An observer of the “Arab spring” may be surprised by an amazing viability of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria. While the authoritarian regime in Tunisia managed to hold on for a number of weeks, the Mubarak regime in Egypt – for a bit more than one month, and eventually Colonel Quaddafi resisted the pressure of insurgents and NATO bomb attacks for about six months, despite the sanctions imposed on Syria and applied for a year already, armed confrontation in Dair Az-Zur and Homs and support of the Syrian opposition by Turkey and Qatar, the Assad regime displays tenacity and, judging by the demonstrations in Damascus, enjoys wide popular support.
Political Geography of the “Arab Spring” Countries
The vitality displayed by the regime should be viewed in a wider context of the Middle East situation and, partly, even in the context of relations between the Arab countries and Iran. It would be interesting to review the political geography of five countries most severely hit by the “Arab spring”. A secular regime was governing in Tunisia. The Mubarak regime in Egypt was practically identical, maybe a bit more camouflaged by the accessories of Western democracy. Over the decades the Jamahiriya of Colonel Quaddafi was an example of a weird symbiosis of Arab nationalism and Islam with socialist ideology which lost its relevance after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Thereupon Quaddafi began to drift (initially, cautiously enough, and then – more openly) toward Western powers. The softening of the authoritarian rule was slow, and Libya was still a secular country. Syria, where power belonged to the Baath party (Arab Socialist Party) since the 1960ies, was another example of the symbiosis of Arab nationalism and socialist ideas, while retaining its secular status like Libya.
If we consider the events of the “Arab spring” in the countries concerned from the viewpoint of their attitude toward Islam we shall have to admit that, primarily, the secular principle of state structure was typical of all four countries. Only one of them, i.e. Libya, was gaining considerable profit from oil export, which facilitated construction of a peculiar Libyan modification of a “welfare state”: a substantial increase in the educational and public healthcare standards. If one is guided by the stance of Western supporters of democratic reforms in the Arab world, the four countries were at the intermediate level on the scale of “authoritarian-democratic rule”, between openly absolute oil monarchies (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman) and liberal regimes (Jordan, Morocco). In terms of the logic of European and American liberal politicians the ”Arab spring” being the “fourth wave of democratization” of sorts had to be primarily aimed at monarchist fundamentalist regimes. By the time when civil unrest began to unfold in Bahrain the situation seemed to have been developing in this direction but after the conflict was suppressed by the Saudi troops the process completely changed its focus. The elections held in Tunisia and Egypt resulted in a triumphant victory of conservative Islamic forces, and the military victory in Libya was won due to the assistance of special forces and Qatar’s money.
At present the League of Arab States (LAS) being under the strong influence of Arab oil monarchies is supporting political opposition in Syria. In general, the whole picture looks not only different but directly opposite to the vision of the “Arab spring” as a wave of democracy.
All this makes one recall the beginning of the Iranian revolution of 1978. The Islamic revolution in Iran was a great enigma to Western political analysts. Meanwhile, there is nothing difficult in explaining the sources of the Iranian revolution. Innovations of the Shah’s regime were a typical “white” revolution: they were not substantiated by corresponding moral practices, Western-like political institutions turned out to be mere “Potemkin villages”, police terror, causing resentment of liberal intellectuals and persuading them to quest for a “national way”, and corruption were raging in the country, i.e. the situation looked much like the recent environment in Egypt and Tunisia. Such halfway policy of “white” revolutions leads to the destruction of regime’s legitimacy: as viewed by the people, and often not only people but also by influential elites, the power gets “criminalized” and the legitimacy of tradition gains the upper hand against the legitimacy of state interests. As a rule, the magnitude of tradition is a driving force of what can be called a “black” revolution.
Usually the cornerstone of a “black” revolution is either a reaction to the inconsistency of a “white” revolution or inadequacy of its leaders' understanding of the actual meaning of the reforms they are trying to carry out, or the Utopian nature of social structures enforced during a “white” revolution.
Probably, the most vivid example of the “white” revolution was the reforms introduced by the Shah of Iran in the 1960ies.
Public response to an actual failure of the “white” revolution can be immediate as it happened in Iran in 1978 (to a large degree it was the reaction to the gaping social rift hitting the society after the “oil boom” of 1973), or delayed as was the case in Egypt where Mubarak happily stayed at the helm for thirty years. However, the outcome is the same – a comeback to fundamental traditional values irrespective of the way the comeback was ideologically decorated.
In case of failure the elite which was trying to accomplish a “white” revolution is viewed by the society as a group attempting to actualize a criminal intent. Not only newly established social institutions but, above all, moral practices applied in their support are outlawed and completely eradicated. As a result, the society not only steps back to its “pre-revolutionary” status. All new components generated by evolutionary means, all social practices urging the society to reform are annihilated in order to please “moral fundamentalism” of tradition. The society steps back not to the starting point of reforms but to an “ideal tradition” of sorts which never existed, and in fact is the same social Utopia as the dreams of “white” revolutionaries who failed to accomplish their plans because of the inadequacy of applied methods.
The revolution in Iran started as struggle against secular authoritarian rule of the Shah, as an attempt to establish liberal democracy but after a brief triumph of Iranian immigrants from Western Europe and the A. Banisadr Government it ended with the establishment of Islamic dictatorship of Khomeini. Though a significant softening of the Iranian regime followed, its fundamentalist orientation still remains quite obvious.
