Russian – Ukrainian Relations. A View from Ukraine
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Representatives of Ukrainian expert community propose their assessment of events that currently take place in Ukraine, comment the perspectives of Ukrainian European integration and share their forecasts on further development of Russian – Ukrainian relations. The interviewees are Maksim Bugriy, Maksym Surzhynskiy, Viacheslav Dziundziuk, Andreas Umland and Sergey Kovalenko.
Representatives of Ukrainian expert community propose their assessment of events that currently take place in Ukraine, comment the perspectives of Ukrainian European integration and share their forecasts on further development of Russian – Ukrainian relations.
The RIAC panel includes:
Maksim Bugriy (The Jamestown Foundation): Ukrainian–Russian relations: ‘Cold Peace’
Maksym Surzhynskiy (Koretskiy Institute of State and Law): The current Ukrainian authorities should promptly establish their legitimacy and constitutional validity
Viacheslav Dziundziuk (Kharkiv Regional Institute of Public Administration): Russia will cease to be considered a fraternal country by the majority of Ukrainians
Andreas Umland (Kyiv-Mohyla Academy): At minimum – long-lasting estrangement, at maximum – war
Sergey Kovalenko (Economic Reform Coordination Center mandated by the President of Ukraine, till January 2014): The rest of Ucraine does not object to Crimea's being a part of Russia should the process have gone peacefully
Maksim Bugriy: Ukrainian–Russian relations: ‘Cold Peace’
Non-Resident Fellow, The Jamestown Foundation
The likely accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation is a strategic mistake of the Russian authorities which will complicate Russian–Ukrainian relations in the short term. In fact, Russia is renouncing the use of ‘soft power’ with regard to Ukraine apparently as part of the ‘conservative’, ‘anti-liberal’ project of Vladimir Putin and part of the Russian elite. Nevertheless, the status of Crimea as a constituent entity of the Russian Federation does not necessarily need to be permanent. Over time, Ukraine and Russia – though it may seem paradoxical – still have the potential for strategic partnership and may even be allies in the future.
Obviously the Kremlin’s involvement in the Ukrainian crisis, including its support for the disgraced Viktor Yanukovich and his business circle, was prompted above all by geopolitical considerations that revolve around the idea of preventing Ukraine from becoming part of the ‘Western project’. Fyodor Lukyanov hit the nail on the head in a recent article characterizing the ‘cost’ of Russia’s stable relations with the West: “When the possibility appeared that a neighbouring country, with the active support of Europe and the United States, might become an entity based on other principles (whether more liberal and Atlantic or, on the contrary, brazenly nationalistic), the space for agreement disappeared.”
What makes the choice of the Russian authorities paradoxical is that the current Ukrainian government represented mainly by Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchina (All-Ukrainian Fatherland) party is a fairly moderate entity in terms of its foreign policy and one that is inclined to have partnership relations with Russia. One proof of this is that the new government’s programme does not provide for Ukraine’s joining NATO, which has already prompted criticism from such people as the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris Tarasyuk, who refused to join the new government. Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Minister of Economic Development and Trade Pavel Sheremet and one of the top candidates for president, Petro Poroshenko, are also in a constructive mood, advocating mutually beneficial cooperation with the Russian Federation on economic issues, energy and security: Ukraine was very unlikely to terminate the ‘gas discount in exchange for the Navy’ agreements signed in Kharkov in 2010. Indeed, the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union that is due to be signed on March 21will not include the economic part, which has prompted concern in Russia about the re-export of European goods from Ukraine.
At the same time, I believe that the Kremlin’s operation in Crimea was in many ways reactionary – and extreme measure implemented by Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian partners. It appears to challenge the Western Euro–Atlantic liberal project of social and political structure that implies economic liberalism, tolerance and emphasis on individual rights, and it effectively legitimizes the use of military force in international relations, especially in Europe. Ukraine has chosen not to resist the aggression of the ‘little green men’ not only because it is militarily weak, but also because it is committed to liberal European values. The flip side of this approach to security is the reliance of European countries on US military assistance, and the Crimean crisis has confirmed that the United States would probably consider military measures if the military conflict were to spread to mainland Ukraine.
