Russia in the MENA Region amid the Ukrainian Crisis

Today, one year after the start of the Russian “special military operation,” one can conclude that its impact on the MENA region has not been as dramatic as many had anticipated. The Russia-Middle East policy has demonstrated considerable resilience, as has the regional system of international relations. Recent developments have been triggered more by long-term shifts in the balance of powers between the United States (U.S.) and China rather than the military confrontation in Europe. In mid-March 2023, Assad visited Moscow and received full confirmation from the Russian side that their bilateral relationship would not change, and that the Kremlin would continue to support Damascus militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Apparently, the Russian side did not push the Syrian leadership towards any fundamental modification in its approach to Türkiye or the Gulf states, although the Kremlin remains interested in a Syrian-Turkish rapprochement and Syria rejoining the League of Arab States.

The crisis in Eastern Europe has been less significant for the region than many other events happening simultaneously inside the Middle East, such as expanding the Abraham Accords, Israel’s deep political crisis, or the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. However, the crisis in Eastern Europe did have an impact on the food security of the MENA region and it also affected negotiations on oil exports within the OPEC+ format. Still, it would be an exaggeration to argue that since the start of the military conflict in Ukraine, the region would be irreversibly transformed. Most regional players demonstrated their intention to remain neutral in the crisis between Russia and the West, carefully avoiding taking sides or explicitly supporting anti-Russian economic and political sanctions.

In the updated version of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, approved by President Putin on March 31, 2023, it is stated that Moscow intends to focus on building “the full-scale and trustful cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, providing comprehensive support for the Syrian Arab Republic, and deepening the multifaceted mutually beneficial partnerships with the Republic of Türkiye, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt…” It also states that Russia is committed to “establishing a sustainable comprehensive regional security and cooperation architecture in the Middle East and North Africa, based on combining the capacities of all the states and interstate alliances of the regions, including the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Russia intends to actively cooperate with all the interested states and interstate associations in order to implement the [sic] Russia’s Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf Region, viewing the implementation of this initiative as an important step toward a sustainable and comprehensive normalization of the situation in the Middle East.”

The future of Russia’s role in the MENA region will be defined by many factors, including the duration of the Russian-Western crisis and its ultimate outcome. Most regional actors look at this crisis not only as a new security challenge, but also as a new political opportunity to diversify their respective foreign policy investment portfolios. It explains why many MENA countries are reluctant to take sides in the Russia-West conflict and are not in a hurry to break their economic, political, and military ties to Moscow.

Furthermore, the first eighteen months of the conflict confirmed that the MENA international relations subsystem has some autonomy that makes it resistant to shocks and destabilizing impulses coming from other parts of the globe. This resilience should not be underestimated and any changes within the subsystem are likely to be gradual, coming mostly from inside the MENA region rather than from outside. Therefore, the Kremlin’s opportunities and constraints will depend more on long-term economic, political, and security developments within the region than on any combination of external factors. In the end, Russia’s influence in the Middle East will largely depend on the ability or inability of Moscow to make a tangible contribution to national modernization projects in years and decades to come.

Introduction

When Vladimir Putin launched his “special military operation” in Ukraine a year ago, many experts and journalists concluded that this decision would inevitably have a fundamental impact on Russia’s foreign policy all over the world, including the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. For instance, there were widespread expectations that being distracted by the conflict with Ukraine, the Kremlin would not be able to sustain its military presence in Syria at previous levels. There were speculations that the special military operation would alienate some of Russia’s traditional friends and partners in the region and that Moscow will increasingly become a marginal player in Middle Eastern affairs, which was perceived by many geopolitical adversaries as a potential window of opportunity. However, it could also be seen as an additional factor of regional instability, raising the risks of new escalations of violence across the Middle East. For instance, if the Kremlin were to significantly curtail its military and economic assistance to Damascus, it could weaken the Syrian leadership and encourage the militant opposition to overthrow Bashar Assad.

