Riga Dialogue Recommendations
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Riga Dialogue Recommendations are a result of the annual “Riga Dialogue”. The event gathers high-level policy-makers and experts from the EU, US, Russia and the European neighborhood. This year’s edition — “The New Normal in the Euro-Atlantic Security Order” — focused on the political, military and economic dimensions of the Russia-West relationship.
Riga Dialogue Recommendations are a result of the annual “Riga Dialogue”. The event gathers high-level policy-makers and experts from the EU, US, Russia and the European neighborhood. This year’s edition — “The New Normal in the Euro-Atlantic Security Order” — focused on the political, military and economic dimensions of the Russia-West relationship.
— Politically, Russia and the West must both be ready for compromise solutions based on reciprocity. Both sides should declare that they do not identify each other as an enemy — and while not denying there are fundamental disagreements on several issues that there is no “war” taking place between them.
— Multilateral institutions can be used more efficiently. For example, instead of the current model where the agenda depends upon the Chairmanship in office and changes with each Chairmanship, the organization should agree on a rolling multi-year agenda. This would help move towards a more predictable, fully-fledged and multidimensional structured dialogue.
— Confidence building measures such as the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe should be revisited and possibly reapplied to the region. This type of engagement could serve to improve existing relations including between Russia and the Baltic states and between Russia and NATO.
— Dialogue on Ukraine would be facilitated by engaging new actors skilled in conflict resolution. A peacekeeping arrangement under the auspices of the UN should be welcomed by all parties. Ukraine, Russia, the EU and the US need to remain engaged in agreeing on the pace and the timeline of peacekeeping operations.
— Progress could also take place on other issues. The humanitarian dimension remains an important target of opportunity. Cultural and research cooperation has been sustained despite the negative political climate. Building on this, and as an act of good will, the EU could consider a more liberal visa regime for students and scholars, opening the possibility for Russia to reciprocate.
— A revived Helsinki Dialogue is necessary to mend West-Russia relations. The current pattern of hostile propaganda, misuse of information (“fake news”) and malign use of cyberspace deepen the rifts and increase the mistrust between Russia and the West. Accordingly, it is important to engage on an international code of conduct on aspects of these information wars, particularly cybersecurity.
— Russia could demonstrate constructive regional engagement with its neighbors in the Baltic Sea region during the Latvian presidency at the Council of Baltic Sea States (2018–2019).
— The centenary of Baltic statehood provides an opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its good will and respect for Baltic independence. Russia’s acknowledgment of the importance of the centenary and any expressions of willingness to develop bilateral and regional relations would help develop trust.
— Russia and the West share many security challenges. Opening discussions on some of these, for example best practices on migration management, could become an important step to bringing both sides together.
— Enhancing the coordination of issues is increasingly important. For example, both sides should work to coordinate at least some of their activities in the MENA region, and to preserve existing cooperation in the Arctic region.
— Militarily, sustained communication between the West and Russia is critical to reduce potential miscalculations.
— The OSCE Vienna Document could play an important role in ensuring transparency and military-to-military dialogue. Both sides should strive to follow the existing rules, as this is key for trust building. The cooperative approach needs to be reinforced by track one and two diplomacy between the West and Russia, providing diplomats and experts with opportunities to jointly assess threats and to engage in detailed discussions on military doctrines. Such efforts can identify misunderstandings and address any misinterpretations.
— Arms control agreements should be based on practical measures of cooperation and should become a critical extension of the political relations between the West and Russia. A new approach or “philosophy” of arms control must be built on the principle of building an inclusive security community.
— Any future discussion on arms control needs to focus on technical elements (exchange and inspections, military transparency), political elements (preservation of the NATO–Russia Founding Act) and confidence building measures (Russia and NATO demonstrating strategic restraint and declaring readiness to stop the arms race in the Baltic Sea region). It should cover both conventional and strategic nuclear arms.
— The US and Russia should work towards sustaining the INF Treaty. Any new negotiations for INF class missiles should contemplate including China and other stakeholders’.
— Specific working groups should explore how new technology, including autonomous weapons systems, can be prevented from undermining strategic stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Exchanging information about exercises, planning, and attempts to buy and develop weapons and weapon systems would facilitate trust.
— Confidence building measures should be reinforced regionally. This is particularly important when it comes to no-notice exercises that are a destabilizing factor in the Baltic Sea region.
— Economically, a more flexible approach to sanctions would be helpful by introducing the possibility of their withdrawal in exchange for progress in the crisis areas that initially caused the sanctions.
— The OSCE’s second dimension—the Economic and Environmental dimension—remains a crucial, yet underused platform for dialogue which can facilitate small cooperative steps (instead of grand concepts). More active discussions on environment and bio-diversity should also be implemented beyond the OSCE, in other international formats.
— The relationship between the EU and the EEU will be increasingly important for EU neighbors and countries in their proximity. Increased communication between these two organizations can help address potential misunderstandings in the economic domain.
— Discussions on impediments to cooperation in the energy field are urgently needed. Renewed EU–Russia energy dialogue could be important to identify challenges and potential concrete steps. The EU could consider using unconventional channels of communication, for example engaging more actively with Russian companies present in the European markets as interlocutors.
— West-Russia economic cooperation could also be developed by building transport corridors between the West and East. The Baltic States with their significant infrastructural capacity could serve as one of the hubs to connect regional centers of growth.
— There is an opportunity to deepen sub-regional economic integration and cooperation in border areas and reduce the extent to which the Russia-EU border is a ‘hard-border’.
Read “Riga Dialogue Afterthoughts 2018: The New Normal in the Euro-Atlantic Security Order” and more here: http://www.liia.lv/en/publications/riga-dialogue-afterthoughts-2018-the-newnormal-in-the-euro-atlantic-security-order-734www.liia.lv/en/publications/riga-dialogue-afterthoughts-2018-the-newnormal-in-the-euro-atlantic-security-order-734
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On September 11, 2018, Riga hosted an open discussion and a presentation of «Riga Dialogue Afterthoughts 2018» publication. The event was organized by Latvian Institute of International Affairs.
