The Issue of Connectivity in India-Russia Relations — From Eurasia to the Arctic

In current realities major powers are experiencing ever-increasing pressure to balance globalisation, regional integration and national interests in their foreign policy to remain competitive. Leadership in the multipolar world demands to materially and ideologically structure the immediate environment, since the very notion of a “pole” implies at least a certain degree of self-sufficiency and, thus, a vision of why and how it could be held together.

Connectivity is key to upholding regional structure. At first, the notion was seen as a way to connect product origins to their consumption destinations, and was operationalised in the number of transport routes and quality of supporting infrastructure. Later, it acquired broader economic interpretation as a process of bringing countries and societies closer together by facilitating access <…> through transport, institutions, infrastructure, financial and IT cooperation, energy, education, research etc. With this in mind, in late 2010s—early 2020s China, the European Union, Russia, India and the US came up with their own connectivity initiatives.

For Russia and India, Eurasia is the primary region to structure. Regardless of the number of players with vested interests in this space, in terms of geography, resources and historical links it would be counterproductive to divide the area and establish several “poles” within one. Instead of nurturing their own projects Moscow and New Delhi, Tehran and Beijing could benefit from improving regional connectivity from different angles for mutual economic betterment. This chapter analyses Russian and Indian connectivity agendas to find out, where their interests and capabilities are complimentary, where they run in parallel and where—contradict one another. A series of interviews with Indian scholars was conducted to support the findings and illustrate main ideas, where Russian and Indian views complement, and where they do not.

Although the issue of connectivity has obviously taken ground in both Russia’s and India’s foreign policy agenda, there is no strategic approach to improving connectivity in Eurasia neither in Moscow, nor in New Delhi. There is no surprise that although there is a very particular understanding of where the countries could collaborate in infrastructural domain, the latter is far from being a reflection of a systemic approach to creating a common regional space, be it under the auspices of Greater Eurasian Partnership or beyond. On the one hand, this is partly to be explained by the relative novelty of the notion per se. On the other, however, the obstacle of geopolitical prejudice seems to be more compelling. Eurasia is a very tricky area to structure, since many big players would want to take part in this process, and both Russia and India have a variety of tracks to balance. For Moscow a key counterpart to pay attention to is China, while New Delhi seeks to maintain constructive relationship in the West.

Nevertheless, there has been an observable increase of related activity after 2022, when Russia intensified its “pivot to the East”, with India being one of the main partners for that. The growth of trade turnover creates the foundation for expanding the logistics and makes India a more outspoken stakeholder in Russian connectivity projects, be it the international North-South transport corridor or the Northern Sea route. At the same time there is a certain difference in how Moscow and New Delhi approach these projects. They clearly focus on hard connectivity elements and, thus, advance quicker in those areas, where economic benefits are more particular, so the INSTC attracts more attention than the NSR. This especially concerns India, while Russia is naturally more invested into both projects.

To make their cooperation more systemic the parties might benefit from, first and foremost, agreeing on a joint connectivity agenda or, at least, identifying specific areas of Eurasia, such as those covered by the INSTC, where they would concentrate their efforts. The second step, in this case, would be raising mutual awareness about potential stakeholders and involving those stakeholders, via first and second-track diplomacy, into investment cooperation. At the same time, a lot would depend on whether Moscow and New Delhi find new drivers for economic cooperation in general, after the revenues from natural resources trade upsurge subside. Trade diversification will multiply the number of stakeholders, providing a boost for infrastructural enhancement.

Finally, the issue of preventing connectivity competition among Eurasian powers is the one to keep in mind, and this is where multilateral forums might come to the fore. Using the potential of, mainly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which Russia, India, Iran and China are all members to, could be an opportunity to maintain systemic approach to regional connectivity. With the SCO now looking for avenues for transformation from a regional security to a regional development-oriented organisation, turning the SCO into a connectivity framework for Eurasia could be a way forward for all interested participants.

Introduction. The issue of connectivity in modern international relations

In current realities major powers are experiencing ever-increasing pressure to balance globalisation, regional integration and national interests in their foreign policy to remain competitive. Leadership in the multipolar world demands to materially and ideologically structure the immediate environment, since the very notion of a “pole” implies at least a certain degree of self-sufficiency and, thus, a vision of why and how it could be held together.

