The Paradoxes of Global Zero

The U.S. administration seems to be reviving projects aimed at total nuclear disarmament that were on the rise at the start of Barack Obama's first term. Back in February 2012, the Department of Defense was reportedly considering further cuts to the U.S. strategic nuclear forces (SNF). In late March 2012, Obama confirmed his commitment to Global Zero as a concept at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. This autumn, Moscow hosted a series of discussions between Russian and American experts on universal nuclear disarmament, all of which indicates that the reelected Obama is likely to advance more disarmament initiatives.

The U.S. administration seems to be reviving projects aimed at total nuclear disarmament that were on the rise at the start of Barack Obama's first term. Back in February 2012, the Department of Defense was reportedly considering further cuts to the U.S. strategic nuclear forces (SNF). In late March 2012, Obama confirmed his commitment to Global Zero as a concept at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. This autumn, Moscow hosted a series of discussions between Russian and American experts on universal nuclear disarmament, all of which indicates that the reelected Obama is likely to advance more disarmament initiatives.

Total nuclear disarmament does not seem to be a priority at expert-level discussions in Russia, although the subject surely deserves attention. Arms control specialists often mention a proposal you cannot refuse, i.e. initiatives a priori unacceptable to the other party, which can hardly reject them for fear of being labeled as being “against disarmament.” Definitely losing the intellectual ground in the disarmament area vis-à-vis the United States, Russia is running the risk of bring unprepared for such initiatives. Bearing in mind the paramount importance of nuclear forces for Russia's security, this matter seems particularly sensitive.

Four Attempts at Nuclear Disarmament

The idea of discarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is far from new. In 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was signed in Geneva, and was, to an extent, honored during the Second World War. Signed in Paris on January 12, 1993, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction came into force on April 29, 1997, after which the implementation stage began. The great powers’ renunciation of chemical weapons has set an international legal precedent for prohibiting certain types of the WMD.

Photo: UN
The Convention on the Prohibition BW, 1972

The situation regarding the ban on biological weapons (BW) is more complicated. The international Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC) was adopted in 1972, committing participants to destroy BW or convert all relevant agents, toxins, weapon types, equipment and delivery means to peaceful aims within nine months of the Convention coming into force. Since 1991, the great powers have been negotiating an Additional Protocol to the Convention, in order to establish its effective date.

Against this background, Russian, American and West European experts have often reflected on prohibiting nuclear weapons, primarily on repeating the CW and BW scenario that rejected them as inhumane and unnecessary for military operations. The agenda for negotiations on the control over nuclear weapons and atomic energy was developed by U.S. and British physicists in 1944-1945. In fact, the nuclear-free projects of today are merely reproducing the initiatives of the 1940s.

Influenced by these attitudes, the nuclear powers have tried launching talks on building a nuclear-free world or at least on profound reductions of nuclear arsenals. But in reality, all initiatives turned out to be a superpower’s attempts to achieve strategic supremacy over its opponent.

Politicians aired the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In December 1945, the USSR, the United States and United Kingdom agreed to set up the UN Atomic Energy Commission. In January 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution containing the Commission's proposal to develop plans on the withdrawal of nuclear warheads from national control, and placing atomic energy under international supervision. In March 1946, the Truman administration (1945-1952) advanced the Acheson-Lilienthal plan, providing for international control of the closed nuclear fuel cycle (CNFC) and the elimination of nuclear weapons within five to six years.

However, in spring 1946, the U.S. representative to the UN Nuclear Energy Commission Bernard Baruch augmented the plan with two amendments. First, decisions on the future international body are to be taken by simple majority, depriving the Security Council permanent members of their veto right. Second, enforcement action against violating states is to be undertaken by a new institution, without sanction of the UN Security Council. On June 14, 1946, the United States put forward a plan for establishing international control over the CNFC, i.e. the Baruch Plan, to the UN Nuclear Energy Commission.

