Setting Priorities: Algeria’s Foreign Policy and Opportunities for Moscow

The comprehensive strategic partnership signed between Russia and Algeria in 2023 documented the allied nature of relations between the two nations. With similar conceptual approaches to global affairs and a commitment to dynamically developing relations in military-technological cooperation and trade, these ties seemingly have a significant potential to be filled with economic, humanitarian or scientific-technological content as well as be fruitful across the political domain. The independence in foreign policies of Russia and Algeria, both countries’ own approaches to the most important problems on the international agenda and a readiness to actively participate in their solution make it extremely important to drive dialogue between the two nations: not only at the political but also at the expert and academic level.

It seems that a clear understanding of the foreign policy priorities of the partner and highlighting both the points where positions of the parties coincide and those where they diverge could be very useful for further development of this collaboration.

Prospects of Algeria’s interaction with Russia in the nation’s areas of priority are different. The seeming similarity of fundamental views on international relations and the transforming world order does not necessarily guarantee positive cooperation. Its realization requires serious work on both sides, thoughtful and frank dialogue at various levels, including among experts. To date, of the three key areas of Algeria’s foreign policy, the Arab thrust remains the most promising avenue for cooperation with Moscow, while the Saharan-Sahelian area requires clarification of the positions of the parties, and the Maghreb area leaves only limited opportunities.

The comprehensive strategic partnership signed between Russia and Algeria in 2023 documented the allied nature of relations between the two nations. With similar conceptual approaches to global affairs and a commitment to dynamically developing relations in military-technological cooperation and trade, these ties seemingly have a significant potential to be filled with economic, humanitarian or scientific-technological content as well as be fruitful across the political domain. The independence in foreign policies of Russia and Algeria, both countries’ own approaches to the most important problems on the international agenda and a readiness to actively participate in their solution make it extremely important to drive dialogue between the two nations: not only at the political but also at the expert and academic level.

It seems that a clear understanding of the foreign policy priorities of the partner and highlighting both the points where positions of the parties coincide and those where they diverge could be very useful for further development of this collaboration.

Principled and independent foreign policy

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Algeria’s foreign policy has traditionally been shaped by certain principles and slogans. Many of them have remained unchanged since the country gained its independence, although some have changed in content and priority. A significant role is given to security issues, which is largely due to the specifics of the Algerian statehood, which took shape amid numerous threats the Algerians had to deal with. Established in the wake of a fierce struggle for independence, the Algerian People’s Democratic Republic was immediately drawn into the War in the Sands (1963-1964). Starting in the 1970s, the country was involved in the Western Sahara conflict, the 1990s were marred by a bloody civil strife and christened as the “Black Decade”. In the 2000s, the country was forced to confront the terrorist activities of AQIM only to face the challenges of the Arab Spring in the 2010s. Finally, by now, the largest country in Africa and the Arab world is surrounded by zones of political conflict, instability and tension along most of its vast (6,343 km) land border: Libya, Niger, Mali, Western Sahara.

The dramatic experience in a relatively short historical period, the current difficult geopolitical situation in the adjacent countries, coupled with the persistent extraordinary political role of the armed forces in Algeria’s political system, predetermine a very specific view of the entire system of international relations.

Thus, Algerian experts emphasize three key components of the nation’s approach to international security: solidarity, globality and indivisibility [1].

The former is understood, on the one hand, as solidarity of all actors in confronting global threats (terrorism, climate change, etc.), and, on the other hand, as solidarity with the countries of the Global South and with the oppressed peoples of Palestine and Western Sahara. The origin of this principle is clearly linked to the socialist character of the Algerian ruling class, which, since attaining independence, has been particularly sympathetic to the Non-Aligned Movement and the ideas of Thiermondism.

Globality is conceived as a global vision of the future and the corresponding role in the new world order of the Algerian People’s Democratic Republic (APDR), which has always claimed leadership within the Third World. This proposition seems to fit well with the concept of the Community of Mankind’s Common Destiny, promoted by Beijing, as well as with the idea of multipolarity conceptualized by Moscow.

