Russia’s Policy in Africa: A Geographic Dilemma

A common theme in discussions on Russia–Africa relations has long been the assertion that Russia has no subregional priorities within Africa. Official documents and speeches often describe African nations as a group of states sharing similar challenges, internal governance and values. The relevant section of Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept does not single out any specific countries of the continent but instead proclaims Africa “a distinctive center of global development.” Meanwhile, the preceding section on the Islamic world identifies five specific priority countries, while the next section on Latin America, in turn, highlights four major partners in that region. The article by Director of the Foreign Policy Planning Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry Alexey Drobinin follows the same logic, saying that despite some differences, Africa is a “cohesive geopolitical entity.”

In recent years, two possible approaches to subregional specialization in Africa have taken shape, albeit with a high degree of approximation. The first one involves selecting countries on the continent for Russian contacts and businesses that meet the parameters of Western risk assessment metrics and corporate business standards. With this in mind, some Russian counterparties have focused on East Africa—former British and partly Portuguese colonies—where there is relative political stability and clear “rules of the game.” Another approach to subregional specialization in Africa involves seeking partners on the continent that, due to internal problems or peculiarities of their foreign policy, do not attract the attention of major players. In other words, by standard metrics of corporate governance, cooperation with such countries appears risky and unjustified. Geographically, these nations are located in the Sahel and West Africa.

With a certain grain of salt, it could be stated that Russia faces a tough choice in Africa: either to focus on low-risk and highly competitive markets, where projects will depend on a changeable political climate and eventualities (such as leaders’ personal attitudes toward Russia) or to explore high-risk and low-competition markets where Moscow has inherent non-market advantages and where dialogue with local authorities is mostly pragmatic (despite all the outward rhetoric). The first scenario would place Russia among a crowded field of nations taking part in a “scramble for Africa” and offering some fairly standard formats of cooperation. In the second scenario, Russia could demonstrate the full advantages of its unconventional foreign policy thinking and implement truly massive projects.

The key factor in making this decision is the issue of resources that the Russian government and businesses are ready to allocate to expanding their presence in Africa. Specialization in the Sahel will undoubtedly require more resources, and the exact material costs are difficult to predict with certainty. Projects in East Africa offer more predictability, although the way of doing business in those countries can also lead to delays in business processes and inefficient spending. Sooner or later, a geographic choice in Africa will have to be made, as the costs of treating the continent as an amorphous whole are only rising. Perhaps 2025 will give us less reason to recall the iconic phrase from The Very Same Munchhausen movie: “At first we planned celebrations, then we planned arrests, and finally we decided to combine the two.”

The year 2024 was quite eventful for Russia–Africa relations. A Russian contingent was deployed to Burkina Faso and Mali, at least four countries on the continent were negotiating the construction of nuclear power plants using Russian technology, the first ever Russia–Africa ministerial forum was held—the list goes on and on. Moscow is patiently exploring possible avenues of cooperation with African partners and has already identified some mutually beneficial formats. The year 2025 began with a policy article by Director of the Foreign Policy Planning Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry Alexey Drobinin, discussing the outlook for ties with the continent, and a high-profile visit of President of the Central African Republic Faustin-Archange Touadera to Moscow.

Although formal calendar dates hardly affect the dynamism of Russian–African relations, the developments in recent months have raised several fundamental issues on the African agenda. The answers to these questions will largely determine not only the number of delegation exchanges and the volume of bilateral trade but also Russia’s image on the continent. The available alternatives set different priorities for achieving Moscow’s foreign policy goals and therefore may lead to different configurations in bilateral relations with African partners and in multilateral engagement with the entire continent.

A monolithic continent?

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A common theme in discussions on Russia–Africa relations has long been the assertion that Russia has no subregional priorities within Africa. Official documents and speeches often describe African nations as a group of states sharing similar challenges, internal governance and values. The relevant section of Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Concept does not single out any specific countries of the continent but instead proclaims Africa “a distinctive center of global development.” Meanwhile, the preceding section on the Islamic world identifies five specific priority countries, while the next section on Latin America, in turn, highlights four major partners in that region. The article by A. Drobinin follows the same logic, saying that despite some differences, Africa is a “cohesive geopolitical entity.”

On the one hand, Russia’s official position aligns with the ideals of Pan-Africanism, emphasizing the importance of African unity in an unjust world order. On the other hand, this vague conceptualization of Africa itself is fraught with practical inconveniences. In particular, such a broad generalization makes it very difficult to develop tailored cooperation strategies for different parts or subregions of the continent. After all, Africa is home to countries with diverse religious and ethnic compositions, export structures, as well as geographic and climatic factors, including droughts, desertification and access to the sea.

Competitive predictability

In recent years, two possible approaches to subregional specialization in Africa have taken shape, albeit with a high degree of approximation. The first one involves selecting countries on the continent for Russian contacts and businesses that meet the parameters of Western risk assessment metrics and corporate business standards. With this in mind, some Russian counterparties have focused on East Africa—former British and partly Portuguese colonies—where there is relative political stability and clear “rules of the game.” That said, the process of obtaining permits in these countries often remains complicated, and large investment projects still require political support from the Russian government. But overall, focusing on East Africa allows Russia to avoid concerns that its limited resources could be spent ineffectively.

Based on this logic, Russian economic agencies are considering the possibility of extending the International North–South Transport Corridor to the East African coast. Tanzania is expected to play a key role in this initiative, but this will require substantial modernization of its ports. Another related proposal, which has been under discussion every now and then, is the establishment of a Russian industrial zone in Mozambique. Among other East African countries, Uganda, which became a BRICS partner in 2024 and boasts a great political weight in the region, is of particular importance as well.

