Russia and North Korea Ready to Cooperate in a Big Way

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea was an important milestone not only in terms of bilateral relations, but it was also the next step toward transforming the global security architecture. One can speak of a self-fulfilling prophecy: in response to pressure from the collective West, Moscow and Pyongyang are ready to join their hands, and what they had previously been groundlessly accused of for the sake of justifying the Washington—Tokyo—Seoul alliance is now becoming a reality.

In addition to the Agreement between the governments of North Korea and Russia on the construction of a road bridge across the Tumangang border and the Agreement between the governments of North Korea and Russia on cooperation in health care, medical education and science — both of “tactical” importance, which at the same time does not diminish their magnitude — the most significant document signed during the visit is the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. It appears from Vladimir Putin’s article titled “Russia and the DPRK: Traditions of Friendship and Cooperation Through the Years” and published in North Korea’s primary newspaper Rodong Sinmun that this agreement is asserted as a pillar in shaping a new world order built on justice, as opposed to the U.S. “rules-based order.” The term “comprehensive strategic partnership” formally means the highest level of relations between countries, and if we compare the way these ties were described before, we can say that “we have jumped over several steps, or even a whole flight of stairs.” The previous treaty dated February 9, 2000, was only pivoted “on friendship, good-neighborly relations and cooperation.” The new agreement is open-ended, which implies that the trend will persist at least in the short, if not medium, term.

Article 4 of the treaty drew particular attention, as it says that in the event of an armed attack against one of the parties by a third country, the other signatory shall immediately provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession. Such wording de facto implies a military alliance, although the Russian leadership shuns this term, emphasizing that the treaty is not directed against third countries. In the West and in South Korea, this caused a stir bordering on hysteria. However, Article 4 mentions a state of war, which does not define every armed conflict. The special military operation, it should be recalled, is technically not a war, and neither Moscow nor Kiev have declared war on each other. Second, assistance with all means must be provided in accordance with the legislation of the two countries and with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which permits individual or collective self-defense. Third, under Article 3 of the treaty, Pyongyang will first have to discuss any potentially drastic decision with Moscow.

This stands in stark contrast to the speculations of Western experts that Kim Jong-un may “go rogue” now that he feels Russia’s support. On the contrary, the presence of two military blocs on the peninsula (China also has a mutual defense pact with North Korea) does not increase the probability of conflict, but rather decreases it — if a conflict does break out, even for tactical reasons, it will quickly turn nuclear, likely resulting in a Cold War-like confrontation. There will be an arms race, saber-rattling, maybe even minor incidents, but this will be movement along the danger line without crossing it.

Article 16 may be seen as targeting sanctions, while it does not explicitly state that UN Security Council sanctions can be ignored. So far, it appears that Moscow’s position formally remains unchanged. It describes the sanctions regime as unfair, will advocate its abolition and will stand against the imposition of new sanctions, along with looking for ways to circumvent them, driven by the principle: “everything which is not forbidden is allowed.” The official lifting of UNSC sanctions or their open disregard may come at the next stage of the flare-up between Russia and the West, in retaliation for sanctions pressure on Pyongyang or Moscow. Nevertheless, Moscow’s supply of precision weapons to Pyongyang is as unacceptable a red line for Seoul as South Korea’s direct supply of ammunition and military equipment to Ukraine.

Articles 18–20 appear similarly important, as they discuss the need to deepen understanding between the two nations. There are enough clichés about North Korea in Russia’s public consciousness and in perceptions of experts and decision-makers alike. Some of them are “red,” depicting the North as a “clone of the Soviet Union,” but most are “black” — widespread myths about “mortar shootings” that need to be systematically uprooted, and it is great that the national leadership has paid attention to this matter. Surely, it’s not quite clear just how much of this multilateral agreement will be implemented but judging by the intensity of contacts between the ministries, agencies and regions of the two countries, allied relations between Russia and North Korea will be strengthened and deepened in a real sense.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea, or the DPRK, was an important milestone not only in terms of bilateral relations, but it was also the next step toward transforming the global security architecture. One can speak of a self-fulfilling prophecy: in response to pressure from the collective West, Moscow and Pyongyang are ready to join their hands, and what they had previously been groundlessly accused of for the sake of justifying the Washington—Tokyo—Seoul alliance is now becoming a reality.

As a result of the visit, three documents were signed: the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, the Agreement between the governments of North Korea and Russia on the construction of a road bridge across the Tumangang border, and the Agreement between the governments of North Korea and Russia on cooperation in health care, medical education and science. The latter two agreements are formally of “tactical” importance, but this does not diminish their magnitude. The decision to finally improve the infrastructure by adding a highway link to the railroad connection has been long overdue. The bridge, which will hopefully be built quickly, in the manner of “Russian money —North Korean builders,” will significantly improve connectivity between the two nations and boost any type of exchange, from economic to humanitarian. The agreement on cooperation in health care, education, and science also opens prospects for North Korean students and postgraduates in Russian universities as well as for improving North Korean medical industry and medical technology. In the author’s opinion, although some medical equipment is labeled as dual-use goods and is subject to sanctions, the opening of a Russian medical center in Pyongyang could significantly improve the situation.