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Connectivity is key to upholding regional structure. At first, the notion was seen as a way to connect product origins to their consumption destinations [1], and was operationalised in the number of transport routes and quality of supporting infrastructure. Later, it acquired broader economic interpretation as a process of bringing countries and societies closer together by facilitating access <…> through transport, institutions, infrastructure, financial and IT cooperation, energy, education, research etc. With this in mind, in late 2010s—early 2020s China, the European Union, Russia, India and the US came up with their own connectivity initiatives.

For Russia and India, Eurasia is the primary region to structure. Regardless of the number of players with vested interests in this space, in terms of geography, resources and historical links it would be counterproductive to divide the area and establish several “poles” within one. Instead of nurturing their own projects Moscow and New Delhi, Tehran and Beijing could benefit from improving regional connectivity from different angles for mutual economic betterment. This chapter analyses Russian and Indian connectivity agendas to find out, where their interests and capabilities are complimentary, where they run in parallel and where—contradict one another. A series of interviews with Indian scholars was conducted to support the findings and illustrate main ideas, where Russian and Indian views complement, and where they do not.

Connecting Eurasia: connectivity in Russia's and India's foreign policy

India quickly embraced the idea of connectivity as a tool to enhance its position within the emerging multipolarity [2]. Already in 2016–2017 it was named one of the key factors of New Delhi’s growth [3]. For Russia the notion is relatively new, and it does not yet stand out as a separate piece of foreign policy agenda [4]. A conceptual difference in how Russia and India see connectivity is also to grasp.

For Moscow the idea has a clear outward focus and comprehensive nature, as it is trying to find the way to organise vast space around itself, as well as balance interests in Eurasia with India and China. The 2023 Foreign Policy Concept states Russia’s unique geographic position and its transit potential as a means to advance national economy and improve transport and infrastructural connectivity in the region [5]. However, the document pays more attention to how the latter may transform it into common space of peace, stability and prosperity through building Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP). According to official statements, the initiative is aimed to create a comprehensive cooperation platform, harmonise economic space from Atlantic to Pacific Ocean, create continental security system from Jakarta to Lisbon and, last but not least, build collective Eurasian identity. For now, such elements as free trade areas, bilateral and multilateral projects, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and ASEAN are mentioned as possible part of the initiative, which allows Moscow to be flexible in formats and success criteria of the project.

For New Delhi the outward and inwards dimensions of connectivity are equally important. Accepting that the notion implies not just linkage, but also competition and dependency [6], India is promoting such connectivity principles, as good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality, in part echoing European sentiments concerning the matter. Moreover, since 2021 India has enjoyed connectivity partnership with the European Union, seeking infrastructural investment and technological support from Europe. New Delhi itself insists, that connectivity must be financially responsible and free from debt burden, environmentally sustainable, transparent in terms of assess costs and have a local ownership [7], as opposed to the Belt and Road Initiative. Attempts to implement this vision followed in 2022, when I2U2 Group united India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States to reinforce mutual investment, and then in 2023, when the idea of the India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) was presented as part of India’s G20 presidency. Yet, India more systemically targets domestic connectivity issues, such as infrastructure within the country, and focuses on its immediate neighbourhood.

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However, instrumentally Russian and Indian visions of connectivity are similar. Both nations emphasise hard connectivity: addressing infrastructural bottlenecks, improving road and rail connections, waterways, port access. The conflict in Europe made it more difficult for Russia to use the potential of the China-Europe railroad trade. As it is looking South for more opportunities, India arises an indispensable partner. Proceeding from the successful Soviet-time case of Vladivostok-Chennai, they are now reinventing connectivity cooperation. Joint Statement “India-Russia: Enduring and Expanding Partnership”, that president Putin and prime minister Modi signed after the 22nd bilateral summit in July, 2024, dedicated a separate part to transport and connectivity. The document posits that Eurasia requires a new architecture of “stable and efficient transport corridors”. The long-awaited international North-South transport corridor (INSTC) may connect Russia and India and other major Eurasian powers as Iran and Kazakhstan, while simultaneously engaging Azerbaijan to play a more active role in region-building. Northern Sea route (NSR) and the Arctic, where Russia needs to balance unfriendly Western nations, members of the Arctic Council, as well as an increasingly more active China, is a brand-new venue for the parties’ connectivity cooperation [8].

