Regionalism in Africa at the Present Stage

The foreign ministers of the three West African states—Olivia Rouamba (Burkina Faso), Morissanda Kouyaté (Guinea) and Abdoulaye Diop (Mali)—made a joint statement on February 9, 2023 during their meeting in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso. The principal message of their statement was the need to expand the partnership, stepping up trilateral trade, addressing regional instability, as well as taking joint steps towards a reinstatement of their (revoked due to unconstitutional changes of governments) membership in the African Union (AU) and in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The international community perceived this statement as an emergence of a new regional association, although the “partnership” between the said nations has not been formalized so far—three months later—and therefore the likelihood of its preservation and further development remains unclear.

On February 16, 2023, a week after the meeting in Ouagadougou, representatives of Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali were allowed to address the 36th AU summit in Addis Ababa to try once again—to no avail—to convince the leaders of the African Union of the need to restore the membership of the three nations. We could say that this was the first attempt to speak with one voice that confirmed the real existence of a strategic tripartite partnership. But too little time has passed to assess its viability and outlook: we are talking about a partnership between the three juntas, while military regimes are unstable by definition, as they are subject to powerful pressure both inside and outside the country. In Mali and Burkina Faso, the possibility of other military groups coming to power remains real; this is less true of Guinea.

Rapprochement with Russia is currently a unifying factor for a large part of the population and for the authorities of the three countries, but we cannot discount those forces that have lost their privileges as a result of the break with France and crave revenge, especially since the West has not completely withdrawn its support. For example, the U.S., which had suspended its military aid to Mali after the second coup in May 2021, had already pledged USD 148.5 million as humanitarian aid in October 2022. The move reflected Washington’s concern over Russia’s growing influence in Africa and the United States’ intention to maintain its presence in the region.

The communiqué is not a binding law. The joint projects agreed to at the Ouagadougou meeting are long-term in nature; the trio of leaders have transitional issues to resolve and elections to hold before these can be delivered. And once elections are held and membership in the AU and ECOWAS is restored, there may be no need to maintain their alliance that is not formalized and does not have any serious financial base.

Certainly, the strategic partnership under review could be a good example for other African nations how they can “agree on interaction,” but in order to start and, most importantly, to effectively operate such an alliance there should be proper preconditions: shared grievances, interests and political postures, as well as mutual understanding between the leaders, that is, there should be a force majeure situation, as it happened in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali in 2020-2022.

Any union can function effectively only if there is a powerful integration anchor (or anchors) like Russia or China in BRICS. In ECOWAS, that “anchor” is Nigeria, which bears most of the financial and administrative burden, thereby ensuring the organization’s viability. The alliance between small and unstable states such as Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali may last for a long time, at least as long as the leaders who inspired it hold respective powers. But what measures other than electoral campaigns can they take to achieve their main stated goals of reinstated membership in the AU and ECOWAS and the lifting of sanctions? They can put forwards old and new arguments—we should not deny their persistence right off the bat; but the African Union and the regional community are also in no hurry to give up their principles. Therefore, we have to admit that entering such partnerships in Africa without external moral and material support does not have any serious practical promise.

The foreign ministers of the three West African states—Olivia Rouamba (Burkina Faso), Morissanda Kouyaté (Guinea) and Abdoulaye Diop (Mali)—made a joint statement on February 9, 2023 during their meeting in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso. The principal message of their statement was the need to expand the partnership, stepping up trilateral trade, addressing regional instability, as well as taking joint steps towards a reinstatement of their (revoked due to unconstitutional changes of governments) membership in the African Union (AU) and in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The international community perceived this statement as an emergence of a new regional association, although the “partnership” between the said nations has not been formalized so far—three months later—and therefore the likelihood of its preservation and further development remains unclear.