Certainly, an emphasis on the significance of global challenges facing humanity is generally characteristic of political elites in Asia and Africa. In the case of Algeria, the discourse of fighting against neocolonialism goes down well into this global agenda, as well as the environmental (access to water and food resources) and economic (fighting poverty) agendas, as well as the policy of respect for human rights, among which the Algerian authorities prioritize gender equality, support for youth and combating unemployment. At the same time, a global vision, understood in its own unique way, makes it possible for Algeria to move away from the dichotomies of free and unfree worlds, imposed by the West. On the contrary, Algeria, in its calls for greater UN transparency, more effective UN institutions and more equitable representation of African nations in this organization’s governing bodies, actually speaks directly about the establishment of true democracy in international relations (see: Abdelmajid Tebboune’s speech). It should not be overlooked that this approach coincides with the Russian approach at the conceptual level, which is also focused on true democracy in world politics (see: Sergey Lavrov’s speech at the Primakov Readings).

The second principle is largely related to the third one, which implies the unwillingness to divide problems into global and regional ones and, accordingly, rejection of the possibility of building regional security frameworks without solving global problems. In practical terms, this approach allows Algeria to raise the importance of its own foreign policy concerns, bringing them up to the global level. Obviously, this is at odds not only with the idea of regionalization, which has become widespread in international relations scholarship in recent years, but also with the country’s approach to specific problems – in particular, with the “regional solution for regional problems” proposition which describes the APDR’s view of the conflicts in Libya and the Sahel.

Despite a clear positing of foreign policy principles, the geographical priorities of APDR’s foreign policy are not so obvious. If they were defined quite distinctly in the time of A.A. Bouteflika (Algerian diaspora abroad – Maghreb – Arab world – Africa – Non-Aligned Movement – global institutions), the program documents adopted under A. Tebboune and the president’s speeches emphasize only two regions: namely, the Arab world and Africa. The Maghreb, whose importance is mentioned in the country’s constitution, can probably be added to these.

Interestingly enough, this prioritization differs not only from the historically established tradition, but also from the geographical and economic reality, in which the Northern Mediterranean remains no less significant.

Closer Circle – Maghreb

The very idea of the Maghreb retains its significance not only for Algeria but also for the other states that belong here, which is reflected in their constitutions (Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia) that mention the importance of belonging to the Greater Maghreb.

Despite a pronounced identity based on ethnic (Arab-Berber population), historical (from the Almoravid and Almohad empires to the colonial era), sectarian (Maliki madhhab), dialectal and cultural commonalities, real integration projects in the Maghreb – from the ideas of the North African Star to the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which has held no heads of states meetings since 1994 – have never enjoyed much success. Moreover, at the bilateral level, Algeria’s relationship with its neighbors has repeatedly been marred by more or less deep crises and, in the case of Morocco, has remained conflictual for most of its history.

However, after 2011, the idea of reviving the Maghreb project was periodically voiced by various individuals in different countries of the region, though in reality it always remained more of a political fantasy, far from reality. The conflict in Libya and instability in Tunisia left little hope for its delivery, and the complete breakdown of relations between Algeria and Morocco in 2021 (ties between the two countries have now been severed even at the academic level) seemed to make a return to the dream of unity impossible.

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Nevertheless, the discussion of Maghrebi integration was back on the agenda in 2024, albeit in a rather unexpected format: a consultative meeting of three leaders was held in Tunisia on April 22: Algerian President Abdelmajid Tebboune, Tunisian President Kais Saied and Libyan President Muhammad Al-Manfi, Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya. They discussed prospects for the deepening of cooperation in the economic sphere, including the development of border regions, energy, food security and the removal of obstacles to trade. The participants agreed to meet every three months.

The absence of representatives from Rabat among the participants, which is particularly striking given the ever-growing Algerian-Moroccan tensions, has led commentators to speculate that the meeting was an attempt to create a structure alternative to the AMU with an anti-Moroccan orientation. While quite logical at first glance, these speculations are hardly based on serious grounds – after all, neither Libya, immersed in the difficulties of the endless transition period, nor Tunisia, limited in its foreign policy capabilities, have any motivation to participate in such an alliance. Characteristically, the anti-Moroccan nature of the meeting was also rejected by Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf, who stated that the meeting was “not directed against any party” and “the door [of the alliance] is not closed to either Morocco or Mauritania.”