Andrey Kortunov:
The Cold War Never Ended in Asia

Yet the most important document by far is the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, which, judging by Vladimir Putin’s article titled Russia and the DPRK: Traditions of Friendship and Cooperation Through the Years and published in North Korea’s primary newspaper Rodong Sinmun, is asserted as a vital pillar in shaping a new world order built on justice, as opposed to the U.S. “rules-based order,” “which is essentially nothing more than a global neo-colonial dictatorship relying on ‘double standards.’” The Russian President says that “Pyongyang has always been our committed and like-minded supporter, ready to confront the ambition of the collective West to prevent the emergence of a multipolar world order based on justice, mutual respect for sovereignty and consideration of each other’s interests.” Both Russia and North Korea have repeatedly expressed their desire to resolve all their differences peacefully, but under pressure from the United States and the collective West, Moscow and Pyongyang are willing “to closely work together to bring more democracy and stability to international relations” and “shape the architecture of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia.”

There are two points to note here. First, the term “comprehensive strategic partnership” formally means the highest level of relations between countries, and if we compare the way these ties were described before, we can say that “we have jumped over several steps, or even a whole flight of stairs.” The previous treaty dated February 9, 2000, was only pivoted “on friendship, good-neighborly relations and cooperation.” Second, this new agreement is open-ended (Article 23), which implies that the trend will persist at least in the short, if not medium, term.

On the one hand, the countries in the preamble reaffirm their “desire to defend international justice against hegemonic aspirations and attempts to impose a unipolar world order” and, on the other hand, express their “commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, as well as other universally recognized principles and norms of international law.” This matter is quite important because, notwithstanding their desire to build an alternative structure, Moscow and Pyongyang are not trying to accelerate this process or to make the UN and its institutions appear to be a thing of the past.

Article 1 outlines a relationship of comprehensive strategic partnership, while Article 2 defines the norms of communication. It also mentions the aspiration for global strategic stability and a new just world order. Article 3 adds further detail saying that “in the event of an imminent threat of armed aggression against one of the Parties, the latter shall, at the request of one of the Parties, immediately operationalize bilateral channels for consultations in order to coordinate their positions and agree on possible practical measures to assist each other in eliminating the emerging threat.”

Yet it is Article 4 that made waves in the Western media: “In the event that one of the Parties is subjected to an armed attack by an individual country or several countries and thus finds itself in a state of war, the other Party shall immediately provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and in accordance with the laws of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation.” Such wording de facto implies a military alliance, although the Russian leadership shuns this term, emphasizing that the treaty is not directed against third countries.

Many people expected the treaty to comprise a political-military component, including the author of this article, who anticipated something of the kind. In the West and in South Korea, this caused a stir bordering on hysteria. Suffice it to recall a quote from National Security Advisor to the South Korean President Chang Ho-jin: “This is nonsense and gibberish of those who, having abandoned the existing norms and responsibilities of the international community, are vowing to develop mutual military cooperation on the premise of a preemptive strike by the international community that will never happen, despite their history of launching wars of aggression, including the Korean War and the conflict in Ukraine.”

However, some important points should be addressed. First, Article 4 mentions a state of war, which does define every armed conflict. The special military operation, it should be recalled, is technically not a war, and neither Moscow nor Kiev have declared war on each other. Second, assistance with all means must be provided in accordance with the legislation of the two countries and with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which permits individual or collective self-defense. Third, under Article 3 of the treaty, Pyongyang will first have to discuss any potentially drastic decision with Moscow.

Konstantin Asmolov:
Russia and North Korea: Current State and Prospects of Relations

This stands in stark contrast to the speculations of Western experts that Kim Jong-un may “go rogue” now that he feels Russia’s support. On the contrary, the presence of two military blocs on the peninsula (China also has a mutual defense pact with North Korea) does not increase the probability of conflict, but rather decreases it — if a conflict does break out, even for tactical reasons, it will quickly turn nuclear, likely resulting in a Cold War-like confrontation. There will be an arms race, saber-rattling, maybe even minor incidents, but this will be movement along the danger line without crossing it.

Article 5 of the treaty binds the parties “not to make friends against each other.” More precisely, “not to enter into agreements with a third country that infringe on the sovereignty, security, territorial inviolability, the right to free choice and development of political, social, economic and cultural systems or other key interests of the counterparty,” not to take part in such actions or allow territories to be used for such purposes. In the West (alas, some Russian liberal columnists have also joined their ranks), this article is perceived as aimed against the Republic of Korea, but it is not about Russian–South Korean relations in general, but about the part of them that could be directed against the North.

In Article 6, the parties state that they support and will pursue peace-loving policies, while Article 7 mentions consultation and cooperation “within the framework of international organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies.” This paragraph illustrates that respect for international organizations goes beyond the preamble.