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However, this road to subregional specialization has two obvious bumps. First, a significant number of countries and big businesses rely on exactly the same risk assessment metrics and corporate standards, coming to the same conclusion about the need to expand their presence in East Africa. As a result, not only major non-Western nations (China, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE) but also Western powers (the United States, France) are increasing their efforts in the subregion all at the same time. In addition, some middle powers—Thailand, Malaysia and Japan—have a noticeable presence in East Africa. In other words, since so many actors evaluate cooperation prospects using the same metrics, East African countries are spoiled by foreign attention and cooperation initiatives, making Russian proposals often appear unconvincing in comparison.

Second, Russia’s strategies for East Africa often exclude Kenya, which was designated as a major non-NATO ally by the U.S. in 2024. In recent years, Kenyan diplomacy has increasingly aligned itself with the Western agenda, particularly in areas such as security, climate and technological development. Therefore, in political terms, Russia’s caution toward Kenya seems logical, but at the same time, Kenya is now the financial and logistical hub of East Africa, and any cooperation projects in the subregion without it are almost doomed to failure.

Risk without competition

Another approach to subregional specialization in Africa involves seeking partners on the continent that, due to internal problems or peculiarities of their foreign policy, do not attract the attention of major players. In other words, by standard metrics of corporate governance, cooperation with such countries appears risky and unjustified. Geographically, these nations are located in the Sahel and West Africa. The governments in some countries of the subregion are often transitional (Mali, Burkina Faso) and/or are still in search of their own foreign policy program (Guinea, CAR). Dialogue with them is therefore invariably difficult, as revolutionary romanticism, anti-colonial rhetoric and vague notions of the “commanding heights” of the economy are often on their agenda. In addition, major risks come from the activities of transnational criminal organizations, such as terrorist groups, drug cartels, and illegal arms and human trafficking networks.

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At the same time, the deployment of Russian military advisers in the region and Moscow’s effective assistance in containing the most complex security threats (primarily international terrorism) have significantly increased the cooperativeness of its partners in the Sahel. Russia has managed to demonstrate that with the right combination of diplomatic efforts and military presence it is possible: to restore the functioning and territorial control of a legitimate government in a country ravaged by civil war (CAR); to remove the constraints of inherently unfavorable conflict resolution frameworks previously imposed by former colonial powers (Mali); to stop a legally questionable intervention by a regional organization (Niger).

Given that Russia is in many ways a security provider for some Sahel nations, the unfolding of its economic and humanitarian presence is less dependent on political dynamics and competition with other external players, which only partly affects Turkey and China. Accordingly, projects in energy, agriculture and water management, mining of gold and rare metals, transport and logistics have the potential to bring great benefits to Russia and its Sahelian partners. Russia is interested not only in gaining access to resources and implementing its technological solutions in a new environment (e.g. in power generation or railway transport) but also in securing significant reputational advantages. The demonstration effect of specific cooperation projects will not be lost in the cacophony of competing initiatives and proposals, and the significance of completed projects will be higher given the close link between development matters and the security situation.

In the long run, implementing projects in the Sahel also contributes to building a new technological and economic balance in Africa, overcoming one-sided dependence on former colonial powers and Western financial institutions. Projects in East Africa can do nothing of the kind, as the subregion is far more integrated into the networks of global economic interdependence.

In the meantime, this approach to subregional specialization also has flaws. First, after the fall of the Assad government in Syria, the problem of a “logistics leg” arose—how and through what routes to sustain the activities of Russian advisers, military-technical cooperation and humanitarian supplies. While in East Africa most potential partners have access to the sea and can deal directly with Moscow, most of the Sahel states are landlocked and need a logistics corridor. So far, this problem has been solved through reliance on several routes (Guinea, Togo, Libya, partly Ghana and Benin), but the stability of deliveries thus becomes dependent on the political situation in third countries.

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Second, cooperation with the Sahel nations is quite resource-intensive, as the implementation of specific projects often requires the creation of related infrastructure—roads, water wells, power substations and transmission lines. It is debatable how much of this can be compensated for by the difference in prices between local and global markets, or by the low labor costs in the Sahel. However, the probability of cost increases during project implementation is quite high, not only because of complex logistics but also because local economies are dependent on fluctuations in the prices of exported minerals.

Two logics of the double-headed eagle

With a certain grain of salt, it could be stated that Russia faces a tough choice in Africa: either to focus on low-risk and highly competitive markets, where projects will depend on a changeable political climate and eventualities (such as leaders’ personal attitudes toward Russia) or to explore high-risk and low-competition markets where Moscow has inherent non-market advantages and where dialogue with local authorities is mostly pragmatic (despite all the outward rhetoric). The first scenario would place Russia among a crowded field of nations taking part in a “scramble for Africa” and offering some fairly standard formats of cooperation. In the second scenario, Russia could demonstrate the full advantages of its unconventional foreign policy thinking and implement truly massive projects.

The key factor in making this decision is the issue of resources that the Russian government and businesses are ready to allocate to expanding their presence in Africa. Specialization in the Sahel will undoubtedly require more resources, and the exact material costs are difficult to predict with certainty. Projects in East Africa offer more predictability, although the way of doing business in those countries can also lead to delays in business processes and inefficient spending. Sooner or later, a geographic choice in Africa will have to be made, as the costs of treating the continent as an amorphous whole are only rising. Perhaps 2025 will give us less reason to recall the iconic phrase from The Very Same Munchhausen movie: “At first we planned celebrations, then we planned arrests, and finally we decided to combine the two.”