Yet, both projects would require from Russia and India significant investment, political will and creativity to not only make them economically feasible, but make sure they fit into broader Eurasian security architecture. And this is where Moscow and New Delhi might face convergence issues. Another challenge is of geopolitical nature, as involving India in Greater Eurasian Partnership proposed by Russia may clash with the fact that its core has long been posited as linking of Eurasian Economic Union with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As Moscow now seems to be reconsidering the mode of its participation in the BRI [9], it is important to balance this China-centred track with paying more attention to projects with New Delhi.

Improving connectivity in Eurasia: a long-term bid on North-South transport corridor

The international North-South transport corridor, introduced in 2000 at the Second International Euro-Asian conference on transport in St Petersburg, remains exactly the initiative, where Moscow and New Delhi could both demonstrate the ability to implement ambitious connectivity projects and facilitate the completion of a more diverse Greater Eurasian Partnership. As a multimodal corridor, the INSTC has three routes, Western, Eastern and Trans-Caspian ones, and implies the use of railroads, highways and shipping lines simultaneously. This provides a fertile ground for more than a hundred infrastructure projects in at least seven countries: Russia, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan [10]. There is no surprise, that since the trilateral agreement on the INSTC among Russia, India and Iran came into force in 2002, eleven more countries joined the project [11].

Yet, until recently the construction of the INSTC was more declarative than real, with the main reasons for limited efficiency being the cost and complexity of missing infrastructure. Geopolitical considerations, where to place the investment premium, also made the routes wait in the wings. Yet, after 2022 Russia has doubled its efforts to boost the corridor construction, gaining political support from Iran and the EAEU countries, primarily Kazakhstan. The leap in Russia-India bilateral trade became another activating factor. Now, interested parties face major task of working on hard infrastructure on all three routes.

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The Western route has been in the limelight, as it now carries more than 70 percent of all INSTC cargo traffic. The route passes through the border points of Samur (Russia), Yalama (Azerbaijan), Astara (Azerbaijan-Iran) and further along the Iranian rail network to the port of Bandar Abbas and from there—to India. The 165-kilometer Astara-Rasht section has long remained its biggest problem, imposing double cargo transshipment on the carriers, but in May 2023 Russia has pledged to lend Iran 1.3 billion Euro out of the total 1.6 billion Euro to complete the section [12], showcasing determination to disentangle the bottleneck. According to the Iranian side, “with proper financing,” the railroad section could be completed by 2029 [13], enabling regular cargo traffic to Bandar Abbas and rising throughput capacity of the route to 15 million tons [14]. The construction of Astara-Rasht sector was expected to start in 2024, however, due to technical issues it is now planned for 2025 [15]. At the same time, this investment will not compensate for different railway gauges in post-Soviet countries (1520 mm) and Iran (1435 mm), so to create seamless infrastructure at the Azerbaijan-Iran border, for example through the construction of a new railroad line to Iranian southern port with 1520 mm gauge, [16] further investment will be needed. This option is now scrutinised by Moscow and Tehran as two sides held negotiations on establishing railroad from Parsabad to Bandar Abbas with Russian standard gauge [17].

The Eastern route of the INSTC has more stakeholders as it relies on transport infrastructure of Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran, but it also received a notable boost in July 2022 with a launch of a new Russian-Indian container service, [18] surpassing in numbers the trade among the others. Since then, compared to 2021, cargo traffic on the Eastern route more than doubled, increasing to 1.2 million tons in 2023 [19], while freight costs have nearly halved by the end of 2024 [20]. The Eastern route provides a great opportunity to deliver cargo from Western Siberia and the Urals to the port of Bandar Abbas, so it can be used by Russian exporters of agricultural or petrochemicals products from these regions. For Kazakhstan the route creates additional export potential as well. Yet, to keep the figures ascending, the route needs effort from investors. Among its drawbacks are relatively long delivery time (at least 37 days), the use of one-lane, non-electrified railroads on some sections [21], limited carrying capacity in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (11 million tons), and again a different railway gauge in Iran [22]. The Eastern route, thus, needs more serious modernisation, than the Western one.