If we put aside the antagonistic logic of rapprochement between the countries, there are two main reasons why the idea of Maghrebi unity is resuscitated.

The first one is image building. For Mohammed al-Manfi, participation in the meeting was an opportunity to demonstrate the regional identity of Libya, which in recent years has been more often perceived not as an independent participant in international relations, but as an object of external claims. For Kays Saied, this is a matter of putting into life his ambitions related, on the one hand, to the strengthening of the Arab foreign policy thrust and, on the other hand, to the preservation of Tunisia’s special mediatory function in the region, which was shaped back in the days of Habib Bourguiba. Finally, for President Tebboune, participation in the meeting was another occasion to demonstrate the leading political role of Algeria.

The second explanation is related to the aspiration, shared by both Algeria and Tunisia: looking for a regional solution to regional problems without the involvement of any external actors.

In this regard, it is quite characteristic that Western approaches to the Maghreb are causing increasing dissatisfaction in Algeria. From the standpoint of Algerian experts, Europe has never learned to perceive Africa in general and the Maghreb in particular as its economic and political neighbor. While maintaining its colonial vision, it simultaneously sees its southern neighbors as a source of threats and increasingly securitizes its policy. This is evidenced not only by Emmanuel Macron’s unfortunate statements, which once led to a sharp deterioration in Algerian-French relations, but also by specific projects being developed today in some European nations to combat illegal migration by way of resettling migrants back to Africa.

In turn, the U.S., as the Algerians point out, although it has included Morocco and Tunisia in the list of its major non-NATO allies, generally does not view the Maghreb as a specific region, building relations with each of the states located there separately and focusing on the fight against terrorism.

In this context, the opportunities for Russia to develop cooperation with Algeria on a pan-Maghreb agenda are probably very limited. Of course, the Algerian side could be interested in cooperating with Moscow on certain issues (for example, the fight against terrorism), as well as in adjusting Moscow’s position on Libya (urging it to refuse cooperation with the authorities in the East of the country) or Western Sahara (in an effort of forcing the parties to hold a referendum in accordance with the UN decisions of 1991); yet even hypothetically, it could never accept Moscow becoming an active participant in inter-Maghreb relations.

Arab brothers

The second thrust of Algeria’s foreign policy – in the Arab world – is essentially limited to participation in solving the Palestinian problem. Intensified efforts in this direction during the last couple of years seem to have been due to several circumstances.

First, launching the Moroccan-Israeli normalization process, which soon turned into a military-political rapprochement between the two states to the point of creating a military alliance, was perceived in the Algerian capital as a direct threat – both due to the aggravation of Algerian-Moroccan rivalry and in the light of the Western Sahara problem (here it is worth remembering that Washington “paid” Rabat for normalization by recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and promising to establish an American consulate there).

Second, Algeria’s next presidency of the LAS in 2022 required substantive content. The Palestinian problem came in handy here. The historical experience of supporting the Palestinian movement, whose leaders found shelter on Algerian soil back in the 1980s, was telling.

And third, dialogue on Palestine allowed Algeria to remind the Arab brothers of its leadership ambitions in the region with the least effort.

Given these circumstances, organizing a meeting of Palestinian factions in Algeria back in October 2022 was quite logical. It resulted in the Algeria Declaration, and a number of provisions also appeared in the final document adopted after the Fourth Inter-Palestinian Meeting in Moscow more than a year later. However, despite the external success of the meeting in Algeria, it never came down to the implementation of the adopted statements, whereas the tragic events in the fall-winter of 2023/2024 created a fundamentally new context for addressing the Palestinian problem. In this new context, the most rigid position of Algeria, whose parliament authorized the president to go to war with Israel, objectively narrows its opportunities to participate in inter-Palestinian mediation.

Regional Trends in the Middle East: Political and Economic Dynamics. RIAC Report

Under these circumstances, the key contribution of the APDR is likely to be support for the Palestinian movement at the UN, where Algeria became a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2024, as well as diplomatic support for radical Palestinian groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The latter, it should be admitted, although being unacceptable partners for a significant part of the world community, have sharply strengthened their positions in the Palestinian national movement in recent months.

