The Arab League Summit: a Stress Test or a Chance for an Agreement?
Arab foreign ministers attend a meeting on
Syria at the Arab League headquarters in
Cairo June 5, 2013
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Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy of Russia, MGIMO-University
On March 25-26, Kuwait will host the next summit of the League of Arab States. Just as is the case with the Arab world as a whole, the LAS is approaching the event shattered and amorphous, with problems snowballing every year.
The League has demonstrated, on the one hand, a susceptibility to tension and a weakened ability to resolve internal conflicts, while on the other hand, a strong instinct for survival, at a minimum for displaying Arab unity.
On March 25-26, Kuwait will host the next summit of the League of Arab States. Just as is the case with the Arab world as a whole, the LAS is approaching the event shattered and amorphous, with problems snowballing every year.
Over its extensive history starting from its founding moment in 1945, the Arab League has weathered numerous crises, acute, temporary and persistent. Such situations have erupted due to differences over tactics employed in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the expulsion of key members; for example, Egypt was punished for signing a peace treaty with Israel through a ten-year suspension; the LAS headquarters also was moved from Cairo to Tunis. From time to time, armed conflicts between members have broken out, both direct wars, such as the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent participation of certain LAS states in the anti-Saddam coalition, and through proxies, i.e. the Egypt-Saudi confrontation during the civil war in Yemen.
To that end, the League has demonstrated, on the one hand, a susceptibility to tension and a weakened ability to resolve internal conflicts, while on the other hand, a strong instinct for survival, at a minimum for displaying Arab unity.
The end of the Cold War and changes in the structure of regional relations which had begun earlier, triggered a gradual evolution in the organization’s role and make-up. Over time, the organization has grown from a fragmented pan-Arab structure, with many of its members gravitating towards alternative multilateral projects (Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, et al.), into an advocacy instrument for use by the oil-rich Gulf states, primarily Saudi Arabia. Thanks to their enormous financial resources, these countries have outpaced others in the international arena and shaped the loyalty of other Arab states according to their political priorities.
The Arab Spring: League Sheds its Outcasts
Qatari Premier and Foreign Minister Sheikh
Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr al-Thani speaks to
Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Arab
The 1990s and 2000s were years of changes to the internal organizational equilibrium, as the Arab League began dropping those people and countries unwanted by Riyadh. The first persona non-grata was Saddam Hussein, whose daring foreign ventures made Gulf monarchs fretful, as they did their best to isolate Iraq with U.S. help after Operation Desert Storm.
At the 2008 LAS summit, Libyan leader Muammar Kaddafi threatened other heads of states with an encore of Saddam’s performance, who had been executed in 2006, only to increase tensions and aggravate Tripoli’s relations with other Arab capitals. As a result, the League used the Arab Spring to collectively support the Libyan opposition, proclaim the Kaddafi regime illegitimate, and establish relations with the National Transitional Council.
The same scenario was meant for Damascus, whose membership was suspended after the domestic conflict erupted. Saudi Arabia and Qatar became key sponsors of the armed Syrian opposition in order to detach Syria from Iran’s orbit.
Hence, during phase one of the Arab Spring, the LAS served as the trumpeter of Riyadh and Doha’s interests in engaging the international community into toppling the Libyan and Syrian governments.
The general replacement of past Arab regimes with Islamist forces appears to indicate that the Arab League may become relatively homogenous.
The general replacement of past Arab regimes with Islamist forces appears to indicate that the Arab League may become relatively homogenous. Indeed, secular governments wary of Islamist infiltration into its political systems have been ousted by figures with an ideological bias toward Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other states, whose domestic and foreign polices rest on conservative Islamic traditions.
These actions have come across in a quite positive light. By opposing autocratic regimes, the Arab League found it easy to remain on the right side of history, also enjoying support from the West which regarded the Arab Spring’s initial stage as uprisings of the masses against dictators.
However, as the situation in the Arab Spring countries quickly worsened and more formidable political challenges surfaced, the LAS ran into a series of important difficulties and consequently into the need to undergo another stress test.
Pitfalls
The evolution of the Arab Spring from revolution to civil confrontation in some key regional countries – mostly peaceful but in certain cases armed – has eroded consensus both among the petroleum monarchies and between the League and the West.
