The Second Georgian Dream is About to Come True

In 2012, the name of the Georgian Dream party evoked the hope for liberating the country from the tyranny of political madmen, the triumph of democracy and the rule of law—not just in words but in actions. In the Georgia of the early 2010s, the dream specifically involved removing Mikheil Saakashvili and his associates from power, provided that a more competent government would take their place. This is what Georgia’s unofficial patron Bidzina Ivanishvili promised voters, and the presence of such an influential figure, who had no personal interest in a political career, helped Georgian society achieve a peaceful and democratic transfer of power.

Indeed, the Georgian dream of a healthy socioeconomic life became a reality in the eight years from 2012 to 2020. The elimination of state racketeering of businesses played a key role in this, as did the resumption of trade contacts with Russia. For Georgia, these were the most peaceful years since the beginning of the 21st century, when people were able to go about their lives and earn a living without fearing for their safety and without sociopolitical upheavals.

Georgian Dream took a page from the United National Movement’s book when it came to Georgia’s comprehensive integration into the European Union and NATO and shared its predecessor’s view that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were parts of Georgian territory. The only addition was the diplomatic principle of “negotiating the possible,” which led to the restoration of economic cooperation and regular air traffic with Russia. Since late 2012, Georgia has tried to stay out of political turmoil in the region and around the world, concentrating instead on foreign economic relations and domestic reforms required for EU accession. This explains why Tbilisi has not introduced a single sanction of its own against Russia since 2014 and sought to keep its involvement in Western restrictions to a minimum. This also explains why Georgia is well ahead not only of other post-Soviet candidates for European integration, but also of several current EU members, in terms of certain European standards.

The reality hit Georgian Dream on the first day of tallying the results of the 2020 parliamentary election, when the EU, whose demands for state-building the authorities had worked so diligently to meet, suddenly threw its support behind the UNM’s false claims of election fraud. For a while, Georgian Dream fought to preserve the illusion that apolitical integration into the EU was possible, but in the summer of 2021, it became patently obvious that:

• neither the transparency and legitimacy of the election, nor Georgia’s compliance with EU regulations were of any interest to anyone in Brussels;
• The EU never saw Georgia as “just another small European country”;
• EU officials wanted the UNM to return to power in Georgia.

Formally, the European Commission praised the success of the reforms carried out in Georgia under EU programs, but it also noted that Tbilisi had refused time and again to act as an agent for the West in the South Caucasus, a region neighboring Russia. Georgian authorities were adamant that national interests dictated the principle of non-interference in the power struggles between the world’s major players, while Georgia’s Western partners, on the contrary, expected it to side with the EU and the United States.

After the 2020 parliamentary election, it became clear that Ivanishvili’s team now faced another political enemy, one that was far more formidable than Saakashvili’s cronies, and one that was attacking the Georgian state from an unexpected angle. The EU’s desire to bring back the UNM and Mikheil Saakashvili to power in Georgia, sidelining Georgian Dream and Bidzina Ivanishvili, left Georgian authorities with an ultimatum: fight or flight.

Bidzina Ivanishvili, who formally returned to Georgian politics on December 30, 2023, as the honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, significantly toughened his rhetoric this past summer and started describing the upcoming parliamentary election as a decisive battle between good and evil in Georgia, with the country’s future hanging in the balance: a victory for the UNM would spell doom for Georgia, while a win for the ruling party would save it. Ivanishvili set the goal for his allies to replicate this October the parliamentary election results of 2016, where Georgian Dream won a constitutional majority, which gave the party freedom to pass legislation, including amending the basic law at its own discretion. This means that the “fight or flight” ultimatum now looms large over the UNM too. Neither the party itself nor the opposition coalition it is busy putting together has a chance of winning the parliamentary election, but there remains a theoretical chance of preventing Georgian Dream from securing a constitutional majority.

Georgian Dream recently presented a new slogan aimed at winning over the electorate, with Bidzina Ivanishvili promising that once the election is over, the Georgian leadership will set about punishing those responsible for the Five-Day War of 2008, “find the strength to apologize” to the people of South Ossetia for provoking hostilities, and do everything to ensure that the years-long confrontation ends with “historic mutual forgiveness and reconciliation.”

