The Korean Nuclear Missile Crisis: It Takes Three to Tango

The Northeast Asian drama involves three main actors: North Korea, the United States, and China. Washington is pursuing a more fundamental goal: to retain its political and military dominance in East Asia and prevent Beijing from significantly strengthening its strategic positions. Unlike the previous administration, for which North Korea had never been a top priority, President Trump immediately put the North Korean nuclear problem on top of his foreign political agenda.

Washington still pins great hopes on China. A significant portion of the U.S. establishment remains firmly convinced that all roads to Pyongyang lead through Beijing, and that the North Korean nuclear problem will be resolved the minute China wants it to be. Beijing is interested in the continued existence of North Korea, whether ruled by the Kim dynasty or not, and even if that country becomes a de-facto nuclear state. It is not even so much a matter if China's fear of millions of refugees from a disintegrating North Korea or weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands. First and foremost, Beijing does not like the prospect that the North Korean regime's collapse could result in the South annexing the North, thus forming a unified Korean state with the capital in Seoul. Such a state would most likely be pro-American, meaning that not just the southern part of the Korean Peninsula but the peninsula as a whole would find itself within the orbit of the political and military dominance of China's main rival.

The North Korean elites would be more likely to choose China's protectorate as a more appealing alternative than Korea's unification under rule by the South.

What about Russia then? It appears that Moscow will side with China in this game. An important signal to that effect came in the form of a joint statement by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries on the Korean Peninsula's problems, which was adopted on 4 July during Russian President Vladimir Putin's meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Moscow.

The recent developments on the Korean Peninsula have already been christened the Caribbean Crisis of our time, and there is certainly some truth to that. In early August, as Pyongyang and Washington exchanged extremely belligerent statements, many believed that the situation was on the brink of a catastrophe. Since then things have simmered down somewhat. Kim Jong-un agreed to postpone a missile strike on Guam, while the Donald Trump administration began sending active signals regarding its willingness to seek a solution using political and diplomatic means. At the same time, the situation remains extremely complex, and a new escalation could happen at any moment.

The Northeast Asian drama involves three main actors: North Korea, the United States, and China. What are the motives behind the key characters in this drama, which more often than not smacks of farce?

North Korea is driven by the basic instinct of survival in the face of actual and imaginary threats on the part of the U.S. and South Korea. The only way for Pyongyang to safeguard itself against its external enemies and preserve sovereignty is to have nuclear weapons.

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The U.S., for its part, is trying to prevent the country which has viewed the former as its main adversary for nearly 70 years, from turning into a nuclear power. At the same time, Washington is pursuing a more fundamental goal: to retain its political and military dominance in East Asia and prevent Beijing from significantly strengthening its strategic positions.

Finally, China does not want a war to break out near its borders, and is thus interested in preserving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing's even greater desire is to drive the U.S. out of East Asia and turn the region into its sphere of influence.

Upon coming to power, the Trump administration announced that the “strategic patience” policy conducted by Barack Obama with regard to North Korea had failed, and that a new approach was needed. Unlike the previous administration, for which North Korea had never been a top priority, President Trump immediately put the North Korean nuclear problem on top of his foreign political agenda. Washington proclaimed a policy of “maximum pressure and engagement” which, in effect, does not differ that much from the previous administration's policy. The main emphasis still remains on increasing pressure on Pyongyang through the use of sanctions combined with pressing China to exert influence on Pyongyang.

Trump's “maximum pressure” has so far proven no more effective than Obama's “strategic patience”. North Korea continues to actively launch missiles, and responds to Washington's rhetoric with even more belligerent statements and moves.

Washington still pins great hopes on China. A significant portion of the U.S. establishment remains firmly convinced that all roads to Pyongyang lead through Beijing, and that the North Korean nuclear problem will be resolved the minute China wants it to be. Their main argument is Pyongyang's economic dependence on China, which accounts for 90% of North Korea's foreign trade. In an effort to nudge Beijing towards stern measures against its neighbour, the Americans are threatening China with so-called secondary sanctions in the form of blacklisting Chinese companies and banks that maintain contacts with North Korea. Given the high level of China's integration into the global economy, and the country's dependence on the dollar system, Washington's broad use of secondary sanctions could cause serious damage to China. In addition, the Americans keep saying that the U.S. has no other choice but to keep building up its military presence in the region in order to protect itself against the North Korean threat. This primarily implies the intensified deployment of anti-missile defence systems; as part of this process, the U.S. has already deployed a THAAD battery in South Korea. China sees the U.S. anti-missile defences near its borders as an immediate threat to its security.

