The Ukrainian Crisis and Migration

The current crisis in Ukraine is expected to cause only a slight, short-term rise in “stress” immigration into Russia. However, in the longer term, the level of immigration from Ukraine to Russia is expected to fall, mostly due to Russia’s tarnished image, particularly as perceived in Western Ukraine, and a broader range of legitimate opportunities for the Ukrainians to move to countries in the developed Western world.

The current crisis in Ukraine is expected to cause only a slight, short-term rise in “stress” immigration into Russia. However, in the longer term, the level of immigration from Ukraine to Russia is expected to fall, mostly due to Russia’s tarnished image, particularly as perceived in Western Ukraine, and a broader range of legitimate opportunities for the Ukrainians to move to countries in the developed Western world.

Ever since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has been by far the most important focal point for Ukrainian immigration as well as being the country that boasted the world’s largest Ukrainian diaspora. However, in recent years there has been a clear downward pattern in the numbers of Ukrainians in Russia’s population. Census data shows that over the years 1989 and 2002 the number of ethnic Ukrainians in Russia dropped from 4 million to 3 million, and by 2010, it fell further to 2 million. According to some recent studies of Ukrainian migration, Russia has lost some of its attraction both as a place of permanent settlement and for seasonal labor: since 2010, Western countries have received more migrants than Russia from Ukraine. The most popular destinations for resettlement migration now include the United States, Canada, Germany and Israel, with Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Spain and Portugal preferred for temporary employment.

Russia’s diminished attraction is largely related to shortcomings in its migration legislation. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian workers have not been successful in legalizing and consolidating their status in Russia, despite many years of living and working in the country. According to Russia’s Federal Migration Service (FMS), in 2013, fewer than 200,000 of the one million Ukrainian workers in Russia had an official work permit. Meanwhile, the Western attraction factor has been growing, particularly with the EU borders moving east as a result of successive rounds of expansion in 2004 and 2007. While temporary labor migration to the EU is also often informal, it has the advantage of higher wages and better working conditions than are on offer in Russia.

Forced and Resettlement Migration

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At the height of the current Ukrainian crisis Russian media ran stories alleging that there were thousands of refugees streaming in across the border from Ukraine. However, in March 2014, FMS officials contested these allegations, noting that the figures given referred to labor migration, not to forced migration, as had been claimed. There is currently no reason to expect any inflow of refugees from Ukraine in the absence of prolonged armed clashes or serious security threats anywhere inside the country.

The accession to Russia of Crimea, with its 2 million residents, will hardly have a serious impact on the level of migration from that region to other parts of Russia. The Russian Government has already announced its plans for major investment to the region, creating new jobs and improving living standards for the local population. In addition, with their newly acquired Russian citizenship, Crimean residents are now entitled to the same social and other benefits as other Russian nationals, without having to move anywhere.

In the short term, resettlement migration figures may rise due to amendments to Russia’s law on Russian nationality: the relevant draft law was approved by the State Duma in its second reading on April 4, 2014. This draft law ushers in a simplified naturalization procedure for people who are recognized as Russian speakers and have resided permanently in Russia (or those whose ancestors resided in the Russian empire or in the Soviet Union). With this, thousands of Ukrainians, who in reality have been living in Russia for some time, could legalize or consolidate their status.

It is however unlikely that changes to Russian law of this order will stimulate an inflow of re-settlers. First, all those who wanted to come to live in Russia have had the opportunity so to do over the past two decades, irrespective of legislative hindrances. Secondly, even with a large Russian-speaking diaspora, Ukraine’s migration potential is believed by many observers to be very low. Respected demographer, L. Rybakovsky, rates it close to zero, given that in 1989–2007 Ukraine lost just 3.5 percent of its Russian population to Russia. Back in 2000, migration analyst V. Mukomel put the migration potential at no more than 550,000 people. Therefore, speculation whipped up by mass media that during the current crisis Russia could attract between 2 and 7 million migrants from Ukraine is completely unfounded.

Labor Migration

In the longer term, the current crisis in Ukraine may result in an even more pronounced shift in the pattern of Ukrainian migration flow from eastward to westward.