However, outside observers should interpret the statements of the Georgian leadership as an effort to win over more voters by contrasting its peace-seeking stance with the aggressive UNM and nurturing public hopes for a peaceful resolution of the South Ossetia issue.

So there is no reason to expect a breakthrough in the South Ossetia issue any time soon. However, the days leading up to the election promise to be the most intense yet. Georgian Dream will try to drive Western proxies out of Georgia, while the proxies themselves will simply try to survive, and right now the ruling party appears to have the upper hand. The second Georgian dream is about to come true.

The First Georgian Dream

When Georgia’s behind-the-scenes billionaire patron Bidzina Ivanishvili founded the Georgian Dream movement in 2011 and then the political party of the same name the following year, his goal was to normalize politics in the country. Over eight years in power, Mikheil Saakashvili’s regime transformed from a revolutionary liberation force into a totalitarian and repressive one, while at the same time drove the country into a Russian trade embargo and spurred Moscow to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As a philanthropist rather than a politician, Ivanishvili sought to solve the country’s socioeconomic problems through a campaign for a legal transfer of power in Georgia, focusing on lifting illegitimate government pressure from businesses. Political activity was simply a means for him to accomplish this. This is why, just a year after Georgian Dream won the 2012 parliamentary election that relegated Saakashvili’s United National Movement (UNM) to the opposition, the billionaire retreated into the shadows, handing over the reins of government to the young business executive Irakli Garibashvili.

In 2012, the name of the Georgian Dream party evoked the hope for liberating the country from the tyranny of political madmen, the triumph of democracy and the rule of law—not just in words but in actions. Political strategists on Ivanishvili’s team encouraged citizens to go to the polls to make the common man’s dream of a normal, peaceful life come true. In the Georgia of the early 2010s, the dream specifically involved removing Saakashvili and his associates from power, provided that a more competent government would take their place. This is what Georgia’s unofficial patron Bidzina Ivanishvili promised voters, and the presence of such an influential figure, who had no personal interest in a political career, helped Georgian society achieve a peaceful and democratic transfer of power. People believed that their lives would be better under Ivanishvili than under Saakashvili.

Indeed, the Georgian dream of a healthy socioeconomic life became a reality in the eight years from 2012 to 2020. The elimination of state racketeering of businesses played a key role in this, as did the resumption of trade contacts with Russia. For Georgia, these were the most peaceful years since the beginning of the 21st century, when people were able to go about their lives and earn a living without fearing for their safety and without sociopolitical upheavals. The United National Movement did not disappear from the political scene even after Mikheil Saakashvili fled abroad. This allowed the ruling Georgian Dream to easily secure a constitutional majority in the 2016 parliamentary election with the simple message “it is either us, or a return to the bloody times of the UNM.” And the party planned to use the same strategy in the 2020 and 2024 election campaigns and beyond. However, after the 2020 parliamentary vote, it became clear that Ivanishvili’s team now faced another political enemy, one that was far more formidable than Saakashvili’s cronies, and one that was attacking the Georgian state from an unexpected angle.

Lessons in Apoliticality

Andrey Petrov:
Georgia in a New World: Between Russia and the West

Georgian Dream’s focus on domestic political stability and the apolitical nature of its informal leader were reflected in its foreign policy agenda. The party took a page from the UNM’s book when it came to Georgia’s comprehensive integration into the European Union and NATO and shared its predecessor’s view that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were parts of Georgian territory. The only addition was the diplomatic principle of “negotiating the possible,” which led to the restoration of economic cooperation and regular air traffic with Russia. Since late 2012, Georgia has tried to stay out of political turmoil in the region and around the world, concentrating instead on foreign economic relations and domestic reforms required for EU accession. This explains why Tbilisi has not introduced a single sanction of its own against Russia since 2014 and sought to keep its involvement in Western restrictions to a minimum. This also explains why Georgia is well ahead not only of other post-Soviet candidates for European integration, but also of several current EU members, in terms of certain European standards.

