The notorious "German Question" in the European political process had taken many different forms, but it always, actually, boils down to one thing: “Where does Germany end?”
In 1990 it was resolved.
As a result of the reunification of East and West Germany the political system called “Socialism in GDR Colors” ceased to exist.
The notorious "German Question" in the European political process had taken many different forms, but it always, actually, boils down to one thing: “Where does Germany end?” In 1990 it was resolved. As a result of the reunification of East and West Germany the political system called “Socialism in GDR Colors” ceased to exist.
Games of the titans: strategies and the driving force of German unification
In 1990 an event of global scale took place in Europe changing both its political map, the pan-European security system and the situation in the European Union. It was the unification of Germany, a recent and extremely important event, and what is of particular interest, almost entirely unforeseeable. Just on the eve of the reunification none of the participants of the process had any definite idea about the timing of German unification and yet this process suddenly and unexpectedly for all began to gather momentum. The new Germany was “built” by conscious effort without military conflicts – something that would have been simply inconceivable in Europe of the past. Many prominent politicians of the time were involved in this process - full of intrigue, swings and turns.
It would seem that this was the case when universal admiration -- of the public and politicians (at least “western”) – could have been easily predicted. However, for the politicians it caused more concern than delight. An ecstatic feeling, “a moment of infinite joy,” certainly prevailed on the day the Berlin Wall fell, but it quickly gave way to anxiety: what would happen with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact? What would be the relations between Western Europe and the Soviet Union? Most European countries were against such a sudden reunification of Germany, not so much because of the fear of revival of German hegemony in Europe but because of the unpredictable consequences of upsetting the European postwar order and security system.
What was the origin of the first impulse which gave real momentum to the process of reunification? Studies based on the archive documents [1] testify to the fact that the U.S. government under the leadership of George W. Bush was the first to take the course aimed at developing a new European strategy with a re-united Germany as a pivotal point. So, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who is thought by many German researchers and the general public to be the main architect of reunification of the two Germanys, can claim only the second place.
There is one more theory, this one widely spread in Russia: Mikhail Gorbachev, “granted” freedom to East Germans, and free choice (meaning unification) to all Germans. It is believed that it was Gorbachev who was the creator of this success story: as “a master of tactics”, he was not frightened by the threats of Soviet generals who were unequivocally opposed to unification, and carried out the project almost single-handedly. But what was it like in reality? No, Gorbachev did not resort to military intervention, but he did not as well have any real understanding of the situation in the GDR (and other Warsaw Pact countries) in the late1980s, or a consistent political strategy for unification. The CPSU Secretary General rather responded to the developments than planned several moves ahead, with many of his plans failing in the face of reality and a different logic of the events development. Gorbachev was a procrastinator: at a time when elections were being prepared in unified Germany he still hoped for a “sovereign GDR” and was angry with Chancellor Kohl for his “ten-point plan” [2]. Gorbachev was counting on protracted talks which would be beneficial for the Soviet Union, but the process went so fast that he could not even “sell” the consent of the Soviet side with profit for the USSR.
Despite the fact that the unification project should obviously be recognized as politically sound, the position of Chancellor Kohl during the process was subjected to harsh criticism. To illustrate, Kohl was criticized for “Pan-Germanism”; Margaret Thatcher fiercely denounced his "great-power ambitions" [3], and Eduard Shevardnadze went even as far as to compare the Chancellor of Germany to Hitler. Kohl’s ambitions manifested themselves, in particular, in his consistent support of the idea of the spread of the institutional system of Federal Germany onto the territory of the GDR -- as opposed to the project of confederation of the two Germanys or the “contractual community” treaty (the idea of Hans Modrow and Gorbachev). The latter idea came clearly too late: by then the GDR leadership could not mobilize anyone under its banner; the legitimacy of the government had virtually fallen to a zero.
Were the expectation justified?
The euphoria Germans felt in the first days of unification was short-lived: in reality the process turned out to be extremely difficult, painful and expensive. With the unification of Germany, the pressure on the German welfare state sharply increased. As a result of the privatization of state-owned enterprises in East Germany 40% of jobs were lost. The financial burden of such large-scale unemployment, the cost of privatization and modernization of infrastructure and the extension of the basic social security system to the east of the country proved to be heavy: the annual cost of reunification amounted to 4-6% of the GDP of the former Federal Republic of Germany [4].
During the four years (1990-1994) the Kohl’s government was unable to cope with the unification, though Christian Democrats retained power after the 1994 elections: the credibility of the government had not yet been exhausted. However, the results of the elections in 1998 brought to power the so-called “red-green” coalition (SPD and the “Alliance 90/The Greens”), with Social Democrat Gerhard Schroeder elected Chancellor. It can be argued that mistakes made in the process of reunification were the most significant causes of the defeat of the CDU / CSU coalition in the elections to the Bundestag.
One of the most complex problems that in principle could not be resolved in the short term was the problem of creating an all-German identity. The Berlin Wall had been triumphantly destroyed, but the "wall in the heads" was still there, perhaps becoming even stronger; “fusion” of ossis and vessis (eastern and western Germans) into a single political and cultural community had not yet taken place; and the value systems of the West and East Germans were converging slowly and painfully. In particular, it was the unresolved economic and cultural problems of reunification that might have lain at the root of the emergence and growing popularity of the Left Party in Germany -- the successor to the Party of Democratic Socialism which initially represented the interests of the citizens of the east of the country. One example was restructuring -- the alignment of economic development levels of old and new federal lands -- which proved to be an extremely onerous task. All new lands (including the former East Berlin) were among the original recipients of financial tranches through the mechanisms of financial equalization. And since not much has changed in this area over the last twenty years, the irritation of the “old” Federal donor lands with the “new” dependent lands is only growing stronger.
What is the situation today?
In fact, today the term “East Germany” in the official rhetoric of the German state does not exist: five full-fledged federal lands have been created on these territories. However, major problems of the reunification have not yet been fully resolved. The officially eliminated border between the two countries has become a sort of “a fold on the ground,” while its official abolition does not mean that it has been removed from the consciousness of the Germans.
Nevertheless, the reunification of the two Germanys cannot be called a failure or a politically unsound project. Widely spread disappointment can largely be attributed to initially erroneous, inflated expectations that the project would be realized at one go, on the wave of general enthusiasm. It was not to be. What is needed for the two states to merge it is not only a very thoroughly thought-over policy which would prevent the radicalization of moods but a natural change of generations, when the existence of the GDR will cease to be a living memory in the minds of most of the population, but will just become a fact of history.
1. See: Alexandr fon Plato. Obedinenie Germanii - borba za Evropu. M. ROSSPEN, 2007.
2. Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung.Informationen aus Bonn. November /Dezember, 1989.
3. Clark A. Diaries. L.1994.
4. Swank D. Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. p.173.