The situation in the region has definitely become more and more delicate. The sudden attack against Assad's regime has led to all-out civil war, in which the government has displayed unexpected resilience, while radical jihadists have joined the opposition's core. (1, 2, 3). As a result, the previous LAS unanimity has been shattered, when in September 2013 Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria and Tunisia voted against external intervention in Syria.
Egypt has run around a peculiar political closed circuit, from the ousting of the military regime led by Hosni Mubarak by mostly liberal opposition forces to the ascent of Islamists, i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood, to their overthrowing and ban (as had been the case under Mubarak), and to the return of the top military brass in the person of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
At the same time, Iran, the strongest non-Arab regional actor, has shown success in tackling its own problems, with signs of progress emerging in handling the Iran nuclear program and a thaw in U.S.-Iranian relations coming to deflect a military strike against the Ayatollahs. These developments have triggered crisis in the U.S.-Saudi relationship.
A fissure has emerged between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the League's most dynamic members, on approaches to further actions.
Against this backdrop, a fissure has emerged between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the League's most dynamic members, on approaches to further actions. The differences have emanated from (1) the significant divergence on politics within the numerous Islamist camp. (2) the emerging competition between the ambitions of Riyadh and Doha, and (3) the fears of the Saudi rulers, who had withstood the effects of the Arab Spring but have become aware of threats stemming from radical Sunnis (1, 2) and pro-Iranian Shiites in the region (1, 2).
The Egyptian Case
The short-lived rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has brought the Saudis a number of nasty surprises, the main one being the advance of the Islamist president Mohammed Morsi to Tehran and his Qatar bias. Qatar, wittily labeled by a commentator "a disproportionally great power", used the Arab Spring to unleash previously unseen political activity, among other things through its Al Jazeera TV channel and claim a strong leadership role in the swiftly changing Arab World.
The Qataris generously financed Mr. Morsi (1, 2, 3), who was lucky to receive several billion dollars – an investment wasted by his ouster. Decrying the event as a military coup, Qatar demanded support be given to the Egyptian Islamists and the restoration of their rule as a legitimately elected government. Although joining ranks to condemn the military’s involvement in the political process, Tehran was more cautious.
Saudi Arabia, on the contrary, openly endorsed the Egyptian generals and recognized the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood two hours after the event took place. Riyadh bolstered its Egyptian success with generous cash infusions that keep the Egypt afloat despite the fallout of the revolution and the weakened economy.
Some of the funds were channeled to strengthen the Egyptian army and security forces. Splintered U.S.-Saudi relations allowed Russia, which had significantly regained its positions in the Middle East, to sign major defense contracts with Egypt after a lengthy period of disengagement. Unconfirmed media reports insisted that Cairo was using the Saudi and UAE loans to purchase Russian combat aircraft and helicopters, surface-to-air missiles and other military hardware (1, 2). However, it may be unwise to obtain Moscow's support on some political issues as an attempt to harass the Americans, as has happened several times before (1, 2).
The acute differences between Riyadh and Doha over Egypt required special mediation from Kuwait. Kuwait appears to be in good position to move ahead with this mission during the LAS summit in late March, although the Egypt problem is far from the only cloud to overshadow the League's future.
Iran and the U.S.A. on the Margins of the Summit
The last truly collective LAS step was made with regards to Palestine.
The agreement between the G6 and Tehran over the Iranian nuclear program was viewed officially by Riyadh as something unexpected. The Saudis were cautious about the future settlement and complained that the deal had been reached behind their back.
The Kingdom was shattered even more by the hints about an American-Iranian rapprochement (the first telephone communication between the two presidents in 20 years) and the previously announced U.S. strategic rebalancing from Europe and the Middle East to Asia-Pacific (1, 2). Riyadh's official commentaries were prudent, while in private Washington was severely censured with hints about Washington's weakness and inconsistency as an ally, primarily with Syria and Iran.
Qatar and Kuwait acted differently and seconded the agreements (1, 2, 3). Moreover, on the eve of Geneva-2, Doha declared that Tehran may play "a critical role" in the Syrian settlement, underlining the healthy climate and optimism about bilateral relations with Iran.