Ivan Bocharov:
The Middle East: Impact of Afghanistan and Ukraine Crises on Key Regional Trends

Today, one year after the start of the Russian “special military operation,” one can conclude that its impact on the MENA region has not been as dramatic as many had anticipated. The Russia-Middle East policy has demonstrated considerable resilience, as has the regional system of international relations. Recent developments have been triggered more by long-term shifts in the balance of powers between the United States (U.S.) and China rather than the military confrontation in Europe. In mid-March 2023, Assad visited Moscow and received full confirmation from the Russian side that their bilateral relationship would not change, and that the Kremlin would continue to support Damascus militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Apparently, the Russian side did not push the Syrian leadership towards any fundamental modification in its approach to Türkiye or the Gulf states, although the Kremlin remains interested in a Syrian-Turkish rapprochement and Syria rejoining the League of Arab States. [1]

The crisis in Eastern Europe has been less significant for the region than many other events happening simultaneously inside the Middle East, such as expanding the Abraham Accords, Israel’s deep political crisis, or the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. However, the crisis in Eastern Europe did have an impact on the food security of the MENA region and it also affected negotiations on oil exports within the OPEC+ format. Still, it would be an exaggeration to argue that since the start of the military conflict in Ukraine, the region would be irreversibly transformed. Most regional players demonstrated their intention to remain neutral in the crisis between Russia and the West, carefully avoiding taking sides or explicitly supporting anti-Russian economic and political sanctions.

In the updated version of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, approved by President Putin on March 31, 2023, it is stated that Moscow intends to focus on building “the full-scale and trustful cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, providing comprehensive support for the Syrian Arab Republic, and deepening the multifaceted mutually beneficial partnerships with the Republic of Türkiye, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt…” It also states that Russia is committed to “establishing a sustainable comprehensive regional security and cooperation architecture in the Middle East and North Africa, based on combining the capacities of all the states and interstate alliances of the regions, including the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Russia intends to actively cooperate with all the interested states and interstate associations in order to implement the [sic] Russia’s Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf Region, viewing the implementation of this initiative as an important step toward a sustainable and comprehensive normalization of the situation in the Middle East.”[2]

Russian-Iranian Relations

Igor Matveev:
Settling the Syrian Conflict Amid the Ukrainian Crisis: Political Economy Perspective

One of the most notable repercussions of the crisis in Eastern Europe has been the strengthening of the Russian-Iranian partnership. Over the last year, there has been a visible increase in the military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran, which is clearly not limited to the alleged shipments of Shahed-series Iranian drones to Russia. [3] In 2022, there was also a growth in the bilateral civilian trade and the resurrection of large-scale Eurasian North-South transportation corridors’ projects, in which Iran is supposed to play a key role. [4] In any case, Russian and Iranian bureaucrats now have shared interests in exchanging best practices in dealing with Western economic sanctions. [5]

However, it would be inaccurate to conclude that Moscow and Tehran have elevated their cooperation to the level of a strategic partnership. So far, Iran does not intend to formally recognize the change in the territorial status quo between Russia and Ukraine that took place since 2014. Russian and Iranian interests in Syria and Afghanistan, in addition to their approaches to Israel, are difficult to reconcile. Moreover, social interaction between the two nations remains low, and several controversial chapters in their bilateral relations (including multiple Russian-Iranian wars in the 18th and 19th centuries and the Soviet-British occupation of Iran during World War II) remain an obstacle for building mutual trust and affection.

Russia and Israel

The military conflict with Ukraine has complicated Russia’s relationship with Israel. The latter cannot remain indifferent to the emerging Russian-Iranian strategic partnership that threatens to challenge a very delicate balance of powers in Syria and perhaps in Lebanon as well. On the one hand, stronger ties between Moscow and Tehran could embolden Iran to be more assertive and aggressive in supporting its Shia clients in Syria and Lebanon, to the detriment of Israeli security. On the other hand, the Israeli leadership is under growing pressure from the West and a large part of the Israeli society to provide more support to Ukraine and to distance itself from Moscow. [6] This could result in Russian-Israeli relations becoming more bumpy and less predictable in future.

Ilya Vedeneyev:
Syria–Turkey Relations: A Road to Normalization

Nonetheless, any deterioration of this relationship has its limitations, as Russia and Israel need each other—both in the MENA region and globally. The Russian-speaking diaspora in Israel is substantial, and it is affluent and politically active, even if it is not united and remains divided along several lines. Israel has always been a vital source of modern technologies for Russia. In addition, the Israeli leadership counts on Moscow to influence radical Palestinian groups as well as imploring Moscow’s Arab partners to moderate their behavior. [7] Both sides have a lot to lose if they sever ties, but the exceptionally strong relationship between Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu along with their similar views on the modern world and the dynamics of international relations should allow them to mitigate political disagreements and to defuse potential crises. [8]

Russia and the Gulf

In the context of Russia’s relations with major Arab countries of the Gulf, there is a remarkable degree of resilience, especially given continuous Western efforts to bring the Gulf on the “right side of history.” While the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members may not fully endorse the official Russian narrative about Ukraine—as evidenced by their support for several UN General Assembly resolutions critical of Moscow, [9] they do not subscribe to the U.S. or the EU anti-Russian sanctions. Furthermore, they are explicitly against expelling Moscow from important multilateral international organizations and forums. The Gulf countries continue to host high-level Russian delegations and sign new agreements on cooperation with their business partners from Russia.