The Crimean crisis, the ‘war of nerves’associated with the threat of war between Russia and Ukraine, has put the issue of the cultural kinship of the peoples of these countries – a kinship that is not reducible to the ideological cliché of the ‘Russian world’ – under the microscope. Obviously, further escalation, as well as conservation of the status of Crimea as a ‘frozen conflict territory’, will erode the potential for Ukrainian–Russian cooperation. At the same time, as the crisis may have reached its peak the optimal strategy could be a direct dialogue between Moscow and Kiev.
Maksym Surzhynskiy: The current Ukrainian authorities should promptly establish their legitimacy and constitutional validity
Scientific associate, Koretskiy Institute of State and Law, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Overall Assessment of the Situation
The current situation in Ukraine is marked by a significant amount of information chaos and legal discrepancies that tend to aggravate the crisis of the country’s political and financial systems.
The information chaos is a result of the fact that the majority of media outlets in Ukraine (both pro-Western and pro-Eastern) are operating in ‘wartime mode’,broadcasting blatant propaganda, twisting facts, taking sides and consequently sowing social anxiety and discord everywhere. This prevents an adequate assessment of the current state of affairs and further divides the people of Ukraine into two camps, prompting ill-considered impulsive actions that may lead to armed conflict.
We could discuss the problem of objectivity of the media at great length. Unfortunately, there is a very simple formula at work here (and it applies not only to Ukraine): to understand the position of this or that media outlet, all you have to do is find out who owns it.
That is why, at this difficult time in Ukraine, what is sorely lacking is a truly independent national and generally accessible information channel with a proven reputation. Unfortunately, no such source of information has emerged in Ukraine.
The legal discrepancy is in turn caused by the discrepancy between the legal and political systems of Ukraine –de jure and de facto.
I will not raise the long-mooted question of the legality of elected officials and the methods already used to revert to the Ukrainian Constitution of 2004, the removal of Yanukovych from office and the process of the formation of the Ukrainian government. One thing is clear: the current state of the legal institutions has no legitimacy– de jure or still less de facto – in the eyes of the Ukrainian population,hence the situation in Crimea and in the eastern regions of Ukraine.
Another result of the imbalance is the suspension of funding on the part of Russia (the $15 billion agreement) and the guarded approach of the United States and the European Union to rendering financial assistance to the current Ukrainian government.
US and EU representatives have made repeated promises of unreserved support – including financial –for the Yatsenyuk government. But in practice no money has been disbursed, and indeed financial aid is increasingly being linked to the need to implement reform. Speaking about reform brings us back to the issue of the democratic legitimization of the Ukrainian government throughout Ukrainian territory. The result is a kind of vicious circle. Time will tell what ‘political capital’ Russia, the United States and the European Union can bring to break the vicious circle and stabilize the situation in Ukraine.
It has to be noted that the ‘time factor’ is extremely important because the biggest threat to Ukraine’s stability is the worsening financial crisis, which may manifest itself in a dramatic way very soon through defaults on social and budget payments.
Ukraine is also showing every sign of a deep political crisis. Despite the protestations of pro-Eastern and pro-Western political forces in support of a united and cohesiveUkraine and the need to form a government that has the ‘trust of the people’, no significant steps in that direction are being made. Such a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ has already led to the referendum in Crimea. If the situation is further ignored, similar consequences may be observed in the east.
So, the current Ukrainian authorities should promptly establish their legitimacy and constitutional validity, because that offers the only chance of deescalating the mounting political conflict. This can only be achieved through presidential and parliamentary elections, thus ‘cleaning up’the system. This will inevitably create a new ‘people’s east-west friendship government’ (such a hope exists). It should be noted that right now,as a parliamentary democracy, Ukraine needs a legitimate government and a legitimate parliament more than it needs a new president. Yet presidential elections are to be held first.
An interesting situation has developed among the political elites. Recent events have prompted politicians and big businessmen who have not yet taken sides in the conflict to look more actively for a ‘safe haven’. Given the still uncertain outcome in the standoff between Russia on one side and the United States and the European Union on the other, the majority tend to preach varieties of the so-called ‘centrist non-conflict ideology’. Its aim is a stable and strong Ukraine with a diversified foreign policy, while the solution of integration issues (joining the European Union or the Customs Union) can be put on hold until a competitive economy and high living standards are achieved.
