The Russian Air Force: Active Effectiveness
Khmeimim airbase
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On 15 January 2016 RBC published a commentary by Pavel Baev, a professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, entitled “The Illusion of Effectiveness: Where is the Russian Air Force Heading?” in which he takes a very critical view of the resources and strategy of the Russian air force. Ilya Kramnik, Head of Defense and Security Desk at Lenta.ruand RIAC expert, has responded to the commentary.
On 15 January 2016 RBC published a commentary by Pavel Baev, a professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, entitled “The Illusion of Effectiveness: Where is the Russian Air Force Heading?” in which he takes a very critical view of the resources and strategy of the Russian air force.
Ilya Kramnik, Head of Defense and Security Desk at Lenta.ru and RIAC expert, has responded to the commentary.
Since the middle of 2014 the political emphasis on demonstrating air power has reached a critical level, while financing has been sharply reduced and the material resources have been deteriorating, with some components becoming extremely worn out. The military reform that has been undertaken has caused another problem: a serious degree of disorganisation in the higher military education system, which has had an especially deleterious effect on the training of personnel for the Air Force. There is an urgent need to review the goals of the rearmament process and to retarget resources towards technical support, as well as to carry out a sober assessment of the risks of provocative air interceptions and of combat operations lasting many weeks. The partially completed modernisation has created the illusion of effectiveness, whereas in fact the Air Force is a weak link in the unbalanced and overburdened Russian military machine.
The claim that the special operation to seize Crimea was undertaken without the use of an air bridge simply does not correspond with reality.
Crimea. Pavel Baev has an inadequate understanding of how the operation in Crimea was conducted. Until February/beginning of March 2014 an air bridge was in active use. In particular, the shots of a Russian armed forces unit being transferred by helicopters on the night of 28 February/1 March 2014 are widely known. In addition, airborne detachments were moved to the Belbek and Gvardeyskoye airfields by Il-76 military transport aircraft after Crimean airspace was closed. Thus the claim that the special operation to seize Crimea was undertaken without the use of an air bridge simply does not correspond with reality. Yes, the main part of the forces was undoubtedly transported by sea, but the advance units which rapidly seized military objectives were also transported by air.
The Baltic states. Pavel Baev says “It is noteworthy that Russian warplanes have tested the efficiency not only of the NATO countries’ air defence systems (including Denmark’s) but also those of neutral Sweden and Finland, while carefully avoiding getting anywhere close to Germany’s airspace.” However, Germany’s airspace is farther away than the main operational zone of Russian aircraft, since the objective of the Russian air force is to move forces and air defences into Kaliningrad and the Kaliningrad region. To get into Germany’s airspace they would need to fly significantly farther west. The Russian air force has made periodic flights in this direction, and in a well-known incident close to Denmark’s air boundary its planes were approximately equidistant from Danish and German airspace.
Syria. The author understates the average number of flights by Russian aircraft. If we look at the number of sorties already flown – 5,600 against ground targets in the period from October to the first ten days of December 2015 – we get more than 50 sorties per day on average, not 30–50, as Pavel Baev writes.
Germany’s airspace is farther away than the main operational zone of Russian aircraft.
The following thought by the expert also raises questions: “Maintaining supplies to the reinforced group is becoming an increasingly difficult issue. In November the Navy was obliged to acquire eight transport ships from the then still friendly Turkey in order to deliver the necessary freight (including fuel and ammunition).” The negotiations on supplying the ships were conducted long before they were acquired and transferred as part of the overall preparation for the operation in Syria, which began in the spring of 2015.
Issues of semi-reform and incomplete modernisation. “The series of plane crashes in the summer of 2015 was unprecedented.” US military aircraft suffered at least as many accidents in 2015. Seven American warplanes, six helicopters and one MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft were irretrievably lost in accidents and crashes in 2015. During the same period the Russian air force’s irretrievable losses amounted to six planes and one helicopter. If we compare the numbers of the two countries’ warplanes and the intensity of their sorties, we find the accident rates for the two approximately equal overall.
Antonov Serial Production Plant
Cessation of ties with Ukraine. This did indeed have a negative impact on the plans to rearm the air force, but the expert exaggerates the significance of this issue. The production of helicopters in Russia continues at the same rate as before. Supplies of helicopter engines from the Motor-Sich factory also continues. By all accounts, the Motor-Sich management found a loophole in the possibility of supplying dual-purpose products. In any case, there is no information about a fall in the helicopter production rate. Moreover, there are reports that an increasing range of aircraft is being supplied to military customers. Almost half of the army’s fleet of aircraft has been updated, including aircraft supplied in recent years – in the last eight years the army’s air force has received more than 500 helicopters of various types, including more than 300 in the last three years. The author’s claim is legitimate in relation to transport aircraft. The An-124 and An-70 planes were developed by the Antonov design bureau in Kiev, but we can undertake the modernisation of the An-124 without Ukraine’s involvement, including supporting and extending the service life of the engines, and the decision to pull out of the An-70 was taken back in the days of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency.
The claims concerning the T-50 fifth-generation fighter being developed under the PAK FA programme are also not clear: “Implementation of the highly important project to create the T-50 (PAK FA) fifth-generation fighter remains uncertain: the steep rise in its costs has forced the Ministry of Defence to reduce state procurement from 52 to 12 planes.” This claim is completely inaccurate. The first series will be limited to 12 planes, but Russia’s overall requirement for this fighter is about 200 planes. The only question is when they will start to enter service in large numbers. A matter of plus or minus two years is not a big issue here, in view of the fact that the life cycle of this model will be about 50 years.
“The category of multi-role fighters includes four modifications of the Su-27…” If we recall that the Americans currently have the F-15А, F-15В, F-15С and F-15E fighters in service at the same time, they’re not very different from the Russian Air Force. But overall, of course, the Russian fleet is more varied – to a large extent because of the specific nature of its objectives. In particular, this specialization is seen in the fact that the air force is equipped with the MiG-31 fighter, a specialized air defence interceptor.
Smart bombs. “In practice the lack of ‘smart bombs’ organically augments the complete indifference to the question of losses among the civilian population.” Given that up to now no one has provided any evidence of losses among the civilian population as a result of Russian air strikes, this argument is hardly worth taking seriously. Modernised bombers with an updated targeting system are capable of making highly accurate strikes with unguided bombs too. “The Syrian operation shows that the Russian leadership has acquired a taste for this and sees no danger in projecting its air power, while the growing accident rate shows the extremely high level of risk in using this policy tool. The partially completed modernisation has created the illusion of effectiveness, while in actual fact the Air Force is a weak link in the unbalanced and overloaded Russian war machine.” The use of evaluative adjectives in such quantity reduces trust in the reliability of the narrative. The lack of comparison between the high level of Russian accidents (and let’s be frank, it’s not low) and those of other countries reduces this even more.
The accident rate. Whatever the accident rate may be, it is not currently capable of affecting the Russian Air Force’s capability to deliver strikes against specified targets. We would, of course, not like to suffer any losses, but this is a feature of any major state’s air force operations when that state is making active use of its war machine. And correspondingly, one could hardly expect that the accident rate would lead to Russia ceasing to use its Air Force. The accident rate undoubtedly needs to be tackled, new aircraft need to acquired, and the system of servicing them needs to be improved, but to say that the accident rate could become an issue hindering the use of the Air Force is simply foolish.
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