Special Warheads and the Special Military Operation

Virtually immediately after the start of the special military operation (SMO), large-scale warfighting in Ukraine prompted discussions of nuclear weapons-related threats and even of the expediency of using such weapons. At the same time, such comments and statements are mostly highly unprofessional. This article attempts to substantively examine nuclear escalation scenarios. The purpose of this exercise is to identify the most dangerous scenarios and ways of preventing them.

There are four very specific ways that can lead to nuclear escalation, which shall be identified without ranking them by probability.

First, we need to consider the option of using so-called “tactical nuclear weapons” (TNW) directly on the battlefield, in Ukraine. This scenario is particularly hyped up, primarily by the so-called West.

The next scenario involves a clash between Russia’s military and NATO resulting in regional nuclear escalation. The “second scenario” is directly connected with the third one that might involve the use of strategic nuclear forces. We are talking “warning”, or “signal” strikes, that is, delivering an inter-continental strike against the enemy’s sparsely populated areas, or against individual military facilities, while minimizing damage to civilian infrastructure. This is a speculative scenario, but presumably possible when one party to the conflict is close to defeat. This scenario may demonstrate readiness to “up the ante” to apocalyptic levels.

The fourth and last scenario entails a full-fledged global nuclear war, a strategic “exchange” entailing the use of the entire range of nuclear forces against all targets across the globe.

The nuclear dimension of a conflict, any conflict involving nuclear powers, remains a reality. There are no automatic nuclear escalation scenarios, just like there are no guaranteed ways of preventing such scenarios, save probably total nuclear disarmament. Such a disarmament, though, is most likely to end in a series of highly destructive conventional wars, and there are huge doubts that the outcome would constitute “a world better than the one before the war.”

The following steps appear possible and expedient for preventing further nuclear-flavored escalation.

First, the operations by Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Moscow and Washington should be “restarted.” These bodies are not fully symmetrical, including their departmental subordination (the Ministry of Defense in Russia and the Department of State in the US); however, as far as one can see, they are similar in the degree to which they are burdened with routine tasks on exchanging data on current international treaties and regimes.

Second, all the parties involved in whatever manner should be looking for a way to limit public nuclear-related rhetoric.

Third, with an NPT Review Conference coming up, it would appear very useful to re-launch the activities of the P5, if not in a full-fledged cooperation mode, then at least in coordinating the parties’ stances.

Virtually immediately after the start of the special military operation (SMO), large-scale warfighting in Ukraine prompted discussions of nuclear weapons-related threats and even of the expediency of using such weapons. At the same time, such comments and statements are mostly highly unprofessional. This article attempts to substantively examine nuclear escalation scenarios. The purpose of this exercise is to identify the most dangerous scenarios and ways of preventing them.

The SMO’s Nuclear Dimension

Nuclear weapons became the backdrop of the special military operation almost instantaneously, or perhaps even before given the narrative about Ukraine’s possible prospects of getting nuclear weapons.

Since February 24, the nuclear

• Russia’s statements concerning the consequences third parties will face should they become militarily involved in the armed conflict (“the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history”, which is unequivocally interpreted as a reference to the nuclear component);
• switching “deterrence forces” to the special mode of combat duty” using “dual purpose” systems in the SMO in their conventional modifications (with reminders of the existing nuclear variants as well);
• testing nuclear weapons delivery vehicles (as well as refraining from such tests);
• exercises for nuclear deterrence forces;
• discussing and announcing possible changes to nuclear doctrine and geography of nuclear forces deployment (and of nuclear forces’ structure);
• “nuclear zero” proponents and critics of nuclear deterrence as such stepping up their activities;
• effects concerning the prospects of new agreements in nuclear arms control;
• media publishing comments of varying sanity from an excessively broad range of persons;
• influence on “external” matters, including the impasse with the Iranian nuclear deal and North Korea stepping up its nuclear missile work; and
• “peaceful nuclear development” problems, including primarily Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.

This article does not set out to offer an in-depth analysis of each of these dimensions.

