In June 2024, the 21st Shangri-La Dialogue forum, an annual conference held in Singapore under the auspices of the UK’s International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on security challenges in Asia, featured retired Indonesian General Prabowo Subianto for the third time in the past three years. He was invited to the Singapore forum in 2022 as Indonesia’s defense minister and influential politician who had twice, though unsuccessfully, run for head of state. In 2023, however, Prabowo spoke from the podium as one of the strongest candidates for the top job. Now, in a special session where he was the only speaker, he was given the floor not only as an incumbent minister, but also as the winner of the February 2024 presidential election, who is to officially take office in October 2024.
Since the forum’s program and the tone of the unfolding discussions are determined by representatives of the United States, as well as its European and Asian allies, we can state that in this case, the collective West did not miss the target. Having figured out in advance the future leader of the nation claiming a prominent role in the emerging multipolar world order, the conference organizers arranged a three-stage “viewing and inspection procedure” for him. What did Prabowo actually bring to the table, and what conclusions can be drawn from the results of this procedure?
Prabowo briefly but clearly presented his position on the events unfolding in the Middle East and in Ukraine, as well as on the state of the U.S.–China relations. U.S. President Joe Biden, Prabowo noted, had just taken a step in the right direction by endorsing a ceasefire proposal in the Gaza Strip. Indonesia would be willing to contribute to a UN peacekeeping contingent there and provide medical care to the civilian population — with the understanding that a genuine resolution of the Middle East conflict and a lasting peace in the region urgently require the emergence of an independent Arab–Palestinian state alongside Israel. As for the Ukraine settlement plan he had outlined a year ago, Prabowo said he would still welcome its implementation as a necessary “intermediate solution.” Prabowo called upon the East Asian neighbors and their external partners to exercise restraint by continuing to engage with each other in a spirit of compromise and mutual support. As for the U.S. and China, they have yet to reassert their responsibility, civilizational tenability and their right to global leadership by finding a new way to coexist in a changing world.
Judging by what Prabowo said and how he held himself during his three appearances at Shangri-La, the collective West has failed “to bend him to their liking” and not for the lack of trying. This is how the situation looks today, anyway. It should also be noted that at the “peace summit” on Ukraine in Buergenstock from June 15–16, 2024, Indonesia was represented by its Ambassador to Switzerland, Ngurah Swajaya. Jakarta did not sign the final communique of this gathering, arguing that a route to peace in Ukraine cannot be found without Russia’s participation.
In June 2024, the 21st Shangri-La Dialogue forum, an annual conference held in Singapore under the auspices of the UK’s International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on security challenges in Asia, featured retired Indonesian General Prabowo Subianto for the third time in the past three years. He was invited to the Singapore forum in 2022 as Indonesia’s defense minister and influential politician who had twice, though unsuccessfully, run for head of state. In 2023, however, Prabowo spoke from the podium as one of the strongest candidates for the top job. Now, in a special session where he was the only speaker, he was given the floor not only as an incumbent minister, but also as the winner of the February 2024 presidential election, who is to officially take office in October 2024.
Since the forum’s program and the tone of the unfolding discussions are determined by representatives of the United States, as well as its European and Asian allies, we can state that in this case, the collective West did not miss the target. Having figured out in advance the future leader of the nation claiming a prominent role in the emerging multipolar world order, the conference organizers arranged a three-stage “viewing and inspection procedure” for him. What did Prabowo actually bring to the table, and what conclusions can be drawn from the results of this procedure?
First of all, Prabowo came into the spotlight as a consistent supporter of a version of neutrality that the proclaimers of Indonesian independence formalized in the concept of “free and active foreign policy” (politik luar negeri bebas-aktif). In short, this means the fundamental possibility and desirability of cooperation with all international partners — given unconditional mutual respect for the national interests of each party. Drawing from this, Prabowo postulated that Indonesia needs both cooperation with all great powers, among which he explicitly mentioned Russia, and good-neighborly relations with adjacent Asian countries that are geographically, historically and culturally close to Indonesia.
Addressing the hot-button topic of the U.S.–China confrontation, Prabowo did not deny that the situation where a dynamic challenger claiming a similar role to the one assumed by the great power that had been dominating the world affairs for quite some time was understandably unsettling. Yet, the experience of centuries shows that such a situation is not a symptom of the historical process taking a knowingly “wrong turn”, but rather its natural course. China’s rise is not a consequence of its inflated claims to something that should not rightfully belong to it, but a return to the position this nation had held for centuries both in Asia and in the world.