Reasons and prerequisites for trilateral rapprochement

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The reasons for a closer rapprochement between Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali than between other states in the region have existed throughout their independence, i.e. since the late 1950s and early 1960s. These countries are former French colonies, united by the French language and the settlement of the same or closely related ethnic groups with a similar culture and traditions within their precincts. Besides, Burkina Faso and Guinea share borders with Mali. Other, more specific, prerequisites for the declared “strategic partnership” have arisen in recent years as military leaders came to power in these states, willing to pursue independent domestic and foreign policies and show a united front against the adversities that befell them: the suspension of their membership from continental and regional organizations as well as the imposition of various sanctions on them amid insecurity and economic decline.

Meanwhile, military coups and military regimes are not new to Africa and, to be fair, it should be noted that this does not change anything in the lives of ordinary Africans when the army destroys the continent’s “democratic” institutions: the level of material well-being remains quite the same, and if it declines, this is typically the case on account of other objective reasons (conflicts, epidemics, droughts, etc.). The most striking example is Sudan, which has been under sanctions for a long time, although the regime of Omar al-Bashir, who ruled from 1993 to 2019, was formally considered civilian, because an army general took the post of president according to the results of general elections. As for “democracy,” when applied to the vast majority of African nations, we can only talk about its “electoral manifestations,” that is, the coming to power, as a result of the popular will, of a politician who has the support of a small majority. What’s even worse, this often provokes social disasters related to him being elected (as was the case, for example, in Cote d’Ivoire in 2010).

During the ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit held in June 2022, its Chairman, Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo, spoke of the need to “find a solution for the three West African nations with military regimes in power, to help them return to constitutional order.” Meanwhile, in Ghana, the rule of Jerry John Rawlings as military leader (1982–1992) is remembered as the period of the most effective fight against corruption, as well as the time of economic recovery and other achievements.

Military coups in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso

On August 18, 2020, Mali’s current interim president, Assimi Goita, led a coup leading to the overthrow of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. The putsch took place in the midst of mass-scale public unrest. The civilian leader was accused of conniving with corruption and of being unable to ensure political stability: indeed, even with peacekeepers allegedly protecting the regime from jihadists, and with significant external financial assistance, the country’s Western “partners” were unable to help the civilian authorities overcome the political-military crisis.

The interim president of Mali, despite ECOWAS demanding to appoint a civilian politician, was former (2014-2015) defense minister, retired colonel (that is, Goita displayed his willingness to compromise) Bah N’daw, who appointed career diplomat Moctar Ouane to chair the transitional government (September 25, 2020 – May 24, 2021). Mr. Goita was given the position of Vice President—formally, his powers were limited to defense and security issues, but he, in fact, made official visits, received ambassadors, appointed members of the provisional parliament, etc.

As a result, tensions in the transitional authorities emerged from the outset, between the recent putschists, who wanted to retain power, and civilians seeking to limit the powers of the military, as well as between the entire ruling group and Mali’s international partners, including those in West Africa, who insisted on a speedy and complete transfer of public administration to a civilian government. Under constant external pressure and sanctions, the new authorities barely had the time to formulate measures aimed at stabilizing the internal political situation that was further complicated by proliferating Islamic radicalism, activities of numerous extremist groups, the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic downturn that ensued due to all of the said circumstances.

Taking advantage of the apparent inability of the transitional government to resolve these problems, on May 24, 2021, Goita, certainly looking to become “first among equals,” led a second coup and was sworn in as president on June 7. Interestingly enough, Malians, apparently not expecting anything good from the putschists this time—as they had already seized power the year before—did not take to the streets in support of the coup, which to a certain extent freed the hands of the AU and ECOWAS, with the two organizations not only suspending Mali’s membership but also imposing sanctions on the country that included closing the borders, cutting off financial aid, and a trade embargo. These measures dealt a heavy blow to the economy of this landlocked state that imports 70% of its food needs and remains dependent on humanitarian aid. To avoid the severity of the sanctions or to have some of them lifted, Goita had to appoint a civilian prime minister, the experienced politician Choguel Maiga. However, the AU and ECOWAS did not appreciate this step of the Malian leader and did not make any concessions.