Many questions may be asked about the validity of such ‘centrist’ groups. It may be that the outcome of the ‘battle’ for Ukraine involving Russia on one side and the United States and the European Union on the other will be determined, at least in the medium term, by the choice of the ‘centrists’ in favour of a more powerful foreign policy partner. True, that raises the question as to whether such a partner would have any use for migrating ‘local hotbeds’ of financial and political force.
The Future of Russian–Ukrainian Relations and the Prospects for Ukraine’s Integration into Europe
When determining the future of Ukraine and the prospects of its integration into the European Union, the Customs Union or some other entity, the ‘either or’ approach is unacceptable. That is, Ukraine should not be forced to align the trajectory of its foreign policy with either the European Union or the Customs Union.
The current state of affairs shows that the ‘either or’ approach merely divides Ukraine. Therefore, at the transitional phase the ‘centrist’ ideology of ‘many vectors’ described above, with its emphasis on the development of local self-government may come in handy. That should temporarily calm the situation and unite the country – provided, of course, that functioning legitimate central and local government bodies exist.
But that is easier said than done, given the current political and economic situation in Ukraine. Therefore, the challenge for Ukrainian policymakers and the entire active international community – if it really is interested in stabilizing the situation – is to design and agree a compromise approach to Ukraine that would enable all the parties involved to ‘save face’.
It is almost certain that the United States and the European Union will be unable to provide Ukraine with the $35 billion the Ukrainian government believes the country needs. That is why Russia’s participation in these processes is essential.
The next important task in stabilizing the situation in Ukraine is the proper assessment of the ‘country risks’ that may arise if financial resources are rendered without proper control. Former Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schroeder has even suggested that financial assistance to Ukraine may end up ‘in the wrong pockets’.
But, as noted above, carrying out large-scale reforms that would offer additional guarantees to creditors and stimulate financial injections is an extremely difficult task at present.
An alternative could be the creation of an international coordinating body, for example, a credit council comprising representatives of Russia, the United States and the European Union to coordinate financial aid to Ukraine. The basic principle of this council may be simple: assisting andimplementing reform. The representatives of this council could be embedded in state power bodies, government funds and enterprises to monitor the targeted use of the money lent ‘all the way down to the very bottom’.
That would be an unprecedented move. But it does at least offer the chance, under the current conditions, to organize the flow of financial aid to Ukraine, even though the structure of state government is temporarily unprepared for ‘civilized’ accounting and making good use of billions in investments.
The Problem of Crimean Self-Determination and the Outlook for the Development of the Crisis
In the light of the latest events, the ‘Crimea factor’ has acquired geopolitical significance. The legal processes triggered by the results of the Crimean referendum are assessed very differently by different states and political leaders both in Ukraine and abroad.
The inability of the world community to find common ground and agree on uniform principles of assessing the situation may indicate the inability of the existing international institutions to resolve the conflict.
This state of affairs may potentially lead either to a reformatting of the existing international institutions or the creation of new formats of multilateral conflict resolution. An extreme case that cannot be ruled out is the increased role of ‘power politics’.
The ‘Crimean factor’ will reopen many festering local issues, for example:
What will happen to the Kharkov agreements and the preferences Ukraine has been given in exchange for hosting the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea?
How and on what terms will Crimea be supplied with energy (including electricity)?
How will the legal systems of Russia and Crimea be synchronized (taxes, budgets, etc.)?
How will issues of citizenship and possible dual citizenship, which is banned in Ukraine, be handled?
These are just some of the questions that arise as a result of the referendum.
The coming days will show whether Russia is ready to expand its borders by incorporating Crimea and therefore assuming the geopolitical, financial and other risks connected with these actions. In any case, Russia’s decision will lift the veil of mystery from the possible scenarios of further development of the situation in Ukraine.
In conclusion, I would like to express hope that the people of Ukraine will be able to live through these difficult but crucial times and have the chance to lay a solid foundation for a successful rule-of-law state.
Viacheslav Dziundziuk: Russia will cease to be considered a fraternal country by the majority of Ukrainians
Head of Political Science and Philosophy Chair, Kharkiv Regional Institute of Public Administration, National Academy of Public Administration, Office of the President of Ukraine
Ukraine has seen a revolution (in full accordance with Lenin’s description of the revolutionary situation when the elite cannot, and the masses do not, want to live in the old way) and not an armed coup. Second, taking part in the revolution on Maidan Square were representatives of ALL the Ukrainian regions and not the mythical right-wing radicals (Banderovites). Yes, some right-wing radicals were there, but numerically they were in the minority. Third, no one considers Yanukovych to be the real president anymore, not even his closest associates (among those who have stayed in the country).