The Trans-Caspian route connects Russian ports in the Caspian Sea with the Iranian ports of Anzali, Nowshahr and Amirabad, wherefrom cargoes go through Iranian territory to Bandar Abbas. The route could be used for transportation of wood, mineral fertilisers, metals and grain [23]. Yet, again it requires double transshipment of cargo in Iranian and Russian ports, which significantly affects the duration of transportation. Secondly, the Russian ports of Astrakhan and Olya freeze during the cold season, which makes it necessary to use icebreaker assistance during the winter navigation period, and this increases costs and transportation time additionally [24]. Thirdly, the infrastructure in the Caspian Sea ports is underdeveloped. The railway approaches to the ports require modernisation and construction of multifunctional port logistics complexes [25]. In addition, transportation by the Caspian Sea is limited by the wear and tear of the fleet and the scarcity of available vessels [26]. However, the Russian side considers this route as a promising one as it invested almost USD 100 million to modernise Volga-Caspian shipping canal in 2023–2024 [27]. At the same time, the burden of financing will inevitably lie only on Russia and Iran unless the third countries, interested in using the route to receive the abovementioned goods.

All challenges notwithstanding, the INSTC is sure to have gained new impetus amidst increasing confrontation between Russia and the West. With the importance of the corridor for trade in Eurasia rising, as evidenced by the 27 percent increase in traffic volume from 2021 to 2023 [28], and its possible capacity ranging from 80 to 100 million tons a year [29], the need for further investment is also to remain. The estimates are that USD 17.7 billion more are required to deal with the most important bottlenecks. Here is where India is expected to become a natural partner in completing the INSTC infrastructure.

For India, the INSTC project is important at the political level, as was mentioned above, but its direct involvement in the development of corridor sections has so far been limited. Despite being the final destination of the route, New Delhi has not been actively involved in building the INSTC infrastructure as yet. For India, maritime transportation, mainly through the Suez Canal, remains the priority way of delivery of its own goods [30], while cargoes along INSTC are mainly directed to India, rather than from India to other countries.

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At the same time, the INSTC gives New Delhi an opportunity to expand its presence in new markets. So far, India's trade with Central Asia and South Caucuses has been limited, but it could grow if the necessary INSTC infrastructure is in place. The same could refer to the promotion of trade between Russia and India. Enhanced infrastructure of the corridor would allow India to increase its export to Russia, reducing trade imbalance. However, experts often mention the vicious circle between the infrastructure quality and bilateral trade complexity, arguing, whether the former or the latter is a dependent variable.

The focus of India’s involvement in INSTC is Iran's Chabahar port, and the renewed impetus for the corridor seems to have provided opportunities to eventually boost cooperation on the issue. In May 2024, New Delhi and Tehran signed an agreement for India to operate the strategic port, with New Delhi to invest USD 370 million in its infrastructural development [31]. Given that Chabahar port is located on the shore of the Indian Ocean, inclusion of this port in the INSTC will significantly reduce costs and speed up cargo transportation, as the ports potential exceeds that of Bandar Abbas. Chabahar could be the end point of all branches of the INSTC, but primarily the Eastern one, so the pressure to improve the connected rail infrastructure on this route is rising [32].

The INSTC can significantly improve Eurasian connectivity in general, especially considering its overlaps with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and transport corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia. However, the realisation of the project faces certain geopolitical impediments as well. Russia is attempting to integrate into BRI, while India has an alternative route to the West-the IMEC. Thus, being involved in different projects, two countries cannot invest sufficient funds into the INSTC, which slows down the progress. The implementation of the corridor requires political will from all sides and only in that case it can start to function properly.

Arctic as a new venue for Russia-India connectivity efforts

The year of 2022 became a turning point for international cooperation in the Arctic. Russia used to prioritise interaction with the Arctic states, but switched to a multi-vector policy in the Arctic in the new conditions. On the one hand, Russia remains open to dialogue within the Arctic Council, which is, unfortunately, no longer functioning in full scale. On the other hand, Russia aims to strengthen interaction with a wider range of non-regional countries, mainly China and India. Both countries are already actively involved in Russia’s Arctic projects on bilateral basis.

As already mentioned, one of Russia’s strategic projects in the Artic is the development of the Northern Sea route, namely installing year-round navigation. Yet, it should be noted that Russia's sovereignty over the NSR and its key role in organising navigation and ensuring safety remain unquestionable for Moscow. The scale of the project requires international cooperation and participation, as well as increased investment flow, turning China and India into natural partners therein. India has expressed interest in developing the Northern Sea route. While for most countries the NSR is evaluated as a shortcut from Asia to Europe, for India it is not exactly so: both routes, through the south and through the north, are equally important for New Delhi. For India, the NSR is, thus, more of an “alternative road” [33].

