format. However, it should be understood that each, even the slightest, step towards the coordination of the fundamental issues — the need to end fights between the governmental forces and the opposition, preserve the territorial integrity of the state, secular nature of its administration, and identify ISIS as the common enemy — is better than a step backward. Until recently, there was no talking about possibilities for the coordination of these points at the level of public rhetoric. There are no springboards for successful settlement in processes of this kind — you have to climb every step to achieve your goal.

Maxim Suchkov, PhD in political science, assistant professor at Pyatigorsk State Linguistic University, columnist at Al-Monitor, visiting research fellow at New York University, RIAC expert