Russia and the Syrian Problem
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PhD in Politics, Head of the Centre for Analysis of Middle East Conflicts, the RAS Institute for US and Canadian Studies
The situation in and around Syria is becoming increasingly dramatic, and the UN estimates the number of casualties at over 60,000. Information on the warring parties’ military successes is highly unreliable. The “frontline” is becoming increasingly blurred, as clashes sweep through Syrian cities, including the capital Damascus. The conflict is also becoming increasingly internationalized. These considerations do accentuate the relevance of Moscow’s stance on the Syrian conflict. To what extent does it meet Russia’s key long-term interests in Syria and the Middle East as a whole? Is Russia ready for possible U-turns up to and including the fall of Assad’s regime?
The situation in and around Syria is becoming increasingly dramatic, and the UN estimates the number of casualties at over 60,000. Information on the warring parties’ military successes is highly unreliable. The “frontline” is becoming increasingly blurred, as clashes sweep through Syrian cities, including the capital Damascus. The conflict is also becoming increasingly internationalized. These considerations do accentuate the relevance of Moscow’s stance on the Syrian conflict. To what extent does it meet Russia’s key long-term interests in Syria and the Middle East as a whole? Is Russia ready for possible U-turns up to and including the fall of Assad’s regime?
The situation in and around Syria is becoming increasingly dramatic, and the UN estimates the number of casualties at over 60,000. Information on the warring parties’ military successes is highly unreliable. The “frontline” is becoming increasingly blurred, as clashes sweep through Syrian cities, including the capital Damascus. The conflict is also becoming increasingly internationalized: Bashar al-Assad is assisted by Iranian advisors and Hezbollah combatants, while the insurgents welcome Islamist volunteers from other hotspots in the region. Experts agree that the chances of a political settlement are diminishing, following Assad’s latest public speech. The statement by UN and Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, describing Assad’s plan as “even more sectarian and more one-sided” than “his previous initiatives that have not worked” seems particularly significant. Brahimi posits that Assad will not be able to take part in the settlement as the country needs “not cosmetic, but real change.” Notably, former-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Brahimi’s predecessor on Syria, was of the same view.
These considerations do accentuate the relevance of Moscow’s stance on the Syrian conflict. To what extent does it meet Russia’s key long-term interests in Syria and the Middle East as a whole? Is Russia ready for possible U-turns up to and including the fall of Assad’s regime?
What’s Happening in Syria?
Lakhdar Brahimi: Assad’s plan - “even more
sectarian and more one-sided” than “his previous
initiatives that have not worked”
This is one of the most sensitive “live issues” under discussion by the Middle East expert community. Analysts are trying hard to formulate Russia’s regional interests, offering a wide range of views, from those focusing on purely economic and broader strategic issues to superficial statements suggesting that Russia can easily do without Arab countries. However, practically all pundits agree that Russia’s prospects in the region to a great extent depend on its role in Syria. This is why developing a coherent view of and approach to the Syrian situation is an absolute prerequisite for Russia generating a relevant strategy.
Russian media reports are largely dominated by an opinion that perceived as all but official: the legitimate government of Bashar al-Assad is resisting the intrusion of foreign terrorist groups (1, 2, 3). Although convincing enough to justify support for Assad, this attitude conflicts both with the reality and with the broadly accepted perception in the international community and in the Middle East (excepting Iran). In addition, Russia’s stance is vulnerable. Unrest in Syria began in March 2011 as a peaceful movement for the reform and expanded civil liberties, but violence broke out only after Damascus responded with force. This violence quickly became reciprocal – and escalated. So, who is opposing Assad’s army – foreign terrorists and their henchmen or some of the Syrian people? An answer that explains how the Syrian authorities are fighting against some of the population, and that these combatant groups inevitably attract volunteers from other Arab countries, would be considerably closer to the reality. Hence, the situation is best described as a civil war, and this is how it is viewed both in the region and in the West.
Assad has actually acknowledged this fact. In his latest public address, he proclaimed the intention to end this civil strife through reaching agreements with “patriotic compatriots” and rejecting “foreign puppets”. This latter include not only groups of foreign Islamist volunteers but also the bulk of the opposition that allegedly receives foreign aid and consequently operates in the interests of external forces. At the same time, the Syrian president keeps silence on the assistance he gets from, for example, Iran.
Qadri Jamil, leader of the People’s Will Party and
the Popular Front for Change and Liberation
Although Moscow should not take simplistic lines put out by Damascus at face value, some Russian media outlets are all to eager to quote and even promote these views. This complicates the job for Russian diplomats, who make sporadic attempts to approach Syria’s opposition – the same opposition described as terrorists by Russia’s state-controlled TV channels. Note that this pro-Assad reading of Syria’s internal conflict is creating a formidable obstacle to Russia establishing areas of common ground with the Arab states on this issue, let alone the West.