Meanwhile, the junta gained significant victories over armed Islamist groups, and, emboldened by its successes, the military government officially invited Paris in February 2022 to withdraw its troops from Mali without delay, which caused a storm of jubilation in Bamako. Although these developments did not mean a complete resolution of the conflict, much less a reconciliation with the AU and ECOWAS, the sanctions were partially lifted in the summer of 2022, after the authorities presented a transitional plan that called for parliamentary elections in late 2023 and presidential elections in February 2024.

Seeking to overcome political and economic isolation in West Africa, the military government began to bolster relations with Guinea, whose coup in September 2021 provided Bamako with an unforeseen opportunity to expand contacts with Conakry thanks to Goita’s former “comrade-in-arms” rising to power there.

A military coup in Guinea took place on September 5, 2021, when the 83-year-old President Alpha Conde was ousted from power and a group of officers led by Colonel and Special Forces commander Mamadi Doumbouya took over. The putschists dissolved parliament and the government, abrogated the constitution, replaced civilian governors, prefects and other officials with army officers, temporarily closed land and air borders, and delivered their customary address accusing the former regime of human rights violations, mismanagement, connivance with corruption and other sins while promising the citizens peace, tranquility and growing material well-being.

Eighteen opposition parties issued a joint statement supporting the military in its quest for “profound constitutional reforms.” Guineans welcomed the military to power in droves. Thousands of people in Conakry and other cities took to the streets to celebrate the overthrow of Conde, who in recent years had noticeably lost his popularity. Thus, the coup was not unpredictable and was in line with the “people’s aspirations.”

Indeed, under Conde’s rule, Guinea remained one of the poorest states in Africa, although it was during the ten years (he first came to power in 2010, then was reelected in 2015 and 2020) of his presidency that the country achieved relative economic stability: the GDP growth rate in the pre-election period reached about 6%, which is a very high level for the region. It should be noted, however, that it was “growth without development,” that is, macroeconomic indicators were on the rise due to “achievements” in the mining sector to the detriment of other sectors and had almost no impact on the well-being of most Guineans.

In 2020, GDP growth—thanks to uninterrupted bauxite exports despite the pandemic—stayed at the level of 5.2%, higher than in many other African countries. Yet, the socioeconomic situation in Guinea, which depends on massive imports, including food, started to deteriorate. In January 2021, the prices of imported flour, grain and sugar rose, and the government markedly increased the price of baked goods under pressure from the National Bakers Union, prompting a wave of protests that forced the administration to reverse its decision. But this led to a shortage of bread in many areas, as bakers refused to produce it at a loss. The controversy between them, the authorities and the population resulted in even higher prices for bread and other foodstuffs and a further increase in discontent.

A month before the coup, gas prices had been announced to rise from 9,000 to 11,000 Guinean francs ($1.12) per liter. To “balance the budget,” the government introduced new taxes and raised old ones. Amid the pandemic that forced the authorities to build up health spending and buy millions of doses of vaccines, Guineans might have accepted price and tax increases if Conde, after the 2020 elections, apparently believing his position was solid, had not simultaneously proposed to increase funding for parliament and presidential services and cut funds allocated to the army and the police. The military certainly could not ignore this, and they took advantage of the uproar in society at the same time.

The bread riots and other disturbances continued throughout the first half of 2021, meaning that the country had been so destabilized by the time of the coup that Guineans might well have seen the army’s intervention as the solution to many of their problems. That is, the coup plotters were confident in the support of the people who were often oblivious to the fact that, in accusing the civilian government of repression, they overlook the fact that it was the army and police who were actively involved in suppressing mass protests against the 2020 elections, when more than 30 people were injured in clashes with the security forces. That is, one cannot unequivocally justify a coup d’etat that can be pigeonholed as UCG or “unconstitutional change of government.” Yet, morally and socio-economically, the civilian government had exhausted the resources of its “political will” by the time of the putsch.

