In a sharp reversal of their previous policy, Turkish leaders are escalating the conflict with Kurdish terrorists by launching a land operation in Iraq. At that, Ankara seems to lack any sort of foreign policy, as the entire set of its international activities is orientated exclusively toward the domestic audience and mobilization of the electorate. Hence, there is no point in trying to find any meaningful strategy in bringing Turkish contingents to Iraq or possible advance to Syria.
In a sharp reversal of their previous policy, Turkish leaders are escalating the conflict with Kurdish terrorists by launching a land operation in Iraq. At that, Ankara seems to lack any sort of foreign policy, as the entire set of its international activities is orientated exclusively toward the domestic audience and mobilization of the electorate. Hence, there is no point in trying to find any meaningful strategy in bringing Turkish contingents to Iraq or possible advance to Syria.
Prior to the Grand National Assembly elections on June 7, 2015, Ankara and Kurdish extremists had been voluntarily engaged in a several-years-long truce and the so-called problem solving process. Turkish intelligence had been in secret negotiations in Oslo with representatives of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), whose leader Abdullah Öcalan had been praised by the pro-government politicians as the leader of the Kurds although the terrorists represent only a fraction of the Kurdish people. In those days, everyone could see the advisers of President Recep Erdogan eagerly photographed with the PKK envoys in the Dolmabahce Palace.
However, Erdogan, the leader of the still ruling Justice and Development Party (AK), turned to be deeply frustrated by the results of the latest elections. The pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) cleared the 10-percent barrier, leaving the AK Party in the minority. The scenario means that Erdogan's hopes for the super-presidential system will not be coming into life in the near future and resumed investigation of the corruption cases of December 17 and 25, 2014, implicating many top officials and their relatives including the president's son. Besides, within a parliamentary republic, the oppositional majority could level the AK Party influence in many central and municipal bodies. For example, the opposition parties were going to abrogate the latest laws on the police and intelligence that have significantly expanded their powers. In the new environment, Erdogan would hardly have a chance to easily hand out the multi-billion contracts to his cronies, thus losing the effective financial levers.
To this end, Erdogan and his team decided to block the formation of a coalition government and hold early elections on November 1, 2015, undercutting the HDP support base. So, they chose to make the U-turn that implies demonization of Kurds, fueling the conflicts and association of the HDP with the terrorists, leaving the party out of the Assembly. On July 20, 2015, a Kurdish youths' march in Suruc was bombed by unidentified rogues, killing over 30 demonstrators, while the Turkish army raided the PKK camps in Iraq. The terrorists responded by calling off the truce and launching their attacks in many Turkish cities. As of now, several dozens servicemen and policemen were killed, with 28 of them on September 7 and 8. The predominantly patriotic Turks went out on the nationwide march under the antiterrorist slogans, sometimes looting shops belonging to Kurds.
However, governmental strategists’ predictions seem hardly feasible. According to surveys, the electoral scene basically reflects the June 7 results and the Kurdish party struggling to end the conflict seems fit to gain more than 10 percent of the vote in November. At the same time, the AK Party appears to have lost some of its supporters frustrated by the recent events, economic troubles and super-presidential ambitions of Erdogan. Hence, for the sake of more votes the government may as well step up its efforts up to a small victorious war and the state of emergency in the Kurds-dominated southeast of Turkey. In absence of force majeure, the AK Party appears practically bereft of the winning chances, whereas Erdogan is vociferously accusing the electorate of having neglected his party to aggravate the conflict. Before the elections he said: "We need 400 deputies, and let the solution be peaceful." Therefore, no peace is likely in Turkey until Erdogan obtains the constitutional majority but his victory seems hardly probable.