The Soviet Union would not accept the U.S. proposals, fearing the procedure would hamper the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb and secure an American nuclear monopoly. On June 19, 1946, Soviet representative to the UN Nuclear Energy Commission Andrei Gromyko presented the draft International Convention to Prohibit the Production and Employment of Weapons Based on the Use of Atomic Energy for the Purpose of Mass Destruction, detailing the prohibition and destruction of all atomic weapons stockpiles, whether they be in a finished or unfinished condition, within a period of three months. On June 11, 1947, the USSR offered the Commission its plan for placing the CNFC under UN control (the Molotov Plan) that was intended to come into force after the nuclear warheads had been dismantled. However, Washington suspected that as soon as its nuclear monopoly evaporated, the USSR would seize Western Europe. And in 1949, the UN Commission's activities came to a standstill.

The second attempt at nuclear disarmament occurred in the late 1960s as part of the work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nonnuclear states agreed to give up plans to create or acquire nuclear weapons, in return demanding additional obligations for nuclear states to renounce the nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the NPT obliged nuclear states "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and to nuclear disarmament". But the USSR and the United States held to different interpretations of the text. The stumbling block was in good faith, as the Russian text suggested voluntary discussion of arms control but the English version meant firm obligation. Referring to this softer wording in the Russian text, the Americans rated the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, i.e. START-1 (1972) and START-2 (1979), a negotiation process free of explicit commitments.

Photo: leonidbrezhnev.narod.ru
Poster "Peace Program", USSR

The third round of the nuclear disarmament discussion came in the mid-1980s. Back in 1971 and 1976, at the 24th and 25th congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union respectively, the Program of Peace was adopted, suggesting progression to the complete elimination of WMD. Speaking on November 6, 1977, in the Russian city of Tula, the Party's Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev pledged that the USSR would, under no circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons. In 1982, Moscow undertook the relevant official commitment. On January 15, 1986, the then Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to annihilate nuclear weapons by 2000, with stage one being the elimination of short and medium-range missiles and a 50-percent cut in strategic nuclear arsenals, stage two being the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and stage three – scrapping the remaining warheads.

The Soviet proposals made Washington suspicious, as the White House feared that Moscow was intent to secure its advantage in conventional forces. Numerous scenarios appeared, detailing how the Kremlin could unleash a massive non-nuclear war to oust the Americans from Europe after nuclear weapons are eliminated. At the Reykjavik summit of October 12, 1986, President Reagan rejected this Soviet initiative, and the two sides agreed to concentrate on limiting the arms race and reducing their nuclear arsenals.

Attempt number four was less direct. Back in 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev proposed signing the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), and in 1993 a special group lead by Russia and India was set up by the UN Security Council, which resulted in UN GA Resolution 48 / 75L on Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices. In spring 1994, the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva entrusted Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada with preparing the mandate for further negotiations on the issue.

Photo: visir.is
Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan,
Summit in Reykjavik in 1986

Ambassador Shannon presented his report on March 28, 1995. The Canadians wanted to concentrate on curtailing the production of fissile materials for military purposes and establishing international control over stockpile use. The proposal envisaged the creation of an international agency to monitor the decrease in weapons-grade fissile material production, to be followed by an international moratorium on the separation of plutonium from nuclear fuel and an overall move from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium in fueling nuclear power plants. After some hesitation, the Geneva Committee members approved the Shannon Plan as a basis for further talks on the prohibition of producing fissile materials for military purposes. On August 12, 1998, a relevant UN committee was set up.

However, a compromise FMCT text has not become a reality, as the sides focused on the practicability of extending future treaty provisions on stockpiled fissile materials. The United States insisted on excluding uranium ore production from the treaty’s remit. China linked the FMCT talks’ future with a rejection of Washington's plans to deploy strike systems in space. In 1999, the mandate debate was resumed as some participants (Pakistan, Israel, and RSA) attempted to review a number of positions in the Shannon Report. The United States was unhappy about the 2001 Russian law on the possible import of used nuclear fuel, fearing that Moscow would extract plutonium and resume nuclear weapons production. After the 2001 session in New York, the talks became mired in stagnation.