As a result, Russia essentially faces the consolidated stance of the Arab League. This standoff appears less than reasonable, especially because even relevant officials in the Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) acknowledge the likelihood that Assad’s downfall is a matter of time. Under that scenario Russia clearly stands to lose numerous well-established, decades-old, positions in the political, economic and military-strategic spheres. Any new regime is not likely to retain Russia’s current economic projects, the Tartus base lease and military-technical partnership more broadly.
Many Russian experts are now worried that this scenario seems to be coming to pass. In his article What do We Need Syria for? respected analyst Vladislav Inozemtsev proves that, in economic terms, Moscow’s approach to the Syrian conflict is poorly grounded. He offers statistics backing up his claims that Russia’s long-term interests involve cooperation with the region’s leading energy powers, primarily the Persian Gulf monarchies, wonders whether Russia’s diplomatic approach to the Syrian conflict is “direct sabotage of Russia’s economic interests” and even poses the blunt question: what does Moscow stand to gain through its strange moves to support Assad.
Economic Input – Strategic Advantage
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to view the highly-complex situation in Syria exclusively through the prism of Russia’s economic interests. Dr. Inozemtsev compellingly showed that while Russia’s interests in Syria can be characterized as moderate, Russia faces considerable risks if its course veers more radically away from that of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and the Persian Gulf monarchies. The economic component clearly requires comprehensive analysis, particularly since it is so closely bound up with Russia’s strategic role in the region and in the world. However, decision-making in foreign affairs rarely relies on economic factors and interests. Frequently, military, strategic, image-related and even moral considerations take precedence over economic factors. Moreover, in order to attain these goals, countries frequently employ cost-based mechanisms. Most countries rate external security as a top priority and most would channel all relevant resources to this end, provided, of course, that it boasts well-defined security parameters.
There are numerous examples of this in the Middle East. Just remember the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the United States allocated generous economic and financial assets to their regional allies. The Camp David agreement is still a considerable drain on Washington’s resources. As for the Soviet Union, Dr. Inozemtsev indicated what it spent on supporting national-liberation movements on the Syrian model. Then there was Egypt (under President Nasser), Iraq, Libya, Algeria and Yemen. Soviet-American rivalry in the Middle East is long in the past, but Russia’s strategic interests in region remain, albeit with modified parameters. The thing to do now is to adequately and realistically define them.
Not Just Phantom Pains
Russian repair base in Tartus
The development of Russia's Middle East policy largely depends on Syria. This country, which is going through one of the most tragic periods in its history, is giving Moscow phantom pains due to loss of the influence that was hitherto maintained thanks to the friendly anti-imperialist camp in the Arab world. Certain segments of the Russian population, especially those that are traditionally anti-American, view Syria as the last bastion of Russian presence in the region, the outpost in confrontation with America, etc. The line "Russia must not repeat its Libya mistake" (i.e. the UN Security Council vote on Resolution 1973 on the no-fly zone) is reiterated by leading Russian media outlets, recalling how Moscow let the resolution go ahead and lost Tripoli. They insist that there must be no repetition of the Libyan debacle in the Syrian case, as the Security Council has essentially lost all credibility. Russia will chart its own course, even if in runs counter to that of the Arab states and the West. Perhaps this stance is the only rational, appropriate one open to Russia?
Russia's current Syrian policy (often interpreted as backing Assad, something Moscow formally rejects) is frequently seen as a manifestation of this phantom pain emanating from its lost grandeur. This prompts reproaches such as “will we keep living in the past?” “Where are the professionals who will look into the future as Assad’s regime seems set to fall?” But these questions, although rooted in a certain rationale, are not grounded in reality. Phantom pains of course matter but only to a certain extent. Foreign policy planning also seems rational. The problem appears a larger one: too many different strands are interwoven in the Syrian case – there is a long history of friendly relations, geopolitical, cultural (tens of thousands of Russian passport holders live in Syria) and military-strategic (Tartus naval facility). Current political interests, both domestic and foreign, as seen by the Russian leaders are no less (maybe even more) important. This complex tapestry of interwoven interests takes the issue out of the hands of foreign policy officials in the MFA, placing it firmly within the remit of the country’s senior leadership. Given this reality, the Foreign Ministry’s key role is to adapt the political decision to the realities of the situation in the Middle East.
President Harry Truman
Notably, even democratic states, governed by presidents, occasionally display similar differences on foreign policy issues as the departmental approach (MFA) is geared at advancing national interests in a region comes into conflict with a presidential approach takes a greater assortment of factors into account, including domestic ones. One of the most vivid examples of this kind of policy-making collision involved Washington and the decision to establish the state of Israel in November 1947 (on the eve of the UN vote on Resolution 181 on the division of Britain's mandated Palestine into Arab and Jewish states). The Department of State clashed with President Harry Truman, after which State Secretary George Marshall was forced to speak out, publicly stating the United States should align its basic interests to the Arab population and oil and not to the settlement of the Jewish minority in Palestine. But the president overruled him, insisting that the vote in favor of dividing Palestine and establishing a sovereign Jewish state was not just a concession to the Jewish lobby but also an expression of prevailing American sentiments, a tribute to the suffering of the Jewish people and the restoration of historic justice. Truman also had a strategic goal in mind, i.e. the future establishment of an ideologically close and reliable ally in the region, which is relevant to this day. As for other US interests in the region – energy and military politics – those have been gradually adapted to the existing realities.