For eight years, Georgian Dream believed that honest, open and effective implementation of European programs would be enough to be admitted to the EU. Georgian authorities have tried to distance themselves as much as possible from the fact that they governed a former Soviet republic on Russia’s border and conduct their foreign policy as if Georgia was just another small European country striving to earn the right to join the big family of the collective West through sincere hard work. This illusion was propped up by the signing of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement in 2014. And in late 2017, in response to criticism from the UNM, Georgian Dream amended the Constitution, committing the state to doing everything in its power to ensure Georgia’s accession to the EU and NATO.

The reality hit Georgian Dream on the first day of tallying the results of the 2020 parliamentary election, when the EU, whose demands for state-building the authorities had worked so diligently to meet, suddenly threw its support behind the UNM’s false claims of election fraud. For an independent observer, the legitimacy and even inevitability of Georgian Dream’s victory were beyond doubt: the UNM had not gained any more supporters in the quiet post-Saakashvili years, and, despite the crowded ballot, no real competition had emerged for the ruling party. The election was open to international observers and, in fact, was held under a less favorable system for Georgian Dream, where the number of single-mandate seats in parliament had been cut. The ruling party had yielded to the advice of its European partners, complicated the electoral process and still emerged victorious in the vote, which had been held in compliance with all the EU standards. Yet when the UNM went off on its usual rant about vote rigging, its sentiments were echoed in official statements not only from Brussels but also from Washington.

For a while, Georgian Dream fought to preserve the illusion that apolitical integration into the EU was possible, offering EU officials any required documents on the voting process and agreeing to a proposal by the EU’s Charles Michel to resolve the political crisis. However, there was no political crisis in Georgia—the opposition’s parliamentary boycott did not disrupt legislative work, and regular protest rallies were small in scale and were portrayed as something significant only in media outlets controlled by Saakashvili’s supporters. In June 2021, the Central Election Commission even conducted recounts at randomly selected polling stations. But this did nothing to change the reactions and rhetoric coming out of the EU, leading the ruling party to withdraw in July from Charles Michel’s plan, which the UNM never signed.

In the summer of 2021, it became patently obvious that:

• neither the transparency and legitimacy of the election, nor Georgia’s compliance with EU regulations were of any interest to anyone in Brussels;
• The EU never saw Georgia as “just another small European country”;
• EU officials wanted the UNM to return to power in Georgia.

When the EU accepted the democratic transfer of power in Georgia in 2012, it expected Georgian Dream, which had declared its commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration, to be a successor to the UNM in both letter and spirit of past EU–Georgia relations. In other words, the EU expected Georgia to be a puppet of the West in anti-Russian geopolitical projects. Brussels signed the Association Agreement with Tbilisi in June 2014 to give the new Georgian authorities an incentive to participate in the growing sanctions pressure on Russia, but instead Georgia opted for neutrality. As a result, discontent with Georgian Dream and with Bidzina Ivanishvili personally started mounting within European institutions. Formally, the European Commission praised the success of the reforms carried out in Georgia under EU programs, but it also noted that Tbilisi had refused time and again to act as an agent for the West in the South Caucasus, a region neighboring Russia. Georgian authorities were adamant that national interests dictated the principle of non-interference in the power struggles between the world’s major players, while Georgia’s Western partners, on the contrary, expected it to side with the EU and the United States.

Georgian Dream bowed to Western demands on issues where it did not see a threat to itself: phasing out of the majority vote in parliamentary elections, which was enshrined in the new Constitution; backing Saakashvili’s former Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili, who holds dual French–Georgian citizenship and has proven herself to be a real agent for the West at the helm of the Georgian state, in the 2018 presidential election. However, when it came to fundamental issues, Georgian authorities preferred not to make any unnecessary moves. As a result, when Brussels came to realize in 2020 that offering “carrots” was not enough to control Georgia from the outside, it turned to “sticks.” The “carrot” of EU candidate status remained, but now European officials paired it with blows of the “stick”—their proxies in the form of the UNM and Zourabichvili—in Georgian politics, fabricating a political crisis in the country and pointing the finger at Georgian Dream.

It was then that Georgia set a new global goal.