Attempt Number Five

Photo: foreignpolicy.com
Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry
and George Shultz

The nuclear-free-world movement emerged on January 4, 2007, as the Wall Street Journal published its articleA World Free of Nuclear Weapons by former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former Defense Secretary William Perry and former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn, who called upon the great powers to begin the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They proposed projects for intermediate international agreements – a roadmap to a nuclear-free world – in the belief that the elimination of nuclear weapons is possible provided all nuclear states:

• Alter the alert status principles for their strategic nuclear forces and make the delivery systems ready for launch after several hours of preparation.
• Eliminate tactical nuclear weapons and radically reduce strategic nuclear arsenals.
• Ratify the CTBT signed by all countries in 1996.
• Sign the FMCT.
• Improve safety and security at storage sites for nuclear weapons and fissile materials, primarily weapon-grade plutonium and high-enriched uranium.
• Cease using plutonium generated by research and energy reactors.
• Establish international control over the CNFC.
• Settle regional conflicts and disputes that stimulate the creation of nuclear weapons by new entities.

Photo: npsglobal.org
Summit Global Zero, Paris, February 2010

During the following two years, the institutional base of the nuclear-free movement strengthened. Harvard University launched a project on the elimination of nuclear weapons led by Sam Nunn [1]. A similar initiative was run by the Institute for Science and International Security. On May 25, 2007, EU security experts set up the Luxembourg Forum to generate strategic projects on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. On December 12, 2007, Harvard held a conference marking the 20th anniversary of the signing of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, looking at the prospects for converting it into a universal agreement.

The next step was the international conference in Oslo on February 26-27, 2008 formally organized by Harvard University and the Hoover Institution. Delegations from 128 countries participated, among them Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store and IAEA Director General Mohamed el Baradei. Experts viewed these events as a rehearsal for a future conference to support total nuclear disarmament. In December 2008, the founding conference of the Global Zero, a new movement, took place in Paris.

Photo: armscontrol.org
"Prague Speech" Barack Obama

In 2009, the U.S. administration tried to internationalize the nuclear disarmament discussion, as Barack Obama voiced his key points in Prague on April 5, 2009 [2], which winning him the Nobel Peace Prize. He stressed that the existing nuclear stockpiles were excessive and a single nuclear warhead exploded in a densely populated city would inflict irreparable damage to the economies of the EU and the United States (reiterating the 1961 statement by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara). According to Obama, the danger of the worst-case scenario is on the rise due to the growing threat of nuclear proliferation and the possibility that transnational terrorist networks get hold of the weapons. The Obama Program proposes the following priority steps:

• Lower the role played by nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy.
• Push other countries to follow suit.
• Hold talks with Russia on signing a new START treaty.
• Strengthen the NPT regime, including establishing international centers for the production and processing of nuclear fuel.
• Deploy a missile defense system to let rogue states know their attempts to acquire nuclear weapons are futile.
• Apply stricter control over missile materials turnover to ensure they do not fall into the hands of criminal and terrorist networks.

The U.S. president suggested concentrating on the 2002 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative, both launched by the George Bush Jr. (2001-2008) administration to foster international cooperation in control of fissile materials and CNFC technologies. The attempts should result in a global summit on the security of nuclear facilities and fissile material storage sites.

The Baruch Plan Revisited

The current debate on the nuclear-free world is notable due to the simultaneous U.S. efforts to revive the CNFC internationalization projects. Back in 1993, the Clinton administration proclaimed its counter-proliferation strategy, putting forward preventive measures against nuclear weapons proliferation. One approach lies in the wider control over fissile material production and turnover in the global market. This amounts to the rebirth of those projects for the international control over the CNFC that were popular in the 1940s.

Photo: ifnec.org
GNEP Executive Committee Meeting,
October 1, 2008 in Paris

In the mid-2000s, Washington made two attempts at kick-starting the NPT reform debate. On February 11, 2004, George Bush Jr. proposed to (1) engage Interpol in realization of the Proliferation Security Initiative; (2) attach universal status to the IAEA Additional Protocol of 1997; and (3) prohibit the supply of the CNFC technologies to countries that did not possess them before January 1, 2004 [3]. At the 7th NPT Review Conference in May 2005, the United States proposed an amendment to Article 10 be adopted, envisaging that states leaving the Treaty place previously acquired CNFC technologies and fissile materials under the IAEA control. And the Agency would obtain the right to exclude the regular violators of these Safeguard Agreements from its Board of Governors.