On the one hand, the inevitable polarization and deterioration of the two conflicting parties’ mutual perceptions may force Ukrainian migrants to abandon Russia, for ideological reasons, in favor of other destinations. It may be too early to speculate about how Russia’s image has changed for the Ukrainian population, because polls on this issue have yet to be conducted. However, available data seems to suggest that Ukrainians and Russians have moved far apart in their assessment of the political crisis. For instance, Viktor Yanukovich is blamed for the crisis by 68 percent of West Ukrainian residents, compared to just 20 percent of Ukrainians in the east of Ukraine and 17 percent of Russians. The West is believed by 57 percent of East Ukrainian residents to have played an instrumental role in recent developments and by 36 percent of Russians, but only 5 percent of Western Ukrainians. At the same time, a survey held on the eve of the referendum on Crimea’s independence showed that the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian population opposed any potential intervention by Russian troops in their country (83 percent), including 93 percent in Ukraine’s western and central regions (1, 2).

REUTERS / Shamil Zhumatov
Simferopol, March, 2014

Even if we assume that residents of eastern regions have not changed their views on Russia or their migration intentions as a result of the crisis, it is important to remember that the eastern regions’ migration potential is significantly lower than that of Ukraine’s western regions, which are mostly highly critical of Russia’s actions. Ukraine has been suffering from some rather severe demographic trends: since independence the republic has seen its population shrink from 52 million to 45.5 million, and this effect was noticeably stronger in eastern regions.

It is also possible that the West may offer Ukrainians more opportunities for legitimate resettlement, thus reversing some of the eastward flows. Since 2008 Ukraine and the EU have been negotiating a more liberal visa regime and an EU-Ukraine Action Plan for visa regime liberalization was announced in 2010. The Action Plan envisaged measures in four areas: more secure documents thanks to biometrics; better border and migration controls; fighting corruption and money laundering; foreign relations; and an improved human rights record.

The 2013 European Commission report noted that Ukraine had largely honored its obligations, having brought its migration laws into compliance with European and international standards. The key obstacles to accepting this legislative work as complete included gaps in anti-corruption legislation, the absence of provisions to regulate finger-printing for biometric documents, and interim protection and medical assistance to refugees. Hardly fundamental, these obstacles could be overcome in the immediate future.

Now that North America and Europe have demonstrated their readiness to support the change of government in Ukraine and its western integration choices, the West may be expected to intensify their cooperation and lower migration barriers.

In practice, this may result in the following.

First, there will be more migration opportunities open to certain classes of Ukrainian professionals, researchers, entrepreneurs, students, etc. Traditionally, in Western countries, any support for this kind of mobility from developing countries has been perceived as an efficient “soft power” tool, capable not only of strengthening mutually advantageous contacts and knowledge exchange, but also of socializing “leaders” – the most active and entrepreneurial members of professions – in the spirit of Western values.

Secondly, some EU countries could raise their labor quotas for temporary Ukrainian workers, provided, of course, that Ukrainian authorities cooperate better on the readmission of illegal migrants and document security. Increased EU financial and technical assistance would help improve border and migration controls in Ukraine and therefore mitigate the risk that migrants will stay on in the EU or that the newly acquired opportunities will be abused.

Implications for Russia

eurasianinfoleague.com
International Conference "Russian-Ukrainian
relations: current status and prospects".
Moscow, 2013

The 2012 Russian Migration Policy document through 2025 states that Russia views migration as an essential resource for “stabilizing and increasing its population” as well as a source of high-qualified labor resources. It can hardly be overstated that Ukraine is the best choice for addressing both these objectives set out in Russian migration policy.

As certain studies suggest, Ukrainian migrants are predominantly 20 to 49 years old, i.e. they belong to the most economically productive age groups. Most labor migrants have technical vocational training or have completed secondary education, which is in high demand on the Russian labor market. Men are employed largely in the construction and transport sectors, while women find employment in retail trade and consumer services.

Besides, Ukrainians are one of the most closely integrated groups in Russian society, causing least irritation or social tension. This conclusion has been borne out by Levada Center surveys carried out in 2013: only 5 percent of people interviewed wanted to see Ukrainian migration restricted, compared to 54 percent and 45 percent of those arguing in favor of limiting resettlement of “residents from the Caucasus” or “settlers from the former Central Asian republics of the USSR,” respectively.