The Second Georgian Dream

The EU’s desire to bring back the UNM and Mikheil Saakashvili to power in Georgia, sidelining Georgian Dream and Bidzina Ivanishvili, left Georgian authorities with an ultimatum: fight or flight. “Flight” meant surrendering to European politicians who could not care less about the fate of the Georgian people and placing the country in the “geopolitical box” of Western puppets. The alternative was to fight for real sovereignty and, something that is equally important for a small state, respect for its sovereignty from its partners. The ruling party chose to fight. The decision was made easier by the growing trend towards regionalization in international relations by the early 2020s, Azerbaijan’s success in defending its territorial integrity despite political pressure from the West and the strengthening of Russia’s global standing after six years of sanctions. Ivanishvili would not have ceded power to Saakashvili’s supporters without a fight in any case, but the developments in neighboring countries, which revealed a general weakening of Western influence, boosted his resolve. Since July 2021, the name of the Georgian Dream party has taken on a second meaning—the dream of an independent foreign policy for Georgia.

The UNM had previously been a convenient political opponent for Georgian Dream (aggressive but weak, unyielding but hated by almost everyone), but this all changed after the European institutions manufactured the “political crisis” in the country, and the government came to see Saakashvili’s party as a real threat. The obvious anti-government efforts of President Salome Zourabichvili, who Georgian Dream had expected to harmonize the country’s political ties with the EU, but who turned out to be a de facto opposition activist, only strengthened the authorities’ conviction that European officials had declared a political war of extermination against them. The UNM and Zourabichvili were acting as Western proxies in this war, and they were the ones who had to be defeated to fulfill the second Georgian dream: Ivanishvili’s team believed that purging Georgia’s government agencies of foreign agents would prevent the West from pushing harmful policies in the country and force it to rebuild relations with Tbilisi on an equitable basis.

This approach to fighting for the sovereignty of foreign policy, of course, continued to reflect the apolitical nature of Georgia’s unofficial patron, his tendency to ignore global geopolitical motives in international relations and engage with everyone with the principle “just business, nothing political” in mind. After all, legal business implies equality between partners and mutual obligations, and Ivanishvili consistently applied this model to politics and demanded that Georgia’s European partners stop interfering in the country’s domestic affairs and take an unbiased look at its progress toward EU membership. This approach remains part of Georgian policy today: even now, when the thirst for geopolitical domination over the world had eclipsed any other motivation in the eyes of the West, Tbilisi is calling on Brussels and Washington to come to their senses, stop funding the anti-government activities of the opposition and radically revise their approaches to improve relations with Georgia.

The West sees things very differently: Georgia is a small country that has never been viewed by those seeking world hegemony as a partner, only as a servant. The EU does not need a new member on the other side of the Black Sea. What it needs is an outpost on Russia’s border, which respects the “capital–colony” hierarchy without question and at a low cost, in exchange for fulfilling the classic dream of many post-Soviet states in the 1990s and 2000s of joining the European family. Any other dream that Georgia may have is seen by Brussels and Washington as a colonial rebellion. The West cannot conceive of a situation where such a rebellion is not organized from the outside, much like the “color revolutions” they themselves have staged in countries with weakened statehood, including Georgia in November 2003. In this narrative, there can only be one orchestrator, whom they consider strong enough and invested in de-Westernizing Georgia—Russia. The absence of diplomatic relations and the diametrically opposed positions of Moscow and Tbilisi on Abkhazia and South Ossetia hold no weight in the West’s calculations—all it sees is the struggle between major powers for colonies.

The First Battle for the Second Georgian Dream

Timofey Bordachev:
Has this little country cracked the code of post-Soviet politics?

Amid the foreign policy contradictions described above—where Georgia wants the West to respect its sovereignty, and the West wants to keep its vassal in line—Tbilisi came to a turning point in 2022. February 24 turned out to be a moment of truth for Georgia too, as the EU and the U.S. demanded that it, like all other partners, join the sanctions war with Russia straight away (something that Ivanishvili had been avoiding until that point). Fortunately for Georgia, its government no longer faced the “fight or flight” dilemma, as the decision had been taken six months prior, when Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili made it clear upon returning to office that Tbilisi would not impose its own sanctions against Russia, the Russian–Georgian border would remain open, Russians would continue visiting the country visa-free, and Georgian businesses would continue exporting goods to the Russian market. And there would be no “second front,” which Kiev desired: Georgia acts in line with its national interests, which means keeping things quiet and peaceful with Russia, increasing bilateral trade and no risk of conflict.