I dare say that the nuclear topic generally looks “overhyped.” At the same time, it does not mean that there is no need for studying relevant issues. Moreover, this topic’s high public profile makes it even more urgent that we focus on possible ways of defusing nuclear threat, including long-term ways.

Ways to Use Nuclear Weapons

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There are four very specific ways that can lead to nuclear escalation, which shall be identified without ranking them by probability.

First, we need to consider the option of using so-called “tactical nuclear weapons” (TNW) directly on the battlefield, in Ukraine. This scenario is particularly hyped up, primarily by the so-called West. This narrative is based on a premise (or it may be called an article of faith) that Russia’s armed forces are incapable of handling their tasks by using conventional weapons only (either owing to their own weakness and backwardness, or to Ukraine’s outstanding capabilities) and on another premise of there being some secret Russian nuclear doctrine that provides for early use of the TNW with the purpose of achieving success / preventing failure in a regional conflict. Let’s note that neither premise has been in any way confirmed at the current stage. The problems of Russia’s military are easy to see, but it is unlikely that any other military would do qualitatively better amid an armed conflict that is unique for post-war Europe in its intensity, territorial span, and overall number of forces involved; Russia’s military still keeps the overall initiative and achieves success at various levels. As for a secret doctrine, no documents have ever been presented to confirm it; moreover, given the information available, we can conclude that hostilities in Ukraine should not even be seen as a regional war with a peer adversary ⁱ, therefore it is rather difficult to talk about any role for the TNW.

Also, it should be noted that the SMO generally has no real targets for the TNW. Even conventional high-precision long-range weapons do not appear to be used to their full capacity. So far, there are no enemy groups whose size makes them “worthy” of using nuclear weapons. Additionally, accounting for all the necessary qualifications, we can see the desire to minimize destruction of civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties. At the same time, any use of nuclear weapons will evidently make it more difficult to carry on warfare in relevant areas given its additional burden on comprehensive support for the advancing units.

The next scenario involves a clash between Russia’s military and NATO resulting in regional nuclear escalation. This scenario’s individual “sub-types” include clashes in Ukraine’s air space (for instance, when enforcing a “no-fly zone”), naval clashes (primarily in the Black Sea, but “Baltic” scenarios are also possible), strikes against NATO states eliminating bases/stores of weapons and military equipment before its transfer to Ukraine. All these cases involve deliberate aggressive actions by a particular state prompted by its own concept of the balance of advantages and disadvantages a direct conflict entails. At this stage, these concepts are very hard to assess, however, “the balance sheet would not balance out” even at the pre-nuclear conflict stage: NATO states will suffer major losses in any case (compensating them will not be an easy task in and of itself, not to mention the political dimension). Russia will find itself in a direct conflict with “the greatest military alliance in history” and that might prove to be an overreach even to get a tie. Transitioning to the nuclear stage here might be quite manageable, but consequences of such a transition are unpredictable. “Banking” on the enemy “chickening out” is an excessively unreliable way of planning warfare.

A particular case of such a scenario involves incidents against a provisional “contact line” that could build up to a full-fledged escalation; however, the last eight years (particularly given the situation in Syria) demonstrate that the parties involved are cognizant of the risks and duly minimize them.

At the same time, the “second scenario” is directly connected with the third one that might involve the use of strategic nuclear forces. We are talking “warning”, or “signal” strikes ⁱⁱ, that is, delivering an inter-continental strike against the enemy’s sparsely populated areas, or against individual military facilities, while minimizing damage to civilian infrastructure. This is a speculative scenario, but presumably possible when one party to the conflict is close to defeat. This scenario may demonstrate readiness to “up the ante” to apocalyptic levels. I would like to specifically emphasize that it does not only mean the case of “Russia is losing to NATO and produces its nuclear big stick,” other nuclear powers also envision, both overtly and covertly, such ways of using nuclear weapons. So far, it is certainly difficult to imagine a situation when, say, France gets involved in the hostilities around Ukraine and suffers horrendous losses, but life is full of surprises. At the same time, given the current available forces and the “conventional deterrence” concept in its various forms, first there will be strategic non-nuclear strikes against the enemy’s key facilities deep into its territory. Once again, no one can guarantee that de-escalation will start at that point, yet the parties will understand more starkly the consequences of moving on to “special warheads”.