Vladimir Likhachev, Mohamed Shetiwi:
Russia — UAE Cooperation in the Energy Sector

There is a widespread perception in the Gulf and in the MENA region that the Western approach to Ukraine is a clear manifestation of double standards. Not only has the West completely failed to address numerous bloody conflicts outside the Euro-Atlantic space—for instance, in Yemen and in Palestine—but it should take direct responsibility for at least some of them, such as Iraq and Libya. The sharp contrast between Europe’s treatment of Ukrainian refugees on the one hand and Syrian refugees on the other suggests that the “universal” Western human rights policies are often selective and biased. Additionally, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is often presented in black-and-white Manichean terms in the West, as part of an existential global clash between “good democracies” and “bad autocracies,” and even as a crusade in defense of Western liberal values against barbaric Eastern despotism. Many states in the MENA region barely fit the Western “democratic” standards and were not invited to the two Summits for Democracy hosted by the Biden Administration in late 2021 and in the spring of 2023, raising questions about why these “disqualified” nations should stand by the principles of the club that they have not been admitted to. [10]

Russia and Syria

Russia’s approach to Syria has not undergone any radical changes over the past year. In view of the costly military operation in Ukraine, the Kremlin has to save money wherever it can; this is likely to affect Russia’s non-military assistance to Bashar Assad in a time when Damascus needs such assistance more than ever. This might result in Moscow being even less committed to a fundamental political transition in Syria than it has been before. However, Russia’s military assistance and direct military engagement in Syria should be of less concern to the Kremlin since the costs of these efforts are almost negligible compared to its expenditure on its military operation in Ukraine.

It appears that Russian goals in Syria will be confined to maintaining the existing political status quo and to assisting Damascus in overcoming its isolation in the Arab world. This in cludes rejoining the League of Arab States and receiving investments and economic aid from wealthy Gulf countries. Specifically, Russia appears to be encouraging Saudi Arabia to take a more positive view on Bashar Assad and to engage in Syria economically. [11] Simultaneously, Russia will also continue to encourage Syria and Türkiye to reconcile their differences on Syrian Kurds and work towards restoring bilateral relations. [12]

Ruslan Mamedov:
Collective Security in the Gulf and West Asia

Finally, the conflict with Ukraine hindered the Kremlin’s ability to pursue even limited collaboration with the West in the MENA region, like in many other parts of the world. The evident lack of trust between Moscow and Western capitals might complicate many regional problems, including resurrecting the Iranian JCPOA, maritime security arrangements in the Gulf, deconflicting in Syria, and multilateral mechanisms for dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If Russia, alongside China, the U.S., and the EU, approaches the MENA security problems as a zero-sum game, this is likely to further complicate any progress in addressing security challenges in the MENA region. Unfortunately, it seems likely that the region will continue to be a venue for geopolitical great power competition in the years to come.

However, there are notable exceptions to this general trend. For instance, in 2022 and 2023, Russia and the West extended UN Security Council resolutions renewing [13] cross-border aid operations into North-West Syria. [14] They also reached consensus on a number of issues related to the post-earthquake economic relief for Syria. Some level of the U.S.-Russia military interaction in Syria seems inevitable as long as both nations maintain their military presence in the country. Russia, China, and the West could potentially agree on new UN-led measures to end the protracted civil war in Yemen. Moscow might take a kind view national elections taking place in Libya, as long as they happen in the near future.

Moving Forward

Aleksandr Aksenenok:
Statehood in the Middle East: In Search of New Models

The future of Russia’s role in the MENA region will be defined by many factors, including the duration of the Russian-Western crisis and its ultimate outcome. Most regional actors look at this crisis not only as a new security challenge, but also as a new political opportunity to diversify their respective foreign policy investment portfolios. It explains why many MENA countries are reluctant to take sides in the Russia-West conflict and are not in a hurry to break their economic, political, and military ties to Moscow.