China is gradually increasing economic pressure on North Korea. On 5 August, Beijing earned Washington's praise by supporting UN Security Council's Resolution 2371, which, inter alia, is capable of reducing North Korea's foreign currency revenue by a third. This is a virtually unprecedented incident in the modern history of international relations when a country imposes strict sanctions on its ally: China and North Korea signed an alliance treaty back in 1961.

Nevertheless, Beijing is unlikely to go much further than that and subject North Korea to “suffocating sanctions” bordering on a total embargo, which is something Washington has been insisting on. Despite all its dislike of the refractory Kim Jong-un, the Chinese leadership is unwilling to provoke a situation in which North Korea would be threatened with an economic collapse and the disintegration of its nationhood. Beijing is interested in the continued existence of North Korea, whether ruled by the Kim dynasty or not, and even if that country becomes a de-facto nuclear state. It is not even so much a matter if China's fear of millions of refugees from a disintegrating North Korea or weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands. First and foremost, Beijing does not like the prospect that the North Korean regime's collapse could result in the South annexing the North, thus forming a unified Korean state with the capital in Seoul. Such a state would most likely be pro-American, meaning that not just the southern part of the Korean Peninsula but the peninsula as a whole would find itself within the orbit of the political and military dominance of China's main rival.

China suspects, and not without reason, that the U.S. needs a military presence on the peninsula not just to protect South Korea against a possible invasion from the north but also to restrain Beijing's ambitions in Asia. Leading U.S. analysts are quite frank in their reasoning that “the U.S.-South Korean alliance is the pillar of the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific”, and that “South Korea is the only place in Asia where the U.S. has a military foothold”. Beijing hardly believes Washington's reassurances that it “is not seeking an excuse to garrison U.S. troops north of the Demilitarized Zone”.

At the very least China is determined to prevent an expansion of the U.S. “foothold” further to the north; ideally, it would like for U.S. troops to leave the Korean Peninsula entirely, and for the alliance between Washington and Seoul to become a thing of the past. Pyongyang's nuclear missile programme might help Beijing drive the Americans out of Korea. If North Korea has intercontinental ballistic missiles, this will inevitably make many in America ask whether military bases in Korea are worth the risk of losing Honolulu, Seattle or Los Angeles.

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There are other reasons why the existence of North Korea is beneficial to China. The Korean nuclear problem gives Beijing an edge with regard to other key issues in its bilateral relations with the U.S. For example, North Korea is diverting Washington's attention from China’s creeping expansion in the South China Sea. Beijing could demand that the U.S. reduce its support to Taiwan as an extra price for its readiness to cooperate on North Korea. In fact, the North Korean and Taiwanese problems are mutually interrelated. It was the beginning of the Korean War that prompted U.S. President Harry Truman to offer naval protection to Taipei, which effectively continues to this day.

China is not going to let North Korea disappear from the political map, and will continue to view that country as its geopolitical asset for at least as long as Beijing's rivalry with Washington for the Korean Peninsula and all of East Asia continues. Should North Korea be destabilised from the inside with the threat of the disintegration of the political regime and nationhood, Beijing would do all it can to prevent Seoul from annexing the North. Chinese troops would be on North Korean soil well before the South Korean-U.S. alliance could take any steps. Beijing would most likely have perfectly legal grounds to do so, acting on an invitation from and with the consent of Pyongyang. The North Korean elites would be more likely to choose China's protectorate as a more appealing alternative than Korea's unification under rule by the South.

What about Russia then? It appears that Moscow will side with China in this game. An important signal to that effect came in the form of a joint statement by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries on the Korean Peninsula's problems, which was adopted on 4 July during Russian President Vladimir Putin's meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Moscow. In the document, the parties place equal responsibility for the Korean Peninsula escalation on Pyongyang and Washington, and propose a joint initiative for a gradual settlement of the nuclear problem. The statement was probably the first instance in the history of Russia's strategic partnership with China when the two countries demonstrated a willingness to act in unison on the Korean Peninsula in no uncertain terms.

The unprecedented nature of the joint statement is also evident from the statement to the effect that the two countries “are paying sufficient attention to the maintenance of the international and regional balance and stability, and emphasise that allied relations between separate states should not inflict damage on the interests of third parties. They are against any military presence of extra-regional forces in Northeast Asia and its build-up under the pretext of counteracting the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programmes.”

In effect, Russia and China explicitly called on Washington to leave Northeast Asia. One could argue that these extremely stern words offered by the two foreign ministries are just diplomatic phrases, which are unlikely to be followed by any serious actions. Then again, Putin's Munich speech was at first perceived by many in the West and in Russia exclusively as an exercise in rhetoric and not as a warning.