Having seized power, the military formed the National Committee of Reconciliation and Development, which, according to Doumbouya, was forced “to assume responsibility for the future of Guinea”, a country that found itself in a “difficult political situation.” Incidentally, while serving in the French Foreign Legion, the current Guinean leader acted as a trainer in risk assessment and rapid decision-making. He later joined the ranks of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), where he participated in the military (anti-terrorist) exercise Flintlock, conducted in February 2020, together with Assimi Goita and Paul-Henri Damiba, the leader of the first 2022 coup in Burkina Faso. Perhaps, it was Goita’s success in seizing power that inspired Doumbouya and Damiba to organize their coups of their own.

The West unanimously condemned the coup plotters in Guinea, whereas the AU and ECOWAS suspended the country’s membership in these regional organizations. ECOWAS imposed sanctions: economic and those related to foreign travel. Only the Goita government did not support those measures. Moreover, several cooperation agreements were signed in 2022 between Bamako and Conakry—the first step to form a partnership later joined by a third state, Burkina Faso.

The first 2022 coup in that West African country took place on January 23: a military group ousted President Roсh Marc Christian Kabore and rebel leader Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba was proclaimed on February 1 as the interim head of state. Like Malians and Guineans before them, Burkinabes welcomed the overthrow of the civilian government, which had lost support primarily because of its inability to overcome poverty and confront the violence carried out by Islamist groups in the northern parts of the country.

As usual, the AU and ECOWAS suspended Burkina Faso’s membership in these organizations “pending the restoration of constitutional order.” Later, ECOWAS and the country’s military administration approved a two-year transition period and agreed to hold presidential elections in 2024.

In the meantime, Damibé failed to keep his promise to return the territories occupied by armed groups to government control and Burkina Faso experienced its second coup within one year on September 30, 2022, led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who declared himself the head of state. Upon taking office, he promised to hold democratic elections in July 2024, in compliance with a timetable agreed with the AU. ECOWAS did not impose sanctions against the new regime. This could be explained by the Community’s awareness as to the scale of the disaster that could result from economic sanctions against a country that is one of the poorest in Africa (3 million people, that is, every seventh inhabitant being permanently hungry there [1]), but one must admit that the “broad gesture” of ECOWAS is more related to the conciliatory rhetoric of Traore, who does not want to break off relations with the regional organization completely.

The position of ECOWAS

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In December 2021, on the eve of the ECOWAS summit, with the situation in Mali on its agenda, the Malian authorities announced their decision to extend the transition period by five years, explaining this move by the fragile domestic political situation and the need to overcome the jihadist threat. In response, the Community imposed another package of diplomatic, economic and trade sanctions against Mali in January 2022. After months of intense negotiations, in June 2022, during the ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit, the Goita government agreed to a transition period of 24 months, although the Community demanded a limit of 16-18 months. Many experts then expected a number of sanctions to be lifted from Bamako, above all, the lifting of the blockade of its borders, but this did not happen, although the country was already on the verge of default, as all the foreign accounts of the Ministry of Finance were frozen. However, a month later, on July 3, 2022, some of the sanctions were lifted.

The first package of ECOWAS sanctions was imposed on Guinea immediately after the September 2021 coup, but only on the coup plotters and their family members. Doumbouya promised to hand over power to civilian politicians within 36 months, ECOWAS demanded that the deadline be reduced to six months, Doumbouya refused, and the Community imposed sanctions on the country, without giving its leaders any chance to justify their position, in violation of the principles of natural justice. In May 2022, Doumbouya announced that the transition period would last 39 months; after that presidential elections would be held. Yet ECOWAS deemed this period was unacceptable and threatened Doumbouya with new sanctions, which were imposed in September of that year. In particular, the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development suspended funding for Guinean development projects, including two energy projects of crucial importance to the country.

On March 1, 2022, the Transition Charter was adopted in Burkina Faso, which provided for the retention of power in the hands of the military for three years. ECOWAS, while expressing its dissatisfaction with the length of the term, did not impose sanctions because the provisions of the Charter were largely consistent with the Community requirement to prevent the participation of the transitional head of state in the elections that were to be held before July 2, 2024.