As for the current situation, unfortunately its development will largely depend on a single person – Vladimir Putin. So far we can only react to what he is doing. There are several things I can say with absolute confidence. First, the majority of people in the south-east of Ukraine do not want the country to become a federation, still less do they want to become part of Russia. All the disturbances that are happening and that are covered by the media are the result of the activities of ‘Russian tourists’ (as we call them) and representatives of Ukrainian marginal ‘pro-Russian’ forces. In reality, they will support whoever pays them the most. Unfortunately, I feel that attempts to rock the boat will continue. But the early shock from this has subsided, the new government is digging in, and the country is becoming more governable. And that gives cause for optimism.
Secondly, many people in various regions of Ukraine (including the south and east) are ready, if the worst comes to the worst, to take up arms to defend the integrity of Ukraine. It may sound emotional, but it is a fact. Patriotic spirit has never been so high (perhaps largely thanks to Maidan). So it won’t be a cakewalk. At the same time, nobody wants to fight; everybody is hoping that a military conflict will not happen.
Unfortunately, all this is casting – and will continue to cast – a dark shadow on Russian–Ukrainian relations. I am afraid that they will never be the same, because many Ukrainians will now judge people on the basis of whether they supported or opposed the occupation of Crimea. Russia will cease to be considered a fraternal country by the majority of Ukrainians. This does not mean that contacts and relations will be broken off completely, but this will be the general perception.
Because of this there is a groundswell of sentiments in Ukraine in favour of European integration, especially considering the many kinds of support Ukraine has been getting from the European Union.
I believe that the representatives of the two countries should continue efforts at all levels to normalize relations.
Andreas Umland: At minimum – long-lasting estrangement, at maximum – war
Dr. phil., Ph. D., DAAD Associate Professor of European Studies Department of Political Science National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
General assessment of the situation
Fragile, undetermined and very risky. Something between peaceful settlement and full-scale inter-state war.
The future of Russian–Ukrainian relations
At minimum – long-lasting estrangement, at maximum – war. Economic and personal sanctions against Ukraine are likely.
Perspectives of Ukraine’s European integration
Increasingly good. The full Association Agreement is likely to be signed and ratified as early as this year – perhaps, step-by-step.
Sergey Kovalenko: The rest of Ucraine does not object to Crimea's being a part of Russia should the process have gone peacefully
Project manager, Law enforcement system reform coordinator, Economic Reform Coordination Center mandated by the President of Ukraine (till January 2014)
The situation in Ukraine has been stable ever since former President Viktor Yanukovych fled the country and revolutionary events came to an end. Despite numerous reports in the foreign media that radical groups have come to power in Ukraine, this is far from being the case.
Radical groups formed a small minority during the revolutionary events in the centre of Kiev. If you look at the statistics, out of the 36 defence sotnyas (units consisting of roughly 100 people) on Maidan Square (the activists who confronted the police) two were made up of representatives of the Right Sector, an association that includes practically all the right-wing organizations in Ukraine. For example, two Right Sector groups had representatives from the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence, the Patriots of Ukraine and Tryzub. Two more defence groups were representatives of the Svoboda (Freedom) political party. However, some reservations are in order here. About a third of the people in Svoboda’s groups were not members of that organization; they were just ordinary citizens of Kiev, predominantly representatives of medium-sized businesses. And in the interests of fairness, it should also be pointed out that after it gained seats in Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada, Svoboda dramatically toned down its rhetoric and can now be considered a radical party. The remaining groups consisted of ordinary people from all over Ukraine. The groups were formed spontaneously, primarily by people living in the same communities. There was also a group of ‘Afghans’, that is,war veterans who served in Afghanistan during Soviet times. Contrary to the widespread opinion,local defencegroups had a large number of people from the eastern parts of Ukraine, particularly from the Donetsk Region. There were practically no unemployed or déclassé elements within these groups.
As a result of the change of power, radical groups did not get a single post in government. Most of the key government posts went to Yulia Tymoshenko’s people, which is resented in society because she and her people – like ex-president Yanukovych –are implicated in a number corruption scandals. The release of Yulia Tymoshenko from prison by the Verkhovna Rada, which was one of the Rada’s first decisions after the President took flight, was met with a fairly negative reaction around the country.
