Syria–Turkey: Normalization vs. Confrontation

The leaders of Syria and Turkey have recently made frequent public declarations of their readiness to start the process of normalizing bilateral relations soon, with Russia as a mediator. However, this positive outlook is at odds with the current sharp escalation of tensions, which is characterized by a marked increase in anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkish society along with destabilization of the internal situation in areas near the Syrian–Turkish border and beyond. An incident that occurred on June 30 in the city of Kayseri in Central Anatolia, where a Syrian migrant was arrested on suspicion of raping a child, sparked anti-Syrian riots. The protesters called for the resignation of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has “sheltered” between 3 and 4 million refugees from Syria. Local police had to use force, detaining 67 people. In response, anti-Turkish demonstrations erupted in the Turkish-occupied areas of Aleppo province in northern Syria that are controlled by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), which opposes Bashar Assad and was established on Turkish soil in 2013. There were also anti-Turkish demonstrations in parts of neighboring Idlib province, where Turkish military observers are stationed and another force opposed to Damascus, Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), was formed back in 2017. These areas are run by radicals from the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)* group, hostile to Ankara.

The Turkish leadership and Erdogan personally have a strong case for resuming dialogue with Syria, driven by both mutual interest in containing the Syrian Kurds (for Ankara, due to security concerns, and for Damascus, in combating Kurdish separatism) and a need to jointly determine the fate of “Small Idlib” — the areas of the eponymous province that remain under the control of the unpredictable HTS and have long become a breeding ground for terrorism, a hub of criminal economy and a source of extremist ideology and infiltration of militants, including into Turkey. Turkish business circles are also interested in fostering trade and participating in Syria’s future reconstruction, not willing to lose out to Arab competitors such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia and other capital-rich Gulf monarchies.

For its part, Damascus is also open to reviving ties with its Turkish neighbor, recalling the positive experience of developing economic cooperation and political dialogue in the 2000s. From the military and political perspective, the Syrian leadership is interested in fully reclaiming Idlib, while avoiding, if possible, a costly military scenario similar to the operations of 2019–2020. Damascus also seems to be planning to critically weaken militarily, politically and economically the self-proclaimed Kurdish Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES) in coordination with Turkey. Apart from some areas in Aleppo province, the AANES controls almost all of Al-Hasakah province and about half of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa governorates, home to the largest oil fields, strategic energy infrastructure and agricultural land. Finally, Syria’s ruling and business circles, much like their Turkish counterparts, would be interested in the extensive involvement of Turkish capital in the post-conflict economic reconstruction of their country.

Yet by openly supporting the anti-Assad opposition at the beginning of the crisis, while also severing ties with Damascus and then hosting millions of refugees hostile to the Syrian authorities, Turkey essentially became a victim of circumstance, drastically narrowing its scope and freedom of maneuver for reconciliation with Assad. The massive influx of migrants has put immense social pressure on the Turkish economy, while the accumulated fatigue among ordinary Turks from the “outsiders” from Syria, which spilled out onto the streets after the “Kayseri incident,” showed that this problem could not be offset by the investment contribution of wealthy Syrian refugees to the Turkish economy.

It seems that figures of authority and warlords in the SIG-run zone attempted to take advantage of the “Kayseri incident,” given that they risk losing everything in the event of even a partial “surrender” of the north to Damascus, which is rumored to be possible with Russia’s mediation. Likewise, HTS leaders and warlords are understandably concerned about their future if Turkey “hands over” to Assad “Small Idlib,” after they have grown used to receiving considerable dividends from the local black-market economy, humanitarian aid and transit trade. However, both circumstances are unlikely to completely erase the chances for Syrian–Turkish reconciliation. Especially since Moscow continues diplomatic efforts in this direction, drawing on its experience of on-the-ground interaction with both Turkey and Syria. Baghdad may once again host the negotiations, as it did in 2021–2022 with successful closed-door consultations on normalizing relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, mediated by Beijing. The prospects for reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus may become clearer by the fall of 2024.