Not By Assad Alone
This case clearly illustrates how the president’s (American or Russian) projection of the domestic factor onto a particular situation in the Middle East significantly complicating the activities of either the Russian MFA or the American DoS. This seems an apposite moment to recall the partial differences at two policy-making levels in the Libyan case, when President Medvedev chose to abstain during the UN Security Council vote on Resolution 1973, but Russia’s ambassador in Tripoli publicly questioned this decision and then lost his post.
Foreign policy pragmatism is not necessarily rooted in economic calculations, and should rather be qualified as economics in international affairs that often prevails in Russian expert and diplomatic assessments of conflicts in the Greater Middle East. Just recall how people mourned the loss of contracts worth billions of dollars (genuine and virtual) in Libya and Iraq after Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein were toppled. Today, Iraqi contracts are steadily coming back, although Baghdad remains wary of Russia. From an economic perspective, it seems sounder to operate within a broader strategic spectrum that incorporates multiple factors - including the moral dimension.
Obviously, Russia's approach to Syria must differ from that taken over Libya (especially after Libya). Moscow's relations with Damascus have much older roots, and run much deeper than those with Tripoli. Syria remained a close partner even during the darkest days of the Soviet Union’s Middle East policy. The Soviet and Russian presence in Syria has been significant both at the elite and grass-roots level. In international matters, the Assad family has been much more deeply geared towards Russia than Gaddafi, who in the past decade mainly wooed EU markets (including the armaments market) and sought greater political influence in Europe. In other words, Russia's strategic interest in Syria is quite clear – preserving its presence and influence in the country and in the region with any legitimate regime in Damascus. Moscow's stance reflects exactly this. It is not backing Assad, rather it is backing the Syrian people and a clear view of Syria's long-term interests.
However, a more detailed look at the key positions involved in working towards achieving these strategic goals reveals questions that, so far, lack convincing answers.
First, although international organizations loudly and prolifically accuse Assad of committing numerous crimes, including crimes against humanity, Moscow refrains from criticizing the Syrian authorities. Does this mean that Russia believes that Assad’s rule could survive? It seems unlikely. But where is the line beyond which Assad may be labeled persona non grata? In spring 2011, Dmitry Medvedev did as much for Gaddafi after several thousand Libyan civilians had been killed. In Assad’s case this figure currently stands at about 60,000, which functions as a stark illustration of the moral side of the problem.
Second, how can Russia's interests there be safeguarded if the Assad regime collapses? There are few suggestions, as Moscow primarily maintains contact with internal opponents loyal to Assad, and not with the “genuine opposition.” Noticeably, this is not just because the real opposition leaders are less than eager to communicate with Moscow (some of them would be willing) but mainly in order to avoid irritating Assad.
Third, should Russia automatically veto any Arab draft resolution on Syria in the UN Security Council, even one that imposes sanctions on the country? By doing so, Russia (with Beijing aligned to Moscow) eliminates the Security Council as an external factor capable of influencing the situation in Syria or the Syrian leadership, turning virtually all the Arab states against itself. Furthermore, why is Moscow delaying the evacuation of Russian citizens from Syria?
Despite the MFA's information campaign, the combination of these and certain other aspects builds the impression of Russia displaying too much reverence toward Assad, although this would seem to be a long way from reality. Some steps that Russia has taken can only be explained by the intrusion of domestic factors into the development of a sustainable Syria strategy. In fact, Russia’s Soviet-style traditionalists in government and general public view the issue through the prism of "American hands off Assad" and regard the media presentation of the Syrian crisis as the "just struggle of the legitimate Assad regime against foreign terrorists." This approach frequently hampers rational foreign policy decisions and drives Russian diplomatic efforts to move out of the limelight, into a non-public zone. In fact, Foreign Service officials are often limited in how far they can go in offering clear-cut answers to propaganda-driven questions that emerge in Russian society. For example, if the MFA meets the genuine opposition in Syria slammed in the media as gangs of terrorists, the “man in the street” may reasonably have cause to wonder why contact is being made with these extremists, if they win in Syria today but could strike Russia tomorrow.
More questions remain, chiefly regarding how Moscow's Syrian policy should grow to combine Russian domestic factors and bona fide interests in the Middle East that are in alignment with the energy strategies of the Middle Eastern leaders that Dr. Inozemtsev mentioned. However, in the final count, the approach taken should rest on the obvious truth that Russia needs Syria, with or without Assad, just as it needs other Arab countries.
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