Considering the Russian-Algerian relations through the prism of the Palestinian problem, one can note a partial overlap between the approaches of the two nations. Both Algeria and Moscow believe it is necessary to consolidate the Palestinian position, and both see no possibility to exclude Hamas from the conflict’s settlement. The principal differences are related to Algeria’s hardline anti-Israeli stance on the one hand and Moscow’s reluctance to antagonize the Israeli side on the other hand. Meanwhile, both countries have very limited instruments of influencing the situation in the conflict. Under these conditions, it seems that Algeria and Moscow can become both rivals in the struggle for inter-Palestinian mediation and partners in conducting this mediation. At the same time, Moscow’s more balanced position and Algeria’s membership in the family of Arab states may become a serious aid in this cooperation.

The largest country in Africa

Finally, the third most important direction of Algeria’s foreign policy is the African thrust, which means, first of all, activities in the Sahara-Sahel zone, considered as a direct extension of the Maghreb.

In this area, Algeria’s policy seems somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, the Sahel is perceived as a source of potential threats. On the other hand, the Sahel is perceived as a space for the realization of Algerian leadership ambitions, in which it competes with Morocco, among others. Deprived of space for such rivalry within the Maghreb itself, these two nations have long been forced to transfer it to the Sahel, thus “drawing” the latter as it were into the orbit of the Maghreb sub-region.

In the meantime, as the well-known Algerian international scholar Oammar Bahzouz notes, the national leadership had to find a balance after 2011 between the need to ensure its own security and the need to “play an important role in the Maghreb-Sahelian arena that would be consistent with its status as a regional power.”

In search of this balance, initially, in the 2010s, the Algerians made only limited efforts in the southern direction, agreeing to act there in parallel with other external actors, primarily France. However, after Mr. Tebboune rose to power, the strategy was revised. Western approaches to the situation in the Sahel, culminating in operations Serval in 2013 and Barkhan in 2014-2022, were deemed completely ineffective; instead, Algeria began to insist on a “global, multilateral and developmentalist” approach, where political and economic measures, as well as security measures, should be seen as auxiliary. This said, repealing the ban on the use of the country’s armed forces abroad, which had traditionally been part of Algeria’s foreign policy strategy, as part of the constitutional amendments adopted in 2020, created the basis for a more active policy in the Sahel.

Despite the fact that until now, the involvement of APDR in settling the situation in the Sahel states has largely been limited to diplomacy, the complication of the situation in the region over the past year and the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States, which is generally breaking away from Algerian mediation, is becoming a new challenge for APDR.

In this context, Algeria’s attempt to diversify its tools of influence on the situation in the region by investing in development projects to be overseen by the recently established Algerian Agency for International Cooperation for Solidarity and Development – is quite notable. The numerous projects it has announced are mainly aimed at developing education and healthcare as well as addressing environmental problems in the neighboring states. Their implementation will naturally take time, which Algeria does not have. The rapid process of military and political transformation in the Sahel requires quick decisions and revision of established approaches. Paradoxically, Algeria’s relations with the Sahel nations turn out to be a crooked mirror of Europe’s relations with the Maghreb – just as the European exteriorization of North Africa exasperates the Maghreb elites, the new elites of the Sahel states do not like Algeria’s tendency to view their region exclusively as a source of challenges and threats.

Russia’s assistance to the Sahel states has caused some resentment in Algeria. The problem for Algeria, however, is that, unlike the situation with French intervention in West African affairs, the Russian presence cannot be interpreted as a manifestation of colonialism. On the contrary, it is about assisting African partners in strengthening their defense and sovereignty, assistance provided at their request and on mutually beneficial terms. So, this Russian approach is quite consistent with all the stated principles of Algeria’s foreign policy.

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Prospects of Algeria’s interaction with Russia in the nation’s areas of priority are different. The seeming similarity of fundamental views on international relations and the transforming world order does not necessarily guarantee positive cooperation. Its realization requires serious work on both sides, thoughtful and frank dialogue at various levels, including among experts. To date, of the three key areas of Algeria’s foreign policy, the Arab thrust remains the most promising avenue for cooperation with Moscow, while the Saharan-Sahelian area requires clarification of the positions of the parties, and the Maghreb area leaves only limited opportunities.

1. Author’s interviews with Algerian experts. Algeria, February 2024.