The divergence of such a scale within the Arab League in relation to the major Gulf actor is not something that will improve the political environment for the approaching summit. Without a doubt, the Iran issue is going to in the centerpiece, bearing in mind the looming expiration of the six-month period allocated by the G6 for Iran to fulfill the initial agreements in view of suspending the nuclear program.
Irina Ahmed Zain Aidrous:
Armed Conflict in Syria and its Implications for
the World Oil and Gas Market
Against this backdrop, the familiar and convenient Palestinian-Israeli affair may as well appear a sliver of light.
The Palestinian-Israeli Settlement: a Ray of Hope for the Arab League
In light of the Arab League turbulence and aggravated inter-Arab and Shiite-Sunni tensions, the specific weight of the Palestinian-Israeli problem, for some time now the Middle East staple, has been gradually diminishing [1].
The fact that the last truly collective LAS step was made with regards to Palestine is very important, i.e. the Saudi-sponsored Arab Peace Initiative adopted at the 2002 Beirut summit during the peak of the Al Aqua Intifada.
The initiative implied an obligation for all Arab countries to sign peace treaties with Israel in exchange for its implementation of the internationally recognized basics of the settlement, i.e. the 1967 borders, the solution of the settlements problem, and the creation of an independent Palestinian state. The topicality of the proposal was confirmed by the 2007 summit in Riyadh.
The Palestinian track seems to offer just about the only area for the LAS to exhibit a semblance of unity, at least to confirm its adherence to the Arab Peace Initiative and appeal for an intra-Palestinian reconciliation.
The initiative – quite a notable step both for the League and the entire Middle East – may add some charm to the Kuwait summit. The timing appears fairly appropriate, since by April, the Palestinians and Israelis must be ready to sign a framework agreement in accordance with the plan outlined by Secretary of State John Kerry.
The Palestinian-Israeli talks resumed in July 2013 after a lengthy downtime. Mr. Kerry has intended the talks to bring a framework agreement in nine months. The confidentiality of the negotiations makes the outcome rather hazy but the stakes are high, as Mr. Kerry has already appealed to the Israelis to be careful about the risks of violence escalation (the third Intifada) if they do not comply or undermine the peace process. Palestinians have also issued threats to Israel.
In search of a solution, Americans have approached the Arab League for support and received relevant promises, which means that the Kuwait summit might issue a statement on the subject.
Few are cherishing illusions about the success of the negotiations, since mutual mistrust is enormous and radicals on both sides carry considerable clout. Nevertheless, the Palestinian track seems to offer just about the only area for the LAS to exhibit a semblance of unity, at least to confirm its adherence to the Arab Peace Initiative and appeal for an intra-Palestinian reconciliation.
Russia and Arab League: Moving Closer on Syria
Differences between Russia and the LAS over the Syrian crisis are giving way to a more constructive agenda that allows Russia and countries of the region to markedly step up their efforts and expand the horizons for the bilateral dialogue. Moscow’s consistency on Syria and its elegant scheme for resolving the Syrian chemical weapons puzzle have apparently become the first examples of genuine grand multilateral diplomacy over the past 20 years, as it has made possible both Geneva-2 and progress at the Iran talks.
Thanks to integrity and insistence on the use of internationally recognized mechanisms for settlement of any kind of crises, Russia in little time proved its value as an independent influential actor, which was appreciated by the regional states who promptly reversed their official stance – from a country supporting a doomed authoritarian regime because of its own post-imperial syndrome, Russia has turned into a wanted potent partner.
The unprecedented intensity of Moscow’s contacts with Riyadh, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Damascus, Cairo and Ramallah parallel with close interaction with Washington on practical aspects of the regional agenda, such as intra-Syrian talks, Palestine-Israel settlement and dialogue with Iran, are growing into a noticeable factor in the formation of the new image of the Middle East. This activity seems to offer palpable fruits, with the initial effects like arms deals and huge energy projects already at hand.
1. Vysotsky A. Middle and Near East in Search of a New Balance of Forces // Asia and Africa Today, Issue 7, 2011, Pp. 10-15
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