The Arctic fits into the concept of India’s rise and the related dispersion of its interests, geography and sphere-wise. New Delhi obtained a status of observer at the Arctic Council in 2013, and released its regional strategic document, “India’s Arctic Policy. Building a partnership for sustainable development”, in 2022. The policy is based on six pillars: science and research, climate and environment protection, economic and human development, transportation and connectivity, governance and international cooperation, and national capacity building [34]. India’s approach towards the Arctic proceeds from its economic interests, the need to research the consequences of climate change, impacting India’s monsoons, as well as geopolitical rivalry with China, as the latter is clearly ahead of India in the Arctic, including in science and research [35].

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Therefore, India is gradually upgrading its policy focus and capabilities to enhance its understanding of the Arctic, and the trend is likely to further intensify in the coming years. However, as a non-arctic state India cannot do much in the Artic on its own. As some Indian experts stress, “there is strong opposition to giving space to countries which are not residents of the Arctic. That is why India has not been able to make any progress” [36]. Apart from this, India is behind other nations in terms of its own Polar research [37]. That is why India is seeking partnership with like-minded countries in the region and have the vision to preserve the Arctic [38], with Russia being one of them. Promising areas for bilateral cooperation between Russia and India are shipbuilding, mining, and construction of port infrastructure, tourism and logistics, including the development of the Northern Sea route.

As experts argue, the Arctic is the next frontier in India’s ties with Russia. As a Northern country and an Arctic state, Russia is also seen as the global north representative while India promotes the views of the global south [39]. Although such vision may run counter to the Russian foreign policy narrative after 2022, there is enough space for the two countries to cooperate in the Arctic, as the 22nd Russia-India summit showed. The Programme of Russian-Indian cooperation in trade, economic and investment spheres in the Russian Far East for 2024–2029, and on the principles of cooperation in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, signed during prime minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Russia, are expected to increase joint investments, activate the search for new sectors of promising cooperation, and boost trade turnover between respective regions. Among other inter-agency documents are also the ones concerning issues of climate change and low-carbon development, geodesy and cartography, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, scientific research and logistics in polar regions, investment and arbitration issues [40]. All of them reflect the multi-dimensional approach to connectivity that India is pursuing, as well as the complexity of establishing connectivity partnership in the Arctic, as compared to Eurasia.

As for hard infrastructure, the Northern Sea route and the Chennai-Vladivostok corridor (the Eastern maritime corridor) are the key venues for Moscow and New Delhi to develop. The latter will strengthen maritime communication between the Russian Far East and the Eastern ports of India [41]. The 2024 Joint Statement mentions the determination to expand logistics links with an emphasis on the capacity of infrastructure on all the routes on the principles of transparency, broad participation, local priorities, financial sustainability and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. To address the shipping issue between Russia and India via the Northern Sea route a joint working body within the intergovernmental commission [42] was created.

All the above-mentioned initiatives notwithstanding, it is clear that Russia and India are currently placing the premium on the international North-South transport corridor development, while the cooperation on connectivity initiatives in the Arctic is so far lacking in institutional framework and experience. INSTC is apparently easier and safer to use in the short-to-middle term, as it is shorter and is not restricted to summer season [43], which makes it simpler for the two nations to perceive why boosting investment is beneficial. Apart from this, there is an obvious lack of public awareness of what each side is doing in the region and why concerted effort could help advance common and individual causes.

Whereas economically the Arctic opens up a vast potential for Russia-India cooperation, geopolitical limitations remain. For the moment, equally to Greater Eurasian Partnership, China is a major Russia’s Asian partner in the Arctic. Trilateral cooperation among Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi might look attractive to Russia, while India is unlikely to overcome constrains of its relations with China. Russian experts express ideas on different formats of cooperation on the Arctic agenda within BRICS, however the ideas are still under discussion. In practice we mostly see cases of bilateral cooperation of Russia and BRICS member states, rather than multilateral engagement among BRICS countries. On a different note, India is well-known to enjoy constructive relationship with the US and the West, being able to balance these relations with its engagement with Russia. The concerns over the US sanctions have been hanging over the India-Russia defence partnership [44] and may impact Russia-India cooperation in the Arctic.