In fact, the sanctions, while complicating the general economic situation, do not induce military leaders to shorten the transition period. They only make it more difficult for them to stabilize their respective countries and prepare for elections because of deterioration of the economic situation, the disruption or reduction of the supply of essential goods, etc. Moreover, the countries under sanctions, and not only them, because any state can theoretically be in their place, lose confidence in the regional organization and begin to live according to their own laws, as was the case with Mali. While Goita first tried to justify the postponement of the elections scheduled for February 2022, later he simply announced that they would not take place before four years and, one could say, he would not listen to any objections.

Certainly, in imposing sanctions, ECOWAS acts in accordance with its “zero tolerance” attitude toward armed seizures of power: the Community has adopted a series of documents concerning the “promotion of democratic governance” in its member states, empowering the regional association to impose sanctions in case unconstitutional change of government occurs, and ECOWAS has consistently followed these prescriptions (despite certain exceptions, as in the case of both Burkina Faso coups which took place in 2022). However, one could wish the Community to stick to a “selective approach” when imposing sanctions, wherever possible, especially since there is a concept of a “bloodless military coup” (this definition applies to the five cases of power changes under review), which can be relied upon in decision-making. In addition, the aforementioned coups were, to a greater or lesser extent, supported by the population.

The position of AU

Since 1960, the “Year of Africa,” the continent has witnessed some 200 military coups and attempted coups, prompting African leaders to take measures to ensure that those who seize power by force do not become “legitimate” rulers. In 2000, the AU’s predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), adopted the so-called Lomé Declaration on principles of response to “unconstitutional change of government,” which envisaged the suspension of a country's membership from the organization in case of an NCG. This approach was embraced by the African Union, which promulgated the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDELG) on January 30, 2007. The Charter entered into force on February 15, 2012. Of the 55 AU member states, 46 signed the Charter and 34 ratified it, including Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali. However, as subsequent events in these countries and in Africa at large have shown, the Charter has not become a cure-all for military interference in political life. Meanwhile, the AU summit of February 19, 2023 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, confirmed “zero tolerance” to the NCG.

Suspension of membership in the AU and imposing sanctions on “guilty” member states occur with enviable regularity: in 2003, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Guinea-Bissau fell “victim” to the AU sanctions. Mauritania and Togo were sanctioned in 2005, Mauritania and Guinea in 2008, Madagascar and Eritrea in 2009, Cote d'Ivoire and Niger in 2010, Mali and Guinea-Bissau—in 2012; CAR, Egypt and Guinea-Bissau—in 2013, Burkina Faso—in 2015, Sudan—in 2019, Mali—in 2020, Guinea, Mali and Sudan—in 2021, Burkina Faso—in 2022.

That said, the most difficult problem for the AU in implementing this policy remains the distinction between legitimate popular uprisings against the heads of state who have lost their credibility, on the one hand, and the NCG, on the other hand, because the latter by definition implies the overthrow of “democratically elected governments.” However, due to the lack of criteria for “unconstitutionality,” the AU’s actions are sometimes inconsistent. For example, the 2014 coup in Burkina Faso was regarded by the African Union as an NCG act, but the popular uprising that preceded the coup and actually led to regime change was not considered “unconstitutional.” For their part, the organizers of the coups in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali in 2020-2022 tried to take advantage of public discontent to legitimize their actions; yet their condemnation by the African Union was uncompromising, as it followed in the footsteps of ECOWAS—while in the cases of Chad in 2021 as well as Sudan in 2019 and 2021, the regional organizations did not exclude these countries from the communities and chose to engage in mediation, which seems to be a more productive response to the NCG in the African environment.

The African Union sanctions coup leaders by prohibiting them from participating in elections and holding key government positions, but this provision is sometimes violated by the AU itself, which is obviously the evidence of a certain ambivalence in its policies and ambiguity in the statutory language. For example, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was involved in the overthrow of the previous head of state Mohamed Morsi in a military coup of July 3, 2013, but the election of al-Sisi in 2014 was not condemned by the AU. As a result, the AU was then accused (somewhat rightly) of using double standards and preferential treatment of large member states.

