Sanctions on Russia: the Risk of a Divided Europe
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The latest European Council meeting has showed (once again) that relations with the Russian Federation are still a dividing element within the European Union (EU). Different threat assessments and interests among Member States risk to hamper the efforts to build up a common approach towards Moscow which has emerged with the sanctions over Ukraine. The decision not to impose new “restrictive measures” against Russia for “attacking the civilians in Aleppo” very well epitomizes this internal cleavage. This step has been the result of a strong opposition of several countries, leaded by the Italian Prime Minister Renzi.
The latest European Council meeting has showed (once again) that relations with the Russian Federation are still a dividing element within the European Union (EU). Different threat assessments and interests among Member States risk to hamper the efforts to build up a common approach towards Moscow which has emerged with the sanctions over Ukraine. The decision not to impose new “restrictive measures” against Russia for “attacking the civilians in Aleppo” very well epitomizes this internal cleavage. This step has been the result of a strong opposition of several countries, leaded by the Italian Prime Minister Renzi. During an informal dinner held the day before the meeting, Renzi has rejected the strong stance of some countries like France, Germany, Poland or the United Kingdom. The Italian opposition has thus led to a re-wording of the document, with the expression “further restrictive measures” – earlier proposed by the EU Foreign Affairs Council – being removed from the final version of the conclusions.
Renzi’s double-track diplomacy
Despite harsh criticism of Moscow’s involvement in atrocities in Syria the recent “Normandy Quartet” meeting showed that both Paris and Berlin want to keep the doors open for cooperation with Russia.
The Italian cautious approach is very much in line with the double track diplomacy the country has traditionally pursued with regards to the Kremlin. On the one hand, Rome keeps condemning the violation of international law in Crimea as well as Moscow’s use of force in Syria asking a peaceful solution under UN auspices. On the other hand, Italy is aware that the only way to reach a sustainable peace in the Middle East (as well as other scenarios) is to keep Moscow engaged rather than further isolate it. For this reason, Renzi is not sure that new sanctions would make a peace settlement in Syria easier to reach. Although sanctions over Ukraine did have an impact on Russia’s economy, they also showed that Putin’s strategy has not changed. On the contrary, the Kremlin has intensified its aggressive foreign policy both inside and outside the country.
Internal reasons
There are obviously internal reasons behind Renzi’s opposition to new restrictive measures against the Kremlin. First, the country has traditionally strong economic, political and cultural relations with the Russian Federation. This makes it hard for the Italian public opinion to share the same concerns as other EU countries in the East and in the North. Second, the Italian leader is struggling internally to convince voters to back his package of constitutional reforms next December. The “anti-EU” card is a very catchy propaganda tool to respond to the right-wing parties’ claims that Italy is subdued to Brussels’ diktats. Third, it sends an important message to those domestic economic actors (notably the agri-food sector) which have experienced losses as a result of the sanctions (and relative counter-sanctions) against Moscow. Fourth, Renzi has exploited the political weakness of some partners like France and Germany (which are also coping with an internal opposition towards the sanctions policy), which do not want to alienate support of their voters in light of the political elections in 2017. Renzi has been very successful from a diplomatic point of view, managing to put himself at the head of a group of countries which are not satisfied with extending sanctions against Moscow, notably Cyprus, Greece, Spain but also Austria, Hungary and Slovakia. Last but not least, the Italian move is part of a broader effort to start a strategic debate on the overall status of the EU-Russia relations.
Russia—EU Relations at a Crossroads.
Common and Divergent Interests
Selective Engagement vs Hard-liners
The current debate on sanctions mirrors demonstrates the gap between two different approaches. On one side, the supporters of the appeasement would like to opt for a “selective engagement” with Russia on separate topics where the dialogue between Brussels and Moscow is essential to maintain peace and security. This approach is very much in line with the five guiding principles for the EU relations with Moscow agreed in March. On the other side, a second group of countries prefers to keep a strong pressure on Putin as a way to deter potential escalation of violence both in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. At the moment, it seems that major EU countries like Germany and France are opting for the first approach. Despite harsh criticism of Moscow’s involvement in atrocities in Syria the recent “Normandy Quartet” meeting showed that both Paris and Berlin want to keep the doors open for cooperation with Russia. It is thus likely that Merkel and Hollande have been tacitly satisfied with the decision not to impose new sanctions on the Kremlin.
No major changes ahead
The divergences emerged in the European Council are not expected to drive to a drastic shift in EU’s approach to Russia in the next months. Putin is trying to use his strategic advantage on the ground in Syria to ask for more concessions from the EU with respect to Ukraine. Yet, this appears very unlikely in the short-term. Although there is a growing frustration in several EU capitals with the slow reform process taking place in Ukraine, the sanctions have been explicitly linked to the successful implementation of the Minsk II agreements. Therefore, the Kremlin has to provide some tangible results in this respect, if it wants to gain some concessions from Brussels. In this sense, Russia’s support to Assad’s aggressive regime in Syria is in open conflict with these efforts. If Putin takes a significant step backwards it may be the case that – if not lifted – sanctions might be re-shaped in the future by de-coupling those hitting State financial institutions and energy companies from the Minsk process.
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