The leaders of Syria and Turkey have recently made frequent public declarations of their readiness to start the process of normalizing bilateral relations soon, with Russia as a mediator. Syrian President Bashar Assad, while receiving Russian President's Special Envoy on Syria Alexander Lavrentiev on June 26, 2024, acknowledged that he viewed the reconciliation positively. In turn, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggested in his address to the nation on July 2 that Ankara could take “additional steps” to establish peace in Syria. Just three days later, on July 5, Erdogan told reporters on his way back from the SCO summit in Astana that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin might send an invitation to Assad for a trilateral meeting. Following this, media reported, citing Turkish newspaper Turkiye, that such a summit could be arranged as early as September in Russia, Iraq or ones of the Gulf states. Turkey was also mentioned as an alternative host country.

However, this positive outlook is at odds with the current sharp escalation of tensions, which is characterized by a marked increase in anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkish society along with destabilization of the internal situation in areas near the Syrian–Turkish border and beyond. An incident that occurred on June 30 in the city of Kayseri in Central Anatolia, where a Syrian migrant was arrested on suspicion of raping a child, sparked anti-Syrian riots. The protesters called for the resignation of Erdogan, who has “sheltered” between 3 and 4 million refugees from Syria. Local police had to use force, detaining 67 people.

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In response, anti-Turkish demonstrations erupted in the Turkish-occupied areas of Aleppo province in northern Syria that are controlled by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), which opposes Assad and was established on Turkish soil in 2013. These protests escalated to the point of shootouts between local Arab militants and Turkish security forces in the cities of Afrin and Jarabulus. There were also anti-Turkish demonstrations in parts of neighboring Idlib province, where Turkish military observers are stationed and another force opposed to Damascus, Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), was formed back in 2017. These areas are run by radicals from the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)* group, hostile to Ankara.

The situation, which may seem contradictory at first glance, is actually logical, overdue and predictable, regardless of triggers similar to the “Kayseri incident”. For more than 13 years of the Syrian crisis, a tangled web of foreign policy contradictions has emerged between Ankara and Damascus due to the involvement of Russia, Iran, the United States and the GCC monarchies in the conflict. These were almost immediately compounded by domestic political issues: the Turkish “protectorate” in northern Syria with a military presence unauthorized by the central Syrian authorities, the emergence of military and civilian elite groups among the local Syrian opposition that are allied with Ankara and oriented toward it, and the mass exodus of Syrian migrants to Turkey, most of whom sympathize with the anti-Assad opposition.

After the decisive victories of Syrian government forces over opposition groups and ISIS* in 2016 –2018 and the consequent geographical containment of the conflict proved that external actors' plans to forcibly remove Assad from power were futile, the Turkish leadership and Erdogan personally started making a strong case for resuming dialogue with Syria. The primary factor here is their mutual interest in containing the Syrian Kurds (for Ankara, due to security concerns, and for Damascus, in combating Kurdish separatism). Secondly, there is a need to jointly determine the fate of “Small Idlib”—the areas of the eponymous province that remain under the control of the unpredictable HTS and have long become a breeding ground for terrorism, a hub of criminal economy and a source of extremist ideology and infiltration of militants, including into Turkey. Thirdly, Turkish business circles are interested in fostering trade and participating in Syria’s future reconstruction, not willing to lose out to Arab competitors such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia and other capital-rich Gulf monarchies. Moreover, the relevance of the latter imperative has increased since Syria’s full membership in the Arab League was restored in May 2023.

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For its part, Damascus is also open to reviving ties with its Turkish neighbor, recalling the positive experience of developing economic cooperation and political dialogue in the 2000s. From the military and political perspective, the Syrian leadership is interested in fully reclaiming Idlib, while avoiding, if possible, a costly military scenario similar to the operations “Dawn of Idlib” and “Dawn of Idlib 2” in 2019–2020, when Syrian forces, despite support from Russia and Iran, failed to fully achieve their goals, facing stiff pushback from the Turkish army (Operation Spring Shield in February–March 2020).