The West responded by coming up with a list of 12 conditions that Georgia needs to meet before it can be granted EU candidate status, formulated in such a way that some of them were simply impossible for Georgian Dream to fulfill (especially the requirement to depolarize the political landscape under the Charles Michel plan, as it was not the ruling party, but the UNM, that was driving this “polarization” on the instructions of European officials). Other conditions could be considered unfulfilled indefinitely, no matter how much the Georgian government might try. Continuing judicial reforms, strengthening the fight against organized crime and corruption, “stronger efforts” to ensure freedom of speech in the media and enhancing gender equality—these and other priorities had no specific target, meaning there was no point at which they could be considered achieved. The most telling condition was “de-oligarchization,” which was understood by both the document’s authors and Georgian authorities as a veiled demand to remove Bidzina Ivanishvili from his informal leadership of the country.

The 12 conditions were both a punishment for Georgia and an ultimatum: submit to our will, or we will block your path to EU membership. The punitive nature of the document became particularly evident when comparing how Brussels was handling Moldova’s candidate status. After the start of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, Chisinau announced that it would not impose sanctions against Moscow, as they would cause serious damage to Moldova, while Russia would barely feel anything—using the same arguments and the same words as Georgia. However, Moldova faced absolutely no ramifications, because the country was behaving like a model post-Soviet colony of the West under President Maia Sandu. Moldova was far behind Georgia in all aspects of EU integration programs, including the 12 conditions. Yet the EU decided to grant candidate status to Moldova, along with Ukraine, where, instead of “de-oligarchization,” the fight against corruption and ensuring freedom of speech in the media, the opposite processes were taking place. The message to Georgia was clear: the Western “carrot” is offered not for excellence in internal governance, but for obedience to external directives.

Without abandoning its vision of international relations, the Georgian government committed to fulfilling the 12 conditions. But it also started to put its own house in order, which led to the drafting of two bills on foreign agents in late 2022 and early 2023. The purpose of the new legislation was to expose the extent of foreign interference in Georgian affairs through the financing of opposition media and NGOs, and to put all these foreign agents into a single registry. The authorities expected a backlash from the West, knowing that the law would uncover Western-led antidemocratic activities in the country. However, they hoped that referencing a similar U.S. law—the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)—and toning down the provisions as much as possible would be enough to assuage their partners. This once again demonstrated that Ivanishvili’s team underestimated the West’s disregard for international law or any norms, for that matter, when their own interests are on the line.

The first political campaign against the law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” was launched in the winter and spring of 2023, when the UNM organized riots outside government offices in Tbilisi, and Western politicians criticized Georgian Dream for attempting to pass the bill. While its text largely copied that of FARA, it was still branded as “pro-Russian.” Western criticism of the Georgian government’s actions made no sense: it was based on the claim that financial transparency in the media and NGOs undermines democracy in Georgia, even though it forms the bedrock of democracy in the West. On the whole, Western institutions did not elaborate on their demands, avoided details and rejected dialogue with Tbilisi, merely repeating: “Do not pass this bill!” Western foreign agents in the form of the United Movement Party and President Salome Zourabichvili did the same inside the country.

Then, a year and a half ago, Georgian Dream agreed to back down. As it became clear in the fall of 2023, the sides had struck a political deal: the ruling party would not expose the activities of the EU and the U.S., allowing them to continue to turn the public against the legally elected government, and in return Brussels would grant EU candidate status to Georgia. This much was clear from how the rhetoric of European officials regarding the 12 conditions changed. Initially, they said that Georgia’s path to European integration hinged on fulfilling the conditions, but later they came to acknowledge that some progress had been made and that candidacy could be granted on the understanding that the document would be fully implemented in the future. On December 14, Georgia finally became a candidate to join the EU—the first “carrot” from the West after three years of “stick.” Yet Ivanishvili’s team was no longer interested in these rewards.