In view of the above, one may argue that dwindling Ukrainian migration will have a negative effect on the qualitative pattern of migration flows in Russia and on its labor market. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that Russia effectively has no alternative sources of immigration. As studies show, the Russian labor market is not globally attractive. The most competitive part of it is the narrow segment of top managers who draw salaries substantially higher than in Western countries. Professions that act as the strongest attraction in the West for highly qualified migrants, such as researchers, doctors, teachers, engineers or IT specialists, are unattractive to foreigners in Russia because of the low salaries or the language barrier.

How does the crisis affect migration from other CIS countries?

During a conference in June 2013 in Moscow, entitled “Russian-Ukrainian relations: reality and prospects,” FMS head Konstantin Romodanovsky announced that out of 1,500,000 Ukrainian migrants in Russia, 700,000 are candidates for expulsion because of their illegal status. This statement, made when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich was still choosing between EU association and integration with Russia, served as a reminder to Russia’s Ukrainian counterparts that Russia had powerful leverage over the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens.

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If Russia’s relations with CIS countries are any indicator, the likelihood of Russia’s using that leverage is present and may be even higher in future, with growing tensions in relations with Ukraine. Russia has played this migration card once, as, for instance, in its conflict with Georgia, when it resorted to limited campaigns expelling Georgian migrants. The diplomatic scandal following the arrest of Russian pilots in Tajikistan in 2011 was punctuated by campaigns aimed at identifying and deporting illegal Tajik migrants. The mass media was also mobilized, with numerous reports speculating about the high level of crime and disease incidence among migrants, in particular those from Tajikistan. This is particularly striking since not long after that, in 2012, Russia was already offering to simplify rules for Tajik migrants in response to Tajikistan’s agreement to continue to allow the Russian military base to remain on its territory. On April 2, 2014, Russia’s president signed the Law On the Ratification of the Protocol Amending the Russia-Tajikistan Agreement on Labor and Protection of Citizens’ Rights.

That Russia is prepared to play the migration card to boost its foreign policy interests cannot but cause concern among migrants themselves, as well as among governments in CIS countries where the economy relies, to varying extents, on remittances from migrants. The position of CIS nationals in Russia is formally very vulnerable. While it is commonly accepted that migrants account for an average of one tenth of the labor force in Russia, or 7 million people (including informal employment), the annual quotas that allow migrants to be employed legally barely cover one third of that number. Millions of people who earn their wages working hard and often in poor conditions, are therefore “candidates for expulsion,” and, if expelled, face a 10-year ban on entering Russia.

Despite the growing concern over Russia’s actions, the current crisis is unlikely to cause much of a change in migration patterns across CIS countries. Contrary to Ukraine, most countries in the region simply have no other alternative. No other country can offer such opportunities to CIS migrants as can Russia, with its vast territory and capacious labor market, open borders and privileges for the entry and employment. No attempts at diversifying the export of the labor force at government level or lobbying for more liberal migration rules elsewhere can change migration opportunities in such a way as to weaken Russia’s position as a labor migration destination.

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The anticipated decline in Ukrainian migration as a result of worsening bilateral relations offers a good chance to think harder about Russia’s long-term strategies on migration and ways of spreading its influence more broadly across the entire CIS.

Migrant communities can be an efficient “soft power” tool; helping to disseminate the host society’s values and culture and to promote contact and stronger cooperation between countries. But to ensure this asset works, the destination country must, at best, take good care of migrants, and, at least, offer them equal, non-discriminatory living and working conditions, respect their human dignity and afford them protection should their rights be violated. What we see in Russia today is quite the reverse, given the extent of illegal migration, corruption, and abuses against job-seeking migrants.

The “hard application” of “soft power” to exert direct pressure on governments in migrants’ countries of origin, threatening them with deportation or visa regimes, risks rescinding all of the benefits of soft power and migration. What might seem a convenient and relatively simple lever of influence in the short term will longer-term undermine trust towards Russia and will only help divert migration flows to other countries whose borders are becoming increasingly more transparent.