Article 8 is quite interesting as it hints at the possibility of regular military exercises and other security cooperation in the future: “The Parties shall establish mechanisms for joint activities to strengthen defense capabilities with the aim of preventing war and ensuring regional and international peace and security.” Subsequent articles list many areas where the two countries will jointly confront “multiplying challenges and threats,” ranging from food and energy security to climate change. For example, economic cooperation is detailed in Articles 10 and 11. The parties seek to make efforts to increase trade, create an enabling environment for cooperation, encourage joint research and mutual investment, acting at the federal, interregional and cross-border levels. Particular attention is paid to the development of free economic zones in North Korea and Russia, with their respective leadership expected to give consideration to the Rason FEZ in this context.

Scientific cooperation is also promising and has all the hallmarks of that between two developed nations: space research, biology, peaceful use of nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, IT, and more. Subsequent articles lay the basis for the development of cooperation in almost every possible domain, not only humanitarian and agricultural, but also in natural disaster prevention and elimination of their consequences, mutual recognition of standards and quality certificates. The latter is quite important in sensitive areas, such as cooperation in technology, security and defense.

Article 14 focuses on legal assistance, including the protection of legal entities and individual citizens of each country, mutual extradition of criminals and the recovery of criminal assets. Article 15 deals with contacts between the legislative, executive and law enforcement institutions of the two nations.

Article 16 might be seen as targeting sanctions: “The Parties oppose the use of unilateral coercive measures, including those of an extraterritorial nature, and consider their imposition to be illegal and contrary to the UN Charter and the norms of international law,” guaranteeing not to apply or accede to such measures if imposed by a third party. Moreover, “if unilateral coercive measures are imposed on one of the Parties by any third party, the Parties shall make practical efforts to reduce the risks, eliminate or minimize the direct and indirect impact of such measures.” Similar wording can be found in Putin’s article: “we will develop alternative trade and mutual settlements mechanisms not controlled by the West, jointly oppose illegitimate unilateral restrictions.”

However, the treaty does not explicitly state that UNSC sanctions can be ignored, and the wording “unilateral coercive measures” formally refers to sanctions imposed against Russia or North Korea by individual countries such as the United States. So far, it appears that Moscow’s position formally remains unchanged. It describes the sanctions regime as unfair, will advocate its abolition and will stand against the imposition of new sanctions, along with looking for ways to circumvent them (this is almost written in clear text), driven by the principle: “everything which is not forbidden is allowed.” Still, the sanctions already in place have not been lifted yet, at least formally.

The official lifting of UN Security Council sanctions, worded as “the Russian Federation no longer binds itself...,” or their open disregard may come at the next stage of the flare-up between Russia and the West, in retaliation for sanctions pressure on Pyongyang or Moscow. Nevertheless, as was demonstrated by a brief aggravation of Russia–ROK relations and Chang Ho-jin’s remarks, Moscow’s supply of precision weapons to Pyongyang is as unacceptable a red line for Seoul as South Korea’s direct supply of ammunition and military equipment to Ukraine.

Ivan Timofeev:
Eurasian Security Structure: From Idea to Practice

Article 17 addresses joint fight against international terrorism, extremism and organized crime, but Articles 18–20 seem much more interesting. The first one of these three highlights cooperation in international information security, which covers not only equal rights in the Internet or countering the criminal use of ICTs, but also the stance “against the misuse of ICTs to tarnish the dignity and image of sovereign countries and infringe on their sovereign rights.” Article 19 is dedicated to the mutual promotion of language learning and the literature of the two nations, as well as to raising awareness of each other in general. Article 20 describes the development of “broad media cooperation to raise the level of knowledge about the lives of the peoples of the two nations, to spread unbiased information about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation as well as bilateral cooperation in the global media space, further enhancement of favorable environment for interaction between the national media, and tighter coordination in countering misinformation and aggressive information campaigns.” This whole section seems important to the author because, as his conversations with numerous reporters covering the Russian President’s visit to North Korea revealed, there are more than enough clichés about North Korea not only in the mass consciousness, but also in the perceptions of experts and decision-makers. Some of them are “red,” depicting the North as a “clone of the Soviet Union,” but most are “black” — widespread myths about “mortar shootings” that need to be systematically uprooted, and it is great that the national leadership has paid attention to this matter.

Surely, it’s not quite clear just how much of this multilateral agreement will be implemented but judging by the intensity of contacts between the ministries, agencies and regions of the two countries, which began after Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia, allied relations will be strengthened and deepened in a real sense.

Thus, this visit cannot be described as a ceremonial event for the sole purpose of expressing diplomatic support or “sending a signal to the West.” Russia and North Korea are ready to cooperate in earnest, and it is no coincidence that the 2024 treaty is compared to its 1961 precursor, much of whose phrasing was reiterated in the new text. That is why, in the author’s opinion, the treaty discussed here is a “stab” at long-term sectoral cooperation, while its military and political component should become an additional factor of preventing an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.