Two days earlier, on December 12, the European Commission adopted a Europe-wide law on foreign agents titled the “Defence of Democracy” package, and Tbilisi saw this as an opportunity to reintroduce its law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” to parliament, which it duly did in early 2024, citing the need to harmonize Georgian legislation with EU norms. The West, which was likely caught off guard by this turn of events after seemingly reining in Georgian Dream, responded by repeating the previous year’s campaign, complete with the same slogans, but without much rhyme or reason. The UNM again mobilized its supporters to protest on the streets, and Salome Zourabichvili again spoke out against the government’s actions. It soon became clear that Ivanishvili’s team was determined to see the process through to the end this time, so members of NGOs funded by the U.S. and EU joined the opposition protests. This kicked off a process of self-disclosure among Western-affiliated agents in Georgia, where experts, political analysts and regional specialists openly told the media that they were set to lose their jobs because of the law on foreign agents, as they were on the payroll in Western structures.

However, the protests were limited to these two groups—the Saakashvili opposition and NGO employees—as the bill did not affect the population in any way. The West sought to sway ordinary Georgian citizens by threatening to take back all European “carrots,” even going so far as to suggest scrapping the visa-free regime. This ultimately forced the population into the same choice as their government: either to bow to the blackmail of Western politicians or to allow the democratically elected parliament to protect the country’s sovereignty. Very few were willing to surrender, and opposition protests drastically decreased after the law passed its third reading. The West redirected its proxies in the country to prepare for the parliamentary election on October 26 and for post-election protest actions. The authorities drew their own conclusions: the first battle was won, the rule of law prevailed, Georgia can now pursue a sovereign policy despite the pressure it faces and has tightened its grip on internal enemies.

The Final Battle for the Second Georgian Dream

Sergey Markedonov:
The Caucasus: Between East and West

Bidzina Ivanishvili, who formally returned to Georgian politics on December 30, 2023, as the honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, significantly toughened his rhetoric this past summer and started describing the upcoming parliamentary election as a decisive battle between good and evil in Georgia, with the country’s future hanging in the balance: a victory for the UNM would spell doom for Georgia, while a win for the ruling party would save it. Ivanishvili set the goal for his allies to replicate this October the parliamentary election results of 2016, where Georgian Dream won a constitutional majority, which gave the party freedom to pass legislation, including amending the basic law at its own discretion. This victory would enable the government to get rid of the UNM for good by declaring it unconstitutional, thereby eliminating Western proxies on Georgian soil and confronting the EU and the U.S. with an accomplished fact: from now on, they will engage with Georgia only through official channels—exclusively with the legally elected parliament and the government appointed by it (starting this year, the president will be appointed by an electoral college consisting of lawmakers and regional representatives, and Georgian Dream will not back any pro-Western candidates).

This means that the “fight or flight” ultimatum now looms large over the UNM too. Neither the party itself nor the opposition coalition it is busy putting together has a chance of winning the parliamentary election, but there remains a theoretical chance of preventing Georgian Dream from securing a constitutional majority. To do this, the opposition needs to win at least 38 seats in parliament. If around 15% of the vote is split among those parties that fail to pass the 5% threshold, the ruling party will need some 60% of the vote for a constitutional majority. In this case, the large opposition coalitions will need to collectively win over 20% of the vote to have a say in parliament (and for the UNM to continue to exist). This is why Saakashvili’s forces are now actively working to build larger coalitions, as a fragmented electorate hurts the opposition in general. This is also why the West is issuing more and more threats every day about breaking off ties with Georgia, trying to scare the most impressionable Georgian citizens into voting against Georgian Dream on October 26. Neither Brussels nor Washington wants the millions of euros and dollars spent on bribing Georgian politicians to go to waste.