Conclusion

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Although the issue of connectivity has obviously taken ground in both Russia’s and India’s foreign policy agenda, there is no strategic approach to improving connectivity in Eurasia neither in Moscow, nor in New Delhi. There is no surprise that although there is a very particular understanding of where the countries could collaborate in infrastructural domain, the latter is far from being a reflection of a systemic approach to creating a common regional space, be it under the auspices of Greater Eurasian Partnership or beyond. On the one hand, this is partly to be explained by the relative novelty of the notion per se. On the other, however, the obstacle of geopolitical prejudice seems to be more compelling. Eurasia is a very tricky area to structure, since many big players would want to take part in this process, and both Russia and India have a variety of tracks to balance. For Moscow a key counterpart to pay attention to is China, while New Delhi seeks to maintain constructive relationship in the West.

Nevertheless, there has been an observable increase of related activity after 2022, when Russia intensified its “pivot to the East”, with India being one of the main partners for that. The growth of trade turnover creates the foundation for expanding the logistics and makes India a more outspoken stakeholder in Russian connectivity projects, be it the international North-South transport corridor or the Northern Sea route. At the same time there is a certain difference in how Moscow and New Delhi approach these projects. They clearly focus on hard connectivity elements and, thus, advance quicker in those areas, where economic benefits are more particular, so the INSTC attracts more attention than the NSR. This especially concerns India, while Russia is naturally more invested into both projects.

To make their cooperation more systemic the parties might benefit from, first and foremost, agreeing on a joint connectivity agenda or, at least, identifying specific areas of Eurasia, such as those covered by the INSTC, where they would concentrate their efforts. The second step, in this case, would be raising mutual awareness about potential stakeholders and involving those stakeholders, via first and second-track diplomacy, into investment cooperation. At the same time, a lot would depend on whether Moscow and New Delhi find new drivers for economic cooperation in general, after the revenues from natural resources trade upsurge subside. Trade diversification will multiply the number of stakeholders, providing a boost for infrastructural enhancement.

Finally, the issue of preventing connectivity competition among Eurasian powers is the one to keep in mind, and this is where multilateral forums might come to the fore. Using the potential of, mainly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which Russia, India, Iran and China are all members to, could be an opportunity to maintain systemic approach to regional connectivity. With the SCO now looking for avenues for transformation from a regional security to a regional development-oriented organisation, turning the SCO into a connectivity framework for Eurasia could be a way forward for all interested participants.

First published in the “India and Russia. Enduring Trust in a transformational era”, edited by Dr Lydia Kulik. 2025. Har Anand Publications. ISBN 978-81-19798-34-6

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2. For example, already the Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh of 2015 was positioned as a sub-regional connectivity project.

3. Growth, connectivity key to India's foreign policy thinking: S Jaishankar // The Economic Times. 25.08.2017. URL: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/growth-connectivity-key-to-indias-foreign-p...

4. Even official translations are varying from «связанность» (connectivity) in public speeches or «взаимосвязанность» (interconnectedness) to «связуемость» (connectability).

5. The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation // MFA Russia. 31.03.2023. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586/

6. Jaishankar, S. Why Bharat Matters. Rupa Publications, India. 2024. 219 p.

7. Ibid. P.48

8. Joint Statement following the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit // Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 09.07.2024. URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37940/Joint+Statement+following+the+22nd+IndiaRus...

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11. Nivedita Das Kundu. International North-South Transport Corridor: Enhancing India’s Regional Connectivity // Valdai Discussion Club. January 1, 2024. URL: https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/international-north-south-transport-corridor/

12. Moscow and Tehran signed an agreement on cooperation in the construction of the Rasht–Astara railway line in Iran. Russia to Provide 1.3 bln Euros State Loan for Construction of Resht-Astara Railway Line in Iran // Interfax. May 17, 2023. URL: https://www.interfax.ru/russia/901828

13. Iran Ready to Build Resht-Astara Railroad Section by 2029 “with Proper Financing” // Morskie Vesti Rossii. February 9, 2024. URL: https://morvesti.ru/news/1678/107515/

14. From Varangians to Persians: Prospects for Development of the North-South Corridor // N. Trans Lab. 2024. P. 17. URL: https://clck.ru/3CCyZv

15. The construction of the Resht-Astara railway, which will connect Iran and Azerbaijan, will start in 2025 // TRANS.RU. October 17, 2024. URL: https://trans.ru/news/k-stroitelstvu-zheleznoi-dorogi-resht-astara-kotoraya-soedinit-iran-i-azerbaid...