Damascus also seems to be planning to critically weaken militarily, politically and economically the self-proclaimed Kurdish Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES) in coordination with Turkey. Apart from some areas in Aleppo province, the AANES controls almost all of Al-Hasakah province and about half of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa governorates, home to the largest oil fields, strategic energy infrastructure (such as the hydroelectric power plants on the Euphrates River) and agricultural land. Many observers rightly note that the wheat grown in the AANES-controlled zone has become a tool in the struggle for sovereignty between the central government and regional Kurdish authorities over the years of conflict. By undermining the Kurds’ position, Damascus aims to make them more amenable in talks as part of the national dialogue and eventually resolve the “Kurdish issue” peacefully within a unitary state, without federalization of the country, which Assad finds unacceptable.

Finally, Syria’s ruling and business circles, much like their Turkish counterparts, would be interested in the extensive involvement of Turkish capital in the post-conflict economic reconstruction of their country.

Yet by openly supporting the anti-Assad opposition at the beginning of the crisis, while also severing ties with Damascus and then hosting millions of refugees hostile to the Syrian authorities, Turkey essentially became a victim of circumstance, drastically narrowing its scope and freedom of maneuver for reconciliation with Assad. The massive influx of migrants has put immense social pressure on the Turkish economy— it is no coincidence that in 2019, polls conducted by Turkish company PIAR showed that Syrians were perceived by local respondents as the second most urgent problem next to the collapse of the national currency. The accumulated fatigue among ordinary Turks from the “outsiders” from Syria, which spilled out onto the streets after the “Kayseri incident,” showed that this problem could not be offset by the investment contribution of wealthy Syrian refugees to the Turkish economy.

It is no surprise that as discussions around Syrian–Turkish reconciliation intensified in early July, the situation sharply deteriorated in the SIG-governed areas of northern Syria, which, as was noted before, are under Ankara’s protectorate. Many analysts reasonably link anti-Turkish demonstrations in the cities of Azaz, Al-Rai and Al-Bab (where Syrians lowered Turkish flags, vandalized offices of Turkish organizations and attacked Turkish civil servants and transport; there were reports of local militants attacking a Turkish army checkpoint in Afrin) to this context rather than solely to the “Kayseri incident.” It is unlikely—and we should agree with the assessment of Turkish news outlet Yetkin Report—that such widespread riots could have been organized so quickly after the incident in faraway Kayseri and in areas that have relied on Turkish donor aid for years. The unprecedented scale of the protests forced Ankara to temporarily close border crossings, urgently deploying military reinforcements to Syria.

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In light of the above, it seems that figures of authority and warlords in the SIG-run zone attempted to take advantage of the “Kayseri incident,” given that they risk losing everything in the event of even a partial “surrender” of the north to Damascus. These fears likely stemmed from leaks in the Turkish media about an unconfirmed contact between Syrian and Turkish military at Russia's Khmeimim base in Syria on June 11, 2024, which nearly coincided with a surprise meeting at the Kremlin between Putin and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who is known to have previously headed his country’s National Intelligence Organization and participated in numerous secret negotiations. A Syrian–Turkish compromise to significantly expand their joint control over the “buffer” zone of the SIG with “ousting” the Syrian opposition from that area is conceivable in exchange, say, for the formation of a united front between Ankara and Damascus against the Syrian Kurds and their AANES.

Likewise, HTS leaders and warlords are understandably concerned about their future if Turkey “hands over” to Assad “Small Idlib” (as another bonus for cooperation against the Kurds), after they have grown used to receiving considerable dividends from the local black-market economy, humanitarian aid and transit trade. For this reason, increased tensions and new clashes are anticipated in the foreseeable future between Turkish military observers stationed there since 2017 and “defiant” local radicals.

Both circumstances can complicate, but are unlikely to completely erase, the chances for Syrian–Turkish reconciliation. Especially since Moscow continues diplomatic efforts in this direction, drawing on its experience of on-the-ground interaction with both Turkey and Syria, including joint patrols with the Turkish military in parts of northeastern Syria under the 2019 Sochi Memorandum. Baghdad may once again host the negotiations, as it did in 2021–2022 with successful closed-door consultations on normalizing relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, mediated by Beijing. The prospects for reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus may become clearer by the fall of 2024.

* The organization is designated terrorist and banned in Russia.