Objectively, the people of Ukraine are not happy with the new government. Thus, with the exception of a few professionals– the Minister of Economic Development and Trade and the Minister of Regional Development, Construction and Housing and Utility Services – all the ministers are amateurs and many of them are corrupt. People are particularly opposed to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Arsen Avakov, who knows practically nothing about internal affairs. What is more, as soon as he was appointed, heproceeded to settle accounts with his former personal enemies and appoint corrupt policemen in the regions, moves that triggered demonstrations and protests. He restored all the corruption schemes within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. People are also angry because he has not taken any measurestoobjectivelyinvestigatethe crimes committed by the ex-president’s team.
We should point out here that the situation in Ukraine is totally normal – the country is not in total chaos. And there is no sign of discrimination against the Russian-speaking population, a fact that deserves special mention. In fact, half of the self-defence forces on Maidan were Russian-speaking citizens. The main goal of the revolutionary events was to overthrow the corrupt regime, not Euro-integration or to change the status of the Russian language. What does give cause for alarm are the actions being carried out to destabilize the situation in Eastern Ukraine. It is worth noting that it is often Russian citizens who are involved in these actions. During the rallies in Kharkov, for example, a Russian flag was hoisted over the regional administration building by a Russian citizen. Contrary to the claims of the Russian media, it is the pro-Russian forces, and not Ukrainian nationalists, that are launching attacks and provoking disturbances in Eastern Ukraine. For example,the pro-Russian radical groups that have stepped up their activities in Donetsk and Lugansk embrace left-wing radical teachings and right-wing radical Russian ultranationalist and neo-Nazi ideologies. It was the pro-Russian participants at a rally in Donetskorganized by local residentsthat attacked demonstrators gathered in support of Ukrainian unity. Several busloads of Russian citizens were brought to a pro-Russian rally in the Rostov region. They joined the local neo-Nazis in attacking and stabbing peaceful citizens. A member of the local section of the Svoboda party was stabbed to death. A young citizen of Donetsk who was protesting against the split of Ukraine was kicked to death.
As of today there are practically no people from Western Ukraine, let alone representatives of nationalist forces from Western Ukraine, in Ukraine’s eastern regions.
The situation in Crimea has clearly provoked anti-Russian sentiments in Ukrainian society, both in the east and west of the country. Two factors are at work here: first, the brazen lies of the Russian leadership that no troops were sent to Crimea, and that the Russian-speaking population in Crimea was oppressed and humiliated. While in the early days of the crisis some people may have believed this, practically nobody believes it now. Armoured vehicles and personnel openly being moved across the Kerch Strait, dropped from helicopters with Russian insignia,and delivered to Crimean airfields by Russian military transport aircraft prove that these uniformed people belong to the Russian Armed Forces. The servicemen themselves do not conceal this fact. The lies of the Russian leadership that they are not Russian soldiers puzzle and irritate the majority of the Russian-speaking population.
Because they do not feel that they are discriminated against, and seeing the movement of Russian troops to Crimea, people believe that Putin just wants to use them as pawns in pursuit of some geopolitical goals. There is a growing fear that Putin wants to conquer Ukraine. Russian analysts probably misjudged the sentiments of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine. They want to be able to speak Russian freely. They want to have close and warm relations with Russia. But they absolutely do not want to become part of Russia. Anti-Russian sentiments are particularly widespread in the Odessa and Donetsk regions. Such feelings were intensified in the Donetsk Region after some peaceful demonstrators were killed. People felt that Russia was trying to destabilize the situation in the region and began to fear a Russian invasion, especially after Russia promised to defend its fellow countrymen in Donetsk.
As for Crimea, objectively the majority of the population there supports integration with Russia. However, Russia’s actions in the region are to some extent destructive. First, Russiahas placed its stake on Sergei Aksyonov. The locals are also afraid of the behaviour of Russian troops in Crimea. Initially, the regular servicemen who had arrived in Crimea treated the local people normally and were quite friendly with them. But a series of rotations was then carried out, apparently to prevent fraternization with the Ukrainian servicemen. As a result, units consisting mainly of non-Slavic peoples – mainly from the Caucasus – were sent to Crimea. Obviously, the mentality and behaviour of these people differ greatly from those of the Slavs. This generates numerous conflicts. The Russian Cossacks have also aggravated the situation. Eyewitnesses say that Cossacks arriving from Russia drink a lot of alcohol and often behave rudely towards the local population.