The suspension of AU membership involves an apparent paradox: if a military government guilty of NCG wants to gain international support—for example, in its fight against jihadists, if not for other reasons, then to create favorable conditions for elections, it must hold these very elections, which in the absence of security could lead to further tensions, violence and a new coup. How, then, can the military guarantee the “brevity” of their rule? Especially since the incompetence of civilian leaders is usually what drives them to carry out a coup.

That is to say, the mere suspension of membership is not enough to deter future NCG because, despite some achievements, democracy in Africa remains “cosmetic,” and the conditions provoking coups persist there. It is clear that the NCG is a threat to democratic development, but many Africans have already stopped believing that they can bring to power leaders capable of changing the existing order of things for the better through elections.

Thus, the controversial actions of the AU and ECOWAS, although carried out in full accordance with the principles and practices of these organizations, do not always have the expected consequences and even more rarely reach the goal of stabilizing the situation resulting from the transition of power from the military to civilian leaders.

Creating trilateral partnership

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Just days before the tripartite meeting, Acting Prime Minister of Burkina Faso Apollinaire Joachim Kyelem de Tambela visited Mali, where he proposed a flexible federation between the two states. On February 9, 2023, Guinea joined Mali and Burkina Faso at a meeting in Ouagadougou. It would seem that the meeting should not be too important, since representatives of the governments of these and other African states have often met in bilateral and multilateral formats before, with nothing special happening. Yet the preceding events that brought the three countries together—exclusion from participation in regional organizations, imposition of sanctions, etc.—prompted them to take countermeasures and to declare extended cooperation. Among the formal reasons for establishing a strategic partnership were the alleged growing instability in the Sahel zone and the need to join forces to fight extremists, although the situation within the zones of recent hostilities has stabilized to some extent.

The economic development in the three countries under sanctions has not gone unnoticed. In particular, the communiqué of the meeting reads: “Reaffirming our commitment to the goals and principles of ECOWAS as well as the African Union, we feel obliged to respond to the aspirations of the people in our nations to create a strategic and priority zone for trade, transport, agriculture, mining ... on the Bamako-Conakry-Ouagadougou axis....” An agreement was reached between the countries on the supply and exchange of essential goods, fuel and electricity, interaction in the field of education, etc. It is also pointed out in the document that the partnership involves political and diplomatic consultations “at the highest level” and the raising of necessary funds for the delivery of the railroad project on the Bamako—Conakry—Ouagadougou route.

Yet, the most important reason why the foreign ministers met at this time was to express their common “regret over the imposition of sanctions without the complex reasons” behind the change of power in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali “being taken into consideration,” and to make their statement of readiness to take joint action to return to the AU and ECOWAS, “not to undermine regional solidarity.” However, as we know, it is always easier to announce something than to move from words to action.

It is worth recalling that trade and economic relations within the framework of ECOWAS, the three states being its members since ECOWAS establishment in 1975, have been developing for more than 45 years, even though we never saw genuine economic integration between the 15 member states for many reasons (different levels of economic development, orientation towards different foreign economic partners, disagreements between the leaders of member states, etc.), whereas the setup of free trade zones (that’s what obviously was implied by trilateral partnership, among some other things) has not been a success. It seems that the three “excluded” countries are currently in a “fit of passion”, so to say, due to their “expulsion” from the regional unions, the imposition of sanctions, and the sensational, albeit only partial, break with their former metropolis, France. Therefore, they are determined to confront their “offenders”, the AU and ECOWAS, by pooling all available resources, forgetting that, as the cases of other African unions have shown, integration is invariably accompanied by nationalist rivalries and are hampered by dependence on foreign aid, bureaucracy, lack of political will, etc.