The South Ossetian Turn

Georgian Dream recently presented a new slogan aimed at winning over the electorate, with Bidzina Ivanishvili promising that once the election is over, the Georgian leadership will set about punishing those responsible for the Five-Day War of 2008, “find the strength to apologize” to the people of South Ossetia for provoking hostilities, and do everything to ensure that the years-long confrontation ends with “historic mutual forgiveness and reconciliation.” At first glance, the initiative seems like a continuation of the campaign against Saakashvili: Ivanishvili seeks to completely erase Saakashvili’s political legacy, and if the country is emerging from the under the thumb of the West, why not put the results of the Five-Day War on the chopping block too? The pledge to apologize “to all the Ossetian brothers and sisters” carries a powerful emotional charge, suggesting that it stems from a genuine desire of Georgian authorities to mend ties with the people of South Ossetia.

However, the timing of these remarks—just before the election, where Georgian Dream is striving for a parliamentary majority—and the history of South Ossetia itself leave little doubt that Ivanishvili is simply advancing the election campaign of the ruling party. Even before 2008, South Ossetia was not under Georgian control and had been fighting for independence from Tbilisi since the late Soviet era. It matters little whether the ruling party wants to roll back contacts with Tskhinval to how they were in July 2008, or even October 2003 (before Mikheil Saakashvili came to power through the Revolution of Roses), as this will not change the fact that South Ossetians will continue to defend their sovereignty. There are no obvious incentives that Tbilisi could offer to compel Tskhinval to join Georgia. Therefore, outside observers should interpret the statements of the Georgian leadership as an effort to win over more voters by contrasting its peace-seeking stance with the aggressive UNM and nurturing public hopes for a peaceful resolution of the South Ossetia issue.

The Georgian leadership has indirectly confirmed that its approach to the South Ossetia issue is primarily driven by populism. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at the UN General Assembly that Moscow is prepared to facilitate the normalization of Georgia’s relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which would include non-aggression agreements—Russia, therefore, views Ivanishvili’s initiative as reconciliation between independent states, not between conflicting peoples within a single country, which is Tbilisi’s stance. It is important that the Georgian leader only mentioned South Ossetia in his speech, while Lavrov proposed extending the peace process to Abkhazia, with which Georgia had been in conflict long before the 2008 war. The top Russian diplomat also emphasized that the issue is not about dismantling Saakashvili’s legacy, but about Georgian authorities accepting the realities that developed without Saakashvili’s participation. And how did Georgian Dream react to this? One of its most prominent members, Mayor of Tbilisi Kakha Kaladze, welcomed Moscow’s willingness to help, but called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a starting point.

Russian troops do not hinder Georgia’s reconciliation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, either at the level of peoples, as Tbilisi claims, or at the level of states, as Moscow suggests. Their presence guarantees the protection of Sukhum and Tskhinval from any renewed attempts by Georgian authorities to take control over these territories by force, as had been the case even before 2008. The call for the withdrawal of Russian troops has only two meanings: Georgia, under the guise of peaceful dialogue, wants to create conditions to deprive Abkhazia and South Ossetia of their statehood and incorporate them into its territory; or this is merely pre-election rhetoric meant to demonstrate to voters that Georgian Dream is strong enough to make such demands of Russia and ambitious enough to tackle a problem that the governments of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikheil Saakashvili had failed to solve.

So there is no reason to expect a breakthrough in the South Ossetia issue any time soon. However, the days leading up to the election promise to be the most intense yet. Georgian Dream will try to drive Western proxies out of Georgia, while the proxies themselves will simply try to survive, and right now the ruling party appears to have the upper hand. The second Georgian dream is about to come true.

The Russian Postscript

Russian sympathies here, as elsewhere, lie with those political forces that defend the sovereignty of their state and advocate equality in foreign policy contacts based on international law. In the West, it has now become common to label the pursuit of sovereignty of states and healthy legal relations between them without double standards as “pro-Russianness.” It is thus no surprise that Georgian Dream is called a “pro-Russian” and even “pro-Kremlin” party by its opponents. For them, there is no such thing as sovereignty; they only recognize vassalage. There is not the slightest hint of real pro-Russian sentiment in what Bidzina Ivanishvili’s team is doing. It is defending and cleansing Georgia of anti-state forces in accordance with the country’s national interests (and in part due to disillusionment with Euro-Atlantic relations), and Russia welcomes this because it is exactly what any independent state should do.