The people of Crimea are not entirely happy with the way the referendum has been organized. For example, the referendum is held in accordance with open lists, that is, a person can vote even if he is not registered as a voter. Russian citizens, including servicemen, are also allowed to vote. This leads some people to feel that the Russian leadership is not really interested in them and that their fate has already been decided. These sentiments are particularly noticeable among young people. The traditionally pro-Russian sections of society in Crimea are mainly pensioners who feel nostalgia for the USSR and who are attracted by promises of pension rises.
The rest of Ukraineis divided about Crimea. On the one hand, people do not want to give the region away simply because of the way this process is unfolding. People watch Russian TV channels that show a totally distorted picture of the situation in Ukraine. They understand that this is propaganda. They see the unlawful introduction of troops that do not belong to the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. They see the provocations by Russian servicemen with regard to the Ukrainian military. Everyone is convinced that Russia has simply decided to grab Crimea. If this had been a peaceful process carried throughnegotiations, the people of Ukraine would probably have perceived things differently. But as things stand, what is happening is seen as nothing but military aggression and annexation. On the other hand, people are not against Russia taking over Crimea. There are several reasons for that. First, the Crimean population is traditionally passive and for the most part politically illiterate. In spite of social development, the Crimean people continue to vote for the candidates who promise them a pack of buckwheat or a bonus of a hundred hryvnia. Crimea depends heavily on state subsidies, with the government budget allocating huge sums of money to sustain it. For all that, the natural and other resources in Crimea have the potential to turn it into a major tourist destination. But that is precisely the issue on which Crimean people are indifferent. The level of crime and corruption in the region is among the highest in Ukraine.
As for the future of Crimea, it looks as if its fate has been decided. It will no longer be a fully fledged part of Ukraine. Perhaps it will become part of Russia, but it may remain an unrecognized republic, like Trans-Dniester. If it becomes part of Russia, then the future of Crimea will depend on Russia’s policy and how much money it is willing to pump into the region. If it becomes an unrecognized republic, Crimea may become a humanitarian disaster area.
The future of Ukrainian–Russian relations is very uncertain. At present, anti-Russian sentiments are spreading throughout Ukraine. Further Russian pressure only intensifies these sentiments. The fraternal love of Ukrainians for the Russian people is dwindling before our very eyes. Initially the anger was directed against Putin. But subsequent developments – petitions by Russian cultural personalities supporting the annexation of Crimea and open support of Putin’s policy by the majority of Russian society – have planted seeds of hostility towards Russians in general. So far, Russia’s policy has produced a rather unwanted result. First, it has sowed hostility among the people. The actions of the Russian leadership have further escalated the hostility. Second, the Russian invasion of Crimea and the threatened invasion of Eastern Ukraine sharply increased support among Ukrainians for the country to become a member of NATO. And again, these sentiments were largely fuelled by the inhabitants of Eastern Ukraine, who traditionally have been opposed NATO membership. The situation regarding EU membership is similar. This may change in the future because, after all, Ukrainians see Russians as their brothers (but this makes things more painful because Russian invasion in this case is universally perceived as a stab in the back). But most probably bilateral relations with Russia will never be the same again, at least as long as Vladimir Putin leads the country, and as long as Russia continues to act like Big Brother towards Ukraine.
I have already commented on the prospects of integration into Europe. There is popular support for this, and it is greater than it was two months ago. Without Crimea, which traditionally has opposed Euro-integration, the balance will shift still further towards Europe. The West, feeling guilty for being spineless in relations with the former Ukrainian leadership and for not being tough enough with Russia over the Crimea situation, will make concessions to Ukraine and fast track put the procedure of integration into NATO and the European Union on a fast track. In this regard, it is revealing that the European Union has unilaterally lifted duties on Ukrainian exports. It should have happened gradually, and only after a free-trade zone agreementhad been signed.
See also:
- The G8 Summit 2014 in Sochi. Perspectives after Situation in Ukraine
- Ukraine crisis. The Reaction of Neighboring Countries
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