The fourth and last scenario entails a full-fledged global nuclear war, a strategic “exchange” entailing the use of the entire range of nuclear forces against all targets across the globe. This scenario certainly is the most catastrophic and least likely. At the same time, we need to remember that, on the one hand, nuclear powers stipulate very specific conditions for moving on to nuclear weapons, but on the other hand, these conditions might be “met” quite unexpectedly for all parties. It should be specifically noted that all nuclear powers are interested in preventing such a scenario. After all, Russia’s military and political leadership unequivocally stated that it is impossible to use nuclear weapons in any conflict that endangers Russia’s territorial integrity, but not the existence of Russia itself: “you cannot use a nuclear bomb in every conflict.”

Of course, many things change, but I dare suggest that the choice between “being kicked into the minor league” and a destruction of global civilization (including Russian civilization) is quite obvious.

Preventing the Apocalypse

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The nuclear dimension of a conflict, any conflict involving nuclear powers, remains a reality. There are no automatic nuclear escalation scenarios, just like there are no guaranteed ways of preventing such scenarios, save probably total nuclear disarmament. Such a disarmament, though, is most likely to end in a series of highly destructive conventional wars, and there are huge doubts that the outcome would constitute “a world better than the one before the war.”

Going back to the SMO, the following steps appear possible and expedient for preventing further nuclear-flavored escalation.

First, the operations by Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Moscow and Washington should be “restarted.” These bodies are not fully symmetrical, including their departmental subordination (the Ministry of Defense in Russia and the Department of State in the US); however, as far as one can see, they are similar in the degree to which they are burdened with routine tasks on exchanging data on current international treaties and regimes. It seems that given the present situation, involving these bodies into the process of eliminating misunderstandings over nuclear (and related) “messaging” on both sides is a sufficiently effective and even simple step. Moreover, successful cases in this area would constitute an additional argument in favor of establishing such centers in other nuclear powers, at least within the P5 grouping of ófficial’ nuclear weapon states.

Second, all the parties involved in whatever manner should be looking for a way to limit public nuclear-related rhetoric. It certainly does not mean curtailing freedom of speech as such, but it appears possible to prohibit officials, including legislators, from making public statements concerning permissibility of nuclear strikes or from putting forward accusations of nuclear terrorism.

Third, with an NPT Review Conference coming up, it would appear very useful to re-launch the activities of the P5, if not in a full-fledged cooperation mode, then at least in coordinating the parties’ stances. Mutual accusations will be of no help at the event at all, even though they cannot be entirely avoided. An updated “Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms” and a joint statement on preventing nuclear war are good steps, but they are not enough.

In conclusion, it should be noted that apparently any use of nuclear weapons will inevitably result in deterioration of Russia’s international standing. The “nuclear taboo” is rather provisional, but there is a reason why it has subsisted since 1945. P5 agreed to the famous formula of there being no winners in a nuclear war, and they appear to have been quite sincere and convinced that nuclear deterrence is expedient. Even though for many February 24 turned their notions of what is possible upside down, let’s continue to hope that both deterrence and taboo will subsist throughout the current escalation of tensions between great powers. Otherwise, one day we will wake up in a totally different world, and there are reasons to believe that not waking up would have been better.

ⁱ. See, for instance: Andreev V.V., Kriventsov N.S., Pakhlemkin D.P., Antipov A.I. “Special Features of Using Aviation Groups in Military Conflicts of the Future” (in Russian) // Voennaya mysl’ (Military Thought), 2022 (6), 37-44.

ⁱⁱ. See, for instance, Bogdanov K.V. “The Signal Component in Strategies of Limited Nuclear Employment” (in Russian) // Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (Global Economy and International Relations), 2022, Vol. 66 (5), С. 5-13. – DOI 10.20542/0131-2227-2022-66-5-5-13. – EDN ZBJWDX.