Furthermore, the first eighteen months of the conflict confirmed that the MENA international relations subsystem has some autonomy that makes it resistant to shocks and destabilizing impulses coming from other parts of the globe. This resilience should not be underestimated and any changes within the subsystem are likely to be gradual, coming mostly from inside the MENA region rather than from outside. Therefore, the Kremlin’s opportunities and constraints will depend more on long-term economic, political, and security developments within the region than on any combination of external factors. In the end, Russia’s influence in the Middle East will largely depend on the ability or inability of Moscow to make a tangible contribution to national modernization projects in years and decades to come.

First published in the Middle East Council of Global Affairs’ Dossier “The Middle East's Fragile Reset: Actors, Battlegrounds, and (Dis)order”.

1. Marianna Belenkaya,“Визит в благодарственной форме: Президент Сирии Башар Асад встретился с Владимиром Путиным [Thanksgiving visit: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with Vladimir Putin],” Kommersant, March 15, 2023, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5875193.

2. “The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 31, 2023, https://www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586/?lang=en.

3. Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Iran sends first shipment of drones to Russia for use in Ukraine,” The Washington Post, August 29, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/08/29/iran-drones-russia-ukraine-war/.

4. Julia Eliseeva, “Двое в лодке: товарооборот России и Ирана достиг рекордных значений [Two in a boat: trade between Russia and Iran hits record highs],” Izvestia, December 5, 2022, https://iz.ru/1434697/iuliia-eliseeva/dvoe-v-lodke-tovarooborot-rossii-i-irana-dostig-rekordnykh-znachenii?.

5. “Николай Машков: иранцы строят деловые отношения не спеша, но на годы [Nikolai Mashkov: Iranians build business relations slowly, but for years],” RIA Novosti, April 13, 2023, https://ria.ru/20230413/mashkov-1864929034.html.

6. Victor Smirnov, “К вопросу о современном состоянии российско-израильских отношений [On the question of the current state of Russian- Israeli relations],” Russian Council for International Affairs, March 28, 2023, https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/k-voprosu-o-sovremennom-sostoyanii-rossiysko-izrailskikh-otnosheniy/.

7. Ivan Starodubtsev, “What’s the Special Chemistry Between Russia and Israel?,” Politics Today, April 20, 2019, https://politicstoday.org/whats-the-special-chemistry-between-russian-and-israel/; Lily Galili, The Other Tribe: Israel’s Russian-speaking Community and How It Is Changing the Country, Report (Washington D.C.: Brookings, September 2020), 8. Evgeny Pozdnyakov, Alena Zadorozhnaya, and Andrey Rezchikov, “Дружба Путина и Нетаньяху спасет отношения России и Израиля [Friendship between Putin and Netanyahu will save relations between Russia and Israel],” Vzglyad, November 3, 2022, https://vz.ru/world/2022/11/3/1185101.html.

9. David Leshchiner et al., The UN Resolution on Ukraine: How Did the Middle East Vote?, Brief Analysis, Policy Watch 3586, (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 2, 2022), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/unresolution-ukraine-how-did-middle-east-vote.

10. Charles W. Dunne, “Biden’s Summit for Democracy Ignored the Middle East,” Arab Center Washington D.C., December 15, 2021, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/bidens-summit-for-democracy-ignored-the-middle-east/.

11. Sam Dagher, “Saudi Arabia and Russia Vaunt OPEC+ Ties, Discuss Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 9, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-09/saudi-arabia-and-russia-vaunt-opec-ties-discuss-ukraine.

12. Kirill Semenov, “Сирия и Турция в поисках компромисса: прагматизм против старых обид [Syria and Türkiye in search of a compromise: pragmatism against old grievances],” Russian Council for International Affairs, January 19, 2023, https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/siriya-i-turtsiya-v-poiskakh-kompromissa-pragmatizm-protivstarykh-obid/.

13. This arrangement ended in July of 2023, when the UN Security Council failed to reach a compromise on the renewal of the humanitarian cross-border corridor in Syria. The West accused Moscow of blocking an extension of the existing humanitarian aid mechanism.

14. Ruth Michaelson, “Russian veto on aid lifeline to Syria could bring ‘catastrophe’ for millions,” The Guardian, July 19, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2023/jul/19/russian-veto-on-aid-life-line-to-syria-could-bring-catastrophe-for-millions.