Attempts of the Baath regime to modernize Syria visibly pursue the same strategy of a “white” revolution. Diligent analysis of the situation in the countries of the “Arab spring” may be a help in working out kind of a model common to all those countries. A revolution launched under the liberal democratic slogans of toppling the authoritarian rule, and applying state-of-the-art computer technologies (social networks, Face-book and Tweeter) to win, begins to stumble after its formal victory. After the authoritarian regime has been removed from the stage, political vacuum comes into its stead. Political situation is affected by the sentiment of the most conservative part of the population which, merely due to tradition and the level of education, is unable to perceive liberal values. Depending on its social structure the country either plunges into the chaos of tribal conflicts, as Libya, or inclines in favor of a fundamentalist regime giving up the secular nature of the state.
Peculiarities of the Syrian Scenario
Why did the process face serious obstacles in Syria? Primarily, one has to consider the composition and structure of its population. Fifteen percent of the Syrian population are Alawis, a sect which was not considered to be an Islamic entity until the mid-19th century; it did not belong to Islam in the same way the Druze of Lebanon did not. Today it is widely believed that the Alawis belong to the Shiite branch of Islam, while one has to point out that the Alawi religion rests under a dense veil of mystery. Holy books are inaccessible to the profane, solemnization is never done publicly. A little more than 10% of the Syrian population are Christians of various trends (Catholics, Nestorians, Monophysits), more than 70% are Sunni Arabs. Namely this multi-confessional nature of society allows the Assad regime to hold on. Both the Alawis and Christians are aware that if the Assad regime falls (Assad is an Alawi) dark times are in store for the Alawi and Christian minorities. In the meantime, big brass of the Syrian army is all Alawis, and a substantial part of intellectuals and professionals are Christians. It should be noted that Syria enjoys a strong cultural tradition deeply rooted in millennia, and Syrian intellectuals belong to the most educated and professional societies of the Arab world. A positive factor in the Syrian situation is the absence of big oil money, consequently, there is no such social stratification shocking the public, which caused the revolution in Iran. Syrian opposition is relatively weak and uncoordinated, while the defection among the military is limited. So far only one top official, Deputy Oil Minister, declared his defection to the opposition.
A serious threat to the Assad regime is Qatar’s involvement into the conflict (there are reports about the participation of Qatar Special Forces in operations in Syria); the country has vast financial resources at its disposal and successful experience of such involvement in the Libyan conflict. Activity of Al-Qaeda terrorist groups in Syria, particularly in Homs, is not a less serious problem.
The Syrian Army is sufficiently large and powerful (330 thousand-strong). The country has a developed system of air defense. According to unofficial reports (Al Arabia channel) Russia supplied S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to Syria. If so, it would be very difficult to implement the plans of establishing a no-flight zone around Syria. As the officer corps of the Army is predominantly Alawi, the possibility of duplicating the Iraqi scenario seems improbable when the generals handed over S. Hussein practically without fighting back.
Bashar Assad is trying, with great pains, to meet the opposition halfway with their demands. A referendum on a new constitution was held in Syria late in February 2012; the document was supported by 89.4% of voters. Keeping in mind that the referendum was attended by 57.4% of voters, endorsement of the new constitution seems quite legitimate. De facto, it all depends on the actual attitude to the constitution of those who abstained from voting. If forty plus percent of the population are actively opposed to the regime the Assad government might face difficult problems. Though the newly-adopted constitution is not a perfect exercise in meeting all the requirements of a democratic state, it is still a significant step forward which can lead to the establishment of a real multi-party system.
What to do next?
It was the unique configuration of the population and the composition of the Armed Forces that pre-determined Russia’s and China’s decision to prevent recurrence of the Libyan scenario in Syria, and veto the UN Security Council resolution. The visit of high-ranking Russian officials to Syria later in January 2012 obviously reinforced Assad’s commitment to follow the path of democratic reforms. The recent weeks of February and early March testify to certain softening of the US and LAS stance on the Syrian issue.
Russia and the Arab League coordinated their positions on the Syrian settlement. The UN Secretary General sent to Syria his special mission headed by Kofi Annan, an extremely seasoned and cautious diplomat immune to radical decisions. Therefore, hopefully, his efforts would help alleviate confrontation.
The combination of these factors gives some hope for a peaceful settlement in Syria. However, the settlement is impossible without sincere volition of the sides involved in the conflict. It requires further real steps toward democratic reforms. Assad is short of time. Only cautious but steady democratization of the regime can reduce the scale of dissatisfaction among the Sunni majority of the country.
An immediate surrender would entail disintegration of the current political regime, chaos and victimization of Alawis and Christians. However, even the slightest slowdown of democratic reforms would be no less lethal. The process has to give hope for the better to the Sunni part of the nation which is not yet involved into armed confrontation.
Informal negotiations of the Syrian Government with the opposition leaders abroad could become a positive factor in the Syrian conflict settlement. Keeping in mind the complexity of organizing such a meeting, its effect could be highly instrumental in terms of the influence on the Syrian Sunnis inside the county and on the European governments currently hostile to the Assad regime. Such talks can be held in a “neutral” country, Azerbaijan for example. The proposal could present some interest to the Azerbaijani Government.