Over the years, ECOWAS members have signed many agreements and approved the so-called Common Industrial Policy to boost productive activities in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, automotive industry, and construction, including on roads crossing the region. However, most of these agreements basically remained on paper. If the new partnership could bring about any positive results in the trade and economic sphere, this would be a true “breakthrough” for African integration, even if to the detriment of ECOWAS unity. First signs of this sort are already in full view: despite the sanctions imposed by the Community, the military government of Guinea in January 2022, after the regional association decided to freeze Malian assets in the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development and to close land borders with Mali, declared that it would keep its borders open with that country.

In principle, cross-border trade in West Africa is booming thanks to border transparency and its formalization (i.e., from illegal to legal) by many member countries of the Community, although transport costs in this region are among the highest in the world. In addition, transport corridors are overloaded with formal and informal checkpoints and roadblocks, whose importance from the security point of view has grown, given permanent military-political instability. But because of this, transport on the borders stands idle for days. In other words, in order to expand trade and economic cooperation, the “troika” will have to simplify border and customs clearance procedures, which, without proper control, will lead to increased smuggling, including of weapons.

On February 16, 2023, a week after the meeting in Ouagadougou, representatives of Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali were allowed to address the 36th AU summit in Addis Ababa to try once again—to no avail—to convince the leaders of the African Union of the need to restore the membership of the three nations. We could say that this was the first attempt to speak with one voice that confirmed the real existence of a strategic tripartite partnership. But too little time has passed to assess its viability and outlook: we are talking about a partnership between the three juntas, while military regimes are unstable by definition, as they are subject to powerful pressure both inside and outside the country. In Mali and Burkina Faso, the possibility of other military groups coming to power remains real; this is less true of Guinea.

Rapprochement with Russia is currently a unifying factor for a large part of the population and for the authorities of the three countries, but we cannot discount those forces that have lost their privileges as a result of the break with France and crave revenge, especially since the West has not completely withdrawn its support. For example, the U.S., which had suspended its military aid to Mali after the second coup in May 2021, had already pledged USD 148.5 million as humanitarian aid in October 2022. The move reflected Washington’s concern over Russia’s growing influence in Africa and the United States’ intention to maintain its presence in the region.

The communiqué is not a binding law. The joint projects agreed to at the Ouagadougou meeting are long-term in nature; the trio of leaders have transitional issues to resolve and elections to hold before these can be delivered. And once elections are held and membership in the AU and ECOWAS is restored, there may be no need to maintain their alliance that is not formalized and does not have any serious financial base.

Certainly, the strategic partnership under review could be a good example for other African nations how they can “agree on interaction,” but in order to start and, most importantly, to effectively operate such an alliance there should be proper preconditions: shared grievances, interests and political postures, as well as mutual understanding between the leaders, that is, there should be a force majeure situation, as it happened in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali in 2020-2022. In fact, along with large regional associations (ECOWAS, the East African Community, the Economic Community of Central African States or ECCAS, etc.), there is a number of other organizations across the entire Africa: the Mano River Union (MRU), the Niger Basin Authority (NBA), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC) and some others. These were created with specific goals and occasionally took seemingly important decisions, but those decisions mostly remained on paper due to a lack of political will and funds for their implementation.

Any union can function effectively only if there is a powerful integration anchor (or anchors) like Russia or China in BRICS. In ECOWAS, that “anchor” is Nigeria, which bears most of the financial and administrative burden, thereby ensuring the organization’s viability. The alliance between small and unstable states such as Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali may last for a long time, at least as long as the leaders who inspired it hold respective powers. But what measures other than electoral campaigns can they take to achieve their main stated goals of reinstated membership in the AU and ECOWAS and the lifting of sanctions? They can put forwards old and new arguments—we should not deny their persistence right off the bat; but the African Union and the regional community are also in no hurry to give up their principles. Therefore, we have to admit that entering such partnerships in Africa without external moral and material support does not have any serious practical promise.

1. Lamarche A., Bentley A. After the Coup: Burkina Faso’s Humanitarian and Displacement Crisis. Refugees International, April 2022. P. 4.