Other NPT parties rejected Washington's proposals. But at its Sea Island summit on June 9-11, 2004, the G8 agreed to impose a year-long moratorium on CNFC technology supplies to countries that did not acquire them before 2004. However the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, on June 7-8, 2007 did not extend the moratorium.

One more idea, widely debated in the United States, is strengthening the World Nuclear Association (WNA) set up in 2001 on the basis of the British Uranium Institute and the nuclear power community. Resembling the IAEA in structure, the WNA has established a Charter of Ethics for its members and annually holds symposia in London. The organization specializes in monitoring the international nuclear markets, primarily regarding the production of natural uranium and nuclear fuel. American experts have been insisting on strengthening the WNA mandate from 2004.

On February 2006, the U.S. Department of Energy commenced its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) that would arrange leasing finished nuclear fuel to interested states and the withdrawal of used fissile materials from user-states for the subsequent processing on U.S. territory [4]. In June 2007, the U.S. Congress approved the International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act, which details the center’s establishment on the territory of a nonnuclear state under IAEA safeguards. On September 16, 2007, the GNEP charter and principles were signed by 16 countries including Russia.

So far, the GNEP initiative has yielded only disappointing results. On April 2, 2009, the Department of Energy refused to withdraw the limitations for the production of components for GNEP on U.S. territory [5]. And since mid-2009, the project amounts to little more than a blank, a complex of agreements with no substance. However, in the near future, the White House may seek to revive the initiative. If that happens, the nuclear-free world project would take another route – towards stronger international control over the CNFC.

Problems for Russia

The United States’ nuclear-free initiatives may also develop into a series of disarmament initiatives, some of them potentially uncomfortable for Russia.

First, in view of the nuclear-free world, Washington may raise the issue of eliminating tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), in which Russia is superior in the European theater. But TNW are viewed in Russia as the only asset the country has that compensates for NATO's conventional weapons advantage, meaning that today TNW reductions would hardly be in Russia's interests.

Second, stricter CNFC control would entail limiting nuclear technology exports. During the past 10-15 past years, Washington has repeatedly voiced discontent about Rosatom's cooperation with India and Iran, and also stressed that it was the USSR/Russia that helped establish the North Korean nuclear program. As a result, more stringent regulations for civilian nuclear technologies could deprive Russia of the already limited markets.

Third, Russia should determine its approach to the FMCT. Nuclear weapons require modernization every 15-20 years. So, after some time, (though not in the near future) discontinued plutonium production could theoretically cause difficulties in maintaining the nuclear potential.

The modern U.S. nuclear doctrine is based on the minimal deterrence concept used to retarget the SNF from military to economic facilities of potential adversaries. Implementing the concept could send the world back to the 1950s, when the probability of a military conflict between the USSR and the United States was high due to technical issues and limited nuclear arsenals. It is hard to predict the conflict threshold in a world in which nuclear powers possess small, mobile arsenals. Taking account of the global BMD system to be deployed and the development of high-precision weapons, this scenario gives the military advantage to the United States and its allies.

History has shown us similar patterns. In 1925, the great powers signed the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons in military operations. Fortunately, no chemical war broke out but the tank war, i.e. the Second World War, did not turn out to be much better. Due to rejection of chemical weapons, the military were unhindered in perfecting tank strikes, as the chemical threat to infantry escorts vanished. What will the world gain from the dramatic reductions of nuclear weapons, which have guaranteed equity in the great powers’ mutual exposure?

1. Nuclear Security Project (Harvard University). Nunn S. Co-Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. “The Mountaintop: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” Council on Foreign Relations. 14 June 2007 // Nuclear Security Project (Harvard University).

2. Text of President Obama's speech in Prague, 5 April 2009.

3. President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD // Official Site of the President of the USA. 11 February 2004.

4. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.

5. US GNEP programme dead, DOE confirms, Nuclear Engineering International, 15 April 2009