The evolution of Indonesia’s ties with its immediate neighbors, Malaysia and Singapore, proves that modern Asia is capable of resolving conflicts and smoothing out mutual contradictions on its own. In Prabowo’s assessment, these three countries, despite some minor differences, are now building such close and trusting relations that would have been unthinkable a short time ago. Speaking again at Shangri-La in June 2023, the Indonesian minister attempted to project this set of ideas and approaches onto the conflict unfolding in Ukraine. The plan he rolled out called for a ceasefire and the establishment of a demilitarized zone along the line of contact between the warring parties under the supervision of UN peacekeeping forces, among other things. Not all of Prabowo’s proposals (especially those concerning a referendum on the state affiliation of the regions that already have the status of constituent entities of the Russian Federation) are in harmony with Russia’s ideas about what should and should not be done to normalize life in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the speaker faced stormy rebukes from the audience, camouflaged as questions, that he was putting “the aggressor” and “the victim of aggression” on the same board, that he did not want to notice “raped Ukrainian women,” “Ukrainian children kidnapped by Russians” as well as the suffering of the Ukrainian civilian population, and that peacekeeping, in his interpretation, would result in Ukraine’s defeat and the triumph of “the aggressor.”
It is unlikely that when preparing to go to the podium, such an experienced politician did not anticipate the audience’s reaction to his remarks. And if he did, why would he still “draw the fire upon himself”? Maybe because he wanted the “intellectual elite” of the West to attest its deepest interest in the escalation of hostilities — as well as its adherence to “double standards” when it comes to defining “aggression”?
Engaging in a polemic with his critics, Prabowo was not afraid to tell them almost straight out that the Vietnamese, Cambodians, Indonesians and other Asians, who had experienced all the horrors of war in the 20th century, would never forget where the aggressors came from, and the memory of those bitter lessons of history is what motivates them to strive for peace where it has been broken. Characteristically, when he returned to Shangri-La a year later as Indonesia’s newly elected president, Prabowo kicked off his speech with the sentiment that sometimes one is reluctant to attend such gatherings because “there is a danger that we do not communicate honestly and do not interact faithfully.” There is much talk, he went on to say, “about the rule of law, rules-based order, etc., etc. But the geopolitical tension, the conflicts, the incidents that are happening as we sit here, gives rise to disillusionment amongst many countries, especially the Global South. Indonesia is of the opinion that in this world of ours that’s getting smaller and smaller, collaboration, cooperation, compromise, respect for the national interests, the core concerns of others are very important in pursuing peace, security, stability and prosperity.”
With these considerations in mind, Prabowo briefly but clearly presented his position on the events unfolding in the Middle East and in Ukraine, as well as on the state of the U.S.–China relations. U.S. President Joe Biden, Prabowo noted, had just taken a step in the right direction by endorsing a ceasefire proposal in the Gaza Strip. Indonesia would be willing to contribute to a UN peacekeeping contingent there and provide medical care to the civilian population — with the understanding that a genuine resolution of the Middle East conflict and a lasting peace in the region urgently require the emergence of an independent Arab–Palestinian state alongside Israel. As for the plan he had outlined a year ago, Prabowo said he would still welcome its implementation as a necessary “intermediate solution” for resolving the situation in Ukraine, which he described not just as dangerous, but as “potentially disastrous.” In other words, he made it clear to his audience that he was not walking back anything he had said earlier on the Ukrainian issue.
Prabowo called upon the East Asian neighbors and their external partners to exercise restraint by continuing to engage with each other in a spirit of compromise and mutual support. As for the U.S. and China, they have yet to reassert their responsibility, civilizational tenability and their right to global leadership by finding a new way to coexist in a changing world.
The forum organizers would not be true to themselves, of course, if they had not tried to steer the Q&A session that followed the speech of the Indonesian President-elect in the direction they wanted. The event moderator, IISS Executive Chairman Sir John Chipman, had a question “on the conflict in Ukraine following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” which he had prepared for the occasion. “President Zelenskyy is very much looking forward in a few weeks’ time to holding a major international peace conference to achieve some of the aims that you outlined in your important remarks just now. Will Indonesia send a high-level delegation to that peace conference, and if so, have you decided who will lead it?”
“Well, sir,” Prabowo replied with deliberation, “I have to remind you that I am not yet the President of the Republic of Indonesia, and that is the authority of the current President of the Republic of Indonesia. So I think you have to ask that question to him.” Silence hung in the huge hall for a few seconds, and when it was clear that the “report is over,” the moderator gasped out with a broad smile and ineffable intonation: “Thank you very much.” As if he wanted to say, “So that’s how it is...”
Judging by what Prabowo said and how he held himself during his three appearances at Shangri-La, the collective West has failed “to bend him to their liking” and not for the lack of trying. This is how the situation looks today, anyway. It should also be noted that at the “peace summit” on Ukraine in Buergenstock from June 15–16, 2024, Indonesia was represented by its Ambassador to Switzerland, Ngurah Swajaya. Jakarta did not sign the final communique of this gathering, arguing that a route to peace in Ukraine cannot be found without Russia’s participation.