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19. From Varangians to Persians: Prospects for Development of the North-South Corridor // N. Trans Lab. 2024. P. 21. URL: https://clck.ru/3CCyZv

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21. Zakharov A. The International North-South Transport Corridor: The Prospects and Challenges for Connectivity between Russia and India // MGIMO Review of International Relations. 2023. Vol. 16. No. 2. P. 225.

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23. Zakharov A. The International North-South Transport Corridor: The Prospects and Challenges for Connectivity between Russia and India // MGIMO Review of International Relations. 2023. Vol. 16. No. 2. P. 226.

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27. Sergeev M. Russia is seriously engaged in the North-South transport corridor // Nezavisimaya gazeta. November 11, 2024. URL: https://www.ng.ru/economics/2024-11-11/1_9132_sanctions.html

28. From Varangians to Persians: Prospects for Development of the North-South Corridor // N. Trans Lab. 2024. P. 9. URL: https://clck.ru/3CCyZv

29. The Resht–Astara Section Will Not Solve Infrastructure Problems of the North-South ITC // LOGIRUS. April 24, 2024. URL: https://logirus.ru/news/infrastructure/uchastok_-resht-astara-_ne_reshit_infrastrukturnykh_problem_m...

30. Suez Canal Crisis: Major Shipping Lines Reroute, Impacting India Trade // India Shipping News. February 13, 2024. URL: https://indiashippingnews.com/suez-canal-crisis-major-shipping-lines-reroute-impacting-indian-trade/

31. India inks 10-year deal to operate Iran's Chabahar port // Reuters. May 13, 2024. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-sign-10-year-pact-with-iran-chabahar-port-management-et-re...

32. Chahbahar Port Transit Project: Eastern Wing of the North-South International Transport Corridor // Valdai Discussion Club. May 19, 2023. URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/tranzitnyy-proekt-porta-chakhbekhar/

33. Viakhireva, N. The Arctic with Asian Focus // Russian International Affairs Council. 28.06.2023 https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/arktika-s-aktsentom-na-aziyu/ (In Russ.)

34. India’s Arctic Policy. Building a partnership for sustainable development // Government of India. 2022. URL: https://library.arcticportal.org/2015/1/Indias_Actic_Policy.pdf

35. Sergunin, A., Viakhireva, N. (interview) Arctic Scientific Diplomacy amidst Geopolitical Crisis // Russian International Affairs Council. 21.02.2024. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/interview/arkticheskaya-nauchnaya-diplomatii-v-uslo... (In Russ.)

36. G A V Reddy, Ajay Sah, Viakhireva, N. (interview). India Seeks Arctic Partnerships with Like-Minded Nations // Russian International Affairs Council. 29.02.2024. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/interview/india-seeks-arctic-partnerships-with-l...

37. D Suba Chandran, Viakhireva N.(interview). Polar Regions Offer Enough Space for India and Russia to Map

What Nations Can Do Together // Russian International Affairs Council. 13.03.2024. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/interview/polar-regions-offer-enough-space-for-i...

38. Ibid.

39. Raj Kumar Sharma, Viakhireva, N. (interview). The Arctic: The Next Frontier in India-Russia Relations // Russian International Affairs Council. 21.06.2024. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/interview/the-arctic-the-next-frontier-in-india-...

40. Russia-India talks // President of Russia. July 9, 2024. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74514

41. Russia and India agree to cooperate in the Far East and the Arctic // The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic. 09.07.2024. URL: https://minvr.gov.ru/press-center/news/rossiya_i_indiya_dogovorilis_o_sotrudnichestve_na_dalnem_vost... (In Russ.)

42. Joint Statement following the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit // Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 09.07.2024. URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/37940/Joint+Statement+following+the+22nd+IndiaRus...

43. Jawahar Bhagwat Vishnu, Viakhireva, N. (interview). India Considers Northern Sea Route Potential // Russian International Affairs Council. 31.07.2024. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/interview/india-considers-northern-sea-route-pot...

44. Raj Kumar Sharma, Viakhireva, N. (interview). The Arctic: The Next Frontier in India-Russia Relations // Russian International Affairs Council. 21.06.2024. URL: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/interview/the-arctic-the-next-frontier-in-india-...